Where to now for the Islamic State?

The Islamic State leadership must be scratching their collective heads. How could the momentum achieved through a blitzkrieg-like march in June and July of 2013 have been so severely dented?

Since their June campaign and rout of the northern Iraq military divisions and its rivals in north eastern Syria, IS has made few strategic gains against its opponents. In northern Iraq, an ill-considered offensive into Kurd territory in August opened a fresh front against the group in what may well be a turning point in its longer term fortunes. Up until IS fired the first shot, the Kurds were more than content with waiting for IS to make a move. They had retaken disputed territory and where in position to defend it. To make matters worse for IS, their Kurd adventure sparked Western reaction and the US initiated air strikes against the group to halt its march on Arbil, the capital of the Kurd autonomous region in the north. Since then, the air war has expanded and now includes numerous western and, crucially, Sunni Arab regional states. The involvement of the latter has given some legitimacy to the foreign action and dulled the expected regional condemnation of another Western-led battle in Arab territory.

In Syria, the town of Kobane, largely unknown up until recently, has become a widely known symbol of resistance against IS aggression. Outbumbered and outgunned, local Kurd fighters initially stalled an IS advance in the town before Kurd volunteers from Turkey and Iraq poured in to bolster the defences and push back IS. Again, foreign air strikes proved the difference as IS armoured and artillery units were forced to withdraw from the arena, mirroring similar reaction across Iraq and Syria in recent months. In Deir ez Zor, the capital of the namesake governorate, IS has also struggled to remove the last vestiges of the Syrian regime. Stern resistance has been put up by elite Republican guard forces. Together with Kobane, hundreds of IS fighters have been killed and many more wounded in a series of assaults in these two locations.

So where to from here? IS have expanded as far as they can go, it seems. Their early success rested on a platform which had been created since 2012 following the withdrawal of the US forces. Mosul was its focus and it was in this city where it slowly eroded the capability of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). This effect, together with the mismanagement and poor training and discipline of the Iraqi army and some local support from Sunni tribes provided the base for its almost supernatural early advances. Since then the ISF have begun to reorganise and have received additional support from thousands of Shiite militiamen in the south, Iranian military forces and Western advisers. The IS advance south from Mosul in June and July also met stiff resistance from more hardy ISF forces, which remain largely intact. In Iraq, at least, a stale mate has developed where neither force has the capability to make major gains against the other. Where gains are made, such as in Baiji recently, these have proven difficult to maintain and have been swiftly overturned. The sense is, however, that with international backing and increasing number of men and material that the ISF and its new allies, the Kurds, have the upper hand and, barring any further massive blunders, are likely to slowly turn the tide against IS in Iraq. The process will be lengthy though and is unlikely to end in 2015.

In Syria, IS are in a marginally better position. For the most part, Raqqa, Deir ez Zor, northern Aleppo and southern Al-Hasakah governorates are under their control. Yet how much of this is due to their opponents distraction with other conflicts is up for debate. The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and its allies are firmly set on eliminating rebels near the capital, containing them in Daraa and Quneitra in the far south and recapturing Aleppo. Indeed, a large proportion of its resources have been dedicated to the Aleppo front. Should fighting in Aleppo cease, either due to a ceasefire or SAA victory, the regime will likely seek to consolidate in Hama and Homs before moving against IS. Should they do so, there may be some complications as US-led air strikes are largely focused on IS areas; however, with both these strikes and the SAA attention shifted, IS may become increasingly isolated. It could also fracture as local tribes seek to re-orientate allegiances towards the stronger force.

For IS planners and its senior leadership the early successes have provided them with a platform; however, this platform is now largely one aimed at consolidation and defence. As it becomes focused on statehood it will find it difficult to maintain territory in the face of overwhelming opposition and battlefield deficiencies. It has no air force and it has no way to effectively repel US-led strikes. It is also outnumbered by its opponents and has no regional allies strong enough to prove the difference in the war. Normal actors would seek negotiation at this point; however, given its ideology and recent beheadings, murders, mass kidnappings and threats, talks are unlikely, at least not on an official level. There may be some understandings but at present momentum has shifted and while it may take some time, the sense is, is that the Islamic State is doomed to conflict for the remainder of its days.

Syria: The importance of Deir ez Zor

The little known eastern Syrian city of Deir ez Zor may seem unassuming and unimportant to the casual international observer when considering the current battles raging around Damascus, Baghdad and Kobane. However, it is this battle ground which is crucial to the outcome of the war in Syria and, possibly, Iraq.

In June 2014, Islamic State (IS) militants overran large parts of northern Iraq and north eastern Syria in a blitzkrieg that netted the group large swathes of territory, loot and new recruits. Its rebel opponents and local government forces were shattered as its fast paced battalions raced from city to city. The pace of the assault and the zeal of its fighting components led the majority of its enemies to withdraw to more secure areas.

In north eastern Syria, IS sought to advance along the breadth of the Euphrates River. It achieved 90% of its mission with the capture of numerous towns between Abu Kamal and its primary Syrian stronghold of Raqqa. Syrian army and Syrian rebel groups were defeated in a string of battles including at two prominent Syrian military facilities near Raqqa. With just a small garrison left in northern Hasakah governorate, Deir Ez Zor's importance to the regime, as it attempted to hold on to some influence in north eastern Syria, increased exponentially.

The Assad regime deployed significant resources to the last remaining regime positions in Deir Ez Zor near the military airport and parts of the city located on the western bank of the Euphrates. Indeed, the importance of the city was highlighted earlier, in September 2013, when it tasked a famed commander and regime insider, Brigadier General Issam Zahreddine, and the Syrian Arab Army's  (SAA) 104th Airborne Brigade of the Republican Guard, with the defence of the city.

Zahreddine, a Druze from Al-Suwayda, comes from a long background of support for the Baathist regime. His father was a one-time Syrian Minister of Defence and it is alleged that the commanders expertise led the Syrian opposition in 2012 to place a US$200,000 bounty on his head, second  in quantity only to Assad.

For Assad, holding Deir Ez Zor is non-negotiable. Control of all or parts of the city allows the regime to project power to its eastern half. Without it, any later battles would become significantly more costly in terms of men and resources as the government would then need to launch any eventual assault from Aleppo or Palmyra. The presence of the 104^th in the city also serves to distract IS forces from engaging SAA advance forces currently in Aleppo and Idlib governorate. This thorn in the IS side is, therefore, important to maintain and to build on if the regime has any hope in retaking the state of Syria as it was prior to 2011.

If IS manage to overrun Deir Ez Zor, they will still face challenges from local tribes and other rebels but the existential threat posed to them from their near-core will be removed. On 3 December, IS launched yet another offensive in Deir Ez Zor to capture the Military Airport from the regime. As of writing they have largely failed to infiltrate the heavily fortified facility and have, again, suffered huge losses. The offensive will not be the last as IS seek to succeed in what is, arguably, the defining battle of the current phase of the Syrian and Iraqi conflict.

Iraq conflict map update - 1 December

Conflict map update - 1 December

Yemen - Al-Bayda governorate

The Yemen state continues to face a severe internal test despite the appointment of a new prime minister. While the Houthis have accepted the new premier, they have not withdrawn from key areas of the country. Indeed, these forces are still involved in an ongoing, weeks long battle in the country's centre, Al-Bayda governorate, with a coalition of Sunni tribes and Sunni militants. Fighting in Rada and villages near it have left hundreds dead on both sides and does not appear to have an end in sight. Fears of a sectarian war aside, the conflict will, at least, rage for a number of months yet. The risk of escalation, exists. Forces may increasingly dedicate more resources to the field and previously neutral players may seek to enter the fray. 

Iraq - Conflict update

Syria - Conflict update

Tunisia - Elections on 26 October - Main players

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2014/10/tunisia-decides-20141021164020540690.html

Libya's split

 

Operation Dignity	Operation Dawn
Loyal to the House of Representatives and Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thani.	Loyal to the General National Congress and Prime Minister Omar al-Hasi.
Centre of power is in Tobruk.	Centre of power is in Tripoli and Misratah.
Nationalist forces, federalists, eastern tribes and Libyan Army	Islamists forces loyal to the city of Misratah.
Supported by Egypt and Qatar.	Supported by Qatar, Turkey and Sudan.

 

Kobani, Syria

Great AFP picture showing IS militants atop a strategic hill top near Kobani in Syria

Egypt - Then and now

April 2013 - El-Sisi and his boss, Mursi. Chuck Hagel uncomfortably in the middle.

One year later, Mursi is in jail and El-Sisi occupies the president's chair. Kerry is the new uncomfortable guest.

Kobani

Here we go. Kobani. The embattled enclave. Kurds, poorly armed, fighting off a superior enemy. Refugees pouring into Turkey and volunteers pouring in to shore up the defences. This narrative has been presented to the world and has (sort of) caught our imagination. The Islamic State have laid siege to the town for a number of weeks and have pushed to within 1 km of the town. There appears little the Kurdish YPG force can do. The Western powers have resisted a large scale air strike against IS forces near Kobani and it appears they are ready to see it fall. This position is likely premised on two broad motivations. One, if Kobani falls Turkey may be drawn into the fighting. This is something NATO and the US want. Two, Kobani holds no real strategic value. IS already control much of the border in the north and they do not fear attacks from the Kurds.  The next 24 hours should tell us much about how much the US and Turkey love the Kurds.

Disposition of US Naval fleet via Stratfor

Latest ISW Control of Territory map

David Haines executed by the Islamic State

Yet another Islamic State hostage has been executed. This time David Haines, a British aid worker, was summarily beheaded following a scripted message to David Cameron, the British prime minister. The IS executioner, who spoke in a heavy British accent, also issued a statement to Cameron threatening to murder another hostage, Harald Doornbos, if the UK did not withdraw its support for US military operations in Iraq and Syria.

The beheading follows the August and early September killing of two US nationals by IS. The beheadings, all produced in high video quality and editing, were conducted by the same executioner and followed a statement against foreign intervention in Iraq and Syria. The purpose of the video appears to be three fold.

The IS are sending a message to the West. Interfere as you did in the past and blood will be spilled. It is essentially a challenge. Secondly, they are demonstrating that they too have power over the destinies of Westerners much in the way that Western powers have power over people of the region. Those executed are also wearing orange overalls, a veiled reference to Guantanamo Bay, no doubt. Thirdly, IS are sending a very subtle hint to the West through their use of a British executioner. The role of foreign jihadis in the IS expansion cannot be under estimated and showing a British citizen executing another brings the IS phenomenon home quite starkly.

The videos will have three results. One, the West will accept the challenge and will increase funding for operations to target IS in the Middle East. Two, the West will seek to use IS and the videos as a justification to clamp down on Muslim extremism in their home countries.

The consequences would appear to be quite contradictory to IS intended goals. If the IS want to establish a state, goading the most powerful militaries into a conflict does not seems sensible, or does it? The mentality of IS appears irrational; however, their worldview differs considerably from the West's. The IS battle is one of truth against falsehood and it is an eternal battle. The ultimate goal is the liberation of all Muslim lands and the destruction of forces viewed as anti-Islam, namely secularism, Christianity, Judaism and the West. Spreading Islam through the gun and sword is justifiable, even commanded by Allah, in their view.

For a video of the recent execution and some commentary, check out the Shafaak news website. Note the images are graphic. http://www.iraqinews.com/features/urgent-video-isis-beheads-uk-aid-worker-david-haines/

The cost of war - Syrian regime air strike in Douma, Damascus on 11 September

Syrian aircraft launched an air strike against the rebel-controlled city of Douma in the greater Damascus area yesterday. Activists say over 40 people were killed in the strikes. Video has begun appearing on the web showing the aftermath of the attack. Victims are shown litterred across a street. Some are severely wounded. Note the visuals are graphic. 

https://www.facebook.com/video.php?v=546639892104493

ISW's new Iraq and Syria Map

http://iswiraq.blogspot.com/

The Houthis not so subtle power play

On 8 September, Abdel Malik al-Houthi (pictured here), said that protests would continue in Sanaa.



The groups is playing on common Yemeni complaints that the government is corrupt and not striving to build on the gains of the 2011 Revolution and 2013/14 NDC to enhance its own regional ambitions. Protesters are currently located in numerous areas of the country. The map shows areas of the capital where the main protest camps are located. Since 18 August, when the protests began, only one protester has been killed. The protester died after the first incident of major violence on 7 September along Sanaa's Airport Road.

Iraq's new government

Iraq's Council of Representatives approved the cabinet line-up of Haider al-Abadi on 8 September. The appointment is a positive development for the country, which has faced months of wrangling over the post of prime minister and an ongoing Sunni militant offensive in the country's centre and north.

Somehow the Iraqi state has managed to survive recent developments and PM Al-Abadi has a historic opportunity to turn things around. But, as always, obstacles remain. His former boss, Nouri Al-Maliki, who resigned in early August following intense pressure over his failure to organise a ruling coalition, remains in the game, just. He is one of three vice presidents. The office carries no real power yet his presence and strong support among elements of the security forces will serve him well if he intends positioning for further power.

The Kurdish bloc are another challenge. The Kurds occupied swathes of territory in June in the north after the Iraqi Army was routed by the Islamic State. They are demanding that the oil and gas revenue debacle, dispute territory issue and status of Kirkuk be addressed in the next three months. If it is not, they are going to leave the government.

Abadi also needs to fill two key positions in his cabinet, the defence and interior ministry positions. Under al-Mailiki these positions were attached to the office of the premier. Under Abadi's new 'inclusive' government he will seek consensus candidates to take these posts. I won't be surprised if, in an effort to reach out to the Sunnis, that he appoints a Sunni politician to one or both of these posts.

And the elephant in the room. The Islamic State control approximately a quarter of the country, including Fallujah, Tikrit and Mosul. The US has joined the fray but a longer lasting solution will require the reformation of the Iraqi military (and its unity). Ground forces are unlikely to be supplied by Obama and the Iraqi Army and its allies will need to gear up for a major fight. The Kurd question also comes into play. The Kurds will likely seek to position themselves to gain as much as they can from their military presence in the north. Concessions will be difficult to come by though as Abadi will face stiff opposition to any suggestions of providing the Kurds with more power.

Internationally, Abadi will find friends in Iran and the US. Strange but powerful bedfellows. Both nations will seek to provide security support but will be cautious in over reaching for fear of isolating the Sunni minority further. Finding the balance will be key in the next six months.

The hard man of Zion

Benjamin Netanyahu is a hard man. And he has to be. After all he runs a Jewish state in a Muslim region. He has very few friends and has to deal with an electorate that are as demanding as a hungry two year old. The wait of expectation on him is immense. He is the tip of the sword, the commander in chief and the fall guy should things go pear shaped. Yet, does he have to be such an asshole?

He was recently quoted as saying:

"The IDF and Shin Bet are responsible to the killing of over 1,000 terrorists, we thwarted Hamas' rocket fire, we destroyed the tunnels and terror towers (high-rise buildings). These are unprecedented blows for Hamas,"

These words were uttered during his weekly cabinet meeting at Hof Ashkelon on Sunday. Now, the audience obviously needs to be taken into account when analysing these words. Israelis want positives. They want to know that their country is safe, that their leaders won't take things lying down. These are fair points and aren't there thousands of us in the world (ehem, South Africa) that would love their leaders to grow a spine. Yet, could he have added something else

The IDF may well have killed 1,000 'terrorists' yet they also killed 1,100 civilians (at least). If Bibi was looking towards the future could he not have said something about these casualties? Been a little softer in his tone? Directed some points to the Palestinian people? Offered some sort of olive branch?

It certainly isn't Israel's fault that Hamas load their weapons and direct their foot soldiers to fight from civilian areas so, in a sense, Israel are right when they say that Hamas are responsible for the civilian casualties. But aren't Israel too? They fired the damn missiles after all.

Indeed, the Israeli argument falls flat and serves more to tarnish their international image when they blame Hamas without taking responsibility for their own actions. So we can understand Bibi but please, for the sake of the next generation, isn't it time to extend the hand of peace?

Ye man, what a mess

Yemen is a small country located at the foot of the Arabian Peninsula. This unassuming 'state' has a rich and storied history and is the fabled homeland of the Queen of Sheba. The country has been ruled over the centuries by various powers, including the Ottomans for a time.

Since 2011, the country has experienced a period of, what can best be described as, anarchy. In 2011, Arab Spring protests were some of the most severe in Yemen with hundreds killed in unrest aimed at unseating the long-serving president, Ali Saleh. The president was later forced to resign and an interim government was appointed. This led to the end of the violent unrest. Yet, despite the apparent success of the revolution, much of the old regime remains in place. The ruling party, the GNC, is part of the interim authority and is still led by…Ali Saleh. Odd, but true. President Hadi, Saleh's sidekick for many years, is current president and the revolutionary youth who led the 2011 protests may well ask the pertinent question, 'wtf?'.

So the protests have ended and the old corrupt guard are still hanging around. So what you may well ask. Well the 'what' is critical. The 2011 revolution opened the lid on the demons lurking beneath the surface of the rugged Yemen exterior. Islamist extremists, southern separatists and northern Shiite Houthi rebels took advantage of the regime's distraction to capture territory and force the state authority from their lands. Tribes have joined each one of these three general parts to further complicate what must surely be the most intricate balance of political forces in the world (except maybe for Nepal).

As of writing the Houthis and their supporters control one governorate in the north, Saada, and parts of two others, Amran and al-Jawf. Thousands of their supporters are also huddled in Sanaa in a number of protest camps. Their demands? Lower fuel costs and the fall of the government. The Houthi protests are probably linked to a national dialogue in 2013 and early 2014 (which they were apart of) that concluded that Yemeni territory should be consolidated into federal regions. The Houthis were upset by this as it divided their illegally obtained territory. The protests will end and the Houthis will probably get a few seats in the power circle but will anything really change for the common Yemeni? Probably not. War and poverty will likely haunt this 'nation' for some time to come.

Iraq and ISW

The Islamic State advance has stalled, badly. Let's be clear, IS are still in the pound seats. Its just that their lightning quick blitzkrieg assault it launched in June to overrun Mosul has, well, stopped. The battle lines are drawn and they are, in Iraq at least, meeting their match. Shiite militias and core Iraqi military forces in and around Baghdad and the Kurd militias in the north are putting up fierce resistance to the increasingly brazen IS. The story is different in Syria of course. IS have continued to plunder the north and north east and have expelled rival militias and regime forces from three governorates. Only the dturdy Kurds remain in their enclaves along the northern border with Turkey. This is probably were they will stay, for now, as IS look for bigger fish to fry. Clue, Aleppo. 

The Institute for the Study of War has been following Iraq and Syria developments very closely. Indeed, it seems they are dedicating all of their considerable analyst knowledge to tracking and reporting on the war. I think, and I think you will agree, that their site is top drawer. Here is a copy of their recent update map. These are produced daily.

The full site can be accessed here. http://iswiraq.blogspot.com/ An analysts wet dream. Thank ISW.

The endless wars

The Israel Gaza Strip conflict appears to have ended, for now. Following nearly 50 days of fighting (granted on and off fighting) Hamas emerged with a tiny bit more fishing area off its coast and some additional border lands. The price? Billions of dollars of infrastructure damage, 2,100 Palestinian dead, a handful of key, top commanders dead, its tunnel system devastated and its image as the protector of the Palestinians tarnished.

The impact on Israel was less severe. Indeed with 68 dead (including 64 soldiers) the human toll was significantly low given the devastation its fighters and tanks wrought on the Palestinian enclave. Indeed, the greatest impact appears to the hardening of already strong anti-Israeli views in the wider region and globe. Israel won't mind though.

These on and off wars are frustrating because they are so clearly unequal. Israel possess the geographic, man power and technical advantage over Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the plethora of other groups operating in the Gaza area. From advanced fighters, to heavy tanks and an intelligence structure easily among the top 5 in the world, the Palestinians face little to no chance against the Israelis. So why fight?

The Palestinian fighting groups were created to resist. If they do not, they cease to serve a purpose. They must, therefore, appear to be fighting the good fight otherwise the Palestinians will ask, why should we support you. The Palestinian fighting groups are also always positioning for influence and taking on Israel scores you some points. The Palestinians would like the world to believe that they are fighting as a single entity. They are not. They are divided.

So will there be another war? Yes. The cycles of peace and conflict are as consistent as the seasons. As long as Hamas et al remain in power with an unrevised constitution and general goal of rejecting Israel and demanding its destruction the ingredients for war will exist. Israel will also need to continue to respond to what is, in essence, a menace. 

The state of Libya

The state of Libya is facing an existential crisis. There are numerous armed groups and political factions vying for control and influence in the country. This competition has resulted in a situation which can best be described as a civil war, with both Tripoli and Benghazi, the country's two major cities, affected by regular rounds of fighting. The battle currently consists of two main coalitions of fighting groups. On the one side are the Islamists and fighters from the powerful city of Misratah. On the other you have the nationalists or secularists allied to two main groupings, the town of Zintan and retired Libyan Army General Haftar. These forces are further divided between groups which have, for all intents and purposes, been grouped together due to the current cause rather than any ideological affiliation.

The government is facing an uphill task in reigning in the fighting groups, even militia funded through the state coffers. The House of Representatives, elected earlier in the year, has moved its office to Tobruk from Tripoli due to the fighting. It has issued numerous statements and passed a law effectively banning militias. Unsurprisingly, the HoR has been largely ignored. 

The failure of the HoR, to date, is of critical importance. The current crisis, it was thought, was largely a result of the failure of the previous legislature, the GNC. In the run-up to the end of its mandate, protests and violent attacks characterised the Libyan security environment in scenes reminiscent of what we are witnessing today. However, the GNC's end and the rise of the HoR has, obviously, not resulted in any apparent improvement.

The Muammar al-Gaddafi regime was successful because it used its iron fist to clamp down on all power centres in the country. It subsumed many powerful tribes and personalities into the regime structure and suppressed (violently) its opponents. This formula worked well for Libya up until February 2011 when the first signs of unrest were reported in Benghazi. 

In 2011, the Arab Spring erupted and a civil war began. The artificial hold on the country was released and previous power centres and interests, specifically the Islamist bloc (read Muslim Brotherhood) and Misratah, came to the fore to fill the vacuum. It is, essentially, this friction between powerful sub-state entities and the weak central government that has defined the post-al-Gaddafi period and it is assessed that this narrative will be one that will characterise the Libyan landscape for some time to come. 

So what can the international community and the Libyan government do to end the crisis? They need to be realistic. Libya is fragmented. It needs, therefore, to provide some power to the sub-state entities. A federal system of governance is the most obvious type of political setup which could suit the country. Within federal regions, the state would surrender most economic power for security control. This would bring stability at least for the meanwhile. But to get to the point the Libyan government needs to provide the regions with a vision and hope that stability and prosperity can be achieved. The international community needs to sit up and take notice and provide as much military and political support to the HoR as it can. They have a small window now that must be taken.

Iraq - Distribution of forces

Syria - Distribution of forces

The Sunni Shia divide

Courtesy of the Council on Foreign Relations

http://www.cfr.org/peace-conflict-and-human-rights/sunni-shia-divide/p33176?cid=nlc-religion-religion_and_foreign_policy_bulletin-august_2014-link3-20140805&sp_mid=46660225&sp_rid=YW5kcmVjb2xsaW5nQHJlZDI0LmluZm8S1#!/

Christianity and Christians - What do they believe?

Christians have been getting wide coverage in the media recently following the militant rampage through northern Iraq and in Syria. Islamist extremists have conducted various atrocities against minority groups, including Christian communities. For many non-Christians, there are questions regarding the group. Who are they? What do they believe? What does it mean to be a Christian? 

There are many denominations but the majority of Christians adhere to the Gospel and these general principles.

Mankind has rebelled against God and adopted the ways of the world:

As for you, you were dead in your transgressions and sins, 2 in which you used to live when you followed the ways of this world and of the ruler of the kingdom of the air, the spirit who is now at work in those who are disobedient. 3 All of us also lived among them at one time, gratifying the cravings of our flesh[a] and following its desires and thoughts. Like the rest, we were by nature deserving of wrath. – Ephesians Chapter 2

Rescue, Resurrection and Response – Christians believe God sent His Son, Jesus, to take on our sins and through him receive salvation. Jesus lived, this is documented. Christians believe He is God as well. Tricky connection but think of them as connected through the Spirit. So how does one become a Christian? Its simple, just repent of your sins (say you're sorry) and ask Jesus to be your saviour. No other actions required. If you pray these words and believe them, welcome to the Christian family.

4 But because of his great love for us, God, who is rich in mercy, 5 made us alive with Christ even when we were dead in transgressions—it is by grace you have been saved. 6 And God raised us up with Christ and seated us with him in the heavenly realms in Christ Jesus, 7 in order that in the coming ages he might show the incomparable riches of his grace, expressed in his kindness to us in Christ Jesus. 8 For it is by grace you have been saved, through faith—and this is not from yourselves, it is the gift of God— 9 not by works, so that no one can boast. 10 For we are God's handiwork, created in Christ Jesus to do good works, which God prepared in advance for us to do. – Ephesians Chapter 2

Islamic State capture Kurd territory in northern Iraq

The Islamic State launched a major offensive against Peshmerga forces in northern Iraq on 2 and 3 August. The offensive led to the IS capture of Sinjar, Mosul Dam and a number of other towns north and north west of Mosul. The IS offensive is the first committed attempt to challenge the Kurds in the north since IS took Mosul in June and may signal a new escalation. In response the Peshmerga have deployed reenforcements and YPG forces from Syria have been deployed to assist KRG Peshmerga forces, the first time this has happened since the Mosul takeover. The Kurds are also promising that they will cleanse Mosul within 48 to 72 hours and retake towns recently lossed. If they can do this, it would be a major feat. While the Peshmerga are viewed as strong, their offensive capability is untested. IS and its supporting organisations are battle hardened and have access to Iraqi heavy armour. While they may be outmatched numerically, they have the technical and experience advantage, a key in any war. Time will tell how this will play out.

The Islamic State

Iraq remains in a precarious security position following the Islamic State capture of territory in the north in June. The Iraqi military are struggling to hold territory in central Salah ad Din, Diyala and Anbar governorate and repeated offensives north to retake Tikrit, have failed. The Islamic State has, however, not pushed its offensive further and it appears that the group is seeking to secure its recent gains, which fall within the predominantly Sunni territory of central and northern Iraq.

The reason for the halt to its offensive is two-fold. One, the Islamic State's resources have increased significantly; however, for a major operation against Iraq's core, Baghdad, and predominantly Shiite south, the group would require more troops, artillery and tanks. While the Iraqi military, its various supporting militia, tribal allies and the Shiite militia are poorly disciplined, trained and resourced, they still hold the numerical advantage. Secondly, assaulting south and holding predominantly Shiite territory would be difficult to say the least. The group is also unlikely to want to seek a greater involvement of the west or Iran – two possible outcomes should it push in any meaningful manner into Baghdad and the south. Likewise, in the east, the Islamic State has no interest, currently, in taking on the Kurds and is content to allow the Kurds to maintain its positions in newly acquired disputed territories.

In the coming months the Islamic State will continue to strengthen its defences in recently acquired territory and will seek to make gains in Anbar, Salah Ad Din, Babil and Diyala governorates to bolster support zones there. From these zones it will pursue its current bombing campaign against Iraqi state and Shiite interests in order to weaken these groups and prevent them from launching a major offensive northwards. While maintaining its gains in Iraq and creating new state structures, the group will continue to pursue its campaign in eastern and northern Syria against its Islamist rivals, the Syrian regime and Kurd militia groups in order to secure control of the predominantly Sunni Muslim territory. We can, therefore, anticipate a continuingly high level of violence in both Iraq and Syria. In Iraq, at least, further major gains, are probable, but unlikely over the next six months. In Syria, the regime and the various rebel groups will reorganise and will aim to limit Islamic State control. I anticipate that these groups will succeed in stopping the Islamic State from making further gains but will struggle to retake territory lost in Deir Ez Zor, Ar Raqqah, Aleppo, Hasakah and Hama.

IDF infographic detailing Hamas tunnelling

Iraq - Islamic State status

The real victims of war

The end of war

When man stops living by his own rules and starts living by God's and with an appreciation for the preciousness of life, then war will cease.

ISW Baghdad map

Map of the week via Maplecroft

Images from Tripoli Airport following recent fighting

Rocket attacks from Gaza - Pre-Operation Protective Edge

Hamas rocket arsenal and ranges

Israel pounds Gaza in response to Gaza fire

On 7 July, the Israeli military launched Operation Protective Edge against Palestinian militants in the Gaza Strip. The operation was initiated in response to repeated rocket, mortar and missile fire into southern Israel from the Gaza Strip since mid-June. The initial stages of the operation included multiple air and naval-based strikes against militant positions across the Palestinian enclave. The Israel Defence Force (IDF) has also deployed additional forces to the Gaza Strip border and mobilized thousands of reserves. These measures combined with statements from the prime minister's office indicate that Israel is preparing for ground operations in the Gaza Strip.

The initiation of the wide ranging Israeli offensive has led militants in the Gaza Strip, including the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigade of Hamas, the Al-Quds Brigade of Islamic Jihad, the al-Nassar Salah al-Din Brigades of the Popular Resistance Committees and the National Resistance Brigades of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine to increase rocket fire into southern Israel and to deploy its longer range rocket and missile fire. These longer range projectiles have the capacity to reach Haifa in the far north and have already struck targets near Tel Aviv, Hadera and Jerusalem. The fighting has left dozens of Palestinians dead and wounded while only a handful of Israelis have been wounded, the majority of whom are based near the immediate border between Gaza and Israel.

State creation where a state already exists: The rise of the Sunnis and the Kurds

The Iraqi conflict has provided groups from across the political spectrum with new opportunities and challenges. The biggest losers at present appear to the be Iraqi government, which has lost a large proportion of its military resources and territory in northern and western Iraq, and Shiite political parties, which up until a month ago, where preparing to negotiate for a new prime minister to head a government which, despite its problems, controlled most of the country. Iran to has seen its proxies in Iraq fail to stem a growing Sunni militant offensive, which threatens it’s influence over elements of the Iraqi polity. The biggest winners have undoubtedly been Sunni Islamist militants, the northern Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the KRG’s international backers, including Israel. These groups have emerged and have carved out new territories which have essentially led to the final death knell to the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement between the UK, France and Russia, which set the framework for the modern day, artificial state boundaries.

The Sunni militant’s deadly northern assault
On 29 June, the Islamic State (IS) declared a caliphate in northern Iraq and northern Syria. The caliphate declaration coincided with the group’s rapid offensive in northern Iraq (since 6 June), which led to its capture of the city of Mosul and territory as far south as the town of Tikrit (Saddam Hussein’s home town) while in Anbar governorate the group has solidified its control of a number of towns and cities, including Fallujah. This blitzkrieg in the north and west of Iraq has accompanied a similar control of territory in Syria where opposing militant groups, including the al-Qaeda (AQ)-aligned Al-Nusra Front (ANF), have withdrawn from territory in the Deir Ez Zor governorate, essentially handing IS control of the Euphrates River from Ar Raqqah city in Syria to the Iraq government-controlled city of Haditha in Anbar.

The IS has its challenges in maintaining its control of its new ‘Islamic state’. The “Sunni Revolution”, as it is being called by some Iraqis, is not a movement led by a single party and there are numerous Sunni tribes, militant groups and former Baathists that all have a stake in the Sunni regions of Iraq and Syria. Indeed, while some groups have declared allegiance (bayat) to IS and its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, such as the ANF command in Al-Bukamal, Syria, many have wholly rejected the caliphate declaration, including the powerful Islamic Front in Syria. In Iraq, other Sunni, Sufi and Baathist groups have remained largely silent to date; however, groupings such as the Sufi militant Naqshabandi Army, led by Hussein-era commander, Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, are unlikely to accept IS leadership of the anti-government insurgency.  Meanwhile, the Kurds, positioned in north western Iraq have maintained a close observance of the fighting in Sunni areas of northern Iraq but have considered, rightly so, that encroaching into IS territory would not suit their long-term goals, which are, essentially, the creation of a Kurd state in Kurdish majority areas of northern Iraq. After all, what allegiance could they owe to the central government that has blocked budget allocations and KRG attempts to sell oil extracted in its region?

The Kurds slick move
Following the IS advance into northern Iraqi cities and towns, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) abandoned their positions in the north and deserted en masse towards the south and into the KRG. The routed ISF forces abandoned millions of dollars’ worth of equipment, which the IS and other militant groups have gratefully accepted. Of more worth than this equipment was the ISF abandonment of territory in the eastern parts of Ninewa, Kirkuk, Salah ad Din and Diyala governorates. This security vacuum was immediately occupied by Kurdish Peshmerga (military) forces which moved beyond the Green Line, established following the 1991 Gulf War, and into disputed territories. 

As of writing the Kurd Peshmerga are arrayed in positions from Sinjar near the Syrian border to areas immediately east of Mosul, down towards Kirkuk and further south to Khanaqin. These forces have met very little resistance and there are strong indications that the Sunni militants are content to allow the KRG to pursue its territory grab, knowing quite well that drawing the Kurds into the conflict would undermine their goal of establishing a caliphate.

It is within this context that the KRG leadership has acted decisively. President of the KRG, Massoud Barzani, has ordered preparations to be made for a referendum on independence including in areas which the KRG have just annexed while statements from Barzani and a host of other Kurdish leaders are adamant in their rejection of demands by the central government and local minority groups, including the Turkmen, that they withdraw from newly acquired territory. The Kurdish Jerusalem, Kirkuk, which lies atop one of the world’s largest oil deposits has been a rallying point for Kurd nationalism and rhetoric of late and it is highly unlikely that the Kurds will surrender the city.

Conclusion
Iraq was created following World War One by foreign powers that new little about the dynamics of the region. At the time, the rural and under-developed Shiite south was largely subsumed into the greater current day Iraq under the leadership of the relatively well-educated Sunni elite, who represented the minority Sunni population. The promised Kurd state in the 1920s also failed to materialize and the Kurd nation was split between Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Iran. This historical injustice is now on the cusp of being righted, but at what cost?

The Kurds have a long way to go to fully safeguard their new state. While Iran and Turkey appear, on the outside at least, to have accepted increasing Kurdish encroachment into northern Iraq and its referendum plans, a strong Kurd state is not, theoretically, in their best interest given Kurd agitation in their respective border territories. The Kurd relationship with Sunni tribes and militants in northern Iraq is also another long term test. Should the insurgency be defeated there is also an elevated risk of conflict between the central Iraq government and the Kurds over their control of disputed territory. Domestically, the Kurd polity appears unified but with increasing gains, the traditional powerhouses, the KDP (closely aligned to Turkey) and PUK (aligned to Iran), may increasingly come to disagreements over the distribution of resources and power. Within this context, upcoming groups, such as Gorran, may further complicate the domestic situation. Ultimately though, the sense is that the Kurd polity will remain unified, over the medium-term at least, as they head for their long strived for state. Internal challenges will be placed aside as they all seek to carve out a new state within a state.

The Islamic State

On 29 June, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) issued a statement indicating the formation of a new Islamic caliphate in Syria and Iraq under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The declaration also included references to its new name, the Islamic State (IS). The announcement by the group (https://ia902501.us.archive.org/2/items/hym3_22aw/english.pdf) is controversial as it is not expected to be accepted by the multiple opposing Sunni non-state armed groups in either Syria or Iraq. Already nine groups in Syria, including the Islamic Front, have come out in rejection of the declaration while Al-Nusra Front figures have also labelled the declaration as being un-Islamic. It is not clear why al-Baghdadi decided to declare the caliphate at this time; however, the group's recent victories in northern Iraq and its capture of vast quantities of Iraqi military hardware may go some way to understanding the group's current confidence and bravado.

IS has staged a remarkable comeback since 2011 when the group appeared to be on its last legs. The withdrawal of the US military from Iraq signalled the start of its resurgence as the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were largely unable, due to intelligence failures and lack of motivation, to combat the groups rise. Under al-Baghdadi, the group, then known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and later renamed ISIL, restructured and regrouped. Two successive year long offensive in 2012 to 2014 revitalised the group as it attacked and freed hundreds of hardened militants from Iraqi jails. The group also actively recruited from among the depressed Sunni youth and has become a beacon for foreign fighters aiming to establish an Islamist caliphate in the region. The year-long offensives also seriously eroded the Iraq military and police. These operations combined with growing Sunni resentment of the Shiite-dominated government created conditions wherein it could break out and take Fallujah in January 2014 and Mosul on 10 June.

The group has been the focus of counter-terrorism debate, within and outside of Iraq. Also known as "Daash" by Iraqis, it has borne the brunt of the political rhetoric emanating from the government. Yet, the group is not the only armed group operating in the country. Indeed, there are multiple groups, including Sunni and Sufi Islamist extremists, Baathists and tribal militia, which have risen with IS over the past three years. Indeed, of late the elevated levels of violence in Iraq have been described by many locals as a Sunni Revolution and not a straightforward capture of territory by one armed group against another.

Thus, we come to the caliphate decision. No doubt the decision to declare a caliphate must have been one that had been on the table for a length of time and would, reasonably, have been made following a full consideration of what the side effects would be. Yet, the imposition of an Islamic state where none exists at present is not new. Indeed, the previous ISIL was, in essence, the creation of a set boundary wherein Islamic law was practiced and enforced. What makes the current declaration different is that they have called for near total allegiance from civilians and armed groups to al-Baghdadi without consultation from the primary fighting groups.

Perhaps IS have calculated that they are strong enough to counter the storm? Perhaps there victories in Iraq have filled the leaderships minds with misconceptions about their strength and capability? Perhaps the declaration is the start of an era of Islamic rule in the region. I think that this will be short lived. Iran, Turkey, Syria and Iraq will not allow a state like this to exist. It threatens them existentially. The US and Israel, the two powerhouses of the region, are also unlikely to allow the establishment of a radical government in Iraq and Syria. The IS's decision to form a state will also place them firmly within the targets of their rivals, particularly those groups that have declared loyalty to al-Qaeda, a group IS now seems to want to replace as the pinnacle Islamist militant group. IS will continue to grow and may succeed in holding territory but holding, administering services and ruling is another thing completely.

Egypt's leaders through the ages an

Abdel Fattah Saeed Hussein Khalil el-Sisi became president of Egypt on 8 June. El-Sisi is the 20^th ruler of Egypt since the establishment of the modern state of Egypt in the early 19^th century. El-Sisi represents the military, which has dominated Egyptian politics since 1953. He is the quint essential 'strong man' leader. His accession has been manufactured by the military which is keen to maintain its grip on power through the suppression of Islamists and basic democratic expression.

The Muhammad Ali dynasty (1805)

Muhammad Ali Pasha al-Mas'ud ibn Agha (1805 – 1848). The founder of the modern state of Egypt. He was an Albanian Ottoman Empire commander who led a force to Egypt following the French withdrawal in 1801. From 1801 to 1805 he fought the Mamluks for control of Egypt, eventually emerging as the leader of Egypt and Sudan. His rule laid the base of the future, modern Egyptian state, separate from its Ottoman masters. His dynasty would continue into the 20^th century. Died 1949 (natural causes).

Muhammad Ali's son, Ibrahim Pasha (1848). Died 1848 (natural causes).

Muhammad Ali's grandson, Abbas I (1848-1854). Died 1854 (Murdered by two of his slaves)

Muhammad Ali's son, Muhammad Sa'id Pasha (1854-1863). Died 1863.

Muhammad Ali's grandson, Isma'il Pasha (1863-1879). Following Urabi Revolt, UK and French pressure on the Ottoman Empire led to his removal. Died 1895.

Isma'il Pasha's son, Muhammed Tewfik Pasha (1879-1892). Died 1892 (Natural causes)

Great-great-grandson of Muhammad Ali and son of Tewfik Pasha, Abbas II Hilmi Bey (1892-1914). The last Khedive. Overthrown by the UK at start of onset of WW1. Died 1944 in Switzerland.

The end of the Ottoman influence (1914)

Great-great-grandson of Muhammad Ali and son of Isma'il Pasha, Sultan Hussein Kamel (1914-1917). Died 1917 (natural causes).

Younger brother of Sultan Hussein Kamel, Fuad I (1922-1936). Died 1936 (natural causes).

Son of Fuad 1, Farouk I of Egypt (1936-1952). The Free Officers, led by Muhammad Naguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser, staged a military coup that launched the Egyptian Revolution of 1952. Farouk 1 went into exile.

Fuad II – Took the thrown after his father abdicated but was one year old at the time. Royal council ruled in his stead until Egypt was declared a republic in 1953.

The rise of the Egyptian military (1953)

President Muhammad Naguib (1953-1954) – leader of Free Officers (military). Deposed by Gamal Abdel Nasser following disagreement. House arrest for 18 years before release by Sadat.

President Gamal Abdel Nasser Hussein (1956-1970) – leader of Free Officers (military). The most successful Egyptian president. Regional player – Arab Nationalist leader. Died 1970 (Heart attack).

President Anwar Sadat (1970-1981) – senior officer in the Free Officers (military). Assassinated 1981 by military officer, Khalid Ahmed Showky Al-Islambouli. Hailed by Islamist radicals.

Muhammad Hosni El Sayed Mubarak (1981-2011). Military officer. Overthrown during Arab Spring.

Mohamed Hussein Tantawi (2011-2012). Leader of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Interim leadership ahead of democratic elections. Stepped down following elections in 2012.

The Islamists (2012)

Mohamed Morsi (2012-2013). First Islamist president. Popularly elected. Overthrown in 2013 by the military. Currently incarcerated.

The return of the military (2014)

Adly Mahmoud Mansour (2013 – 2014). Installed by the military following the mid-2013 coup. Ceded power following elections in May 2014.

Abdel Fattah Saeed Hussein Khalil el-Sisi (2014 to present). Head of the military until his resignation prior to elections in May 2014. Won a disputed election

The loaded gun - Triggers in the Iraq conflict

Over at red24 we have been tossing around a few triggers for a further escalation in the conflict in Iraq. Do you agree?

Peshmerga are convinced to enter the fight on the side of the ISF.
ISIL and allied militants take another governorate capital.
Turkey moves forces into Ninewa.
The US initiates air strikes.
Shiite militias are deployed north and west of Baghdad in great numbers.
A major refinery in the country is taken offline, for whatever reason.
ISF forces attempt to seize Kirkuk.
Iran deploys a larger number of troops to the country.

If these triggers are met, our baseline risk will likely change leading us to alter our advisory.
Do you agree?

Legislative elections and a new start in Libya?

The Libyan people will vote for a new legislature on Wednesday. They will vote for members to populate the new House of Representatives (HR). The HR will replace the massively controversial General National Congress (GNC), which was elected in 2012 and has come to be the focal point of all dissension in the country. The GNC, whose mandate expired in February, has struggled to present itself as the representative of the people and has stepped from one crisis to another. The latest was the illegal election of Ahmed Maetig, a Misratah businessman, as prime minister. The Islamist dominated GNC pushed through the appointment despite strong opposition and valid claims that the vote was unconstitutional. To many people's relief the decision was later overturned and accepted by Maetig. In the interim, however, General Haftar appeared and with hundreds of disaffected soldiers took on militia in the far east of the country in Benghazi. His rise was purportedly in response to his desire limit the influence of Islamists in the country; however, his connections to the US and the CIA have not gone unnoticed and have discredited his nationalist appeal somewhat. It is yet to be seen if Haftar will cease his attacks and return his troops to the legitimate military structures once the election is held and a new government is appointed. 

Yemen's Game of Thrones - The threat from the north

The Houthi rebel group continues to make gains in the north and the central government continues to ignore was it turning out to be a potential existential threat. Houthis have been knocking around northern Yemen since the early 2000s but it was only with the advent of the Arab Spring that the group escalated its activities and strengthened its hold on the north. Its growing strength has brought it into direct competition with Salafist communities allied to Saudi Arabia, Islah party militia and al-Ahmer tribesmen leaving hundreds dead. The Houthis have also engaged Yemeni military forces. Over the past month the group has made further gains in the north and has signed at least two ceasefires with the government; however, the sense is, is that the current ceasefire, signed on 21 June, will not hold for very long. The Houthis are demanding that an NDC federal regions proposal be scrapped. The new regions will effectively divide the Houthi staging areas in the north into three separate regions and produce "rich and poor regions". The Houthi opposition is also enflamed by the presence of conservative Salafist armed presence in the north, the encroachment of Saudi Arabia into its area of influence and, no doubt, the undue influence Shiite Iran has for the Shiite Houthi group. The government is happy to wait it out it seems. It is also unclear whether the Hadi administration can even confront the Houthis effectively given its focus on securing critical oil and gas supplies and suppressing tribal agitation in Marib, separatist sentiment in the south and AQAP in the south and south east. Hadi's test is yet to come it seems but in the mean time the Houthis will try and eke out further gains in the north.

The Iraq end game

The crisis in Iraq is deepening but not for the reasons you think. The media focus has been on the crushing defeats the ISIL has inflicted upon the Iraqi Army. This is true but the core Iraqi force, its Shiite allies and the large Kurd Peshmerga in the far north remain intact and 75 to 85% of Iraq's oil production capacity is unaffected. Indeed, oil supply has increased not decreased since the start of the militant assault on 6 June. Of particular concern is the further deepening schism of the Iraqi polity. Kurd forces have moved into disputed territories in federal Iraq, including the Kurd Jerusalem, Kirkuk, and have stated plainly that they are there to stay. Sunni tribes and a range of militant bodies have taken advantage of the security situation to take control of some areas in the Sunni heartland of Anbar. In the south, Shiite militias and Shiite volunteer armies have been mobilized to 'defend against the militants'. Demobilising this force seems a long way off. Iran, for its part, is seeking to secure the Shiite core and has dispatched troops to assist to defend Shiite religious sites and the predominantly Shiite government while the US is also mulling air strikes against the Sunnis. The militant offensive will end at some point and it is likely that the primary grouping, ISIL, will be unable to hang on to the territory it has acquired given its relatively lesser strength. The Sunni polity, divided as it is will become the side show for a wider Shiite Kurd confrontation over the Kirkuk oil fields which could increasingly draw Turkey, which supports the Kurds, and Iran, which supports the Shiite south.