Tuesday, December 9, 2008

Mumbai Terror - Who is the Enemy?

The counterterrorismblog hosted a panel of top counter-terrorism analysts in Washington recently. The panel discussed the recent highly complex terror attacks in India that made use of Jihad infantry to attack transportation, Jewish and hotel targets across the city. For anyone interested in the attacks or wishing to know more about an incident that has the potential to lead to war between India and Pakistan this is a must read. For the full report please click here.

Tuesday, December 2, 2008

The Mumbai attacks and fallout

Much has been written about the brazen Mumbai attacks that were carried out by Islamist militants last week against a number of Western and local targets. The shock and awe that followed the initial reports of bombings and killings have been replaced by anger and a burning desire by the local Indian authorities and the normal citizenry to bring those responsible to justice. Finger pointing and accusations have been running wild with allegations that the Pakistani intelligence service somehow had some hand to play in the attacks. The evidence is damming. Pakistani ISI has long been viewed as having been infiltrated by jihadi elements and for being sympathetic to their aims. President Zadari has done his best to curb the ISI but much work still has to be done. The Pakis have also come out openly and condemned the attack and the shuttle diplomacy and back and forth statements, are clear that the Pakis do not want a confrontation with their nuclear neighbours.

The Indian 9/11, as it is now being coined, has many repurcussions for the region and the world. The most obvious is the reaction of India. Will they respond, will they take the fight across the border to Pakistan and hunt for the militants themeselves like Bush did with Iraq and Afghanistan? This is a clear possibility, but improbable at the moment. The Indians are stretched battling naxalites across the eastern states and attacking a huge neighbour would cost hundreds of thousands (and if nukes were used, millions) of lives. It is likely that the Indians will rather up the anti by accusing Pakistan of complicity thus placating the Indian public, which is currently baying for revenge. Pakistan will respond with equally fiery rhetoric and denials, more Indian ministers will resign and the matter will remain unresolved.

Pakistan for its part must continue to act against militants. The military is currently battling Taleban aligned militants across its western border with Afghanistan. However, this fight must be escalated to include the intelligence service. A cleaning of the ISI house must follow. If it doesnt, militants and those that sympathise with them will become stronger. The international community must also act and support the Indian and Pakistani governments. First step is obviously to bring the two parties to some sort of understanding. Pakistan must show it is willing to support counter-terror operations. If it doesnt, it risks war with India. Secondly, the international community must support the Indians and Pakistanis with aid, intelligence and financial and by offerring counter-terror expertise. The dangers are clear. The Jihadists want war between India and Pakistan because war suits their designs. Within chaos it operates best. Within stable states its ability to operate is seriously curtailed.

Tuesday, November 18, 2008

Middle East: Q&A

Readers of the blog have submitted a few questions over the years. I’ve attempted to answer a few here. If you have any others or would like to discuss the points further, leave a comment.

Why is peace so allusive between the Israelis and Arabs?

The crucial turning point of all new and old peace initiatives continues to be the status of Jerusalem, a city that has been fought over for centuries and left a scar across the face of the region. It is this battle for this city, a city that is home to three religions, that remains the unmoveable obstacle to all progress. If a solution can be found to the political control of Jerusalem, peace would surely follow. Other crucial issues such as the right of return for Palestinian refugees scattered by numerous Arab-Israeli wars and the status of the Palestinian state are also important stumbling blocks. If these two issues were solved without an agreement on Jerusalem a deal would fail. A deal on Jerusalem without the Palestinian issue questioned would, in my opinion, not lead to a breakdown.

What does America want in the Middle East?

The first answer that usually comes to mind is ‘oil’. Wealth attracts interest. The US saw an opportunity in the ME and took it. Of course this is not the entire truth. As global hegemon, the US seeks to balance other powers against each other. To protect its interests in the ME it sought to protect Kuwait in 1990 while only two years earlier it had been a supporter of the very same regime against Iran. In 2003, it removed Saddam Hussein. This was a strategic blunder on the part of the junior Bush, which has allowed Iran to gain the upper hand in the region. Much work will be required to restore the balance.

Will Israel last?

It needs three things to maintain its position in the region, 1. Internal unity 2. Support of a major power and 3. Technological superiority. It is these three primary elements that have helped it survive against bigger and stronger enemies for sixty years. So far it has all three. It will last, for now.

Saturday, October 11, 2008

Damascus in turmoil?

Olivier Guitta interrogates the issue of Syrian complicity in the murder of former Lebanese PM Rafik Hariri and the ramifications that murder has had on the countries domestic and international image. The article appears in the Middle East Times:

If there is one country that has been all over the news lately, it is Syria. In fact between President Bashar Assad's charm offensive to the West (real or not), Syrian troops amassing near the Lebanese border, a terror attack in Damascus, it seems that today things are shaking up in Syria. But the difficulty of reading into this imbroglio is growing by the day: more players, more incidents, more drama.

While it is tough to know for sure what is going on in Assad's country, a certain pattern is emerging. And all roads lead to the International Tribunal that is meant to try the murderers of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. For the time being the various U.N. reports on the investigation are pointing to one direction where the culprits are presumed to be: Damascus.

What Assad would hate more than anything is that his regime would stand accused and be convicted of being behind the assassination of Hariri. The International Tribunal has become an obsession for the Syrian president. According to the Beirut daily Al-Anwar who cites Lebanese and international sources who obtained copies of the forthcoming report from the international commission, Syrian security services heavyweights are reportedly implicated in Hariri's assassination.

This has put the regime in Damascus in a near panic state. A number of analysts believe that Assad will go to great lengths to prevent the tribunal from proceeding. Now a more clear explanation of events which unfolded in Syria over the last year begins to emerge.

It all started with the assassination in February in Damascus of Hezbollah's Imad Mughnieh. While no formal accusation against the Syrian security services can be made, there is no way that in a country so tightly controlled there was not at least complicity from some in the regime. Interestingly, Mughnieh was suspected of having a hand in Hariri's murder and it could have been convenient for Damascus to get rid of him to avoid linkage to the regime.

Then shortly after, Syria's number 2, Assef Shawkat, head of the security services and Assad's powerful brother in law, was kicked out of the inner circle, stripped of his powers and allegedly put under house arrest. According to a Syrian opposed to the current regime, if Shawkat was not Bashar's sister's husband, he would have been eliminated. What is sure is that Shawkat was reportedly the real mastermind behind Hariri's murder. It is then quite convenient to have him taken out of the picture.

Fast forward to August 1, when General Muhammad Suleiman, Assad's right hand man was murdered by two snipers in Tartous. What makes his murder more than suspicious is that he was in his summer residence under tight security and had usually a team of 20 or so bodyguards. Weirdly enough, none of the members of his security team fired back or launched a pursuit against the snipers. Also Assad surprising everyone did not postpone a trip to Tehran, did not attend the funerals, and did not even present his condolences to the general's family. It looks like the death of his close confidante did not affect Assad in the least. And coincidence: Suleiman was summoned to appear in front of the international commission investigating the assassination of Hariri just a few days after his death. He already had been questioned twice and was one of the key witnesses, since all Syrian services reports from Lebanon were sent to him.
Last but not least, on Sept. 27, an explosion near a security service center in Damascus took place, killing 17. Again, how could this operation be pulled off in a country and a neighborhood so tightly controlled? How could a car full of 500 pounds of TNT be brought there? According to Syria's official television, the explosion killed a general and his son. It is allegedly Brigadier Abdel Karim Abbas, who was reportedly also one of the people interrogated by the international commission investigating Hariri's murder.

While it is true that one can doubt that the regime would be behind a "terror" attack that made so many victims just to kill one of its operatives, this is not so far-fetched especially in light of what occurred in the past few months.
These sudden 'accidental' deaths come at a convenient time for the regime. As they say in the intelligence business, there are no coincidences.

Olivier Guitta, an adjunct fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and a foreign affairs and counterterrorism consultant, is the founder of the newsletter The Croissant (www.thecroissant.com).

Thursday, October 9, 2008

Two journalists go missing in Lebanon - updated


Two US citizens, Taylor Luck (a writer for the Amman based Jordan Times) and Holly Chmela (a New York Times intern) went missing in Lebanon on 1 October. The couple left Amman on 29 September for Beirut on holiday and were due to return to Amman on 4 October after visiting Syria. The couple were last seen leaving their Beirut hotel on 1 October and were planning to travel north to the troubled Tripoli area. Reports emerged on 9 October that the pair had been seized by the Syrian authorities in the company of a 'smuggler' and were arrested for not having the proper visa to enter Syria. The couple were handed over to the US authorities in Damascus later on 9 October.
The dissapearence remains a mystery and a number of questions remain unanswered. Why were they travelling with a smuggler? Where were they between 1 and 9 October? Why would two journalists, one familiar with the region, risk crossing illegally into Syria, during a time of increased Syrian military build up along the Lebanse border and tension with Lebanon - when they could easily obtain an entry visa? When did Syria arrest the pair? The mystery of their dissapearence and reemergence will only become clearer once the two have exited Syria and been interrogated by the US authorities. The MECAS report continue to monitor developments and will keep its readers updated.

Friday, September 19, 2008

National dialogue: Implications for Lebanon's elite


Lebanon's political elite gathered in Beirut on 16 September for the first time since 2006 in an attempt to reinvigorate national reconciliation talks, seen as a key political goal in the post-Syrian Occupation history of the country. Present at the talks sponsored by President Michel Suleiman, were the leaders of the most dominant parties including the Future Movement, Free Patriotic Front, Amal, Hezbollah, PSP and a host of other smaller parties. Top of the agenda was the future character of a national defence strategy - a key sticking point between the March 14 and March 8 Alliance. As predicted the talks ended up being talks about talks and another session is due to be held on 5 November.

Lebanon emerged following the Syrian withdrawal in 2005 with no clear power arbiter that could keep the opposing sides from each others throats. It was only the concerted efforts of Lebanese politicians in 2005 that paved the way for talks. However, Lebanon's political immaturity led to a breakdown in these talks with the March 8 Alliance led by Hezbollah and Amal resigning from the cabinet and withdrawing from the dialogue in 2006 following a brief war between Israel and Hezbollah in July and August. What followed was a two year political freeze during which time political and sectarian tensions flared, Fatah al-Islam fought a series of battles against the Lebanese Armed Forces, Beirut downtown was occupied by March 8 protesters and the south of the country was turned into a UN peacekeeping zone.

The freeze was broken suddenly in May 2008 when a decision by the March 14 Alliance, Future Movement, to disband the Hezbollah telephone network and remove a pro-Hezbollah manager from the Beirut International Airport sparked pitched gun battles between pro- and anti-government forces across the country. At least 65 people were killed and dozens more injured during the clashes that finally resulted in the March 8 anti-government alliance occupying March 14 positions in Beirut. The March 8 alliance had clearly emerged as the dominant physical, if not political, force in the country. It must be noted that during the unrest the Lebanese army did not engage either side and took the middle ground allowing the opposing militias space to slug it out.

The violence showed that the Hezbollah led March 8 was clearly the strongest force in the country, but without a political mandate, something the March 14 alliance held onto fiercely. Queue international diplomats and Qatar in May - both sides agreed to meet in Doha for talks to resolve the differences. The meetings were highly successful and resulted in Michel Suleiman, up to then the military leader, taking over the presidency and an agreement reached on assigning more power to the March 8 alliance. A new cabinet was formed and here we stand at the precipice of Lebanese stability. Or do we?

The country is seen as a magnet for Islamist extremists who are believed to have flocked to the country's numerous refugee camps in recent years. The most feared group of these is Jund al-Sham a group based in the Ein al Hilweh camp. Fighting between them and Fatah militia has resulted in numerous deaths in recent months; however, the clashes don’t come close the 2007 battles between Fatah al-Islam and the Lebanese Army in the Nahr al-Bared camp. Although Fatah al-Islam has been routed, some elements remained scattered in the country and have the ability to carry out attacks in the country. The political vacuum has also created space for feuding clans and militias to carry out attacks against one another. Key hotspots have been Tripoli, the Bekaa Valley and the Chouf Mountains. In addition to these threats political and military figures are routinely assassinated.

Lebanon's political elite still have much work to do. The urgency of them accomplishing there goal can not be underestimated. As long as the main political blocs, the March 8 and 14 alliances remain deeply and aggressively opposed and the Lebanese army fail to take sides, space will be created for vendettas, feuds and assassinations which means that by the time they do agree there wont be much of a country left.

Wednesday, September 17, 2008

US Embassy attacked in Sanaa

Two car bombs targeting the US Embassy in Sanaa killed 16 people on 17 September. The attack, which was later claimed by Islamic Jihad in Yemen, was the first successful attack in the city since April this year when the al-Qaeda Organisation in the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen Soldiers Brigades, fired mortars towards a customs authority office and the Italian embassy. The recent attack underscores the continuing high threat from terrorism in Yemen and has serious implications for persons wishing to conduct business or visit the country. The attack was very well planned and executed and while the attackers did not penetrate the heavily fortified perimeter, the mere presence of a large number of al-Qaeda militants in the capital without the local security forces having issued a warning is a major concern and raises questions about the Yemeni intelligence services ability to track the large number of Islamist militants in the country. The al-Qaeda inspired militants have issued a number of threats this year already and carried out a number of attacks. A few of the most major recent developments include:


  • On 17 September, Islamic Jihad claims the US Embassy bombings and threatens further attacks against the UAE, Saudi and British Embassies in Sanaa.

  • On 16 September, Islamic Jihad reportedly threatens to carry out attacks against targets in Yemen.

  • On 19 August, the al-Qaeda group in Yemen issued a statement on a website confirming the death of al-Qa’iti and threatening reprisal attacks.

  • On 11 August, Yemeni security forces raided a house in Tarim, Hadramawt governorate. At least five al-Qaeda linked militants were killed including the alleged leader of the group, Hamza al-Qa’iti. A number of Yemeni security force personnel were also among the casualties.

  • On 5 August, al-Qaeda in Yemen threatened to carry out larger scale attacks in the country if militants arrested by the authorities, in connection with the 25 July suicide attack, were not released.

  • On 15 June, security forces arrested two suspects accused of planting bombs in government buildings in Sanaa governorate.

  • On 29 May, Yemeni authorities arrested an eleven-man terror cell in Sanaa. The suspected al-Qaeda linked cell were nationals of Chad and Saudi Arabia. The police action was followed by two security incidents on 30 May that may have been related to the capture of the al-Qaeda suspects.

  • On 12 May, reports indicate that AQ in Saudi have ordered their operatives to relocate to Yemen.

  • On 30 April, two bombs exploded on the premises of a customs office, near the Italian embassy in the Safia Janubiah area of Sanaa. There were no injuries or damages. Al-Qaeda Organisation in the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen Soldiers Brigades, claimed responsibility for the attack.

  • On 10 April, two Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) were located in the vicinity of the west wall of the Hadda residential compound in Sanaa.

  • On 9 April, a bomb exploded in the al-Hadda neighbourhood of Sanaa near the offices of Canadian oil company Nexen. There were no casualties or damage.

  • On 6 April, militants belonging to al-Qaeda fired three mortars/rockets into the Kuwait housing complex in the al-Hadda neighbourhood of south western Sanaa. There were no reports of injuries or damages. The complex houses foreign workers and the offices of the Yemen-owned Safer oil company, formerly known as Hunt Oil.

  • On 18 March, unknown individuals fired three mortar rounds towards the US embassy in the Sawan district of Sanaa. Two people died, including a security official guarding the embassy. The mortars landed short of the embassy in a nearby school. The Yemen government have blamed al-Qaeda for the attack.

  • On 2 February, an assailant threw a grenade at a group of students in a restaurant near the University of Sanaa. The attack left two people dead and 25 injured. The perpetrator has been identified as Mohammed Hassan al-Wajih. The motive for the attack remains unclear; however, authorities believe it may have involved a family dispute.

For a video of the incident, please click on the following link: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W2G6ogHD1iM

Wednesday, July 16, 2008

The Afghanistan forecast

On 7 October 2001, the military forces of the United States and United Kingdom began a bombardment of Afghanistan in an attempt to oust the ruling majority Pashtun Taliban movement. The operation dubbed "Enduring Freedom" was supported by the predominantly Uzbek, Tajik and Hazara United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan or Northern Alliance (NA), which led the ground assault against the Taleban. Initial Taleban resistance crumbled under the massive onslaught and Kabul soon fell to the Western backed NA. Western ground troops arrived in 2002 under the guise of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) which was taken over by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 2003, and were tasked with securing the gains made by the initial invasion and restoring order and the rule of law in Afghanistan. Since 2003, NATO-ISAF has enjoyed only partial success in restoring order. Many parts of the country remain lawless and ungoverned. Within this hostile climate of hostility and disorder, the Taleban and other like minded groups have reemerged as dominant forces challenging and threatening the very survival of the Western backed Hamad Karzai government. There is no better example of this growing insurgent dominance than the 13 July assault on a remote US outpost in Kunar province that left nine US soldiers dead. The attack led US commanders to reevaluate the outposts position near the village of Wanar and eventually decide to withdraw its forces from the fort.

The Taleban came to prominence in Afghanistan in the early 1990s. Supported by the Pakistan intelligence services and military and filled with recruits from Pashtun communities in western Pakistan and southern Afghanistan, the Taleban came to be the greatest threat to the newly installed mujahadeen government in Kabul. In 1994, the Taleban fought a series of battles against local warlords dispelling many of them and capturing Kandahar, a major southern city. By 1996, the group had captured Kabul and had almost complete control of the country (the NA controlled 10% of the territory, predominantly in the north east). The Taleban's first order of business after coming to power was to install a new legal code which was, in essence, a strict interpretation of Sharia Law. Non-Pashtun Afghanis were also largely denied access to power and were systematically replaced in all sectors of the country's political system and economy.

During this period, the Taleban forged closer relations with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the only states which recognised the Taleban administration. Osama Bin Laden's flight to Afghanistan in the late 1990s, also led to a now infamous relationship between the Taleban and al-Qaeda. Indeed, Bin Laden's partial financing of the regime and the addition of al-Qaeda fighters into the Taleban armed forces led to the development of closer ties between the two organisations, ties that are thought to continue to this day.

The 2001 ouster of the Taleban by the combined US/UK/NA forces crippled the organisation, but did not wholly destroy it. The Taleban's strong support from local Pashtun groups along the shared Pakistan - Afghanistan border and its bases in Pakistan have helped to restore the organisation to a point were it can boast an insurgent force of 2-3,000 combatants. Its technical and numerical inferiority to NATO-ISAF and US forces (47,000 troops combined) has also largely been overcome with the Taleban resorting to an al-Qaeda type strategy similiar to typical guerilla wars elsewhere in the world. Suicide bombings, ambushes and kidnappings combined with a 'hit and run' strategy have resulted in the group making great strides towards eroding the limited authority of the Hamad Karzai government and draining the coalition NATO-ISAF and US forces to a point where Western nations have begun calling for a full withdrawal from the embattled country.

Pakistan's troubled Federally Administered Tribal Areas and North West Frontier Province are also fertile breeding grounds for the Taleban. The Haqqani faction of the Pakistan Taleban rule with impunity in northern Waziristan and offer support to the Taleban in the form of bases and training areas. Leader of the faction, Jalaluddin Haqqani is also long serving Taleban leader, having served in the Taleban administration in the 1990s and being named the one time Taleban military commander in 2001.

The consequence of the alliance with al-Qaeda, its strong community support and its bases in Pakistan have recently been revealed with the frequency of attacks in provinces (Ghazni, Wardak and Parwan) surrounding Kabul and in the capital itself increasing year on year since 2006. For NATO-ISAF and Afghan forces overcoming these considerable obstacles will require a multi-pronged approach. Engaging with and protecting local communities will have to be prioritised. Creating alliances is a key ingredient in fighting a counter-insurgency campaign. However, this may require more troops on the ground, something a war weary Western public may not be so keen on. Coalition forces will also need to target insurgent bases. Unfortunately, many of these are based in Pakistan. Obtaining permission to carry out target attacks or convincing the Pakistan military to re-establish control in its lawless western regions will require a massive effort. Expect the Taleban to continue its growth for the short-term.

Other factions:

Hizb-i-Islami (Islamic Party) is led by Gulbaddin Hekmatyar. It is also known as Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin. The group, based in Kunar, Laghman, Jalalabad and Paktia is ethnic Pashtun and supports the Taleban against the coalition forces in Afghanistan. The group gained a reputation during the Soviet occupation as the most violent of the seven mujahadeen groups operating against the Soviets. Hekmatyar received support from Pakistan and the US during this period. His party has since fallen out of favour with Pakistan and continues an insurgency against the Taleban from Maza e sharif and Jalalabad. The group must not be confused with the Khalis faction of Hizb-i-Islami, based in Nangarhar and led by Mulavi Younas Khalis, which broke away from the main faction in 1979.

Thursday, July 10, 2008

Al-Qaeda in the descent, Taleban in the ascendancy


US propaganda during the month of July has indicated that Al-Qaeda attacks have decreased. In addition, a number of media reports have suggested that AQ are planning to move to Sudan and Somalia. These announcements come on the back of increased tensions following Iranian Shahab Missile tests on 9 and 10 July. Meanwhile, a US Naval carrier group has reposition from the Persian gulf to the Gulf of Oman to assist in operations against the Taleban in the Afghanistan theatre. Propaganda aside this may suggest that the US and the Iraqis are gaining significant momentum in Iraq or it may mean that AQ are holding off on attacks at present. In Iraq itself 9 of the 18 provinces have now been returned to Iraqi security control. The Stratfor article below also suggests that Iran and the US are looking to forge a long term deal over Iraq and that the first fruits of these negotiations are now being reaped as violence ebbs.

Afghanistan meanwhile remains firmly in the grip of a Taleban insurgency and no such deal seems to have been reached in this arena. The number of NATO Isaf troops based in the country remains well below levels required to bring stability. The Taleban have also evolved their tactics AQ style and are carrying out a sustained guerilla type war against foreign forces. The attacks have also begun to be focused on Kabul province. The feeling is that attacks against the economic and political heart of the country are likely to carry more weight than elsewhere in the country. The Taleban have also strenghthened its position in Pakistan's tribal areas and following peace deals with the Pakistan government and its alliances with local tribal groupings, its future seems secure. The NATO forces are left with few options other than increasing the size of its force to battle the Taleban and its allies (AQ & tribals).

One cant help but feel that the Afghan tragedy is a repeat of so many conflicts in the past. The British, Soviets and now the Americans have all come unstuck in the region. No deals will bring the Taleban to heel. The geography of Afghanistan offers the Taleban ample room to move and plan. Overcoming them will require active Nato presence in most rural and urban communities. If they can not succeed in this mission the Taleban will stay strong.

Peace breaks out: Stratfor looks at looming peace deals

By Peter Zeihan

As students of geopolitics, we at Stratfor tend not to get overexcited when this or that plan for regional peace is tabled. Many of the world’s conflicts are geographic in nature, and changes in government or policy only rarely supersede the hard topography that we see as the dominant sculptor of the international system. Island states tend to exist in tension with their continental neighbors. Two countries linked by flat arable land will struggle until one emerges dominant. Land-based empires will clash with maritime cultures, and so on.

Petit vs. Grand Geopolitic
But the grand geopolitic — the framework which rules the interactions of regions with one another — is not the only rule in play. There is also the petit geopolitic that occurs among minor players within a region. Think of the grand geopolitic as the rise and fall of massive powers — the onslaught of the Golden Horde, the imperial clash between England and France, the U.S.-Soviet Cold War. By contrast, think of the petit geopolitic as the smaller powers that swim alongside or within the larger trends — Serbia versus Croatia, Vietnam versus Cambodia, Nicaragua versus Honduras. The same geographic rules apply, just on a smaller scale, with the added complexity of the grand geopolitic as backdrop.

The Middle East is a region rife with petit geopolitics. Since the failure of the Ottoman Empire, the region has not hosted an indigenous grand player. Instead, the region serves as a battleground for extra-regional grand powers, all attempting to grind down the local (petit) players to better achieve their own aims. Normally, Stratfor looks at the region in that light: an endless parade of small players and local noise in an environment where most trends worth watching are those implanted and shaped by outside forces. No peace deals are easy, but in the Middle East they require agreement not just from local powers, but also from those grand players beyond the region. The result is, well, the Middle East we all know.

All the more notable, then, that a peace deal — and a locally crafted one at that — has moved from the realm of the improbable to not merely the possible, but perhaps even the imminent.

Israel and Syria are looking to bury the hatchet, somewhere in the Golan Heights most likely, and they are doing so for their own reasons. Israel has secured deals with Egypt and Jordan already, and the Palestinians — by splitting internally — have defeated themselves as a strategic threat. A deal with Syria would make Israel the most secure it has been in millennia.

Syria, poor and ruled by its insecure Alawite minority, needs a basis of legitimacy that resonates with the dominant Sunni population better than its current game plan: issuing a shrill shriek whenever the name “Israel” is mentioned. The Alawites believe there is no guarantee of support better than cash, and their largest and most reliable source of cash is in Lebanon. Getting Lebanon requires an end to Damascus’ regional isolation, and the agreement of Israel.

The outline of the deal, then, is surprisingly simple: Israel gains military security from a peace deal in exchange for supporting Syrian primacy in Lebanon. The only local loser would be the entity that poses an economic challenge (in Lebanon) to Syria, and a military challenge (in Lebanon) to Israel — to wit, Hezbollah.

Hezbollah, understandably, is more than a little perturbed by the prospect of this tightening noose. Syria is redirecting the flow of Sunni militants from Iraq to Lebanon, likely for use against Hezbollah. Damascus also is working with the exiled leadership of the Palestinian group Hamas as a gesture of goodwill to Israel. The French — looking for a post-de Gaulle diplomatic victory — are re-engaging the Syrians and, to get Damascus on board, are dangling everything from aid and trade deals with Europe to that long-sought stamp of international approval. Oil-rich Sunni Arab states, sensing an opportunity to weaken Shiite Hezbollah, are flooding petrodollars in bribes — that is, investments — into Syria to underwrite a deal with Israel.

While the deal is not yet a fait accompli, the pieces are falling into place quite rapidly. Normally we would not be so optimistic, but the hard decisions — on Israel surrendering the Golan Heights and Syria laying preparations for cutting Hezbollah down to size — have already been made. On July 11 the leaders of Israel and Syria will be attending the same event in Paris, and if the French know anything about flair, a handshake may well be on the agenda.

It isn’t exactly pretty — and certainly isn’t tidy — but peace really does appear to be breaking out in the Middle East.

A Spoiler-Free Environment
Remember, the deal must please not just the petit players, but the grand ones as well. At this point, those with any interest in disrupting the flow of events normally would step in and do what they could to rock the boat. That, however, is not happening this time around. All of the normal cast members in the Middle Eastern drama are either unwilling to play that game at present, or are otherwise occupied.

The country with the most to lose is Iran. A Syria at formal peace with Israel is a Syria that has minimal need for an alliance with Iran, as well as a Syria that has every interest in destroying Hezbollah’s military capabilities. (Never forget that while Hezbollah is Syrian-operated, it is Iranian-founded and -funded.) But using Hezbollah to scupper the Israeli-Syrian talks would come with a cost, and we are not simply highlighting a possible military confrontation between Israel and Iran.

Iran is involved in negotiations far more complex and profound than anything that currently occupies Israel and Syria. Tehran and Washington are attempting to forge an understanding about the future of Iraq. The United States wants an Iraq sufficiently strong to restore the balance of power in the Persian Gulf and thus prevent any Iranian military incursion into the oil fields of the Arabian Peninsula. Iran wants an Iraq that is sufficiently weak that it will never again be able to launch an attack on Persia. Such unflinching national interests are proving difficult to reconcile, but do not confuse “difficult” with “impossible” — the positions are not mutually exclusive. After all, while both want influence, neither demands domination.

Remarkable progress has been made during the past six months. The two sides have cooperated in bringing down violence in Iraq, now at its lowest level since the aftermath of the 2003 invasion itself. Washington and Tehran also have attacked the problems of rogue Shiite militias from both ends, most notably with the neutering of Muqtada al-Sadr and his militia, the Medhi Army. Meanwhile, that ever-enlarging pot of Sunni Arab oil money has been just as active in Baghdad in drawing various groups to the table as it has been in Damascus. Thus, while the U.S.-Iranian understanding is not final, formal or imminent, it is taking shape with remarkable speed. There are many ways it still could be derailed, but none would be so effective as Iran using Hezbollah to launch another war with Israel.

China and Russia both would like to see the Middle East off balance — if not on fire in the case of Russia — although it is hardly because they enjoy the bloodshed. Currently, the United States has the bulk of its ground forces loaded down with Afghan and Iraqi operations. So long as that remains the case — so long as Iran and the United States do not have a meeting of the minds — the United States lacks the military capability to deploy any large-scale ground forces anywhere else in the world. In the past, Moscow and Beijing have used weapons sales or energy deals to bolster Iran’s position, thus delaying any embryonic deal with Washington.

But such impediments are not being seeded now.

Rising inflation in China has turned the traditional question of the country’s shaky financial system on its head. Mass employment in China is made possible not by a sound economic structure, but by de facto subsidization via ultra-cheap loans. But such massive availability of credit has artificially spiked demand, for 1.3 billion people no less, creating an inflation nightmare that is difficult to solve. Cut the loans to rein in demand and inflation, and you cut business and with it employment. Chinese governments have been toppled by less. Beijing is desperate to keep one step ahead of either an inflationary spiral or a credit meltdown — and wants nothing more than for the Olympics to go off as hitch-free as possible. Tinkering with the Middle East is the furthest thing from Beijing’s preoccupied mind.

Meanwhile, Russia is still growing through its leadership “transition,” with the Kremlin power clans still going for each other’s throats. Their war for control of the defense and energy industries still rages, their war for control of the justice and legal systems is only now beginning to rage, and their efforts to curtail the powers of some of Russia’s more independent-minded republics such as Tatarstan has not yet begun to rage. Between a much-needed resettling, and some smacking of out-of-control egos, Russia still needs weeks (or months?) to get its own house in order. The Kremlin can still make small gestures — Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin chatted briefly by phone July 7 with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on the topic of the nuclear power plant that Russia is building for Iran at Bushehr — but for the most part, the Middle East will have to wait for another day.

But by the time Beijing or Moscow have the freedom of movement to do anything, the Middle East may well be as “solved” as it can be.

The New Era
For those of us at Stratfor who have become rather inured to the agonies of the Middle East, such a sustained stream of constructive, positive news is somewhat unnerving. One gets the feeling that if the progress could hold up for just a touch longer, not only would there be an Israeli-Syrian deal and a U.S.-Iranian understanding, the world itself would change. Those of us here who are old enough to remember haven’t sensed such a fateful moment since the weeks before the tearing down of the Berlin Wall in 1989. And — odd though it may sound — we have been waiting for just such a moment for some time. Certainly since before 9/11.

Stratfor views the world as working in cycles. Powers or coalitions of powers form and do battle across the world. Their struggles define the eras through which humanity evolves, and those struggles tend to end in a military conflict that lays the groundwork for the next era. The Germans defeated Imperial France in the Franco-Prussian War in 1871, giving rise to the German era. That era lasted until a coalition of powers crushed Germany in World Wars I and II. That victorious coalition split into the two sides of the Cold War until the West triumphed in 1989.

New eras do not form spontaneously. There is a brief — historically speaking — period between the sweeping away of the rules of the old era and the installation of the rules of the new. These interregnums tend to be very dangerous affairs, as the victorious powers attempt to entrench their victory as new powers rise to the fore — and as many petit powers, suddenly out from under the thumb of any grand power, try to carve out a niche for themselves.

The post-World War I interregnum witnessed the complete upending of Asian and European security structures. The post-World War II interregnum brought about the Korean War as China’s rise slammed into America’s efforts to entrench its power. The post-Cold War interregnum produced Yugoslav wars, a variety of conflicts in the former Soviet Union (most notably in Chechnya), the rise of al Qaeda, the jihadist conflict and the Iraq war.

All these conflicts are now well past their critical phases, and in most cases are already sewn up. All of the pieces of Yugoslavia are on the road to EU membership. Russia’s borderlands — while hardly bastions of glee — have settled. Terrorism may be very much alive, but al Qaeda as a strategic threat is very much not. Even the Iraq war is winding to a conclusion. Put simply, the Cold War interregnum is coming to a close and a new era is dawning.

www.stratfor.com

Tuesday, June 3, 2008

Tribal Yemen


A tribally based country, racked by poverty, divided between the prosperous north and disposessed south, rebelion in the mountainous north, scores of
African's seeking to escape poverty washing up dead on the western coastline every week and an economy inching towards the precipice. This is Yemen. Tourism officials will point out that these threats are being dealt with and that there is plenty to sea and do in the country once home to the mysterious Queen of Sheeba, Roman legions, Arab traders and the British Royal Navy. They would be right of course, Yemen's history is rich and its cultural heritage unique. These two reasons alone are enough for me to pack my bags for Sanaa. Yet the country is not, right. There is something about it that feels like a Somalia 20 years ago. The country isn't falling just yet, but those first signs are showing. The emergence of al-Qaeda cells (The Yemeni Brigades) in Sanaa, Aden, Marib and Hadramawt and a recent announcement by al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia that they were moving to Yemen are incredibly worrying. If only, if only Yemen had vast quantities of oil...then perhaps the world would care. But, alas, they dont. How ironic then is it that a brother (a perfectly honest chap) of the infamous Osama bin Laden is planning a bridge across the Gulf of Aden into Dijibouti. A connection that will connect two of the most historically rich, yet poorest and most insecure, areas in the world. Hopefully World Bank aid or the discovery of Tanzanite or some other rare metal may boost the country in the future. But one cant help but feel that the current regimes tenure will end, like Sheeba's did, like the Britons and the Romans...and what will remain are the tribes.

Sunday, May 25, 2008

The people of Lebanon decide, the people with the guns that is

The Lebanese parliament will convene at 17:00 today (25 May) to elect Army General Michel Suleiman as president of the country. The election will end six months of uncertainty over the position, since Emile Lahoud resigned in November 2007.

His election is, rightly so, being punted as a remarkable achievement for the Lebanese polity which has been at odds since the end of the Israeli-Hezbollah war in August 2006. In 2006, the pro-Syrian anti-government anti-Western Hezbollah accused the ruling majority (you guessed it pro-Western anti-Syrian) of colluding with the Israelis and began a string of civil campaings, including an opposition tent city in central Beirut, to amongst other things demand a veto power in the cabinet. They have now received that. This fact seems to have been completely ignored by elements of the world press. Hezbollah is the real winner here. They have a puppet president, have further eroded the credibility of the majority in parliament, have strengthened their military position following their successful show of force in April and May of this year and are set to make further gains should their momentum not be stopped.

Lebanon has not reached a happy tipping point. Its emergence may have serious implications for the region and must be addressed as a matter of urgency. How one does that is debatable. Hezbollah meanwhile will claim that this emergence is the will of the people, was done through legitimate means and can be fully justified. I had a look at the results of the most recent parliamentary elections held in 2005. They are quite revealing.

Pro-Syrian (Hezbollah and allied) 35 seats.
Anti-Syrian (Future Movement) 72 seats.

Enough said.

Thursday, April 17, 2008

Israel and Gaza

The 2007 Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip was a turning point in the Middle East Peace Process. Not only did it effectively split the Palestinian polity into two distinct entities it also had the effect of isolating those two new blocs, with one group in the West Bank and the other Palestinian group Fatah, in the Gaza Strip. Since then Hamas has secured its position and has continued to refuse to acknowledge Israel, a pre-requisite for any peace agreement. Fatah meanwhile has secured its position in the West Bank with Israeli security assistance. With this quarter secure many analysts believed that the time was right for the IDF to reengage militants in the Gaza Strip; however, the continued fallout from Israel's disastrous 2006 Lebanese adventure mitigated against any large scale operations and since June 2007 Israel and Hamas have been fighting a low intensity conflict along the Gaza border area. There are rumours now however that the IDF is preparing for a large scale incursion. These rumours have been spread before of course, but with the continued threats of a Hamas breakout of the Gaza area, increasing rocket salvo attacks against Israeli communities along the strip and a rising number of IDF casualties, the decision to go after Hamas may already have been made.



A Reuters cameraman is killed while filming an IDF tank in the Gaza Strip

Tuesday, April 15, 2008

Mystery blast in Shiraz, Iran

At least 12 people were killed and 200 injured after a bomb explosion in the in the Rahpouyan-e Vessal cultural center section of the Hosseynieh Seyed al-Shohada Mosque in the southern city of Shiraz on 12 April. The blast interrupted the sermon of well-known cleric Anjavinejad who was lambasting extremist Wahabi beliefs and the outlawed Baha'i faith - both of which are considered heretical by Shiites. Officials report that the blast was an accident and that leftover munitions from a past military exhibition were to blame. There are rumours that the authorities are covering up the incident, to what end nobody knows. If the blast was a terrorist act the prime suspects would be Arab seperatists, Kurd militants, followers of the Baha'i faith or Wahabists. "Investigations" are continuing.



Panicking congregants scatter as the blast rips through the mosque

Note on the city: Shiraz is a historical city of more than 1 million people and is known for being home to many scholars, artists and poets, and for local craftsmanship of rugs and metalwork. The tourist city, about 600km south of Tehran, is the capital of southern province of Fars. One of Iran's most famous cities, Shiraz is popular with foreign tourists because of its proximity to important ancient sites from the Achaemenid Empire that ruled much of Asia from 550-331 BC.

Monday, April 7, 2008

Ex-Soviet troops discuss the Afghan War 1980-1989



Aljazeera take us back to the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan during the 1980s. For more click here. The picture on the left is a Soviet era propaganda poster.

Syria-Lebanon-Israel and Hezbollah face off


A few hundred square kilometres and four armies on high alert are a recipe for disaster. This is the current state of affairs along the Syrian-Israeli-Lebanon borders where the three nations plus the Hezbollah militia have placed there militaries on high alert. Israel was the first to do so in February following the assassination of Imad Mugnihey in Damascus, Syria, and the subsequent Hezbollah claims that Israel had ordered the hit. Hezbollah followed suit soon after the Israeli move and then in late March, Syria deployed three infantry divisions to the Lebanese border and Golan Heights area. They explained that they did so in preperation for an Israeli attack on Lebanon...the truth is it was done to put pressure on the Lebanese government ahead of the Arab Summit in Damascus, held recently on 1 April. Last and not least the Lebanese Army were placed on high alert by army chief Michel Suleiman on 6 April. This was done not because of any real threat but in response to Israeli emergency drills being conducted between 6 and 10 April and to appease Hezbollah, no doubt. Whatever the reasons for the heightening of the alert levels, the fact remains that we have three highly effective and combat ready armies (and the Lebanese force) facing off in an area the size of the greater London metropolis. Recipe for disaster? You betcha ass it is.

Saturday, March 29, 2008

"al-Qaeda on the run" - US President G.W. Bush 2008


1) More people have been killed in Pakistan in 2007 and 2008 in terror attacks than in the period 2001 to 2006. 2) Suicide attacks in Afghanistan have spiked with the number of terror attacks in Kabul, Afghanistan, having doubled since 2006. 3) The Taleban in Afghanistan and their allies in Pakistan are cashing in on the lucractive opium trade and Pakistan military inefficiency in the FATA areas, a lawless region in Pakistan along the Aghan border. 4) The insurgency in Afghanistan is set to worsen and more lives will be lost. These are the facts. They are not from conspiracy theorists, nor are they from a senile Mugabe like dictator, they are the words of NATO generals, US Intelligence chiefs, US senators and the US president's own Afghan Study Group report released in January 2008. The disinformation spread by George Bush serves to insult the intelligence of the world. Al-Qaeda and the Taleban are strong and growing stronger, and threaten not only south Asia, but the larger region as well.

Monday, March 24, 2008

Achtung: Austrians feel the sting of al-Qaeda in the Sahara


Two Austrian tourists were kidnapped in Tunisia on 22 February by al-Qaeda affiliate al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The tourists were taken back into Algeria and from there on to northern Mali. Algerian and Tunisian forces went on high alert in March after the AQIM stated it had kindapped the two. However, they were too late to catch the kidnappers who returned to bases in the Kidal region of Mali. As of 24 March the two had not been released and negotiations are currently underway to secure their release.

The kidnap was motivated for economic and political reasons. AQIM demanded a ransom of 5 million euros and the release of 10 Jihadists incarcerated in Tunisian and Algerian gaols. If the ransom is not paid AQIM have threatened to execute the couple. AQIM have abducted tourists in the past most recently in 2003 when 32 foreigners were taken in eastern Algeria. The threat in this quarter is real and warnings by governments and risk assessors is regularly ignored by foreign travellers who continue to travel to this high risk region with inadequate support or security. AQIM are active, AQIM are real and they will make sure that any visit to their home turf is met with certain consequences. Bottom line, dont travel around the desert in a fancy 4X4 with Austrian or foreign number plates, if you do you're asking for trouble.

Egypt: Al Jazeera special feature ahead of April elections

Al Jazeera takes a look at the Muslim Brotherhood. Guests include the editor of Carnegies Arab Reform Bulletin and a Muslim Brotherhood spokesman.

Tuesday, February 19, 2008

Lebanon: The primary players and their goals

What they want or dont want

Iran - Destruction of Israel, removal of pro-West government in Lebanon. Will support Syria and Hamas to achieve these ultimate goals.
Syria - Return to Lebanon either through Hezbollah proxy or through military occupation
Lebanese Future Movement (anti-Syrian majority) - Maintain hegemony in Lebanon, try to reach consensus with Hezbollah i.e. get Hezbollah to accept anything less than a veto power in the cabinet.
Hezbollah/Amal - They want a veto in the Lebanese executive.
Israel - Wants Hezbollah to be disarmed and its northern border secured so that it can concentrate on Gaza and Hamas.
US - Wants pro-Western government to remain in power to balance Syria and Hezbollah
Russia - Doesn’t want the US to gain a foothold in Lebanon. Will look to remain neutral and a balance to any US involvement in Lebanon. Currently have naval bases in Syria (Alleppo).

Possible scenarios:

  • Civil war in Lebanon, unlikely at present, unless foreign interference.
  • Syrian preemptive attack on Golan Heights. Co-ordianted with Hezbollah. Unlikely, Syria would be punished severely by Israeli counter attacks.
  • Popular uprising by Shiites. Unlikley, Lebanese army remains strong and has so far crushed any open dissent.
  • If the Lebanese army were to fracture or weaken further, its likely that we would have to rate the country as extreme. They are the primary keepers of the peace at the moment.
  • Syrian allies in Lebanon stage coup, Syrian military intervention to 'stabilize' the country.Hezbollah attack Israel in retaliation for 12 Feb assassination, Israel respond in kind at some point. Winter is a mitigating factor, slowing Israeli advance. Likely Israeli response at this time to be targeted attacks against Hezbollah positions in southern Lebanon/Beirut and or Beqaa Valley.

Notes:
Syrians main option is to further destabilise Lebanon through targeted assassinations etc. They rely on Hezbollah, however, to play along. If Hezbollah find that the pro-West government is unlikely to give up power they may be open to Syrians greater involvement in Lebanon.

Russia and US are balanced in the Mediterranean, unlikely to get directly involved over threat of larger scale war. Israel will maintain defensive positions and will be unwilling to mobilize fully unless a serious escalation in hostilities. The season also mitigates against a ground invasion at the moment. The UN are mere observers in southern Lebanon and will not stand in the way of an Israeli invasion or Hezbollah troop movements.

Upcoming events:

26 February Lebanese parliament convene for the 14th / 15 th time to elect a president. Likely to be postponed again.

29 March: Arab Summit in Damascus.

Thursday, February 14, 2008

Hezbollah intelligence chief assassinated in Syria


(1962-2008)

Killed in a car bomb in Damascus on 12 February. Possible suspects - CIA, Mossad

The killing of Imad Mughniye in Damascus, what ever is the context and whom ever are the executors, is a benchmark in the war between the Iranian Terror networks and their enemies. Mughniye has led the Iranian and Hezbollah operations against US personnel since 1983 and was the top planner in the Hezbollah-Israel war. He was seen as the principal link between the Pasdaran (Iranian Revolutionary Guard) power and its supported organizations around the world including Hezbollah in Lebanon and overseas. But as important, was his role in coordinating the Iranian Terror activities with Syria's intelligence services. His elimination has mostly a symbolical effect on the secret war between Western intelligence and the axis' secret apparatus. In intelligence lingo, he was the top Terror operations general, not only central to Lebanon's activities but also to training Hezbollah's "international" action, including Iraq, Gaza and the West. The impact of such an event is seen clearly in the statements made by the leadership of Hezbollah and the potential actions the group may take.

Some other incidents he was involved in and some facts:

The 1983 bombings of the US Embassy and US Marine and French paratrooper barracks in Beirut, which killed more than 350 people

The 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires

The kidnapping of Westerners in Lebanon during the 1980s, and a series of other high-profile operations.

Mugniyah is also reported to have met with members of al-Qaeda’s senior leadership, including Osama bin Laden, and is believed to have played a role in the terrorist group’s technical development.

Interpol recently put out an international warrant for him for his alleged role in the Buenos Aires attack

The United States indicted him for his role in planning and participating in the June 14, 1985, hijacking of an American commercial airliner and the killing of US Navy diver who was aboard the flight.

Before Osama came along, Imad was responsible for the majoirty of US terror related fatalities overseas. (not including Iraq)

Response?

Hezbollah are believed to be planning a response to the killing of Imad. This may take a number of forms...a strongly worded condemnation is unlikely....a cross border incursion into Israel is also not on the cards for now. A terror attack against a Jewish target, either in Israel or elsehwere is the most plausable response. His deep connection to Osama bin Laden may also lead to retaliatory attacks. Bottom line, expect an attack, probably against a high value target, soon. See below from wiki:

"On February 16, 1992, Israeli helicopters attacked a motorcade in southern Lebanon, killing Musawi, his wife, son, and four others. Israel said the attack had been planned as an assassination attempt. In retaliation, a shadowy group called "Islamic Jihad - led by Imad- " carried out the Israeli Embassy attack in Buenos Aires. Musawi was succeeded as secretary-general of Hezbollah by Hassan Nasrallah."

More links:

FBI's most wanted
http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/terrorists/termugniyah.htm

Wednesday, February 13, 2008

The insurgency in Algeria



The insurgency in Algeria continues to claim lives, impact upon local business and threaten investment in the oil- and gas-rich North African state. Since the early 1990s, Islamist militants have taken up arms to bring about regime change and to introduce an Islamist caliphate in the region. While the insurgency has waned in recent years, it continues to draw volunteers to its ranks and to threaten government and foreign interests in the country. This state of affairs remains unchanged despite a concerted campaign by the Algerian military to annihilate insurgent bases scattered over the mountainous northern and southern desert reaches of the country. The insurgency has also taken a new direction since the beginning of 2007, when the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat changed its name to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The newly rebranded group has focused its larger attacks against police and foreign interests with highly public suicide and car bomb explosions, in addition to its normal activities. The threat to foreign interests has also seemingly increased in the past two years. Kidnapping threats have reportedly been made to foreign business people and a number of kidnaps for ransom have been reported since January 2007, which suggests that kidnap and killing of foreigners remains a priority tactic for the AQIM.

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is a Sunni extremist organisation that aims to create an Islamic state in Algeria and to ultimately unite the Muslim world into a caliphate (an Islamic super state ruled by a single leader) reaching from Morocco to the Philippines. Its long running campaign against the Algerian government to achieve this end is well documented and the group's activities continue to make regional and international headlines. The April 2007 suicide car bomb attacks in Algiers against the offices of the prime minister, the kidnapping of an Egyptian in May 2007, the kidnapping of three Chinese workers in June 2007, the December 2007 suicide attacks against the Algerian judiciary and the UN headquarters in Algiers, and a range of other bomb attacks against convoys carrying foreign workers, are clear indications the group is serious about targeting high value marks such as government institutions and foreigners in Algeria.

The group has approximately 500-1,000 members, with the bulk of these operating in the northern regions. A smaller detachment is believed to be operating in the southern reaches of the Saharan desert along the border with Niger, Mali and Mauritania. The southern group's activities are minor compared to their northern compatriots who have well established networks across the north of the country, particularly in the region from Ain Defla to Skikda. This axis accounts for the majority of reported incidents involving the AQIM. The terrain is well suited to the insurgency, being mainly forested and mountainous, affording the group ample seclusion and protection from the Algerian military. It is financed through criminal activities, chiefly smuggling, and through donations, believed to be received from sympathisers and cells based in Europe. It may also have a degree of support from the primary al-Qaeda organisation, although it is commonly believed that the link between the two is largely nominal (i.e. opportunistic).

The group's ranks are replenished through recruitment amongst communities in Algeria, West Africa and other neighbouring states. High levels of unemployment, political marginalisation and disenchantment with the ruling regimes of North Africa, and the growth of Islamist thought and practice all combine to provide a rich recruitment environment for the AQIM. The AQIM is also bolstered periodically by the return of fighters from Iraq and Afghanistan who bring newly learnt tactics and experience with them. These fighters are a key ingredient to the success of the AQIM. Indeed the upswing in suicide and car bomb attacks has been explained in part as a consequence of the return of these fighters from Iraq and Afghanistan.

Algerian government response to the AQIM
The government of Abdul-Aziz Bouteflika has responded to the AQIM threat in a number of ways. Firstly, security force numbers have been increased countrywide and are due to be bolstered further by an additional 15,000 units annually until 2010, when the total Algerian security force contingent should number around 200,000 members. Secondly, it has continued a highly successful military campaign against suspected AQIM hideouts in the country. Thirdly, the intelligence services are believed to be acting to sow dissention in the ranks of the AQIM leadership; this is occasionally reported on by the Algerian press. Lastly, the government has offered a series of amnesties to the insurgents; hundreds of militants are believed to have taken up the offer, in return for a life of normalcy. These national strategies have been complimented by regional and international counter-terrorism agreements such as the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI). Together with the other North African states and the US, programs designed to coordinate regional security responses to terrorism have been operationalised. Through the TSCTI, local security forces have been equipped with the necessary skills to counter terrorist groups, particularly in the Sahel area. Local and regional strategies and policies have yet to show any significant results, however. The AQIM's presence in Algeria shows no signs of diminishing and the number of high-profile attacks is in fact increasing not falling as the government would lead us to believe.

Future outlook
AQIM remains the most potent anti-government force operating in Algeria and will continue to threaten the security of the country for the medium-term. However, its capacity to enact serious regime change remains highly improbable. The Algerian army maintains a numerical and technological superiority over the militant bands and the government remains stable and unified. AQIM's alliance with al-Qaeda remains a concern, not only for the Algerian government, but also for the neighbouring states of Morocco and Tunisia. The group's alliance with al-Qaeda has led it firmly into the internationalist jihad fold. Attacks outside of the country remain a concern for regional states and the US, both of which are keen to eradicate any future terror breeding grounds. In terms of method, there is evidence to suggest that tactics favoured by insurgents in other theatres (Iraq and Afghanistan primarily) may be gaining in popularity in Algeria. The use of improvised explosive devices, for example, is one such tactic that is becoming more frequent. However, this can simply be seen as a natural evolution of the current conflict, as insurgents experiment with new methods. Targets will continue to be foreigners and the government (military, police, industrial and otherwise). Algerian civilians will also be indirectly affected as the AQIM pursue their indiscriminate bombing campaign in public areas.

In February Algerian security forces identified four new AQIM staging points or regions. The group was believed to have nine before. However, due to the military crackdown, Dorukdel, AQIM leader, has reorganised his network. See map below.


Wednesday, February 6, 2008

Risk analysis: Basic frameworks


Risk analysis remains a field divided. There is no single method of measuring risk. There are many indicators, but the most successful and least controversial remains the subjective approach. One based on evidence and then presenting possible scenarios. Ive put a few down below focusing on terrorism and politics.

Terrorism:

Current status

We currently rate the threat of terrorism in ___ as ___. (our position)

There is a history of terror related activity in the country__.

This threat is derived from Islamist extremist groups/anarchists/separatists/insurgents.

The following groups are believed to be active in the region/have a support structure in the region, have easy access to the region.

The most recent terror related activity occurred on_ . (action etc)

On that occasion___.

OR / AND The most recent threat received from a terror group.

Modus Operandi & Area of operation

The most high risk regions are__. The safer regions are_____

Terrorists target___ (westerners, government, military, civilians, ethnic group)

The types of weapons used in attacks__ (IED, Suicide attacks, shooting etc)

Analysis

We believe that further attacks are highly likely/possible/unlikely because of___ Threats/regional position/high number of foreign visitors/historical precedent/nationally symbolic days/govt action/islamist schools/trends/incidents

Personal response

What you can do-general security advice.

Politics:

Historical context

Main political players, current government

Government policies, policy direction

Opposition to government, name them, policies, ideology

Threat to stability?

Internal - external Consequence of opposition - Civil unrest - violence

Response to the threat.

Areas to avoid, Anniversarys to avoid, topics to avoid etc

Upcoming events that could spark events affecting safety and security.

Do we think this event will change the status quo, lead to a deterioration in security etc.

Civil unrest (Element of political)

Incidence of civil unrest are regularly/periodically reported in (country). Most incidence take the form of peaceful demonstrations/mass rallies/marches/riots/clashes with police/strikes in response to domestic issues/regional issues/international issues/random. Civil gatherings are usually peaceful/Civil gatherings turn violent on occasion with little warning. These usually occur in major cities (capital etc)/rural areas/outlying areas etc. and affect travellers in terms of delays/do not overly affect travel itenaries/have a direct impact on travellers safety (Special note). Avoid them etc + (link)

Militias and secession, how to succeed.


Regional conflicts are not modern problems for states. As long as there have been central governments, there have been groups opposed to the status quo, some of which have taken up arms to overthrow the ruling regimes. Success is usually measured by the power they are able to extract from their conflict, be it total victory or some sort of regional concession. One of the most significant successes include the Russian Revolution, American War of Independence and numerous colonial wars that resulted in the removal of the ruling regime. But what did these groups have that differentiated them from other less successful groups, thinking primarily of FARC in Colombia, the LTTE in Sri Lanka and Jundallah in Iran where conflicts continue to rage on endlessy and with, seemingly, no end in sight.

  • Popular support. Usually groups opposed to a government require the support of the majority of a countries people in order to take full control, or of a regions people to take federal control. Unfortunately for many regional groupings they remain too small to openly combat central government. However, in places like Iraq, regional autonomy can be achieved, see the KRG for example.

  • Backing from international powers. During the cold war US and Soviet led coups were commonplace and couldn't have succeeded without their support. Today this sort of support is less likely, in a world becoming increasingly dominated by international consensus and the idea of national sovereignty. However, covert support from the major powers is still hinted at occassionaly. Iran supports Shiite militias in Iraq and the US supports 'democracy advocates in Iran.'

  • Single mindedness and unity. This may sound obvious, but if groups become splinteted in their goals like in the Philippines amongst the Moro fighters, it becomes impossible to gain any significant advantage.

So there you have it, not exactly a closed list but a starting point for any would-be revolutionaries.

Wednesday, January 9, 2008

Indian democracy and Indian economy: Self serving or inhibiting?

James Voortman explores India's current difficulties in advancing economic reform within a democratic political system. As one of Asia's shining democratic success stories India will be keen to push through much needed economic reforms; however, recent history has shown that this is easier said than done. For more, click here.

Monday, January 7, 2008

Hezbollah to the government: Everything must go (our way)


Lebanon's political foot dragging over the election of a new president continues to cast a shadow over the futre of the country. Since the end of Lahoud's term in November the countries main opposition parties have been unable to agree on a mechanism to vote in consensus candidate, Suleiman. Hezbollah and its allies continue to demand a cabinet veto in return for a resumption in talks aimed at creating a constitutional amendment allowing Suleiman, a civil servant, the ability to stand for and be elected president. Hezbollah have also threatened to stage mass protests, threatening to disrupt the Rafik Hariri International Airport and other major entry and exit ports if a solution is not found following the 12 January session of parliament. These threats will do nothing for the confidence of the long-sufferring Lebanese people who have faced the threat of civil war since the assassination of Rafik Hariri in 2005. The short term outlook for Lebanon remains bleak. It is highly unlikely that any compromise will be found on 12 January. Expect yet another delay on the issue and mass action by the oppostion. If you're visiting Lebanon at the moment sit tight...if you're planning to go you may want to hold tight and spend your money elsewhere, perhaps on a trip to the local mall to take advantage of the post Christmas clearance sales. Everything must go.