The state of Libya is facing an existential crisis. There are numerous armed groups and political factions vying for control and influence in the country. This competition has resulted in a situation which can best be described as a civil war, with both Tripoli and Benghazi, the country's two major cities, affected by regular rounds of fighting. The battle currently consists of two main coalitions of fighting groups. On the one side are the Islamists and fighters from the powerful city of Misratah. On the other you have the nationalists or secularists allied to two main groupings, the town of Zintan and retired Libyan Army General Haftar. These forces are further divided between groups which have, for all intents and purposes, been grouped together due to the current cause rather than any ideological affiliation.
The government is facing an uphill task in reigning in the fighting groups, even militia funded through the state coffers. The House of Representatives, elected earlier in the year, has moved its office to Tobruk from Tripoli due to the fighting. It has issued numerous statements and passed a law effectively banning militias. Unsurprisingly, the HoR has been largely ignored.
The failure of the HoR, to date, is of critical importance. The current crisis, it was thought, was largely a result of the failure of the previous legislature, the GNC. In the run-up to the end of its mandate, protests and violent attacks characterised the Libyan security environment in scenes reminiscent of what we are witnessing today. However, the GNC's end and the rise of the HoR has, obviously, not resulted in any apparent improvement.
The Muammar al-Gaddafi regime was successful because it used its iron fist to clamp down on all power centres in the country. It subsumed many powerful tribes and personalities into the regime structure and suppressed (violently) its opponents. This formula worked well for Libya up until February 2011 when the first signs of unrest were reported in Benghazi.
In 2011, the Arab Spring erupted and a civil war began. The artificial hold on the country was released and previous power centres and interests, specifically the Islamist bloc (read Muslim Brotherhood) and Misratah, came to the fore to fill the vacuum. It is, essentially, this friction between powerful sub-state entities and the weak central government that has defined the post-al-Gaddafi period and it is assessed that this narrative will be one that will characterise the Libyan landscape for some time to come.
So what can the international community and the Libyan government do to end the crisis? They need to be realistic. Libya is fragmented. It needs, therefore, to provide some power to the sub-state entities. A federal system of governance is the most obvious type of political setup which could suit the country. Within federal regions, the state would surrender most economic power for security control. This would bring stability at least for the meanwhile. But to get to the point the Libyan government needs to provide the regions with a vision and hope that stability and prosperity can be achieved. The international community needs to sit up and take notice and provide as much military and political support to the HoR as it can. They have a small window now that must be taken.
A simple blog curated by Andre, a risk management intelligence professional. Going strong since 2005. Feedback to rushmore100@gmail.com
Tuesday, August 19, 2014
The state of Libya
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