Yemens example to us: No resources + No freedom = War

History often affords observers glimpses of the future and what we are likely to expect given the constancy of human experience. The case of Yemen is an interesting subject to observe and to analyse in order to predict the future of other Arab states in the region. Since the end of the Second World War, Arabian countries have developed considerably on the back of oil and gas wealth, which has afforded ruling regimes significant breathing room to stifle domestic opposition and maintain authoritarian status quos. However, in the case of Yemen, resources are not unlimited and the government is showing signs of stress, particularly in fringe areas such as the south, amongst ex-Southern Yemeni loyalists, and in the north, amongst Shiite minority groups.

Yemen's gas, oil and water resources are running out. The next two decades will show incredible strain on the local economy if alternative avenues of revenue are not found or if significant foreign investment is not forthcoming. The pressure on the patronage system in the country, which keeps disparate groups from openly battling the government, will grow significantly. We have already witnessed what economic discrimination in the south can result in. Widespread anti-government protests in the economically backward south have broken out frequently since May 2007. Although the risk of a coup is unlikely given the largely decentralized opposition and the well resourced northern army, the cracks are beginning to show. In the past few years the Yemeni army has also faced serious rebellion in the north amongst Zahdi Shiite groups, primarily the Believing Youth. This group is staunchly anti-government and opposed to the government of Ali Saleh. In a country defined by loyalty to the tribe rather than the state, the Zahdis and the local authorities have never got along. The presence of seemingly illegitimate government authority has deepened distrust between the groups. Saleh for his part has taken tough measures in crushing the Zahdi uprisings, using militant, loyal tribal and regular forces in these campaigns. The conflict in the north is, like the unrest in the south, likely to continue for the foreseeable future and may deteriorate further, should Saleh not take more substantive steps to appease the rebels.

As the ancestral home of Osama bin Laden, Yemen's position in jihadi thinking remains strong. Positioned between the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa, Yemen has become a central staging point for al-Qaeda and other Sunni jihadist groups. The growing instability of the south and north is likely to create conditions within which returning fighters from Iraq and Afghanistan can train and operate. The increasing pressure on the government from the USA to diminish the presence of al-Qaeda is likely to further pressure the government and strain relations between itself and the west. This may have an impact on foreign investment and aid.

Saleh needs to reform the political system immediately and return opposition groups to position of power in the country. If the demands of the opposition are not met, Saleh will find it increasingly difficult, given the economic downturn, to contain these groups. The time to act is now. If Saleh waits, the government will become weaker, diminishing its bargaining power. Hanging onto power remains 'Mugabe like' and will see the country slide deeper into the abyss. By granting power, possibly federal, to the northerners in return for an end to fighting and demobilization and by investing in the south, in terms of economic aid to the impoverished Aden, Saleh will eradicate the conditions within which al-Qaeda could operate, thus meeting the third goal. These acts remain unlikely to happen however given recent historical precedence and Yemen is likely to fragment within the next three decades. Yemen is the tip of the iceberg and an example to other Middle Eastern states, that authoritarian rule in the modern world is unsustainable given the limited resources our planet has to offer.

Algeria's ongoing campaign to root out Islamist extremism

Since the early 1990s Algeria has battled to contain an Islamist insurgency that has claimed tens of thousands of lives and that has in recent times evolved into a highly efficient and deadly insurgency structured along the lines of the al-Qaeda campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Attempts by the Algerian government to quell the insurgency have proved fruitless despite repeated amnesty offers, military campaigns and other acts of subterfuge. Algerian ministers have stated in the press that the insurgency is waning and that the war on terror was being won; yet in the past 12 months Algeria has experienced some of the worst terrorist violence since the bloody 1990s. The re-branded al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has adopted new tactics in its war against the Algerian government using suicide operations as a useful tool in its quest to overthrow the Bouteflika regime. How to combat this terror has become a central focus of local regimes and international concerns, primarily the US, which does not want to see a resurgence of Islamist extremism in the Sahel.

The emergence of the AQIM out of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat was done more for propaganda purposes than signaling a real shift in the group's policies. Indeed the group has had a long association with al-Qaeda and Algerian fighters have been prominent in Iraq and Afghanistan fighting against coalition forces there. They still have a strong Salafist leaning and are committed to national and international jihad against the enemies of Islam [sic]. The AQIM has developed new methods as mentioned above and it is believed that veteran fighters of the insurgencies elsewhere have radicalized and improved the efficiency of the movement locally. The evolution of the group has serious implications for Algerian and North African security.

Extremist Islamist thought has come to predominate in many areas of North Africa. Radical imams preaching a firebrand version of Islam have instilled in many local communities a strong anti-Western and anti-institutional sentiment that has benefited terror recruiters. Combined with high unemployment amongst easily persuaded youth the ranks of the local insurgents continue to swell. The Sahel area is seeing a decisive shift at present that could ultimately affect countries south of the Sahel. Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian security forces have done well to combat the scourge and in the case of Morocco dedicate large chunks of their spending of defence.

Battling extremism using force has clearly failed. Algeria's military is one of the strongest and well trained in Africa and yet a group of up to 1,000 insurgents continue to exact a heavy toll on civilian and military interests. Even in Morocco extremists continue to emerge and threaten local security. The problem isn’t the extremist as much as it is the doctrine, that appeals so much to the masses. The issues are therefore two fold. Poor conditions, poverty etc, give rise to discontent which is then manipulated by jihadists and extremist imams for some end, usually martyrdom. The recruits are usually poorly educated and are entranced by the possibility of becoming a martyr and escaping the current poor conditions. When these two issues exist in a country, extremism is bound to flourish. Local governments therefore need to spend their budgets, not on extra security and armies, but on education and economic reform. By taking away the conditions that extremist take advantage of and by closing down and eradicating firebrand mosques and teachings, the jihadist phenomenon will disappear. However, the conditions that give rise to these problems have existed for at least a generation and overcoming them will take time.

Economic indicators

Tunisia: Unemployment 13.9% (2006 est.); GDP per capita $8,900 (2006 est.); Literacy 74.3%

Algeria: Unemployment 15.7% (2006 est.); GDP per capita $7,600 (2006 est.); Literacy 69.9%

Morocco: Unemployment 7.7% (2006 est.); GDP per capita $4,600 (2006 est.); Literacy 52.3%

Olmert's tricky choice: Strike or..?

The question on everybody's mind is when, if at all, will Olmert make a decision to strike at the growing menace in the Gaza Strip and in southern Lebanon. The Iranian nuclear crisis and the weakness of Fatah in the West Bank aside, these two regions continue to threaten the very heart of the vulnerable Israeli state. Hamas in Gaza have done well since the takeover over the Strip in June. They have, despite economic sanctions, taken over control of the security of the region and conducted at least one highly public training drill. Rocket attacks by Hamas and Hamas aligned groups continue to reign down on Negev communities and clashes between the IDF and Palestinian gunmen are reported daily along the border. Hamas are betting on the Israeli army invading the Gaza Strip so that they can use their new defensive weapons against Israeli heavy armour. Olmerts problem is two fold. Strike and face heavy casualties, do nothing and face the Israeli public. Olmert has come under increasing pressure at home to do something about the Gaza Strip. Pressure from southern Israeli communities has become enormous of late and with just cause. The daily barrage of Qassam rockets and mortars has left a deep scar on the mental fabric of southern communities. Inaction by the Olmert government has directed the anger for these attacks away from Hamas towards the Israeli authorities. Problem one.

Problem two. The north of the country also continues to be an arena within which Israeli security can be affected. However, striking here is slightly more difficult. The presence of Lebanese Army forces and UN peacekeepers in southern Lebanon prevent Israel from striking at present. However, Hezbollah continues to rebuild and reequip with support from Iran, which has laid some 1000km of highway in the south to make the militia group more mobile. Hezbollah is strengthening but face the same problems the Israelis do in that they can not penetrate through the UN and Lebanese barrier in the south without causing significant political damage to its cause. Its goal will be to try and influence the Lebanese government and somehow manipulate the Israelis into striking first. But perhaps this will come later. Domestic ascendancy is their primary goal.

Olmert has a number of problems therefore. Hamas is strong and growing, internal anger at his inaction is rising, Hezbollah is a continuing menace in the north and the Fatah government (something we have not touched upon) remains weak in the West Bank. Israel is surrounded. The question now is, when will they lash out, because lash out they will. Watch this space.

The India-US Nuke deal

Featuring a whole new format, the South Asia Review presents a short analysis of "The India - US nuclear deal and the costs of its failure" The piece details yet another US government foriegn policy failure that could cause yet more of a schism in the already divided Indian legislature. For more, click here.

Voortman on Sri Lanka's fiery President Rajapakse

James Voortman, a leading Asian security analyst, outlines the main security threats in the Sri Lankan theatre at present. His most recent analysis appeared in an article published by the Asian Times. To read the article, please click here. For further South Asia analysis visit Voortman's blog by clicking here.

Defining the Qaeda monster

I recently received a mail from a reader concerning definitions and the fight against terrorism. The reader was confused that the US hadn’t been able to destroy al-Qaeda despite having overwhelming technical and military superiority. The question raised issue over the harmony of terrorists and how governments used the tag, terrorist, to identify its modern day enemies.

Terrorism is a phenomenon that is not easily defined or does it fit into any particular framework. When attempts are made to do so, arguments are made against it and counter examples generally prove to be successful in showing that a particular group or incident is not terrorism but another type of attack. So when analysing the effect of terrorism we are in fact analysing the effect of attacks on civilian or military interests by groups with set ideologies and motivations. Looking at the Middle East analysing particular countries we are confronted with numerous groups, which strangely enough are usually associated with al-Qaeda. This group has been blamed for hundreds of attacks, and groups either aligned with it or motivated by it are said to be diffuse. Yet this raises a number of problems. The most obvious being, do all these groups share a common ideology? The answer surely, must be no. With differing nationalities, immediate priorities are largely ignored by analysts and media commentators to the detriment of proper analysis. This has largely been a factor of government's pigeon holing groups into easily identifiable structures so that they can easily present the 'enemy' to their civilian populations. It is a political consequence more than a scientific one and to understand 'terrorist groups' one must understand this function, this flawed function.

The Bakiyev show: Soviet style politicking at its best

Kyrgyzstan president, Kurmanbek Bakiyev called for a referendum for 21 October. The referendum was announced in September and comes at a time of growing criticism of the Bakiyev regime. Bakiyev's presidency has faced rising crime rates, poverty, continued allegations of corruption, battles for control of lucrative businesses , political assassinations and infighting and allegations of a cover up of murders in Aksy in 2002. Popular protests to his rule have occurred frequently most notably in April and November 2006 and the hopes of the Tulip Revolution, which brought Bakiyev to power, have been dashed. Bakiyev has, therefore, chosen to ask the people to decide on constitutional amendments and reforms to the electoral law that will make political parties directly elected to a newly expanded parliament and give him greater power over the legislature. In the past, under Akiyev, snap referendums were held to give the president greater power. It is clear that the current referendum is continuing this tradition and the great hopes and ideals of the Tulip Revolution have been dashed. It is also clear that Bakiyev has not given the people enough time to realise exactly what it is that he is doing.

In October Bakiyev was elected leader of the Ak Jol Eldik Partiyasi. Although he resigned shortly after his election, it is hoped that this party will emerge as the new majority party. Kyrgyzstan has never had a majority party, unlike most if its neighbours and it is Bakiyev's hope to have a party that will legitimise his presidency and rubber stamp his decision. It is a clever political gamble. Most of the protests in the country have focused on the leaders. By moving towards parties blame is not so easily assigned. The government also gains international legitimacy and is seen to be democratic. Inspection of the proposed Kyrgyz constitution also reveals that power will continue to rest with the president and power will continue to be centered in the president's office. Under the new constitution the president elects 50% of the electoral commission, the cabinet and ministers. In fact the president can control everything and does control everything. The referendum it would seem is another smoke screen designed to deflect attention away from Bakiyev's obvious policy failures and to diminsh the power of parliament, which has been severely critical of his rule since 2005. If voters accept the new constitution, snap elections are due to be held before the end of the year for a new parliament. If they do not accept the referendum expect Bakiyev to conjur up another magic show to stay in power. With Bakiyevs manipulations and growing discontent echoes of the 2005 Tulip Revolution are already starting to be heard.

The Pakistan conundrum: Consequences of Musharraffs reelection

On 6 October President Pervez Musharraf was re-elected for a fresh five year term by the Pakistan's national and provincial assemblies. The world will now turn its attention to the Supreme Court, which is due to rule over the legality of the election, when it meets on 17 October. However, Musharraf's hold on power is set to continue, as the courts lack the stomach to stand up to the president. With Musharraf's power seemingly secure, it is appropriate to look at the issue of his re-election and how it will shape the following aspects of Pakistan's future: For more, click here.

Israeli's offer parts of al-Quds

The Israeli political hierarchy has publicly stated its intention to return control of parts of Jerusalem, the central sticking point for so many failed peace agreements, to the Palestinian National Authority in any future peace agreement. Although the positive talk is commendable and a long time coming the truth of the matter is that the offer was made at a time when the Palestinians are bitterly divided and even offers of leaving the Holy Land wouldn’t be able to be finalised. Hamas remains in control of the Gaza Strip and is threatening to carry the fight to the West Bank. Recent evidence suggests that Mahmoud Abbas' security forces are in disarray and if it were not for the presence of Israeli soldiers in the West Bank, Hamas and not Fatah, would not be in control of the Palestinian polity. So does the offer mean anything? Yes and no. In reality the offer is baseless, like the Americans offering Senegal a piece of land on Mars. As a symbolic gesture it's great. It will reinvigorate the Western diplomats and give them something with which to negotiate with. For Olmert's government offering a symbolic olive branch will earn him big points with the international community, but not amongst the ultra-cons. With Jerusalem just one of the primary issues (ther other being refugees, borders, settlements, water and security) we are left to wait in anticipation for the November US sponsored peace talks.

Pakistan: The implications of Nawaz Sharif's deportation

The deportation of Pakistan's ex-prime minister Nawaz Sharif on 10 September has deepened the country's ongoing political crisis. Sharif was granted the right to return by the Supreme Court in August, but Musharraf maintains that the man he ousted in a 1999 coup was in violation of an exile commitment. The General alleges (and is supported by allies from the Saudi government) that a deal struck in 2000, committed Sharif to at least ten years in exile in Saudi Arabia. The deportation is bound to have significant repercussions for Pakistan's political landscape. For more, please click here.

Standing gaurd over Iraq

Gen. David Petraeus is due to report back to congress today and tomorrow on the current state of the Iraq war. His findings will be crucial in the final decision on the troop withdrawal from the embattled country. Debka.com outline a few of the current issues confrotning the US army in Iraq. Below are a few selected. For the full text, please click here.

Along with improved security in some districts in and outside Baghdad, US commanders on the spot agree that they are still short of strength for cementing their control of the territory gained and completely routing al Qaeda and Sunni and Shiite insurgent forces. They also agree that the security gains and the measures they have put in place will soon melt away once American troops are gone.

Baghdad’s fall to the Shiites would spell the demise of Baghdad as the seat of central federal government. The country would then fall apart into three or four entities which would claim independence and sink into fraternal warfare. The American army would become irrelevant having lost is primary missions, barring the fight against al Qaeda.

The offensive against al Qaeda’s forces in Iraq is still unfinished. The jihadists appear to have lowered their profile, but nowhere, even in Anbar, do their followers seem to be at breaking point or near turning tail. The reverse is true: they are struggling towards a recovery from successive American blows.

It is clear to even the most amateur watcher of the Iraq war that the US find themselves in a no win situation. Withdraw and the state collapses leading to a Shiite theocracy and Iranian resurgence to the detriment of local allies. Stay and continue to suffer politically damaging heavy losses. Much rests on the ability of the Iraqi forces themselves wresting control of the country away from unlawful elements. If the Iraqi government falls or is driven out of Baghdad, the game is up and Iraq will fall squarely into the Somalia category.

Sri Lankan army gains in the north

South Asia review highlights the growing problem faced by the Sri Lankan armys onward march into Tamil territory in James Voortman's new oped "Sri Lanka: The political implications of an assault on the north" Read more about it here.

Smuggling and conflict: Security threat to southern Israel

Egyptian security forces discovered a cache of explosives on 2 September 100km south of el-Arish in the Sinai. The cache, destined for the Gaza Strip, contained none other than the 240 mm Kayutsha rocket, used successively against Israel by Hezbollah in the 2006 Summer war. If Gaza groups had gained control of these weapons the cities of Ashkelon, Netivot and possible Beersheba could have been targeted. There is no evidence to suggest however, that groups like Islamic Jihad and Hamas don’t have these weapons already. Over the past year statements have been made that militants are stockpiling offensive weaponry in the Gaza Strip in preparation for a full out conflict with Israel. It would make sense therefore for the militants to bide their time and wait for an opportunity to strike at Israel when their attention is diverted to the north or in the West Bank. At present the groups are using lower yield rockets, the Qassam (pictured bottom) that hardly cause any physical damage and is rather used to sow chaos in southern Israeli communities. Israel has not responded to the latest threats, due in part to the ongoing negotiations with Fatah, however, with increasing pressure at home to take out Hamas and secure border communities, Olmert's hand may be forced, leading to an escalation and an answer to the question on everyone's lips "Do Gaza militants possess long range offensive weapons?"

Crucial Lebanese poll

The Lebanese parliament is due back in chambers on 25 September to elect a new Christian president to replace pro-Syrian Emile Lahoud. The issue of the presidency is largely symbolic, however, if a new president is not chosen before the November cut off or a quorum of 86 out of 128 MPs is rejected by the opposition, the country may face a serious internal political stalemate that may threaten civil war. Since the events of 2005 when ex-Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was brutally slain in an apparent Syrian car bomb attack the country has been deeply divided between two main camps, pro-Syrian March 8 forces and anti-Syrian March 14 forces led by the Future Movement (FM) and Hariri's son Saad. The opposition has voiced concerns over the FM's pro-Western stance and its refusal to accept a unity government deal that would give the opposition more of a voice and crucially, a cabinet veto. During November 2006, the opposition launched a series of protests and demonstrations in Beirut in an attempt to force the issue. However, backed by the army the government has managed to hang on to power and reject the opposition demands.

The two sides are now obliged to work together to elect a new president. While it is constitutional requirement to have a Christian president, just how the government plans to elect him remains a mystery. With insufficient parliamentary clout to force a quorum, the FM has no choice but to negotiate with the opposition. There are signs also that the opposition may be softening their demands to ease this decision. In late August, parliamentary speaker Nabih Berry said the opposition would be willing to withdraw their unity government demand if a consensus candidate could be elected. This new development may be an opportunity for the FM to open up to a possible opposition candidate or at least a candidate acceptable to both parties.

For the meanwhile at least, hopes are high that the government can pull through this current crisis and with the army having recently defeated the Fatah al-Islam insurrection near Tripoli (2 September), come to some sort of working agreement with the opposition. However, these positive signs must not detract from the continuing risk. There is reason to believe that the country may be heading towards all out civil war. Hezbollah maintains a well equipped armed force in the south and have allegedly reequipped their missile crews and troops with Syrian assistance. The USS Kearsarge Expeditionary Strike Group has also taken up position along the Lebanese coast and Adm. William Fallon has met with the FM government on at least one occasion. The outcome of the presidential election is being watched by all sides and its outcome either peaceful or violent will have serious ramifications for the future of this embattled Mediterranean state.

Hamas planning to crash into northern Egypt - Debka

August 30, 2007, 10:19 AM (GMT+02:00): Hamas plans to use 100,000 protesters against the hardships in Gaza, which are blamed on Egypt’s closure of the Rafah outlet, as a battering ram to break through the crossing Saturday and link up with fellow Palestinians in Egyptian N. Sinai. Hamas will then seize both sides of the border including a part of Sinai. Cairo has cautioned Gaza’s Hamas rulers that beefed-up Egyptian units are under orders to shoot the first Palestinian trespasser crossing through.Egypt, which closed the Rafah gateway after the Hamas takeover of Gaza two months ago, has set up a two-line deployment between Rafah and El Arish to halt the Palestinian influx. Some units are armed with gear for crowd dispersal.
The US National Guard unit manning the Multinational Force Organization’s Al Gorah headquarters in el Arish has declared a high alert and pulled in reinforcements from Sharm el-Sheikh after receiving intelligence of a plan to attack them under cover of the Gaza demonstration. Their commander was warned by Egyptian officials that “events highly dangerous to the region are expected Saturday.” Israel has also built up strength at the Kerem Shalom crossing to Gaza and Egypt opposite the Philadelphi border strip.

http://www.debka.com/headline.php?hid=4544

Algeria's Islamist threat

(Pictured here: An April 2007 AQIM suicide attack in Algiers left over 30 people dead)

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has made a number of statements recently regarding the attempted assassination of Mustapha Kertali, reformed Islamic Salvation Army leader, and the structure of its organisation. In early August ex-Islamist Kartali was targeted by a rogue AQIM member in Boumerdes. The attack has been shown as an example of disunity within the AQIM ranks and in light of the recent surrender of AQIM southern leader Musab Abudaoud this argument has gained weight. However, the assumption is a weak one. The algerian government have been battling Islamists for 17 years. Thousands of lives have been lost. Recent high profile attakcs in Algiers also undermine the argument that AQIM is diminishing in strength. In fact the opposite is likely true. with returning mujahadeen from the Afghan and Iraqi theatres new skills and tactics are being used by the group. Recent announcements also suggest that AQIM will restructure to become a "true military force" capable of challenging the Algerian army. So watch this space. The Algerian conflict is likely to increase in intensity, not decrease as media outlets and Algerian government officials seem to suggest.

Interview with Hassan Nasrallah April 2007 Part 1

Interview with Hassan Nasrallah April 2007 Part 2

Interview with Hassan Nasrallah April 2007 Part 3

Freedom fighters and terrorists

Recent conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa have once again raised the mainly academic debate over how to define militant groups. In Yemen, the northern Shiite rebellion has been labeled terrorist action by the local authorities. In Iran a number of groups operate against the central regime such as the Kurd Pjak and Sunni Baloch Jundollah. In the occupied territories, Hamas has been labeled a terror organisation and in Lebanon Hezbollah also shares this label. So how do we define the term objectively?

It is clear that the two distinctions come down to motivation and tactics. To be a legitimate freedom fighter it is clear that the group must have a political agenda, must represent a majority in a defined area (not necessarily the majority nationally) and should direct their attacks against enemy forces and not civilian populations; although the argument for doing so can be made easily to justify the ends.

Terrorist groups, however, can share these same characteristics and like al-Qaeda it is clear that these groups can easily be labeled freedom fighters. They too are fighting against an enemy, for a people according to a set political (religious) agenda. The Islamic State of Iraq is one such example. In the Middle East at least most militant groups (labeled as terrorists) are fighting for political power. So can we define al-Qaeda as a freedom fighter militant group? The answer must be yes.

Any group can and has used terror as a tactic in warfare. States use it, militant groups, militias and individuals use it. Applying the label terrorist therefore becomes problematic and if used often takes on a new meaning and a meaning that lends one to see the groups less in the light of the classical terrorist group but more in the so called legitimate freedom fighter clique. One thing is for sure the label 'terrorism' has been over used particularly by governments keen to eradicate internal dissent and external threats to their power base and hegemony. Terrorism is thus used to instill fear rather than understanding and when it is used to justify certain actions is nothing but a smoke screen.

Implications of the Red Mosque siege

In a continued effort to bring Middle East Security Report: News & Views readers up to date analysis of current regional security issues we have recently joined with James Voortman from the South East Asia Review. He presents his first article to us, below.

The standoff between the Pakistani military government and militants at the Lal Masjid mosque in Islamabad has now ended, but Pakistan is due to experience a number of political and security effects. A number of possible outcomes exist for the troubled South Asian nation in the wake of this well publicised incident.

What is fairly certain is that the country is bracing itself for a period of instability in the coming months. Politically, Lal Masjid did not produce a clear winner. Since March, President Musharraf has been under substantial pressure due to his dismissal of Pakistan's chief justice, Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry. The country has been engulfed by mass protests in cities throughout the country. Analysts were predicting his downfall, insisting that he would be unable to hold on to power by democratic means and that his only alternative would be to either resort to authoritarian tactics or to make a deal with the exiled leader of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), Benazir Bhutto. The eventual siege and the relative success of the operation have served to distract the public's attention from Musharraf's troubles. However, this reprieve may be short lived, especially with the supreme court due to decide on the fate of Chaudhry in the next week. The president has a number of options. Most experts believe the best choice would be to strike a deal with Bhutto, which would enable the former prime minister to return from exile. However, Musharraf may have to resign his post as General of the military - a step he might be unwilling to take. Alternatively the president may still use the Lal Masjid situation to his benefit. The barrage of militant attacks expected by security experts in the wake of the siege may enable the president to declare a state of emergency in the country. This would result in a postponement of elections and more breathing room for Pakistan's embattled leader.

The security implications of a raid on the Lal Masjid were always going to significant. In late 2006, the Pakistani military bombed a number of madrassas in the country's north western tribal area. What followed was a substantial increase in terrorist attacks in both the tribal areas and in Islamabad. A similar situation is almost certain to occur in the wake of the mosque siege. Already a video tape released by al-Qaeda has shown the organisations second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri urging Pakistanis to avenge the Mosque siege and to revolt against the Musharraf regime. Threats such as these may finally galvanise the Pakistani military into abandoning what many western officials have called their half hearted attempt at fighting militants within their borders.

The military has a long history of using militant outfits to fight their wars in Indian administered Kashmir and in the Soviet occupied Afghanistan. However, since Pakistan joined the US-led war on terror the military has been expected by its allies to play a prominent role in dismantling such groups. With Musharraf running out of options the motivation for doing this will never be greater. Troops have already been redeployed to the tribal regions and security has been greatly beefed up outside areas of strategic importance. The coming months in Pakistan are likely to charecterised by a significant degree of instability. The country is likely to experience street protests and militant attacks during this time. However, Pakistan is unlikely to become to creep toward an Islamic state as some analysts have suggested. This is because the military remains a unified, influential and most importantly secular organisation. The security situation is however, likely to remain dire, while the future of the current and successive government's will be uncertain.
-James Voortman
Senior analyst
http://southasiareview.blogspot.com/

Creating new realities in the Middle East

Tracking the evolution of terrorism has become a key concern for policy makers, security experts and regional leaders. Understanding the root causes of jihad (holy war - terrorism, depends who you are) are imperative in understanding the motives of the enemy and predicting whether or not the enemy will strike again. Understanding these causes would also help in the formulation of policy designed to engage with and ultimately negate the threat to domestic security.

Jihad is in essence a response to the presence of the infidel on holy ground. The creation of the state of Israel in 1948 is seen as a turning point in the history of the region and a catalyst to the subsequent conflicts in the region and future conflicts. Israel remains a blight on the region, a blight Arab Muslims hope to eradicate. Arabs have long struggled to develop a single homogenous approach to how this would be achieved. Arab nationalism and now the rise of political Islam are approaches being used to build nation states and homogenous polities capable of forming sustainable governments and governments strong enough to eradicate foreign bodies such as Israel.

Since 1948 the situation has become complicated with the involvement of foreign powers, particularly the US in the power struggles in the region. The US has made matters worse by siding with the Jewish state against the Arab. This in and of itself has created additional fuel for the anti-Western/Jewish fire that threatens to burn out of control. Israel and the US are seen as occupying powers by most Arabs in the region. Removing these forces and destroying their homelands has become a prerequisite of most jihadi groups. Some states however have come to accept the status quo, have accepted that Israel and the US are here to stay. Chief amongst them are Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and Lebanon. This does not mean that their people agree however with their leaders, however. Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and a host of other Islamist parties have taken advantage of this feeling amongst the masses and are making gains regionally, threatening the so called apostate allies of the West and Israel. Buoyed by a strong religious ideology and public mandate they have called for an end to foreign interference and the destruction of the Zionist state. Jihadi groups have benefited from this rise in political Islam and favourable economic conditions (poverty) as well to recruit new members and gather support for their campaigns against the West and Israel. There task has been made increasingly easy by subsequent US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. For the dissillusioned millions jihad presents an opportunity to strike out at an enemy, that albeit technologically superior, is relatively close at hand and vulnerable to guerilla style and terror tactics.

Solutions for the West are not simple. It is essential that moderate Muslims are engaged in dialogue. These groups must be shown as the new order. Of course breaking with the past, notably the nationalist Arab parties, will be difficult but if sustainable peace is to be had it is essential that moderates be approached in order to sideline conservative and extremist Muslims. This change must be accompanied by a withdrawal of foreign armies from Arab soil. Allowing local actors to control their own destinies is imperative. Military and political power must return to local leaders. Lastly, local economic and religious elites must be forced to give up their power to the new emerging classes. They were supported in the past by Western foreign policy to the detriment of local peoples. If democracy is truly to be embraced these actors must be coerced into giving over power. In a nutshell the West must acknowledge the failure of 60 years of foreign policy in the region and accept their losses, pulling out and creating a new reality a reality that is acceptable to the majority of the Arab people, not to political elites and select allies.

On 9 July authorities discovered two VBIEDs in the southern Yemeni port city of Aden. Details of the discovery remain unclear. The discovery follows the 2 July bombings in Marib that killed seven spanish tourists. Yemeni forces have been carrying out a series of operations following the Marib incident. At least 15 suspected al-Qaeda militants have been captured and one killed in a shootout with police in Sanaa on 4 July. For more on the threat from terrorism in Yemen see below.

Al-Qaeda's menacing presence in Yemen

On 2 July 2007, a suicide bomber drove his vehicle into a group of Spanish tourists in the Marib governorate, 140km east of the Yemeni capital, Sanaa, killing seven tourists, two local Yemenis and injuring a further six people. The attack, allegedly carried out by an al-Qaeda linked militant, occurred near an ancient temple to the Queen of Sheba (or Bilquis). The tourists were preparing to leave the area with their police escort when the bomber struck. This attack is one of the most severe on foreign interests in recent years and provides an example of the ongoing high threat from terrorism in this impoverished country. It also comes at a time when 36 members of al-Qaeda are standing trial in Yemen for planning and carrying out terror attacks. Several of these militants are still on the run, after they escaped from a Sanaa prison in February 2006.

Yemen is a country deeply connected to al-Qaeda. This is evidenced by the disproportionally large number of Yemenis within al-Qaeda's ranks and by the fact that Yemen is the ancestral home of al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden. Yemen has also been the scene of numerous al-Qaeda attacks since the 1990s. More recently, in September 2006, militant groups carried out attempted attacks against two oil facilities in Marib and in the Dhabah region of Hadramawt. This attack followed the bombing of the US navy vessel, the USS Cole, in October 2000 and other minor attacks on the British, US and Turkish embassies. In 2002 al-Qaeda also claimed responsibility for an attack on an oil tanker off the Yemeni coast.

The 2 July bombing in Marib follows recent warnings from al-Qaeda that it would carry out attacks against government interests in Yemen. On 30 June 2007 it threatened to carry out unspecified attacks if its captured members were not released from Yemeni jails. On 1 May 2007 al-Qaeda in Yemen also purportedly told a local journalist that it was preparing to carry out attacks against members of the Yemeni security forces. This they said was in retaliation for the alleged torture of al-Qaeda suspects while in police detention, and for other attacks against the al-Qaeda leadership, most notably the assassination in 2002 of the head of al-Qaeda operations in Yemen, Abu Ali al-Harithi. To highlight this threat, al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the 29 March 2007 slaying of Ali Mahmud Qasaylah, the chief criminal investigator in the Marib governorate. General warnings have also been issued in the past by the group, threatening to target Westerners and Western interests.

Despite the Yemeni government's well-publicised support for the war on terrorism, it faces a number of internal problems that are likely to divert attention away from efforts to combat terrorism. It faces a Shiite sedition in the northern Saada governorate, strong opposition from pro-independence groups in the southern regions, high levels of poverty and government corruption, and as witnessed by the recent attack, an inability to defend foreign interests against extremist attacks. The strength of local tribal groups also makes policing large swathes of territory problematic.

As such, despite Yemen's repeated promises to beef up security at foreign embassies and offices the likelihood of further attacks against Western interests remains a distinct possibility. Even though most visits to the country pass without incident, travellers wishing to visit Yemen are urged to remain cognizant of the high threat from terrorism in the country. They should if at all possible maintain a low profile while in the country. The latest attack also shows that a police escort, while advisable, is no guarantee of a safe trip.

The rise of Hamastan - a chance for peace in Palestine?

19 June 2007 - On 11 June, Hamas initiated a chain of events that would lead to the total collapse of the Fatah security forces in the Gaza Strip. Intense factional fighting was reported throughout the Strip and at least 100 people were killed in the clashes that followed. While internecine clashes have been regularly reported since Hamas' rise to power in January 2006, the routing of the Fatah security forces came as a shock to many observers and to Fatah itself, which thought its position relatively secure. By 14 June Hamas had overrun most Fatah positions and taken the strategically important Preventive Security headquarters in Gaza City. Currently an uneasy calm has settled over the Gaza Strip and the new Fatah government based in the West Bank is making moves to reestablish contact with Israel and reopen aid channels to its impoverished state coffers.

In reaction to Hamas' attacks, Mahmoud Abbas, Palestinian Authority president and Fatah leader, declared a state of emergency in the Gaza Strip, dismissed Prime Minister Ismael Haniyeh, a senior member of Hamas, and dissolved the Palestinian government.

Read more >>>

-Andre Colling

Evan Kohlmann's "Two decades of Jihad in Algeria"

http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefagspc0507.pdf

Through The Fog - by David Kenner (Beirut Beltway)

Wars are funny things. On the face of it, this one started for a seemingly apolitical reason -- a bank was robbed, and the army tried to arrest the criminals. It could have been the plot of a particularly spectacular episode of Law and Order. When the serious fighting broke out, the question of how the battle will affect the basic political terrain of Lebanon were irrelevant. Over thirty soldiers have been killed; the terrorists have to die. But how will Lebanon look different, after the smoke clears?

The most intriguing possibility is a crack-up of the pro-Syrian coalition. While Nasrallah is warning that an incursion by the Lebanese Army into Naher el-Bared constitutes "a red line," the FPM supports "any action the army undertakes." (Hat Tip: Beirut Spring) When the matter is purely hypothetical, it is unlikely to break up the March 8th coalition -- all of whose parties are perfectly well aware of the cost of failure. But in the event of a sustained army invasion of the camp, the split could widen.

Meanwhile, I am sympathetic to a strategic argument against invading Naher el-Bared: a guerilla battle in narrow streets, with the distinct possibility of radicalizing the Palestinians present, should be avoided if at all possible. The Lebanese Army also does not, presumably, want to set a precedent of assuming responsibility for patrolling the camps. But I am confused by Hizbullah's moral qualms about the Lebanese Army entering Naher al-Bared. The Shi'a militia opposes the Lebanese Army doing whatever it can to wipe out a group who considers them infidels because -- because -- why? Maybe, because they are temporarily fighting for the same side. Paging Seymour Hersh...

I also cannot imagine that the Aounists really believe that Al Qaeda is setting bombs in Christian areas. It takes a special kind of person to believe that Al Qaeda has lost interest in Iraq, in favor of scaring the Maronites and destroying Lebanon's tourist season. It requires ignorance of the international political situation, any knowledge whatsoever of the international tribunal's imminent creation, and a total lack of understanding of who benefits from chaos in Lebanon. But, in some ways, it no longer matters what Aoun thinks. He has made his bed with Hassan Nasrallah and Syria, and now he needs to sleep there.

And then, of course, there are the Palestinians. There are many questions about how Lebanon will look different after the latest battle; there is one certainty. Naher el-Bared will be half-destroyed and there will be many Palestinian civilians among the dead. The abject poverty that the Palestinians live in will become more abject, the already-high potential for radicalization among the Palestinians will become higher. The Arab governments, which claim to fight on behalf of the Palestinian cause, should be disgraced by their refusal to integrate Palestinians within their own countries. Some things never change.
http://www.beirutbeltway.com/

Al Qaeda's New Front in Lebanon by Walid Phares

Yesterday in northern Lebanon, a group named Fatah al Islam conducted several attacks against the Lebanese Army, killing (up to) 25 soldiers and losing (up to) 15 members in addition to civilian casualties. The fighting is still raging at this hour. This security development, which could be happening in many other spots in the troubled Middle East, from Iraq to Gaza, and from Somalia to Afghanistan, has however a special dimension. It signals in fact the opening of a new front in the War with al Qaeda’s Terror: Lebanon. Here are the reasons:

Fatah al Islam is based in the Palestinian camp of Nahr al Bared in Northern Tripoli, Lebanon’s second largest city with a Sunni majority. The group is an offshoot of another previously formed group, Fatah al Intifada, both dissidents from the Palestinian Authority headed by Mahmoud Abbas and both –importantly- backed and financed by the Syrian intelligence. But Fatah al Islam, formed last November and headed by Palestinian-born Shaker Absi, is linked directly to al Qaeda. Absi was a colleague of Jordanian-born Abu Musab al Zarqaqi, killed by an US air raid last year. Fatah al Islam since its inception has told its supporters and the population in its areas of training and operations that it follows the Jihad of al Qaeda.

Fatah al Islam aims at creating an "Emirate" (Islamist principality as in the Taliban model) in the Sunni areas of Lebanon, and is planning on conducting operations similar to the ones in the Sunni Triangle of Iraq. But according to the Lebanese Government and terrorism experts, the group is being secretly supported by the Syrian regime of Bashar Assad. The question arises in the West about the logic of having a so-called “secular” Baathist regime supporting an “Islamic Fundamentalist” organization. First, the Baathist logic is to use groups not necessarily carrying its Pan-Arab ideology to attack the regime’s foes and achieve strategic goals: For decades, the Assad (father) regime supported and used the national-socialist SSNP (Syrian neo-Nazi organization), the Christian war lord Frangieh, the Maronite militiaman Elie Hobeika, Arab Socialist factions, the Shiia Jihadist Hezbollah and most importantly a roster of Jihadi Sunni networks. From Tripoli to Sidon, the Assads' regime manipulated Harakat al Tawheed al Islamee and the Gamaat Islamiya, both al Qaeda-like Jihadists. Inside the Palestinian camps of Lebanon, the Syrian Mukahabarat remote controlled many groupings – Jihadi in their ideology and outlook, but feeding from the Baathist machine.

The axis: Hezbollah & al Qaeda

The Fatah al Islam is the latest marriage of convenience between a group of committed Jihadists, rotating in the al Qaeda’s constellation but gravitating around Damascus influence. The group accepts Bashar’s support and the Syrian regime tolerates the organization’s “Sunni” outlook: Both have a common enemy, even though they may come at each other’s throats in the future. The men of Bin Laden anywhere in the world, including in Lebanon, have the same standing order: Bringing down the moderate Arab and Muslim Governments (even in multiethnic societies) and replace them with Emirates. The men of Bashar Assad and Mahmoud Ahmedinijad have converging goals, bring down the democratically elected Government in Lebanon and replace it with a Hizbollah-Syrian dominated regime, as was the case before 2005. Thus each “axis” has one objective in Lebanon: crush the Seniora Government. They will take all their time to fight each other after.

Today's clashes between the al Qaeda linked terror network and the Lebanese Army are a prelude to terror preparations aimed at crumbling the Cedars Revolution, both Government and civil society this summer. It is a move by the Assad regime to weaken the cabinet and the army in preparation for a greater offensive later on by Hizbollah on another front. In short the Damascus-Tehran strategic planners have unleashed this “local” al Qaeda group in Tripoli to drag the Lebanese cabinet in side battles, deflecting its attention from the two main events, highly threatening to Assad: One is the forthcoming UN formed Tribunal in the assassination case of Rafiq Hariri. The second is the pending deployment of UN units on the Lebanese-Syrian borders. Both developments can isolate the Syrian regime. Thus, the Fatah al Islam attacks can be perceived as part of a preemptive strategy by the Tehran-Damascus axis. But the results, if the Lebanese Army fails to contain the terrorists, could be very serious to the Seniora Government and the UN. Worse, if the first piece of a Sunni Triangle is put in place in Lebanon, this could affect the geopolitics of the War on Terror globally: The rise of Salafi Jihadism along the coasts of Lebanon, from Tripoli to Sidon, passing by Beirut. This Emirate-to-be, could become the closer strategic enclave of Bin Laden to the US Sixth Fleet, Europe’s cities and Israel.

The United States and the West are now faced with a new development which they cannot allow to grow unchecked: an al Qaeda base on the Eastern Mediterranean. The strategic responses are only two: Reshape the Lebanese Army to face off with the Jihadists and deploy multinational forces on the Syrian Lebanese borders as soon it is possible. The Seniora Government also has work to do: It must without hesitation call on the UN Security Council to deploy forces on the borders, in application of UNSCR 1559 and under Chapter 7. The three main leaders of the parliamentary majority supporting the cabinet have opened the path for such a move: Saad Hariri, the leader of the Sunni community has blasted Fatah al Islam as a threat to Muslims; Walid Jumblat, leader of the Druses and Socialists has already been calling for a UN military intervention; and last but not least, the various Christian parties opposed to Assad have accused the Syrian regime of igniting Terror. All planets are now aligned for a successful move against al Qaeda in Lebanon, before it is too late. But the question is: will the Lebanese politicians seize the moment?

Dr. Walid Phares is the author of The War of Ideas: Jihadism against Democracy. He is also the Director of the Future Terrorism Project.

http://counterterrorismblog.org/

Saada War 3: A human tragedy

Since January of this year followers of the Malik al-Houthi have been waging a low intensity war against the superior forces of the Yemeni Army. Armed with jet fighters, heavy armour and a relatively sophisticated array of ground weaponry the Yemeni Army have been unable to shake the resistance of the Houthi fighters. Fighting continues to rage across Saada govenorate and to date has been limited there. Fighters from other Yemeni tribes have allegedly joined the government ranks, a move that lays the platform for future inter-tribal conflicts. The government has been unwilling to negotiate with the Houthis, despite having done so in two previous insurrections in 2004 and 2005. This move has suprised many, including myself. Yemen has repeatedly blamed Iran and Libya for supporting the rebels a sign that a different agenda is at play. It is possible that the government is doing this to secure further concession from the US (in terms of financial aid). Who knows? Meanwhile thousands of civilians continue to be displaced and hundreds of troops killed int he battles. The tragedy of Saada enters its fourth month.

Militant attack on Iraq parliament 12/04/2007

Analysing the risk of terrorism and politics

Heres a short piece I did exactly two years on how to evaluate terrorism and political stability. Very simplified but provides a starting point for understanding how risk is evaluated.

Terrorism:

Current status

We currently rate the threat of terrorism in ___ as ___. (our position)

There is a history of terror related activity in the country__.

This threat is derived from Islamist extremist groups/anarchists/separatists/insurgents.

The following groups are believed to be active in the region/have a support structure in the region, have easy access to the region.

The most recent terror related activity occurred on_ . (action etc)

On that occasion___.

OR / AND

The most recent threat received from a terror group.

Modus Operandi & Area of operation

The most high risk regions are__. The safer regions are_____

Terrorists target___ (westerners, government, military, civilians, ethnic group)

The types of weapons used in attacks__ (IED, Suicide attacks, shooting etc)

Analysis

We believe that further attacks are highly likely/possible/unlikely because of___

Threats/regional position/high number of foreign visitors/historical precedent/nationally symbolic days/govt action/islamist schools/trends/incidents

Personal response

What you can do-general security advice.

Politics:

Historical context

Main political players, current government

Government policies, policy direction

Opposition to government, name them, policies, ideology

Threat to stability? Internal - external

Consequence of opposition - Civil unrest - violence

Response to the threat. Areas to avoid, Anniversarys to avoid, topics to avoid etc

Upcoming events that could spark events affecting safety and security. Do we think this event will change the status quo, lead to a deterioration in security etc.

Cybercast # 2: March 2007

The Shia-Sunni Divide: Myths and Reality

By Omayma Abdel-Latif
Al Ahram Weekly, March 1-7, 2007

As the US-led occupation of Iraq enters its fifth year, conflicts and political rivalries in the region appear to be assuming a sectarian edge unseen since the 1982-1989 war between Iraq and Iran.

The debate over why this should be so is increasingly dominated by two approaches. Proponents of the first argue that concepts corruption, autocracy, occupation, nationalism, etc..., can no longer explain the range of conflicts and alliances within the region. "It is, rather, old feuds between Shia and Sunnis which will forge attitudes and define prejudices," writes Vali Nasr in his book, The Shia Revival.

As a consequence, argues Nasr and his fellow travellers, sectarian identity will play an increasingly significant role in drawing political lines and determining regional alliances, shaping not just how states and sub-state actors behave but the political attitudes of ordinary people as well. Sectarian-inspired conflicts, along the lines of those seen in Iraq, will come to constitute a major fault line in Middle East politics. Seen from this perspective, the political conduct of Iran or Hizbullah can be explained as a reawakening of Shia identity. By the same token Saudi Arabia's condemnation of Hizbullah as provoking Israel's attack on Lebanon last summer can be reduced to Riyadh's concern over growing Shia influence in Lebanon. Supporters of such a view would also argue that the Saudi Arabian mediation that resulted in the Mecca agreement between the two main Palestinian factions was also a product of Riyadh's desire to reassert Sunni influence. "Saudi Arabia fought to get Hamas back," said Martin Indyk, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institute, in a recent New York Times interview. Concerned over Tehran's growing influence in Palestine, the Saudis were determined to reassert themselves. Hamas, argued Indyk, may well be viewed as extremists by Riyadh, but at least they are Sunni extremists. Click link for more...

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=19047&prog=zgp&proj=zdrl,zme

Brammertz 5th report: 7th UN report on the Hariri assassination

Summary

The Security Council, in resolution 1644 (2005) of 15 December 2005, requested the United Nations International Investigation Commission to report to the Council on its progress, including on the cooperation received from the Syrian authorities, every three months.
The attached report summarizes the progress made by the Commission in its investigative activities since the last report to the Council on 12 December 2006. During the reporting period, the Commission has remained focused on its primary objective in the investigation of the Hariri case and has provided technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities in 16 other cases including the assassination of Minister Pierre Gemayel and, most recently, the Ain Alaq bombings of February 2007.
In the Hariri case, the Commission has made progress in collecting new evidence and in expanding the forms of evidence collected. This has enabled the Commission to narrow its focus in a number of areas during the reporting period, particularly in relation to establishing the motive behind the execution of the crime.
The Commission continues to maintain a close working relationship with Lebanese authorities on all matters relevant to its mandate. The Commission also continues to receive responses to its requests to other Member States, including the Syrian Arab Republic. This cooperation remains an important component of the Commission’s work.
Since the last report, the political and security environment in and around Lebanon has remained unstable. The Commission continues to monitor the political situation in the region and its potential impact on its investigations and requirements for its security.
In light of the current and planned investigative activities, it is unlikely that the Commission will complete its work before its current mandate expires in June 2007. The Commission therefore welcomes the request for an extension of its mandate beyond this date.

I. Introduction

1. This report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1644 (2005) of 15 December 2005, in which the Council requested the United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission (‘the Commission”) to report every three months to the Council on the progress of its inquiry, and on international cooperation including the cooperation received from the Syrian authorities.

2. This report, the seventh report of the Commission and the first in 2007, provides an update of issues covered in previous reports to the Council and notes progress in the work of the Commission since the last report of 12 December 2006 (S/2006/962). As outlined in earlier reports, the Commission remains mindful of its obligation to protect the confidentiality of its investigations in order to ensure the integrity of the legal process and to protect those who have cooperated with the Commission. This approach is taken in full agreement with the Lebanese judicial authorities. Hence the present report provides an overview of activities undertaken in the reporting period rather than a detailed account of ongoing investigations.

3. Since the last report, the security environment in and around Lebanon has remained unstable, as illustrated by the bombings of two buses in the village of Ain Alaq, near Beirut, which resulted in the death of three people and injuries to 20 others on 13 February 2007. Also, discussions about the creation of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon remain at the top of the political agenda in Lebanon and in the region. The Commission therefore continues to monitor these issues for potential impact on its investigation activities and requirements for its security.

4. As in the past, the Commission maintains a close working relationship with Lebanese authorities on all matters relevant to its mandate. During the reporting period, the Commission also received extensive and timely assistance from a number of other States in a wide range of substantive areas. The Commission also continues to receive responses from the Syrian Arab Republic which provides information and facilitates interviews with individuals located on Syrian territory. This cooperation remains an important component of the Commission’s work.

Click link for more...
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/researcharticle.asp?article_id=133

The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood

By Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke
From Foreign Affairs, March/April 2007--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary: Even as Western commentators condemn the Muslim Brotherhood for its Islamism, radicals in the Middle East condemn it for rejecting jihad and embracing democracy. Such relative moderation offers Washington a notable opportunity for engagement -- as long as policymakers recognize the considerable variation between the group's different branches and tendencies.
Robert S. Leiken is Director of the Immigration and National Security Programs at the Nixon Center and the author of the forthcoming "Europe's Angry Muslims". Steven Brooke is a Research Associate at the Nixon Center.


FRIEND OR FOE?

The Muslim Brotherhood is the world's oldest, largest, and most influential Islamist organization. It is also the most controversial, condemned by both conventional opinion in the West and radical opinion in the Middle East. American commentators have called the Muslim Brothers "radical Islamists" and "a vital component of the enemy's assault force ... deeply hostile to the United States." Al Qaeda's Ayman al-Zawahiri sneers at them for "lur[ing] thousands of young Muslim men into lines for elections ... instead of into the lines of jihad."

Jihadists loathe the Muslim Brotherhood (known in Arabic as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen) for rejecting global jihad and embracing democracy. These positions seem to make them moderates, the very thing the United States, short on allies in the Muslim world, seeks. But the Ikhwan also assails U.S. foreign policy, especially Washington's support for Israel, and questions linger about its actual commitment to the democratic process.

Over the past year, we have met with dozens of Brotherhood leaders and activists from Egypt, France, Jordan, Spain, Syria, Tunisia, and the United Kingdom. In long and sometimes heated discussions, we explored the Brotherhood's stance on democracy and jihad, Israel and Iraq, the United States, and what sort of society the group seeks to create. The Brotherhood is a collection of national groups with differing outlooks, and the various factions disagree about how best to advance its mission. But all reject global jihad while embracing elections and other features of democracy. There is also a current within the Brotherhood willing to engage with the United States. In the past several decades, this current -- along with the realities of practical politics -- has pushed much of the Brotherhood toward moderation.

U.S. policymaking has been handicapped by Washington's tendency to see the Muslim Brotherhood -- and the Islamist movement as a whole -- as a monolith. Policymakers should instead analyze each national and local group independently and seek out those that are open to engagement. In the anxious and often fruitless search for Muslim moderates, policymakers should recognize that the Muslim Brotherhood presents a notable opportunity.

BIG BROTHERS

Since its founding in Egypt in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood has sought to fuse religious revival with anti-imperialism -- resistance to foreign domination through the exaltation of Islam. At its beginning, the Brotherhood differed from earlier reformers by combining a profoundly Islamic ideology with modern grass-roots political activism. The Brotherhood pursued an Islamic society through "tarbiyya" (preaching and educating), concentrating first on changing the outlook of individuals, then families, and finally societies. Although the Brotherhood's origins were lower-middle class, it soon pushed Islamization into the local bourgeoisie and then clear to the palace. At the same time, it formed the armed Special Apparatus, replicating Young Egypt's Greenshirts, the Wafd's Blueshirts, nascent Nazi Brownshirts, and other paramilitary organizations that were rife in the Middle East at the time.

In 1948, with civil strife looming, the Egyptian government dissolved the Brotherhood. Later that year, a number of Brothers were implicated in the murder of the prime minister. Despite his public denunciation of the assassins, Hasan al-Banna, the Brotherhood's founder, was soon assassinated as well -- leaving the factionalized Brothers squabbling over a successor.

In a gesture of conciliation to the palace (and also to prevent a single faction from dominating), the Brotherhood chose an outsider, the respected judge Hasan al-Hudaybi, to succeed Banna as its leader. Hudaybi's selection coincided with the military coup that toppled the Egyptian monarchy. The Free Officers Movement, led by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser and his successor, Anwar al-Sadat, had worked closely with the Muslim Brothers, who were attracted by the soldiers' nationalist stance and Islamic rhetoric. But the Free Officers' promise to Islamize the new constitution soon proved illusory. An embittered member of the Brotherhood's paramilitary Special Apparatus emptied a pistol at Nasser during a speech, prompting the new regime to herd into Nasser's squalid jails much of the organization, few members of which had any inkling of the hair-brained assassination adventure. Nasser, uninjured and unfazed, emerged as a stoic hero, the Brotherhood's notorious Special Apparatus as the gang that could not shoot straight.

In prison, the guards applied the kind of torture that would make Arab nationalism infamous, in Egypt as well as in Iraq and Syria. The Brothers' wounds throbbed with fateful questions: How could those who stood shoulder to shoulder with us against the British and the king now set their dogs on us? Can those tormenting devout Muslims really be Muslims themselves? Sayyid Qutb, then the Ikhwan's most profound thinker, produced an answer that would echo into the twenty-first century: these were the acts of apostates, "kafireen". Accordingly, the torturers and their regime were legitimate targets of jihad.

But from his own cell, Hudaybi disputed Qutb's conclusion. Only God, he believed, could judge faith. He rejected "takfir" (the act of declaring another Muslim an apostate), arguing that "whoever judges that someone is no longer a Muslim ... deviates from Islam and transgresses God's will by judging another person's faith." Within the Brotherhood, Hudaybi's tolerant view -- in line with Banna's founding vision -- prevailed, cementing the group's moderate vocation. But it appalled the "takfiris", who streamed out of the Brotherhood. Qutb, who breathed his last on Nasser's gallows in 1966, went on to become the prophet and martyr of jihad. "Qutb has influenced all those interested in jihad throughout the Islamic world," said a founding member of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, an erstwhile jihadist group known for its vicious campaign against foreign tourists in Egypt during the 1980s. "The Brothers," he continued sadly, "have abandoned the ideas of Sayyid Qutb."

The Ikhwan followed the path of toleration and eventually came to find democracy compatible with its notion of slow Islamization. An Islamic society, the idea goes, will naturally desire Islamic leaders and support them at the ballot box. The Ikhwan also repeatedly justified democracy on Islamic grounds by certifying that "the "umma" [the Muslim community] is the source of "sulta" [political authority]." In pursuit of popular authority, the Brotherhood has formed electoral alliances with secularists, nationalists, and liberals.

Having lost the internal struggle for the Brotherhood, the radicals regrouped outside it, in sects that sought to topple regimes throughout the Muslim world. (Groups such as al Jihad would furnish the Egyptian core of al Qaeda.) These jihadists view the Brotherhood's embrace of democracy as blasphemy. Channeling Qutb, they argue that any government not ruling solely by sharia is apostate; democracy is not just a mistaken tactic but also an unforgivable sin, because it gives humans sovereignty over Allah. Osama bin Laden's lieutenant, Zawahiri, calls it "the deification of the people." Abu Hamza al-Masri, the one-eyed radical cleric who presided over London's notorious Finsbury Park mosque, considers democracy "the call of self-divinity loud and clear, in which the rights of one group of people, who have put their idea to vote, have put their ideas and their decisions over the decisions of Allah." Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (whom a recent West Point study found to be the most influential living jihadist thinker) inveighs, "Democracy is obvious polytheism and thus just the kind of infidelity that Allah warns against, in His Book."

Many analysts, meanwhile, sensibly question whether the Brotherhood's adherence to democracy is merely tactical and transitory -- an opportunistic commitment to, in the historian Bernard Lewis' words, "one man, one vote, one time." Behind that warning is an extensive history of similar cadre organizations that promised democracy and then recanted once in power: the Bolsheviks, the Nazis, the Baath Party in Iraq and Syria, even the Nasserists. There is slim evidence that the Brotherhood has pondered what it would do with power. Although it has been prodded by the electoral process to define its slogan -- "Islam Is the Solution" -- Islamist governmental blueprints are scarce, even ones as sketchy as Lenin's "State and Revolution" or Marx's "Critique of the Gotha Program".

But in at least one respect, the Brotherhood differs from those admonitory precedents: its road to power is not revolutionary; it depends on winning hearts through gradual and peaceful Islamization. Under this Fabian strategy, the Brotherhood seeks a compact with the powers that be -- offering a channel for discontent while slowly expanding its influence. As one senior member told us, "It would be unjust if the Brotherhood were to come to power before a majority of the society is prepared to support them." Another Ikhwan leader told us that if the Brotherhood should rule unwisely and then face electoral defeat, "we will have failed the people and the new party will have the right to come to power. We will not take away anyone's rights." And in extensive conversations with the Muslim Brotherhood's disparate allies throughout the Middle East, we heard many expressions of confidence that it would honor democratic processes.


INTERNAL DEBATES

Middle Eastern jails, petrodollars, geopolitical rivalries, and the "Muslim Awakening" have given rise to a highly variegated Islamist movement. Unfortunately, nuance is lost in much of current Western discourse. Herding these different beasts into a single conceptual corral labeled "Salafi" or "Wahhabi" ignores the differences and fault lines between them -- and has thwarted strategic thinking as a result.

When we asked Muslim Brothers in the Middle East and Europe whether they considered themselves Salafists (as they are frequently identified), they usually met our question with a Clintonian response: "That depends on what your definition of Salafist is." If by Salafism we meant the modernist, renaissance Islam of Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh (turn-of-the-twentieth-century reformers who influenced Banna), then yes, they were Salafists. Yet the ubiquitous Web site www.salafipublications.com, which is run by Salafists who believe that religion should never mix with politics and that existing rulers should be supported almost unconditionally, attacks Afghani and Abduh for being "far away from the Salafi "aqidah" [creed]." (This is the view, for obvious reasons, of the Saudi religious establishment.) Such "pietists," most of whom were trained in official Saudi institutions, argue that the Brotherhood's participation in politics has converted them into the "Bankrupt Brotherhood." According to one, "The Muslim Brothers have political goals and strategies, which induce them to make concessions to the West. For us, the Salafists, the goal is purely religious."

Other critics speculate that the Brotherhood helps radicalize Muslims in both the Middle East and Europe. But in fact, it appears that the Ikhwan works to dissuade Muslims from violence, instead channeling them into politics and charitable activities. As a senior member of the Egyptian Brotherhood's Guidance Council told us in Cairo, "If it wasn't for the Brotherhood, most of the youths of this era would have chosen the path of violence. The Ikhwan has become a safety valve for moderate Islam." The leader of the Jordanian Islamic Action Front, the Muslim Brotherhood's political party in Jordan, said that his group outdoes the government in discouraging jihad: "We're better able to conduct an intellectual confrontation, and not a security confrontation, with the forces of extremism and fanaticism." In London, Brotherhood leaders contrasted their approach to that of radical groups, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), that "seek to bring society to a boiling point."

The Brotherhood claims success at sifting radicalism out of its ranks through organizational discipline and a painstaking educational program. (One Muslim Brother noted that the organization's motto could be "Listen and Obey.") If a Muslim Brother wishes to commit violence, he generally leaves the organization to do so. That said, a number of militants have passed through the Brotherhood since its inception, and the path from the Brotherhood to jihad is not buried in sand. Defections have historically occurred when the organization has faced a conjunction of internal and external pressures, as when the "takfiri" element emerged under repression to produce the Egyptian jihadist movement. Today, however, Brothers who leave the organization are more likely to join the moderate center rather than to take up jihad. In the mid-1990s, internal dissent over registering as a political party occurred in the context of a government crackdown against a jihadist assault. These pressures resulted in an exodus of Brothers, many of whom formed the core of the liberal Islamist "wasatiyya" movement, including the moderate Hizb al-Wasat (Center Party).

One issue of enduring concern is Qutb's ambiguous legacy in the Brotherhood. Critiquing "the martyr," as Qutb is known, requires a surgeon's touch: he died in the service of the organization yet had strayed far from the founder's vision. Even Hudaybi's "Preachers, Not Judges", an indirect but clear refutation of Qutb, never mentions him. Today, the Brotherhood lionizes Qutb, admittedly a major figure whose views cannot be reduced to jihad. But it straddles a barbed fence in embracing Qutb while simultaneously arguing that his violent teachings were "taken out of context." What lessons will younger members tempted to radical action draw?

While jihadists have been sorting out the finer points of international slaughter, the Ikhwan has hunkered down to pursue national goals. In the November 2005 legislative elections in Egypt, independent candidates affiliated with the Ikhwan, which is officially banned but still tolerated, won a surprising 20 percent of the assembly -- especially impressive considering widespread government fraud and voter intimidation. In the new parliament, the Brotherhood has coordinated its legislative efforts by forming an internal experts committee, nicknamed "the parliamentary kitchen," that groups Brotherhood candidates according to their specialties. Instead of pursuing a divisive religious or cultural agenda, the Brotherhood has pushed for more affordable housing, criticized the government's handling of the avian flu threat, and demanded accountability for the recent series of bus, train, and ferry disasters.

These electoral advances and moderate, practical criticisms have made for an increasingly tense relationship with the Egyptian government. The Ikhwan's electoral gains were followed, in May 2006, by their support for judicial reform and independence. President Hosni Mubarak's suspected preparations for handing over power to his son Gamal have led to further crackdowns on the opposition.

Such pressure exacerbates differences between various tendencies in the Egyptian Brotherhood. Since the 1980s, middle-class professionals have pushed it in a more transparent and flexible direction. Working within labor unions and professional organizations, these reformers have learned to forge coalitions with and provide services to their constituents. A leader of the reformist faction told us, "Reform will only happen if Islamists work with other forces, including secularists and liberals." This current finds a comfortable home within the Egyptian umbrella movement Kifaya (Enough!), which embraces the Brotherhood along with all manner of secularists, liberals, nationalists, and leftists. Kifaya was born in fervent opposition to the war in Iraq and now forms the battered core of Egyptian democratic opposition. (It is ironic that a war waged in the name of promoting democracy has midwifed a democratic front in Egypt that is at odds with the United States and its war.)

The Brotherhood's reformist wing contends with conservatives in high positions in the organization who bear the scars of repression and secrecy. The sharpest divisions have occurred over the issue of forming a political party, a key plank of the reformist agenda. Doing so, reformists argue, would serve the broader goals of the organization by giving the Brotherhood a platform to spread its message to an otherwise unavailable audience. The conservatives argue that a party should be an annex to the movement, devoted solely to politics. Meanwhile, the Brotherhoood's social movement would perform tasks outside of politics, such as charity, education, and health.

BROTHERLY LOVE OR SIBLING RIVALRY?

Although the Egyptian branch remains the most influential Brotherhood group, offshoots have prospered throughout the Middle East and Europe. But there is no Islamist "Comintern." The Brotherhood's dreaded International Organization is in fact a loose and feeble coalition scarcely able to convene its own members. Indeed, the Brotherhood's international debility is a product of its local successes: national autonomy and adjustability to domestic conditions. The ideological affiliations that link Brotherhood organizations internationally are subject to the national priorities that shape each individually.

Suppressed throughout much of the Middle East, the Brotherhood spread across the Arab world and, via students and exiles, to Europe. In the early 1980s, the Egyptian Ikhwan sought to establish coordination among dozens of national offspring. But opposition was universal. Right next door, the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood powerhouse Hasan al-Turabi protested, "You cannot run the world from Cairo." When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the Kuwaiti Muslim Brothers objected to the acquiescence of the International Organization and withdrew, taking with them their plump wallets. The U.S.-installed government in Iraq is another apple of discord. While Muslim Brothers throughout the Middle East and Europe inveighed against the "puppet" Iraqi government, the Iraqi branch of the Muslim Brotherhood sat prominently in the Iraqi Parliament. More recently, the alliance between the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and Abdel Halim Khaddam, the dissident former Syrian vice president, has been widely offensive to other Brotherhood branches. The war in Lebanon last summer sharpened that divide, as the Syrian Brothers leaped to denounce President Bashar al-Assad's meddling in Lebanon, while the rest of the Brotherhood rallied behind Hezbollah.

The national branches also have divergent views of the United States. In Egypt and Jordan, even as it has considered a partnership with Washington against "autocracy and terrorism," the Brotherhood, driven partly by electoral concerns, has harshly criticized the United States. The Syrian Brotherhood, meanwhile, keenly supports the Bush administration's efforts to isolate the Assad regime; the kind of inflammatory anti-U.S. statements typical in Jordan and Egypt are rare in Syria.

Even on the central issue of Israel, each national organization calls its own tune. Every Muslim Brotherhood leader with whom we spoke claimed a willingness to follow suit should Hamas -- the Palestinian offshoot of the Brotherhood -- recognize the Jewish state. Such earnest professions may be grounded in the confident assumption of Hamas recalcitrance, but that position nonetheless stands in sharp relief to that of most jihadists. As Zawahiri expresses the jihadist view, "No one has the right, whether Palestinian or not, to abandon a grain of soil from Palestine, which was a Muslim land, which was occupied by infidels."

The Brotherhood does authorize jihad in countries and territories occupied by a foreign power. Like in Afghanistan under the Soviets, the Ikhwan views the struggles in Iraq and against Israel as "defensive jihad" against invaders, the Muslim functional equivalent of the Christian doctrine of "just war." However, the Brotherhood's failure to stress the religious dimension incenses the jihadists, who mock the Brotherhood (including Hamas) for conducting jihad "for the sake of territory" rather than for the sake of Allah. Compare the statement from the Brotherhood's Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who argues that "the enmity between us and the Jews is for the sake of land only," with this one from Zawahiri: "God, glory to him, made the religion the cause of enmity and the cause of our fight."

Muslim Brothers expressly deny their organization is anti-Semitic. The current Egyptian general guide, Muhammad Mahdi Akef, argues that there is no conflict between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jews, only between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Zionists (who, Akef told us, "are not Jews"). Despite these denials, Brotherhood literature has expressed hatred for all Jews, not just "Zionists." The October 1980 children's supplement to the Brotherhood newspaper "Al Dawa", for example, was designed to instruct young children on "the enemies of your religion": "Such are the Jews, my brother, Muslim lion cub, your enemies and the enemies of God. ... Muslim lion cub, annihilate their existence." But in a recent sermon at a Somali mosque in North London, Kamal El Helbawi -- reportedly the most influential Muslim Brother in the United Kingdom -- declared that to be a good Muslim, faith was not enough. After faith there was neighborliness, and Helbawi related a story: "The well-known scholar Abdullah Ibn al-Mubarak had a Jewish neighbor. The Jew wanted to sell his house. The buyers asked him the price, and he said, 'Two thousand.' They said to him, 'But your house is only worth one thousand.' He said, 'Yes, but I want one thousand for my house and another one thousand because of the good neighbour whom I am going to leave behind.'" After the service, we asked Helbawi whether recent news accounts of Muslim anti-Semitism in the English Midlands inspired his sermon, which publicly lauded a Jew for displaying a sacred Islamic virtue. "Precisely," he replied.

Islamists have been accused of using deceptive "double discourse": good moderate cop in English, bad fundamentalist cop in Arabic. A recent article in the journal "Current Trends in Islamist Ideology" found worrying discrepancies between the English and Arabic versions of certain articles on the official Muslim Brotherhood Web site. But Helbawi's sermon was delivered exclusively in English, with no restatement in Arabic. This public, on-the-record display was far more persuasive than the usual Brotherhood spin separating anti-Zionism from anti-Semitism.

BROTHERS ABROAD

In Europe, Brotherhood-led groups represent minorities in secular, democratic countries, and they understand that they will remain minorities for the foreseeable future. None actively pursues the objective of converting its compatriots to Islam. Instead, the emphasis falls on the rights of religious minorities. (Ironically, the European Brotherhood-inspired organizations take full advantage of Europe's extreme official religious tolerance, inspired by the experience of Nazi anti-Semitism.)

One example of the Brotherhood's European approach came after a Danish newspaper printed cartoons satirizing the Prophet Muhammad last year. Although its transnational networks helped spread the word about the cartoons, all branches officially called for peaceful protest. The Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe, a grouping of the most important European Brotherhood-led bodies, condemned the European papers that printed the cartoons but hardly in stinging terms. Although it criticized the cartoons for "hurt[ing] the feelings of Muslims," it devoted more space to calling for increased cooperation between Muslims and non-Muslims. The jihadists, in contrast, were offering blood money for the heads of the cartoonists and coordinating "embassy burning days."

In France, the sheer number of Muslims, alarming press and government reports about the Islamization of schools, radical "garage mosques," clamorous Muslim protests against Israel, desecrations of Jewish graveyards, attacks on uncovered women, and several foiled terrorist plots have created the general impression, inside and outside the country, of a powerful rising Islamism. That is why a number of French and overseas observers rushed to label the stone-throwing, car-burning riots of 2005 in the largely Muslim slums "the French intifada." But in three and a half weeks of riots, Islamism failed to make its presence felt, still less to establish sharia in some obscure precinct, as reported by overwrought observers. "Islamic radicals played no role in the triggering or spread of the violence," according to France's domestic intelligence service, Renseignements Généraux. "On the contrary, they had every interest in a rapid return to calm in order to avoid being accused of anything." The chief of the Paris branch of the Renseignements Généraux told us that of the 3,000 rioters arrested in Paris last fall, there was "not one known as belonging to an Islamist crowd, and we monitor them quite closely."

In fact, when the Islamists emerged, it was to try to calm the autumn rioters, who often greeted these missionaries with hails of stones. The Brotherhood-linked organization Union des Organisations Islamiques de France (UOIF) repudiated the riots in a fatwa. That fatwa was the culmination of a UOIF strategy, forged 15 years earlier, to be perceived as a reliable partner of the French government. The highest-ranking permanent official of the domestic surveillance agency told us that the UOIF "needs" them, presumably to certify that the organization poses no danger.

Similarly, when French authorities banned the wearing of the hijab (or "foulard"), the position of the UOIF was accommodation. The UOIF's cautious stance on the law disappointed other European branches of the Brotherhood. They wished their French counterpart would be more aggressive and feared the French were setting a precedent of quiescence for other European Islamist groups of a more separatist persuasion.

As part of their collaborationist, low-profile strategy, the UOIF has also maintained a prudent distance from such lightning rods as the Ikhwan figure Qaradawi, notorious in the West for justifying jihad in Israel and Iraq. Qaradawi has gone notably uninvited to recent UOIF annual congresses. (For many Islamists, Qaradawi is no radical; as far as the jihadist ideologue Abu Basir al-Tartusi is concerned, Qaradawi deserves excommunication for his "moderation.")

The UOIF newspaper "Al Ittihad" even treats the Palestinian question cautiously, supporting only charitable donations to refugees and presenting the Palestinians as victims rather than warriors. The UOIF does not participate in pro-Palestinian demonstrations and steers clear of the charged Arab-Israeli dispute. It did not take part in the 2003 national demonstration against the war in Iraq, nor in the massive marches in the spring of 2006. The organization's absence from both the riots and the marches, in the European country with the most Muslims, ought to soothe fears of an Islamist takeover of Europe.

The UOIF's discretion differs sharply from its British counterpart, the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB), which warmly welcomes the likes of Qaradawi. Although a quarter the size of the French Muslim population, the United Kingdom's Muslim population is more angry and assertive, and far more prone to terrorism. The UOIF is more influential than the MAB, but the smaller MAB splashes in a much stormier sea. When the Muslim Brothers formed the MAB in 1997, it was but one of many Muslim organizations in the United Kingdom. Many were radical, rejecting the mild, if more fundamentalist, Deobandi and Barelwi traditions of their parents. Already in the field for a generation was the U.K. Islamic Mission, an offshoot of the Pakistani Islamist movement founded by Abul A'la Maududi. While the UOIF'S voice boomed in the small room of French Muslim activists, the MAB'S was a small voice trying to be heard in a vast auditorium in which the young were already pitching rotten eggs at their elders.

As the MAB grew in prominence, it began to work with the British government. This cooperation has been notable at London's Finsbury Park mosque. That mosque gained notoriety thanks to its infamous erstwhile preacher. Despite Masri's arrest and expulsion from the mosque, his followers returned and quickly regained control. The police, hesitant to intervene directly in a house of worship, offered the MAB control of the mosque in exchange for ridding it of radicals. The MAB gained a majority on the mosque board and gathered to retake the building. Although Masri's men tried to storm the mosque, the assembled MAB supporters routed them. Since then, Scotland Yard tells us that their "reliable and effective partners" have even "deradicalized" some of Masri's former followers.

Open cooperation with the authorities has put the MAB at odds with radical groups such as HT. The contest between the MAB and HT roughly follows ethnic and generational lines: young Muslims of Pakistani descent are heavily represented in HT, whereas the older and fewer Muslims of Arab descent join the MAB. A former HT member told us that his group "dominates the British scene." He estimated that HT had some 8,500 members in the United Kingdom; the MAB could boast only 1,000. The formally nonviolent HT itself is a full step away from the subjects of the British internal security chief's recent assessment of jihadist activity: "Some 200 groupings or networks, totaling over 1,600 identified individuals (and there will be many we don't know) who are actively engaged in plotting, or facilitating, terrorist acts here and overseas." In light of these numbers, no wonder MAB officials told us that their group was "a decade behind," and not gaining ground against, radical groups in the United Kingdom.

DIVIDE AND ENGAGE

Born as an anti-imperialist as much as an Islamic revivalist movement, the Brotherhood, like the United States, will follow its own star. If individual branches resist the intercession of fellow organizations, how much less likely is it that they will embrace U.S. tutelage? But cooperation in specific areas of mutual interest -- such as opposition to al Qaeda, the encouragement of democracy, and resistance to expanding Iranian influence -- could well be feasible.

One place to start would be with representatives of the Brotherhood's reformist wing, especially those already living in the West. The United States lost an opportunity to hear from one of these reformers last October when Helbawi -- the imam whom we heard deliver a sermon extolling a Jew -- was forced off a flight en route to a conference at New York University. This treatment of a figure known for his brave stand against radical Islam and for his public advocacy of dialogue with the United States constitutes yet another bewildering act by the Department of Homeland Security, which provided no explanation. This London-based admirer of Shakespeare and the Brontës appears to be exactly the sort of interlocutor who could help bridge civilizations. Instead, his public humiliation was a gift for the radicals, a bracing serving of "we told you so" on the subject of engaging Americans.

U.S. policy toward the Brotherhood is contested between those who view the Brotherhood and its affiliates as a vital component of the global jihadist network and those who argue that the Brotherhood's popular support in key Muslim countries and moderating potential require some degree of engagement. The former view seems ascendant and explains an increase in U.S. efforts to isolate the Brotherhood -- such as preventing Helbawi and other reformist members of the Brotherhood from entering the United States or prohibiting U.S. government personnel from engaging with the Brotherhood.

But if the United States is to cope with the Muslim revival while advancing key national interests, policymakers must recognize its almost infinite variety of political (and apolitical) orientations. When it comes to the Muslim Brotherhood, the beginning of wisdom lies in differentiating it from radical Islam and recognizing the significant differences between national Brotherhood organizations. That diversity suggests Washington should adopt a case-by-case approach, letting the situation in each individual country determine when talking with -- or even working with -- the Brotherhood is feasible and appropriate. In the United States' often futile search for "moderate Muslims" with active community support -- and at a moment when, isolated and suspect, Washington should be taking stock of its interests and capabilities in the Muslim world -- a conversation with the Muslim Brotherhood makes strong strategic sense.