Friday, July 13, 2007

Implications of the Red Mosque siege


In a continued effort to bring Middle East Security Report: News & Views readers up to date analysis of current regional security issues we have recently joined with James Voortman from the South East Asia Review. He presents his first article to us, below.

The standoff between the Pakistani military government and militants at the Lal Masjid mosque in Islamabad has now ended, but Pakistan is due to experience a number of political and security effects. A number of possible outcomes exist for the troubled South Asian nation in the wake of this well publicised incident.

What is fairly certain is that the country is bracing itself for a period of instability in the coming months. Politically, Lal Masjid did not produce a clear winner. Since March, President Musharraf has been under substantial pressure due to his dismissal of Pakistan's chief justice, Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry. The country has been engulfed by mass protests in cities throughout the country. Analysts were predicting his downfall, insisting that he would be unable to hold on to power by democratic means and that his only alternative would be to either resort to authoritarian tactics or to make a deal with the exiled leader of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), Benazir Bhutto. The eventual siege and the relative success of the operation have served to distract the public's attention from Musharraf's troubles. However, this reprieve may be short lived, especially with the supreme court due to decide on the fate of Chaudhry in the next week. The president has a number of options. Most experts believe the best choice would be to strike a deal with Bhutto, which would enable the former prime minister to return from exile. However, Musharraf may have to resign his post as General of the military - a step he might be unwilling to take. Alternatively the president may still use the Lal Masjid situation to his benefit. The barrage of militant attacks expected by security experts in the wake of the siege may enable the president to declare a state of emergency in the country. This would result in a postponement of elections and more breathing room for Pakistan's embattled leader.

The security implications of a raid on the Lal Masjid were always going to significant. In late 2006, the Pakistani military bombed a number of madrassas in the country's north western tribal area. What followed was a substantial increase in terrorist attacks in both the tribal areas and in Islamabad. A similar situation is almost certain to occur in the wake of the mosque siege. Already a video tape released by al-Qaeda has shown the organisations second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri urging Pakistanis to avenge the Mosque siege and to revolt against the Musharraf regime. Threats such as these may finally galvanise the Pakistani military into abandoning what many western officials have called their half hearted attempt at fighting militants within their borders.

The military has a long history of using militant outfits to fight their wars in Indian administered Kashmir and in the Soviet occupied Afghanistan. However, since Pakistan joined the US-led war on terror the military has been expected by its allies to play a prominent role in dismantling such groups. With Musharraf running out of options the motivation for doing this will never be greater. Troops have already been redeployed to the tribal regions and security has been greatly beefed up outside areas of strategic importance. The coming months in Pakistan are likely to charecterised by a significant degree of instability. The country is likely to experience street protests and militant attacks during this time. However, Pakistan is unlikely to become to creep toward an Islamic state as some analysts have suggested. This is because the military remains a unified, influential and most importantly secular organisation. The security situation is however, likely to remain dire, while the future of the current and successive government's will be uncertain.
-James Voortman
Senior analyst
http://southasiareview.blogspot.com/

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