Wednesday, November 14, 2007

Algeria's ongoing campaign to root out Islamist extremism


Since the early 1990s Algeria has battled to contain an Islamist insurgency that has claimed tens of thousands of lives and that has in recent times evolved into a highly efficient and deadly insurgency structured along the lines of the al-Qaeda campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Attempts by the Algerian government to quell the insurgency have proved fruitless despite repeated amnesty offers, military campaigns and other acts of subterfuge. Algerian ministers have stated in the press that the insurgency is waning and that the war on terror was being won; yet in the past 12 months Algeria has experienced some of the worst terrorist violence since the bloody 1990s. The re-branded al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has adopted new tactics in its war against the Algerian government using suicide operations as a useful tool in its quest to overthrow the Bouteflika regime. How to combat this terror has become a central focus of local regimes and international concerns, primarily the US, which does not want to see a resurgence of Islamist extremism in the Sahel.

The emergence of the AQIM out of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat was done more for propaganda purposes than signaling a real shift in the group's policies. Indeed the group has had a long association with al-Qaeda and Algerian fighters have been prominent in Iraq and Afghanistan fighting against coalition forces there. They still have a strong Salafist leaning and are committed to national and international jihad against the enemies of Islam [sic]. The AQIM has developed new methods as mentioned above and it is believed that veteran fighters of the insurgencies elsewhere have radicalized and improved the efficiency of the movement locally. The evolution of the group has serious implications for Algerian and North African security.

Extremist Islamist thought has come to predominate in many areas of North Africa. Radical imams preaching a firebrand version of Islam have instilled in many local communities a strong anti-Western and anti-institutional sentiment that has benefited terror recruiters. Combined with high unemployment amongst easily persuaded youth the ranks of the local insurgents continue to swell. The Sahel area is seeing a decisive shift at present that could ultimately affect countries south of the Sahel. Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian security forces have done well to combat the scourge and in the case of Morocco dedicate large chunks of their spending of defence.

Battling extremism using force has clearly failed. Algeria's military is one of the strongest and well trained in Africa and yet a group of up to 1,000 insurgents continue to exact a heavy toll on civilian and military interests. Even in Morocco extremists continue to emerge and threaten local security. The problem isn’t the extremist as much as it is the doctrine, that appeals so much to the masses. The issues are therefore two fold. Poor conditions, poverty etc, give rise to discontent which is then manipulated by jihadists and extremist imams for some end, usually martyrdom. The recruits are usually poorly educated and are entranced by the possibility of becoming a martyr and escaping the current poor conditions. When these two issues exist in a country, extremism is bound to flourish. Local governments therefore need to spend their budgets, not on extra security and armies, but on education and economic reform. By taking away the conditions that extremist take advantage of and by closing down and eradicating firebrand mosques and teachings, the jihadist phenomenon will disappear. However, the conditions that give rise to these problems have existed for at least a generation and overcoming them will take time.

Economic indicators

Tunisia: Unemployment 13.9% (2006 est.); GDP per capita $8,900 (2006 est.); Literacy 74.3%

Algeria: Unemployment 15.7% (2006 est.); GDP per capita $7,600 (2006 est.); Literacy 69.9%

Morocco: Unemployment 7.7% (2006 est.); GDP per capita $4,600 (2006 est.); Literacy 52.3%

Wednesday, November 7, 2007

Olmert's tricky choice: Strike or..?


The question on everybody's mind is when, if at all, will Olmert make a decision to strike at the growing menace in the Gaza Strip and in southern Lebanon. The Iranian nuclear crisis and the weakness of Fatah in the West Bank aside, these two regions continue to threaten the very heart of the vulnerable Israeli state. Hamas in Gaza have done well since the takeover over the Strip in June. They have, despite economic sanctions, taken over control of the security of the region and conducted at least one highly public training drill. Rocket attacks by Hamas and Hamas aligned groups continue to reign down on Negev communities and clashes between the IDF and Palestinian gunmen are reported daily along the border. Hamas are betting on the Israeli army invading the Gaza Strip so that they can use their new defensive weapons against Israeli heavy armour. Olmerts problem is two fold. Strike and face heavy casualties, do nothing and face the Israeli public. Olmert has come under increasing pressure at home to do something about the Gaza Strip. Pressure from southern Israeli communities has become enormous of late and with just cause. The daily barrage of Qassam rockets and mortars has left a deep scar on the mental fabric of southern communities. Inaction by the Olmert government has directed the anger for these attacks away from Hamas towards the Israeli authorities. Problem one.

Problem two. The north of the country also continues to be an arena within which Israeli security can be affected. However, striking here is slightly more difficult. The presence of Lebanese Army forces and UN peacekeepers in southern Lebanon prevent Israel from striking at present. However, Hezbollah continues to rebuild and reequip with support from Iran, which has laid some 1000km of highway in the south to make the militia group more mobile. Hezbollah is strengthening but face the same problems the Israelis do in that they can not penetrate through the UN and Lebanese barrier in the south without causing significant political damage to its cause. Its goal will be to try and influence the Lebanese government and somehow manipulate the Israelis into striking first. But perhaps this will come later. Domestic ascendancy is their primary goal.

Olmert has a number of problems therefore. Hamas is strong and growing, internal anger at his inaction is rising, Hezbollah is a continuing menace in the north and the Fatah government (something we have not touched upon) remains weak in the West Bank. Israel is surrounded. The question now is, when will they lash out, because lash out they will. Watch this space.

The India-US Nuke deal

Featuring a whole new format, the South Asia Review presents a short analysis of "The India - US nuclear deal and the costs of its failure" The piece details yet another US government foriegn policy failure that could cause yet more of a schism in the already divided Indian legislature. For more, click here.