University in Egypt - The new protest hotspot via ME Online

Pressed by police at every turn, Egypt's Islamists have turned universities into protest hubs to galvanise their flagging movement four months after the ouster of Islamist president Mohamed Morsi. Morsi's loyalists have made no headway in trying to reinstate the jailed former president, but they continue almost daily protests nonetheless in a bid to force concessions from the government. "The coup authorities do not allow us to protest in the streets without cracking down," said Mahmud Sabry, a student at Al-Azhar University in Cairo. "Universities are now our main battle front."
http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=62210 

The state of the Syrian Civil War

Bashar al-Assad maintains a grip on power in Syria. His elite, regular and militia forces, supported by a largely unified Alawite community and international backers (Russia, Iran and China) have successfully repulsed a determined but divide rebel 'movement'.

The rebels racked by internal dissent, an unclear common post-conflict goal and conflicting ideological positions have failed to make further in-roads into regime-dominated territory since their largely surprising early successes in 2011 and 2012. This state of affairs has largely been a result of its lack of armour and air assets and clear and unified military command. The Free Syrian Army (FSA) aligned to the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NCSROF), numerous local militias and Islamist 'extremists' all have their own command and control systems and rarely coordinate operations. Despite the rebel failures, Assad's position remains precarious, largely due to the threat of foreign intervention. The US military strike threat in September in response to the regime's chemical weapons use in Damascus shook the confidence of the regime. Indeed, they responded unusually swiftly following a Russian proposal to declare their chemical weapons stockpiles to the international community, averting an apparent imminent US air and naval strike. Despite this successful side-step, the potential for foreign military intervention in 2014 is a highly probable scenario.

In the interim there are credible indications that the regime and part of the rebellion (likely NCSROF) will meet towards the end of December or early 2014. The momentum towards talks has largely been a result of the international reaction to the August chemical attack in Damascus. It is still not clear if the two sides will meet. Indeed, should either side begin to make advances on the battlefield negotiations may be delayed. Should negotiations occur, they will not, however, affect one inevitable outcome of the civil war - Syria will remain split for many years to come. The rebels have taken control of peripheral territory in the north and north east and Sunni central regions remain as restive as ever, which will require large allocation of regime resources to subdue and contain. From strongholds in the north, Islamist extremists will also continue to place massive pressure on the regime to further their goals of creating an Islamic Caliphate in Iraq and Syria while Kurds are unlikely to step back from their push towards greater autonomy in the far north and north east. 

Syria will face ongoing conflict in 2014 regardless of whether negotiations occur or not. The intensity and spread of the fighting will largely depend on a number of factors, including the extent of foreign support for local armed groups, developments on the battlefield and the relationship between competing rebel organisations. In addition to the possible internationalization of the conflict, the specter of a regionalization of the conflict is a potential new hotspot of confrontation. Israel conducted at least three attacks in Syria in 2013 and Turkey remains highly agitated by repeated cross-border conflict spillover. Either of these forces may enter the fray in 2014 in response to Syrian conflict developments or to protect their own national interests. 

The re-rise of AQI in Iraq

Iraq's insurgency reached new heights in 2012 and 2013 as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) reorganized and established a highly competent and organised command and control network capable of projecting its presence across much of the country and in neighbouring Syria. This trend is expected to continue through 2014.

Under the umbrella of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the group has established a presence in northern Syria and benefited greatly from a flow of fighters and expertise from the Syrian conflict theatre to Iraq through existing trafficking and smuggling routes. In December 2012, AQI benefited significantly from a spike in anti-government protests in Sunni areas while a government crackdown on Sunni communities in mid-2013 further heightened anti-government sentiment and bolstered support for ISIL/AQI operations in the country in the Sunni belt located between Baghdad, Anbar and Ninewa governorates in the north. From this strong base AQI launched a major year-long campaign, 'Breaking the Walls', which culminated in a complex, multi-phase operation against a fortified prison complex in Abu Ghraib in July 2013, which led to the escape of 500 prisoners, including dozens of hardline Islamist militants. Following the completion of this operation AQI announced the start of its next phase, 'The Harvest of the Soldiers', campaign. In the latter part of 2013 AQI mass casualty bombings resulted in hundreds of security force and civilian fatalities. In 2013, at least 5,000 people have been killed in AQI-related attacks.

AQI/ISIL are expected to continue their offensive against the state of Iraq in 2014 and into 2015. It will continue to use vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED), suicide attacks (SVEST) and suicide VBIED's in once-off attacks and wave or coordinate countrywide attacks that have resulted in a tremendous and horrific casualty count over 2012 and 2013. It's targeting of both hard and soft police, military and government targets and Shiite communities will continue and may well increase in frequency as it aims to extend its influence and control of territory in Iraq to further its ultimate goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate in central and northern Iraq and northern Syria. 

It is MECASR's position that AQI/ISIL will succeed in capturing and holding territory In Iraq should the government not act immediately to reform and equip its security sector to deal with the insurgency. AQI/ISIL will also continue to pursue alliances with ideologically aligned groupings such as the al-Nusra Front in Syria; however, its increasing bravado and dominance may bring it into direct conflict with other Islamist extremist groups and result in periods of intense in-fighting, particularly in Syria where there are numerous and competing Islamist militant organisations. The AQI campaigns, which have had a significant impact on the majority Shiite population in Iraq, will also serve to escalate sectarian tensions and sectarian conflict is expected to spike in 2014. Hardline Shiite militia groups, such as the Mahdi Army, Badr organization, Asai'b ahl al-Haq (AAH), and Katai'b Hezbollah (KH) will respond with further mobilization in some areas at a minimum and retaliatory attacks against Sunni communities at the most.