Since the early 1990s Algeria has battled to contain an Islamist insurgency that has claimed tens of thousands of lives and that has in recent times evolved into a highly efficient and deadly insurgency structured along the lines of the al-Qaeda campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Attempts by the Algerian government to quell the insurgency have proved fruitless despite repeated amnesty offers, military campaigns and other acts of subterfuge. Algerian ministers have stated in the press that the insurgency is waning and that the war on terror was being won; yet in the past 12 months Algeria has experienced some of the worst terrorist violence since the bloody 1990s. The re-branded al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has adopted new tactics in its war against the Algerian government using suicide operations as a useful tool in its quest to overthrow the Bouteflika regime. How to combat this terror has become a central focus of local regimes and international concerns, primarily the US, which does not want to see a resurgence of Islamist extremism in the Sahel.
The emergence of the AQIM out of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat was done more for propaganda purposes than signaling a real shift in the group's policies. Indeed the group has had a long association with al-Qaeda and Algerian fighters have been prominent in Iraq and Afghanistan fighting against coalition forces there. They still have a strong Salafist leaning and are committed to national and international jihad against the enemies of Islam [sic]. The AQIM has developed new methods as mentioned above and it is believed that veteran fighters of the insurgencies elsewhere have radicalized and improved the efficiency of the movement locally. The evolution of the group has serious implications for Algerian and North African security.
Extremist Islamist thought has come to predominate in many areas of North Africa. Radical imams preaching a firebrand version of Islam have instilled in many local communities a strong anti-Western and anti-institutional sentiment that has benefited terror recruiters. Combined with high unemployment amongst easily persuaded youth the ranks of the local insurgents continue to swell. The Sahel area is seeing a decisive shift at present that could ultimately affect countries south of the Sahel. Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian security forces have done well to combat the scourge and in the case of Morocco dedicate large chunks of their spending of defence.
Battling extremism using force has clearly failed. Algeria's military is one of the strongest and well trained in Africa and yet a group of up to 1,000 insurgents continue to exact a heavy toll on civilian and military interests. Even in Morocco extremists continue to emerge and threaten local security. The problem isn’t the extremist as much as it is the doctrine, that appeals so much to the masses. The issues are therefore two fold. Poor conditions, poverty etc, give rise to discontent which is then manipulated by jihadists and extremist imams for some end, usually martyrdom. The recruits are usually poorly educated and are entranced by the possibility of becoming a martyr and escaping the current poor conditions. When these two issues exist in a country, extremism is bound to flourish. Local governments therefore need to spend their budgets, not on extra security and armies, but on education and economic reform. By taking away the conditions that extremist take advantage of and by closing down and eradicating firebrand mosques and teachings, the jihadist phenomenon will disappear. However, the conditions that give rise to these problems have existed for at least a generation and overcoming them will take time.
Economic indicators
Tunisia: Unemployment 13.9% (2006 est.); GDP per capita $8,900 (2006 est.); Literacy 74.3%
Algeria: Unemployment 15.7% (2006 est.); GDP per capita $7,600 (2006 est.); Literacy 69.9%
Morocco: Unemployment 7.7% (2006 est.); GDP per capita $4,600 (2006 est.); Literacy 52.3%
The emergence of the AQIM out of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat was done more for propaganda purposes than signaling a real shift in the group's policies. Indeed the group has had a long association with al-Qaeda and Algerian fighters have been prominent in Iraq and Afghanistan fighting against coalition forces there. They still have a strong Salafist leaning and are committed to national and international jihad against the enemies of Islam [sic]. The AQIM has developed new methods as mentioned above and it is believed that veteran fighters of the insurgencies elsewhere have radicalized and improved the efficiency of the movement locally. The evolution of the group has serious implications for Algerian and North African security.
Extremist Islamist thought has come to predominate in many areas of North Africa. Radical imams preaching a firebrand version of Islam have instilled in many local communities a strong anti-Western and anti-institutional sentiment that has benefited terror recruiters. Combined with high unemployment amongst easily persuaded youth the ranks of the local insurgents continue to swell. The Sahel area is seeing a decisive shift at present that could ultimately affect countries south of the Sahel. Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian security forces have done well to combat the scourge and in the case of Morocco dedicate large chunks of their spending of defence.
Battling extremism using force has clearly failed. Algeria's military is one of the strongest and well trained in Africa and yet a group of up to 1,000 insurgents continue to exact a heavy toll on civilian and military interests. Even in Morocco extremists continue to emerge and threaten local security. The problem isn’t the extremist as much as it is the doctrine, that appeals so much to the masses. The issues are therefore two fold. Poor conditions, poverty etc, give rise to discontent which is then manipulated by jihadists and extremist imams for some end, usually martyrdom. The recruits are usually poorly educated and are entranced by the possibility of becoming a martyr and escaping the current poor conditions. When these two issues exist in a country, extremism is bound to flourish. Local governments therefore need to spend their budgets, not on extra security and armies, but on education and economic reform. By taking away the conditions that extremist take advantage of and by closing down and eradicating firebrand mosques and teachings, the jihadist phenomenon will disappear. However, the conditions that give rise to these problems have existed for at least a generation and overcoming them will take time.
Economic indicators
Tunisia: Unemployment 13.9% (2006 est.); GDP per capita $8,900 (2006 est.); Literacy 74.3%
Algeria: Unemployment 15.7% (2006 est.); GDP per capita $7,600 (2006 est.); Literacy 69.9%
Morocco: Unemployment 7.7% (2006 est.); GDP per capita $4,600 (2006 est.); Literacy 52.3%
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