The
Sunni militant’s deadly northern assault
On 29 June, the Islamic State (IS) declared a caliphate in northern Iraq and northern Syria. The caliphate declaration coincided with the group’s rapid offensive in northern Iraq (since 6 June), which led to its capture of the city of Mosul and territory as far south as the town of Tikrit (Saddam Hussein’s home town) while in Anbar governorate the group has solidified its control of a number of towns and cities, including Fallujah. This blitzkrieg in the north and west of Iraq has accompanied a similar control of territory in Syria where opposing militant groups, including the al-Qaeda (AQ)-aligned Al-Nusra Front (ANF), have withdrawn from territory in the Deir Ez Zor governorate, essentially handing IS control of the Euphrates River from Ar Raqqah city in Syria to the Iraq government-controlled city of Haditha in Anbar.
The IS has its challenges in maintaining its control of its new ‘Islamic state’. The “Sunni Revolution”, as it is being called by some Iraqis, is not a movement led by a single party and there are numerous Sunni tribes, militant groups and former Baathists that all have a stake in the Sunni regions of Iraq and Syria. Indeed, while some groups have declared allegiance (bayat) to IS and its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, such as the ANF command in Al-Bukamal, Syria, many have wholly rejected the caliphate declaration, including the powerful Islamic Front in Syria. In Iraq, other Sunni, Sufi and Baathist groups have remained largely silent to date; however, groupings such as the Sufi militant Naqshabandi Army, led by Hussein-era commander, Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, are unlikely to accept IS leadership of the anti-government insurgency. Meanwhile, the Kurds, positioned in north western Iraq have maintained a close observance of the fighting in Sunni areas of northern Iraq but have considered, rightly so, that encroaching into IS territory would not suit their long-term goals, which are, essentially, the creation of a Kurd state in Kurdish majority areas of northern Iraq. After all, what allegiance could they owe to the central government that has blocked budget allocations and KRG attempts to sell oil extracted in its region?
On 29 June, the Islamic State (IS) declared a caliphate in northern Iraq and northern Syria. The caliphate declaration coincided with the group’s rapid offensive in northern Iraq (since 6 June), which led to its capture of the city of Mosul and territory as far south as the town of Tikrit (Saddam Hussein’s home town) while in Anbar governorate the group has solidified its control of a number of towns and cities, including Fallujah. This blitzkrieg in the north and west of Iraq has accompanied a similar control of territory in Syria where opposing militant groups, including the al-Qaeda (AQ)-aligned Al-Nusra Front (ANF), have withdrawn from territory in the Deir Ez Zor governorate, essentially handing IS control of the Euphrates River from Ar Raqqah city in Syria to the Iraq government-controlled city of Haditha in Anbar.
The IS has its challenges in maintaining its control of its new ‘Islamic state’. The “Sunni Revolution”, as it is being called by some Iraqis, is not a movement led by a single party and there are numerous Sunni tribes, militant groups and former Baathists that all have a stake in the Sunni regions of Iraq and Syria. Indeed, while some groups have declared allegiance (bayat) to IS and its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, such as the ANF command in Al-Bukamal, Syria, many have wholly rejected the caliphate declaration, including the powerful Islamic Front in Syria. In Iraq, other Sunni, Sufi and Baathist groups have remained largely silent to date; however, groupings such as the Sufi militant Naqshabandi Army, led by Hussein-era commander, Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, are unlikely to accept IS leadership of the anti-government insurgency. Meanwhile, the Kurds, positioned in north western Iraq have maintained a close observance of the fighting in Sunni areas of northern Iraq but have considered, rightly so, that encroaching into IS territory would not suit their long-term goals, which are, essentially, the creation of a Kurd state in Kurdish majority areas of northern Iraq. After all, what allegiance could they owe to the central government that has blocked budget allocations and KRG attempts to sell oil extracted in its region?
The
Kurds slick move
Following the IS advance into northern Iraqi cities and towns, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) abandoned their positions in the north and deserted en masse towards the south and into the KRG. The routed ISF forces abandoned millions of dollars’ worth of equipment, which the IS and other militant groups have gratefully accepted. Of more worth than this equipment was the ISF abandonment of territory in the eastern parts of Ninewa, Kirkuk, Salah ad Din and Diyala governorates. This security vacuum was immediately occupied by Kurdish Peshmerga (military) forces which moved beyond the Green Line, established following the 1991 Gulf War, and into disputed territories.
Following the IS advance into northern Iraqi cities and towns, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) abandoned their positions in the north and deserted en masse towards the south and into the KRG. The routed ISF forces abandoned millions of dollars’ worth of equipment, which the IS and other militant groups have gratefully accepted. Of more worth than this equipment was the ISF abandonment of territory in the eastern parts of Ninewa, Kirkuk, Salah ad Din and Diyala governorates. This security vacuum was immediately occupied by Kurdish Peshmerga (military) forces which moved beyond the Green Line, established following the 1991 Gulf War, and into disputed territories.
As of writing the
Kurd Peshmerga are arrayed in positions from Sinjar near the Syrian border to
areas immediately east of Mosul, down towards Kirkuk and further south to
Khanaqin. These forces have met very little resistance and there are strong
indications that the Sunni militants are content to allow the KRG to pursue its
territory grab, knowing quite well that drawing the Kurds into the conflict
would undermine their goal of establishing a caliphate.
It is within this context that the KRG leadership
has acted decisively. President of the KRG, Massoud Barzani, has ordered preparations
to be made for a referendum on independence including
in areas which the KRG have just annexed while statements from Barzani and a
host of other Kurdish leaders are adamant in their rejection of demands by the
central government and local minority groups, including the Turkmen, that they
withdraw from newly acquired territory. The Kurdish Jerusalem, Kirkuk, which
lies atop one of the world’s largest oil deposits has been a rallying point for
Kurd nationalism and rhetoric of late and it is highly unlikely that the Kurds
will surrender the city.
Conclusion
Iraq was created following World War One by foreign powers that new little about the dynamics of the region. At the time, the rural and under-developed Shiite south was largely subsumed into the greater current day Iraq under the leadership of the relatively well-educated Sunni elite, who represented the minority Sunni population. The promised Kurd state in the 1920s also failed to materialize and the Kurd nation was split between Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Iran. This historical injustice is now on the cusp of being righted, but at what cost?
The Kurds have a long way to go to fully safeguard their new state. While Iran and Turkey appear, on the outside at least, to have accepted increasing Kurdish encroachment into northern Iraq and its referendum plans, a strong Kurd state is not, theoretically, in their best interest given Kurd agitation in their respective border territories. The Kurd relationship with Sunni tribes and militants in northern Iraq is also another long term test. Should the insurgency be defeated there is also an elevated risk of conflict between the central Iraq government and the Kurds over their control of disputed territory. Domestically, the Kurd polity appears unified but with increasing gains, the traditional powerhouses, the KDP (closely aligned to Turkey) and PUK (aligned to Iran), may increasingly come to disagreements over the distribution of resources and power. Within this context, upcoming groups, such as Gorran, may further complicate the domestic situation. Ultimately though, the sense is that the Kurd polity will remain unified, over the medium-term at least, as they head for their long strived for state. Internal challenges will be placed aside as they all seek to carve out a new state within a state.
Iraq was created following World War One by foreign powers that new little about the dynamics of the region. At the time, the rural and under-developed Shiite south was largely subsumed into the greater current day Iraq under the leadership of the relatively well-educated Sunni elite, who represented the minority Sunni population. The promised Kurd state in the 1920s also failed to materialize and the Kurd nation was split between Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Iran. This historical injustice is now on the cusp of being righted, but at what cost?
The Kurds have a long way to go to fully safeguard their new state. While Iran and Turkey appear, on the outside at least, to have accepted increasing Kurdish encroachment into northern Iraq and its referendum plans, a strong Kurd state is not, theoretically, in their best interest given Kurd agitation in their respective border territories. The Kurd relationship with Sunni tribes and militants in northern Iraq is also another long term test. Should the insurgency be defeated there is also an elevated risk of conflict between the central Iraq government and the Kurds over their control of disputed territory. Domestically, the Kurd polity appears unified but with increasing gains, the traditional powerhouses, the KDP (closely aligned to Turkey) and PUK (aligned to Iran), may increasingly come to disagreements over the distribution of resources and power. Within this context, upcoming groups, such as Gorran, may further complicate the domestic situation. Ultimately though, the sense is that the Kurd polity will remain unified, over the medium-term at least, as they head for their long strived for state. Internal challenges will be placed aside as they all seek to carve out a new state within a state.
No comments:
Post a Comment