The Islamic State

Iraq remains in a precarious security position following the Islamic State capture of territory in the north in June. The Iraqi military are struggling to hold territory in central Salah ad Din, Diyala and Anbar governorate and repeated offensives north to retake Tikrit, have failed. The Islamic State has, however, not pushed its offensive further and it appears that the group is seeking to secure its recent gains, which fall within the predominantly Sunni territory of central and northern Iraq.

The reason for the halt to its offensive is two-fold. One, the Islamic State's resources have increased significantly; however, for a major operation against Iraq's core, Baghdad, and predominantly Shiite south, the group would require more troops, artillery and tanks. While the Iraqi military, its various supporting militia, tribal allies and the Shiite militia are poorly disciplined, trained and resourced, they still hold the numerical advantage. Secondly, assaulting south and holding predominantly Shiite territory would be difficult to say the least. The group is also unlikely to want to seek a greater involvement of the west or Iran – two possible outcomes should it push in any meaningful manner into Baghdad and the south. Likewise, in the east, the Islamic State has no interest, currently, in taking on the Kurds and is content to allow the Kurds to maintain its positions in newly acquired disputed territories.

In the coming months the Islamic State will continue to strengthen its defences in recently acquired territory and will seek to make gains in Anbar, Salah Ad Din, Babil and Diyala governorates to bolster support zones there. From these zones it will pursue its current bombing campaign against Iraqi state and Shiite interests in order to weaken these groups and prevent them from launching a major offensive northwards. While maintaining its gains in Iraq and creating new state structures, the group will continue to pursue its campaign in eastern and northern Syria against its Islamist rivals, the Syrian regime and Kurd militia groups in order to secure control of the predominantly Sunni Muslim territory. We can, therefore, anticipate a continuingly high level of violence in both Iraq and Syria. In Iraq, at least, further major gains, are probable, but unlikely over the next six months. In Syria, the regime and the various rebel groups will reorganise and will aim to limit Islamic State control. I anticipate that these groups will succeed in stopping the Islamic State from making further gains but will struggle to retake territory lost in Deir Ez Zor, Ar Raqqah, Aleppo, Hasakah and Hama.