Syria: The importance of Deir ez Zor

The little known eastern Syrian city of Deir ez Zor may seem unassuming and unimportant to the casual international observer when considering the current battles raging around Damascus, Baghdad and Kobane. However, it is this battle ground which is crucial to the outcome of the war in Syria and, possibly, Iraq.

In June 2014, Islamic State (IS) militants overran large parts of northern Iraq and north eastern Syria in a blitzkrieg that netted the group large swathes of territory, loot and new recruits. Its rebel opponents and local government forces were shattered as its fast paced battalions raced from city to city. The pace of the assault and the zeal of its fighting components led the majority of its enemies to withdraw to more secure areas.

In north eastern Syria, IS sought to advance along the breadth of the Euphrates River. It achieved 90% of its mission with the capture of numerous towns between Abu Kamal and its primary Syrian stronghold of Raqqa. Syrian army and Syrian rebel groups were defeated in a string of battles including at two prominent Syrian military facilities near Raqqa. With just a small garrison left in northern Hasakah governorate, Deir Ez Zor's importance to the regime, as it attempted to hold on to some influence in north eastern Syria, increased exponentially.

The Assad regime deployed significant resources to the last remaining regime positions in Deir Ez Zor near the military airport and parts of the city located on the western bank of the Euphrates. Indeed, the importance of the city was highlighted earlier, in September 2013, when it tasked a famed commander and regime insider, Brigadier General Issam Zahreddine, and the Syrian Arab Army's  (SAA) 104th Airborne Brigade of the Republican Guard, with the defence of the city.

Zahreddine, a Druze from Al-Suwayda, comes from a long background of support for the Baathist regime. His father was a one-time Syrian Minister of Defence and it is alleged that the commanders expertise led the Syrian opposition in 2012 to place a US$200,000 bounty on his head, second  in quantity only to Assad.

For Assad, holding Deir Ez Zor is non-negotiable. Control of all or parts of the city allows the regime to project power to its eastern half. Without it, any later battles would become significantly more costly in terms of men and resources as the government would then need to launch any eventual assault from Aleppo or Palmyra. The presence of the 104^th in the city also serves to distract IS forces from engaging SAA advance forces currently in Aleppo and Idlib governorate. This thorn in the IS side is, therefore, important to maintain and to build on if the regime has any hope in retaking the state of Syria as it was prior to 2011.

If IS manage to overrun Deir Ez Zor, they will still face challenges from local tribes and other rebels but the existential threat posed to them from their near-core will be removed. On 3 December, IS launched yet another offensive in Deir Ez Zor to capture the Military Airport from the regime. As of writing they have largely failed to infiltrate the heavily fortified facility and have, again, suffered huge losses. The offensive will not be the last as IS seek to succeed in what is, arguably, the defining battle of the current phase of the Syrian and Iraqi conflict.