Long War Journal

This site is absolutely fantastic. It has up to date information on militants and militant groups from across the globe. Check it out if you have a moment. 

http://www.longwarjournal.org/

red24 on Soundcloud

Access podcasts and other interesting audio from red24's Soundcloud page, available here https://soundcloud.com/red24assistance

Winter Storm Alexa - Levant hit by a cold snap

Snow fall in Cairo and Jerusalem and flooding in Gaza.

red24's 2014 Threat Forecast AVAILABLE

Now available FREE, that's right no registration, no entering of details. To access the document, just go to www.red24threatforecast.com

Egypt referendum date

The Constitutional referendum in Egypt has been set for 14 and 15 January. The draft was created by a 50-member committee, excluding the former regime, which was ousted by the military in July. The former regime, now opposition, and a range of other groups are expected to boycott the poll.

red24 Security Briefing - Islamist militancy in Yemen

I recently wrote a briefing on the state of Jihad in Yemen. Here is an excerpt and a link through to the article.

"...Given current political, economic and social conditions in Yemen, AQAP will continue to find unstable areas within which to conduct its operations against the state. Only a full negotiated settlement between Yemen's differing warring or competing regional and political groups will offer the state adequate time and space to confront the Islamists in a meaningful manner. Even if a political solution was found it would still take years for the government to fully eradicate the militant threat given the increasing interconnectivity between militants and local tribes. AQAP is, therefore, expected to continue to grow and increase its presence in the state."

For more - https://www.red24.com/members/intelligence/newsletters_security_briefings/rising_islamist_militancy_yemen_11122013.php

A deadly attack in Sanaa

On 5 December 2013, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) launched a bold attack against the Ministry of Defence complex in central Sanaa, the Yemeni capital. The attack began when a suicide car bomber rammed the entrance to the facility and detonated his explosives creating a breach through which a number of well-armed militants dressed in military attire entered the facility. Following a gun battle with local guards and the elimination of all of the militants, at least 52 people had been killed, including seven foreign nationals and a relative of the Yemeni president, and over 160 wounded. The target of the attack was a hospital located on the grounds; AQAP's media wing, al-Mallahem, stated via a Twitter post on 6 December that the attack was conducted because the building "accommodates drone control rooms and American experts" – a reference to US military personnel who currently operate in Yemen with the local security forces and who have coordinated a highly successful and deadly drone strike war against Islamist militants in the country since 2011.

Target Iran - Another bombing in Beirut

A suicide bomber and car bomb detonated outside of the Iranian embassy in Lebanon's capital, Beirut, on 19 November. The blast in the Bir Hassan district left at least 23 people dead and 146 more wounded. Among the fatalities were members of the Iranian diplomatic representation. It is unclear at this time which group coordinated the attack; however, given the location and target of the attack a connection to the Syrian conflict is likely. Sunni rebels and militant groups battling the Syrian regime have threatened to carry out retaliatory attacks against the Syrian government's allies, specifically Hezbollah, which maintains a strong presence in southern Beirut, and Iran, on a number of occasions since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011. There is evidence to suggest that the spate of recent bombings in Beirut and the wider country are directly connected to the conflict in Syria (see below). The ongoing fighting in Syria will continue to stoke tensions and further retaliatory action is likely in Lebanon.

On 14 October, the local authorities reportedly defused a 'car bomb' in the Maamura area of southern Beirut. The area is considered a Hezbollah stronghold.
On 15 August, a car bomb detonated in the Ruwaiss area of southern Beirut, killing at least 16 people and wounding 200 others. The attack was claimed by the Brigade of Aisha, the Mother of the Faithful. The Lebanese president blamed Israel for the attack.
On 9 July, a car bomb exploded in Beirut's Bir al-Abed suburb, a Hezbollah stronghold, wounding 37 people.
On 26 May, two rockets were fired into the southern Shiyah area of Beirut, wounding four people. The wounded were Syrian nationals. Hezbollah maintains a strong presence in the affected area.
On 9/10 April, Hezbollah militia discovered and defused a bomb in Beirut's Hay al-Sellom area. The device had inscriptions indicating a link to the Syria-based al-Nusra Front.
On 28 January, a bomb exploded under a car in Beirut's Hay al-Sellom area, wounding two people. 

Massacre in Ghargour

Anti-militia sentiment generated by a militia skirmish in Tripoli on 7 November led hundreds of people to gather in the Ghargour area of the capital on 15 November. What was meant to be a peaceful protest ended in violence and the death of 47 people when militia in the area opened fire on the protesters. The militia are from Misratah, a highly independent city 192km east of Tripoli, which achieved global fame for its resistance against the Gaddafi regime during the 2011 Libyan civil war. Following the conflict the Misratah militia and rebel groups from around the country, remained in Tripoli despite strong opposition from locals for them to relocate. These militias have presented the authorities with numerous challenges as they have been frequently implicated in clashes with rivals and disruptive protests. The 15 November violence will add pressure on the government to deal with the issue. However, a simple removal of militias is not immediately anticipated. The Misratah militia, like the Zintan militia, which guards the Tripoli International Airport, are politically connected and take orders from their brigade commanders, not the central government. Moving them will take time and further conflict is anticipated.

Muharram, a new start and security threat

Muharram is around the corner and Muslims are gearing up to celebrate the start of the Islamic New Year. On the western calendar the new Islamic year starts on 4 November. The period is important for Muslims, particularly those linked to the Shiite sect. The tenth day of Muharram is the day Shiites believe Imam Hussayn, the grandson of the Prophet, was struck and killed in Karbala, Iraq. Large religious processions accompany the day in Iraq and other countries with large Shiite populations, including Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Yemen, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. These events have been characterised by disturbances in the past. Many Sunni Muslims consider Shiites heretics and militant groups and extremists have carried out attacks against Shiite interests during Ashura in the past. Further incidents are anticipated this year. 

University in Egypt - The new protest hotspot via ME Online

Pressed by police at every turn, Egypt's Islamists have turned universities into protest hubs to galvanise their flagging movement four months after the ouster of Islamist president Mohamed Morsi. Morsi's loyalists have made no headway in trying to reinstate the jailed former president, but they continue almost daily protests nonetheless in a bid to force concessions from the government. "The coup authorities do not allow us to protest in the streets without cracking down," said Mahmud Sabry, a student at Al-Azhar University in Cairo. "Universities are now our main battle front."
http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=62210 

The state of the Syrian Civil War

Bashar al-Assad maintains a grip on power in Syria. His elite, regular and militia forces, supported by a largely unified Alawite community and international backers (Russia, Iran and China) have successfully repulsed a determined but divide rebel 'movement'.

The rebels racked by internal dissent, an unclear common post-conflict goal and conflicting ideological positions have failed to make further in-roads into regime-dominated territory since their largely surprising early successes in 2011 and 2012. This state of affairs has largely been a result of its lack of armour and air assets and clear and unified military command. The Free Syrian Army (FSA) aligned to the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NCSROF), numerous local militias and Islamist 'extremists' all have their own command and control systems and rarely coordinate operations. Despite the rebel failures, Assad's position remains precarious, largely due to the threat of foreign intervention. The US military strike threat in September in response to the regime's chemical weapons use in Damascus shook the confidence of the regime. Indeed, they responded unusually swiftly following a Russian proposal to declare their chemical weapons stockpiles to the international community, averting an apparent imminent US air and naval strike. Despite this successful side-step, the potential for foreign military intervention in 2014 is a highly probable scenario.

In the interim there are credible indications that the regime and part of the rebellion (likely NCSROF) will meet towards the end of December or early 2014. The momentum towards talks has largely been a result of the international reaction to the August chemical attack in Damascus. It is still not clear if the two sides will meet. Indeed, should either side begin to make advances on the battlefield negotiations may be delayed. Should negotiations occur, they will not, however, affect one inevitable outcome of the civil war - Syria will remain split for many years to come. The rebels have taken control of peripheral territory in the north and north east and Sunni central regions remain as restive as ever, which will require large allocation of regime resources to subdue and contain. From strongholds in the north, Islamist extremists will also continue to place massive pressure on the regime to further their goals of creating an Islamic Caliphate in Iraq and Syria while Kurds are unlikely to step back from their push towards greater autonomy in the far north and north east. 

Syria will face ongoing conflict in 2014 regardless of whether negotiations occur or not. The intensity and spread of the fighting will largely depend on a number of factors, including the extent of foreign support for local armed groups, developments on the battlefield and the relationship between competing rebel organisations. In addition to the possible internationalization of the conflict, the specter of a regionalization of the conflict is a potential new hotspot of confrontation. Israel conducted at least three attacks in Syria in 2013 and Turkey remains highly agitated by repeated cross-border conflict spillover. Either of these forces may enter the fray in 2014 in response to Syrian conflict developments or to protect their own national interests. 

The re-rise of AQI in Iraq

Iraq's insurgency reached new heights in 2012 and 2013 as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) reorganized and established a highly competent and organised command and control network capable of projecting its presence across much of the country and in neighbouring Syria. This trend is expected to continue through 2014.

Under the umbrella of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the group has established a presence in northern Syria and benefited greatly from a flow of fighters and expertise from the Syrian conflict theatre to Iraq through existing trafficking and smuggling routes. In December 2012, AQI benefited significantly from a spike in anti-government protests in Sunni areas while a government crackdown on Sunni communities in mid-2013 further heightened anti-government sentiment and bolstered support for ISIL/AQI operations in the country in the Sunni belt located between Baghdad, Anbar and Ninewa governorates in the north. From this strong base AQI launched a major year-long campaign, 'Breaking the Walls', which culminated in a complex, multi-phase operation against a fortified prison complex in Abu Ghraib in July 2013, which led to the escape of 500 prisoners, including dozens of hardline Islamist militants. Following the completion of this operation AQI announced the start of its next phase, 'The Harvest of the Soldiers', campaign. In the latter part of 2013 AQI mass casualty bombings resulted in hundreds of security force and civilian fatalities. In 2013, at least 5,000 people have been killed in AQI-related attacks.

AQI/ISIL are expected to continue their offensive against the state of Iraq in 2014 and into 2015. It will continue to use vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED), suicide attacks (SVEST) and suicide VBIED's in once-off attacks and wave or coordinate countrywide attacks that have resulted in a tremendous and horrific casualty count over 2012 and 2013. It's targeting of both hard and soft police, military and government targets and Shiite communities will continue and may well increase in frequency as it aims to extend its influence and control of territory in Iraq to further its ultimate goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate in central and northern Iraq and northern Syria. 

It is MECASR's position that AQI/ISIL will succeed in capturing and holding territory In Iraq should the government not act immediately to reform and equip its security sector to deal with the insurgency. AQI/ISIL will also continue to pursue alliances with ideologically aligned groupings such as the al-Nusra Front in Syria; however, its increasing bravado and dominance may bring it into direct conflict with other Islamist extremist groups and result in periods of intense in-fighting, particularly in Syria where there are numerous and competing Islamist militant organisations. The AQI campaigns, which have had a significant impact on the majority Shiite population in Iraq, will also serve to escalate sectarian tensions and sectarian conflict is expected to spike in 2014. Hardline Shiite militia groups, such as the Mahdi Army, Badr organization, Asai'b ahl al-Haq (AAH), and Katai'b Hezbollah (KH) will respond with further mobilization in some areas at a minimum and retaliatory attacks against Sunni communities at the most.

Sophisticated militant attacks in 2013

Islamist extremists have proven themselves capable of increasingly sophisticated and complex attacks targeting well-guarded business and state sites in recent years. The most recent example of this was the hostage crisis in Kenya's capital, Nairobi, from 21 to 24 September. The hostage taking was led by Al-Shabaab, a Somali-based and al-Qaeda-linked armed group, which is currently battling the AU forces and Somali government in Somalia. The group stated that the operation was in response to the Kenyan government's military offensive into Somalia in 2011 (Operation Linda Nchi). The final count of the operation is 72 dead and over 200 wounded. The attack against a prominent business site in the heart of Kenya’s capital shocked the nation and questions have been raised about how this could happen? Of course, to those in the know this attack has been waiting to happen and is not something extraordinary. In fact in 2013, there have been at least two other major militant-led operations in Algeria and Iraq.

Algerians woke up to news of a major militant incursion into the southern In Amenas desert town area during the morning of 16 January. The world would later recount the horror of a mass hostage taking and killing of foreigners by militants loyal to the veteran fighter, Mokhtar Belmokhtar. The attack involved extensive planning and was executed without the knowledge of the relatively sophisticated and well-resourced Algerian security forces. The militant band, approximately 40 men, infiltrated a highly secure area, skirmished and defeated, at least initially, crack Algerian troops and police units, and then took control of a major gas processing plant, Tigantourine, for just under three days, despite the presence of hundreds of Algerian security force personnel. Once the incursion had finally been overcome the losses were significant. At least 37 foreign hostages had been killed, including many by Algerian security force assaults, and 29 militants were dead. *For more on the attack read Statoil’s post-incident analysis http://www.statoil.com/en/NewsAndMedia/News/2013/Pages/12Sep_InAmenas_report.aspx

Iraq has been beset by rising casualty figures in 2013 as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and its close affiliate, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), have initiated wave after wave of once-off and coordinated countrywide mass casualty attacks in the country. The group has proven itself capable of astonishing feats. The most extraordinary in 2013 must be the July Abu Ghraib prison break. Multiple waves of suicide bombers attacked the facility while secondary gun attacks targeted the outer perimeter allowing upwards of 500 prisoners to escape the, arguably, second most well-guarded site in the country after the International Zone in central Baghdad. Among the escapees were dozens of senior AQI commanders. ISIL quite rightly lauded the operation as a major success and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was left embarrassed. *For further information on the insurgency in Iraq and the prison break, check this out http://iswiraq.blogspot.com/.

The complex attacks in 2013 show us a number of things. One, militant groups exist and many are well-resourced, motivated and trained. Two, major militant players are aware of the value of operational planning and intelligence gathering. Three, they know which sites to target to inflict the most damage to a state’s reputation or to advertise its goals. Four, they are willing to operate extra-territorially. Five, major militant groups are willing to sacrifice large numbers of its fighters to meet its goals (in all three cases most of the fighters were apprehended or killed). Six, many governments are unprepared to prevent a determined militant attack.

Complex mass casualty attacks are (the big call) likely to continue to be a major issue in the near-term. Developing conflicts in Africa, the Middle East and Asia have given rise to numerous well-armed and resourced non-state armed groups who will have studied the complex attacks in Algeria, Kenya and Iraq and seen the value the attacks have received for seemingly a bit of effort. For government’s and counter-terrorism planners the task of countering the threat is enormous. There are simply too many targets militants could strike against that would serve their goals; however, work must be done and intelligence needs to be ramped up if we are to prevent future such attacks.

The local view - South Africa is increasingly involved in extra-territorial disputes and conflicts (DRC, CAR etc) and as we attempt to further strengthen or continental position we will, like Kenya, increasingly come within the gaze of the militant groups we are attempting to subdue or overcome. South Africa’s intelligence gathering is weak (as was proven by the CAR fiasco), our borders are porous (walk a few hundred metres from a border crossing and you can cross without being bothered) and we have infrastructure that can allow militants easy movement and accessibility to high value targets. The large number of Western tourists in the country must also be of massive appeal to foreign-based militant groups. Finally, weapons are easily accessible in South Africa and planning and executing an attack in the country appears to be quite possible. It would be foolish to think that SA is immune to attacks in the future and it is incumbent upon the government to work to prevent future possible attacks.

Peace overtures by the Syrian government

Syria's Deputy Prime Minister Qadri Jamil has stated that the conflict in the country, which has already left 100,000 people dead, has reached a stalemate. He has added that the government is open to a ceasefire at any future negotiations, specifically Geneva II talks, which have been postponed on a number of occasions.

The announcement is significant and would certainly not have been made without Bashar al-Assad's say so. The Syrian regime has just emerged from a particularly tricky period where it attempted to dissuade the US from striking its key chemical weapons sites. It, and its primary ally, Russia, managed to avert the crisis by offering to allow international observers into the country to safeguard its chemical stores, the same stores it has just recently denied it used. Within this context the regime has taken an additional step by calling for a ceasefire. It is saying all the right things.

It is careful to note that what politicians say and what they do are completely different things entirely. Last year Obama said chemical weapons use was a 'red line'. This year he denied it and has refused to take responsibility for punishing the Syrians for the 21 August chemical attack in Damascus. Putin has repeatedly stated that foreign intervention is against international law and lambasted the US for its war mongering position while carefully side stepping Russia's own history of foreign intervention in Afghanistan and more recently, Georgia.

So what is the Syrian regime up to? What is certain is that the Assad regime wants to safeguard its own interests, namely its political control and Alawite minority. So far it has succeeded, sort of. While its commercial capital, Aleppo, is devastated so are Sunni majority areas across the centre of the country. Alawite communities along the north western coastline are relatively secure and Damascus, the capital, is in regime control. The Syrians are also making significant overtures to the Kurds in the north and an autonomy deal may well be on the table – if this were to proceed to fruition the rebels would be in a very tricky position. By pressing for peace now while the rebels look ragged the Syrians will gain significant international credit. They have most likely come to the conclusion that they have lost large parts of the country but can still emerge stronger than the rebels. 

Chemical weapons and a border bombing

While the focus on the Syrian chemical weapons is losing a bit of steam in the international press the conflict within Syria continues to rage. Regime battles against rebel brigades are being reported across much of the country. In an interesting development yesterday a car bomb detonated at a border crossing into Turkey (Bab al-Hawa) killing seven people. The bomb detonated at an Islamist brigade checkpoint on the Syrian side. It's still not clear which group coordinated the attack; however, it may be linked to an incident on Monday. Turkish forces shot down a Syrian helicopter, which the Turks allege, had crossed into Turkish air space. The Syrians, naturally, deny this was the case and have lambasted the Turkish aggression. Here's the analytical long shot. . . The bombing was related. It is possible that Syrian intelligence activated an anti-Turkish militant cell in the north. The bombers were aiming to deliver the bomb to a Turkish border town when the vehicle was stopped. Fearing they'd be found out, they detonated the device. Alternatively, another rebel group (there are many, and most don't like each other) may have conducted the attack against an opponent. Any which way you look at it, the incident serves to highlight one major point. Syria is not a friendly place at the moment.

Yom Kippur shutdown in Israel

The Israeli authorities have, as anticipated, sealed access to parts of the Palestinian controlled parts of the West Bank until midnight on 14 September during the Jewish Yom Kippur observance. Crossings into the territory were closed late on 12 September. Border crossings between Israel and Egypt and Jordan have also been closed for the duration of the observance, which ends during the evening of 14 September. Security will also be increased countrywide, particularly at synagogues and in mixed (Christian/Jewish or Muslim/Jewish) cities and towns, while public transportation, including air travel, and business operations will be significantly reduced. The additional security measures have been enforced in response to the threat of Islamist and Palestinian extremist attacks. In addition, elevated security will be in place at the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. Palestinians men under the age of 45 will also be restricted from accessing the site for Friday prayers. The security increase is not in response to Yom Kippur but rather relates to low-level violence at the site over the past week and a recent threat by the armed wing of Fatah, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade, that it had ordered attacks against Israel from 13 September.

- red24 alert, issued on 13 September. If you'd like information on this service, visit www.red24.com

Assad's Gas

Obama's Quandary on Syria

A US Strike on Syria is becoming increasingly unlikely in the face of growing opposition to Obama's resolution requesting Congressional authorization. An initial vote on the resolution is due to be held in the US Senate on Wednesday but given recent statements and opposition from senators the vote may be delayed to Thursday or even Friday. If the vote does proceed it will then be followed by another round of voting, possibly over the weekend or early next week. If senate votes not / the resolution does not receive at least 60% support the House of Representatives is unlikely to vote for the resolution either. This back and forth of course does not change the fact that the US president can authorize strikes without congressional approval. However, doing so now, after he has referred the resolution to the bicameral house, would be political suicide. 

The US regime's moral high ground

The blood of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis and Afghanistanis cover the hands of the US regime (not too mention the millions of poor that have died at the hands of their created market system) and now they sit and decide on the ethics of a punitive strike against Syria. The US regime would gain more world favour if they stuck to the facts (they used weapons we are attacking them because of that) and did not appeal to our sense of morality or some distant ethical standard. 

http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/03/politics/five-things-syria-hearing/index.html?hpt=hp_c1

Syria updates

The Institute for the Study of war has a fantastic blog on the current Syria concern -> http://iswsyria.blogspot.com/ If you want to know whats going on, what war assets are stationed in the region and what TLAM means, check this site out. 

Super MENA Mario

On a lighter note, something this blog is not known for, I'd like to introduce the game which calms all concerns of imminent Syrian meltdown. I refer, of course, to Super Mario or Super MENA Mario as the Middle East desk refers. Tell me this sweet melody doesn't calm the waters -> http://www.marioflash.org/

Scenes of war - Homs

http://exitleftproject.wordpress.com/2013/08/23/panorama-of-destruction-the-story-behind-the-aerial-view-of-homs/

Hijacking at Tripoli International Airport?

There was speculation in the media last night that a Royal Jordanian (RJ) Airlines aircraft had been hijacked at Tripoli International Airport. Not surprising given the country's insecurity, you may say. What was surprising is that the Jordanian airline issued a statement later denying that one of their aircraft had been hijacked. So what's the fuss? Well, the Libyan authorities did close the airport runway in response to something. What that something is, is uncertain. Best guess? Some loon tried to get on to the runway or threatened an aircraft at the facility. It's happened before. Tripoli Airport security is slightly better than security at your home but not as good as what is required for an international airport sadly. We expect more such incidents.

Military deployment around Syria

Syria and Iraq

The past week has seen significant discussion over the likelihood of an US strike on Syria with numerous commentators comparing the impending strike to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It should be made clear that no decision has been made or announced publicly on whether to intervene or not (Obama interviewed on PBS on 28 August stated that he had options but had not made a decision). The misunderstanding over the US and Middle East is understandable. In an attempt to inform the discussion, please find below a brief comparison of Syria and other countries where the US has recently intervened.

Bush
The Bush administration was hawkish, undermined by corruption and dual interests and committed to respond to 9/11. Afghanistan was viewed as an easy target and the regime of the time did not consider historical precedent of what precisely an intervention in Afghanistan meant – a drawn out, costly and likely indecisive war (ask the UK and Russia). Iraq presented Bush with another opportunity to complete what had been left unfinished in 1991. Its oil also offered the US with a very tempting carrot.

Obama
Since the heady days of George W, the US has come to a realization. It cannot intervene without significant cost. Indeed, since Obama has come to power, he has drawn down troops in Iraq and Afghanistan and focused on targeted drone strikes aimed at disrupting terrorist networks. This is a much more 'intelligent' use of force and is a deviation from the strong arm tactics of the Bush-era. Obama has also calculated that involvement in Syria does not suit the US interest at this time. It has had two years to intervene and has not as yet. If it wanted Syria's dwindling resources, as many people contend is their main objective, they would have intervened already. Dropping the Syrian regime does also not suit its regional ambitions. Syria may be labeled an enemy, but it's an enemy that the US and Israel can live with. Indeed, the Alawite regime contains the Sunni majority, which precedent suggests, is open to influence from al-Qaeda aligned groups. Indeed, the growing Islamist threat in Syria poses the West with a major dilemma. Support the rebels and possibly open the country up to control by Islamist extremists.

But what to do about the use of chemical weapons? Lets be clear, conventional weapons have done more harm than chemical weapons in Syria to date. HOWEVER, if the Syrians are allowed to continue to use WMD's what stops them from deploying them on a large scale basis? It is this possibility that the US wants to prevent. So a punitive strike against the Syrian regime sends a very clear message "Don't use chemical weapons or else".

Slaughter in Iraq

The conflict in Iraq gets scant attention these days. But in a story that highlights the near daily slaughter in the country the overall picture is clear and ... bleak. Courtesy of Shafaak.com

"Gunmen believed to be from al-Qaeda organization slaughtered on Wednesday an Iraqi family of Shiite Muslims south of Baghdad. This incident comes a few days after a video was published showing a more than five-Qaeda gunmen executing three truck drivers on the international road between Ramadi and Syria. It is believed by following up the images that drivers are from Alawi sect. The security source, who asked not to mention his name, told "Shafaq News", said that" gunmen attacked a house in the morning in Latifiyah area south of Baghdad and slaughtered the 7 –member family."

http://www.shafaaq.com/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7092:gunmen-dressed-afghan-uniform-slaughter-qshiiteq-family-south-of-baghdad-photos-&catid=50:security&Itemid=76

Military build-up and possible Syria strike options

A potential US-led strike on Syria

Much has been written about since Monday about a potential military strike by US-led forces against the Syrian regime in response for its alleged 21 August Sarin gas attack against a rebel held area of Damascus. Indeed, an attack scenario is getting major momentum in the media and this is likely to filter up to the main levers of power. The West has, essentially, convinced itself that the Syrian government used chemical weapons in Ghouta on that fateful night, yet conclusive evidence has yet to be produced and the West, should they intervene at this exact moment, would only be doing so with a prima facie case of misconduct. Does the Syrian regime deserve to be punished for this crime? That is uncertain.

Should the West intervene it is likely to take the form of ship-based missile attacks or air strikes. The US has naval assets in the Mediterranean (four destroyers) and  two carriers nearby (Arabian Sea). It also has an air capability at Bagram Airbase in Turkey and in Jordan not to mention its numerous other facilities across the Middle East. A land option is currently unavailable to the West give the logistics involved. Any initial missile/air attack would need to subdue Syria's existing air-defence systems before further air strikes. Following these events strikes would likely target suspect chemical weapons stores or production plants and symbolic military and state facilities. The likelihood of a successful completion of this mission is high given the US' technological superiority.

Syria has already responded to the impending strike by scattering its forces so the immediate impact of the strikes will be lessened and its conventional force is unlikely to be destroyed. Following any strike it will then retaliate. Its intelligence services will initiate a violence campaign in Lebanon in an attempt to stoke sectarian tensions. Scud attacks targeting Israel are likely while limited operations against US forces in the region, particularly those in Turkey and Jordan are a possibility. Rebels in Syria may also be encourage to launch fresh offensives coinciding with the air strikes. Likely escalation areas include those in and around Aleppo, Damascus and Idlib.

Any attack by the West will achieve little on the battlefield. At the negotiation table the attack may also serve to further harden Syria's already belligerent attitude undermining any possible peace talks. This outcome is already the most likely under the current circumstances, it should be noted. There is a possibility, however, that a sustained air campaign by the West, that essentially suppresses the Syrian air capability, one of the keys to its continued survival, will force the regime to accept a compromise. The question here is, does the US and its allies have the appetite for a sustained campaign? Time will tell.

State of the conflict in Syria

Developments in MENA

The MENA region has been affected by a number of key events in August. Many of these are connected and point to movement on US foreign policy and conflicts in the region. Interesting reading. You make up your own mind as to what they all mean.

• US Embassies places diplomatic facilities on alert in Africa, MENA and Asia in response to al-Qaeda threat. Al-Qaeda later denies that it was going to carry out an attack. Embassy issue follows US State Department Worldwide Travel Alert and Interpol global terrorism warning (Early August).
  
• Egypt moves against Muslim Brotherhood members in Cairo sparking widespread civil unrest that leaves hundreds dead (14 August).
  
• Syrian regime launches Sarin Gas attack on rebel area of Damascus killing hundreds (21 August) US appears to be set to respond with air strikes (26/27 August).
  
• Rockets are fired into northern Israel from southern Lebanon. Israel responds with air strikes on Naameh in Lebanon near Beirut (23 August).
  
• AQAP bombing targets Yemeni military personnel (25 August).
  
• Bombings in Beirut (Hezbollah area) and Tripoli (against Sunni mosques) (15 and 23 August).

The impact of the Syrian conflict on neighbouring states

A short piece I did on the impact of the Syrian Civil War on the Middle East region in June 2013. Offers some insight into whats going on in light of recent reports of possible US/NATO military action against the Assad regime in response to the chemical attack last week in Damascus' Ghouta area which left 500-1,300 people dead. 

The conflict in Syria has been ongoing since 2011 and has left approximately 100,000 people dead, tens of thousands more wounded and displaced millions, internally and externally. The war is being fought between the Syrian government (mainly Alawite) and a predominantly Sunni rebellion. The Syrian government forces comprise the military, police and civilian militia which are loyal to President Bashar al-Assad and his Ba'ath Party. The regime is also allied to Hezbollah, a Lebanon-based Shiite militia group, which has deployed hundreds of its fighters to Syria in recent months.

http://www.news24.com/MyNews24/The-impact-of-the-Syrian-conflict-on-neighbouring-states-20130827

Sarin attack in Damascus

The Syrian military attacked Ghouta in eastern Damascus earlier today with Sarin gas killing between 100 and 600 people. This is what the Syrian opposition claim and which has been supported by a flood of video on Youtube and accounts on Twitter. The attack is officially unconfirmed. The alleged Sarin incident coincides with the Sunday arrival of a UN chemical weapons inspection team raising concerns that the Ghouta incident may have been staged. What, after all, would the Syrian government have to gain from a such high profile attack near the capital when inspectors arrive unless they were close to collapse or military defeat? The answer? Nothing. There is a very good probability that the incident on 21 August was manufactured by militants within the rebellion to gain international support for UN action against the Syrian government.andrec 

Egypt: Understanding the political instability

Since 14 August, there has been a significant outbreak of violence across Egypt as the military moved to clear protest camps that were established in support of the recently deposed, democratically elected president, Mohammed Mursi. However, Egypt’s political stability has been significantly undermined over the past 32 months, dating back to January and February 2011, when countrywide anti-government rallies led to the resignation of former long-serving president, Hosni Mubarak, and the banning of the former ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). Following a transitional period of military rule under the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (February 2011 to June 2012), Islamist political parties emerged as the dominant political force in elections in late 2011 and early 2012. The Muslim Brotherhood (MB)’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and the Salafist al-Nour Party (and the Islamic Bloc) emerged as the primary political groupings, with approximately 65 percent of the seats in the People's Assembly. Liberal, leftist, moderate Islamic and former NDP-linked parties fared poorly. The presidential election in mid-2012 was won by Mohammed Mursi, an MB member; he narrowly defeated Ahmed Shafik, a former Mubarak-era cabinet minister and military leader. 

 From June 2012 to June 2013, animosity toward the Islamist-dominated government grew in response to opposition accusations that Islamists were centralising power, undermining the functioning of the judiciary and failing to meet the goals of the 2011 revolution. The constitution drafting process in late 2012 was also heavily criticised by the opposition as the drafting committee, the Constituent Assembly, was allegedly dominated by Islamist personalities. The tension between the opposition and the Islamists culminated in major countrywide anti-Islamist protests in June 2013. On 3 July, the powerful military leadership announced that it was intervening in the crisis. The military announced the suspension of the constitution. The military also removed and arrested Mursi (who remains in detention), and made the head of the Constitutional Court, Adly Mansour, the interim president. Since then, Mansour has issued a constitutional declaration (on 8 July) outlining the transition period (expected to last at least six months), appointed a new prime minister (on 9 July), and overseen the appointment of a new interim cabinet (on 16 July). 

 In the weeks following the 3 July military takeover, the MB-led National Coalition in Support of Legitimacy led a number of counter-protests against the military takeover, calling for the reinstatement of Mursi and the former constitution. These were largely held on Fridays and affected the capital, Cairo, and Alexandria. From mid- to late July, two primary gathering points emerged in Cairo and Giza, namely the Rabaa El Adawia Mosque in Nasr City and Nahda Square, respectively. These protests were affected by sporadic acts of violence, both minor and significant. On 8 July, military personnel fired on pro-Mursi demonstrators in Nasr City, killing 51 people. On 27 July, approximately 120 pro-Mursi protesters were killed in another attack in Nasr City. Following these events, calls by the interim government to the MB to disperse its Cairo and Giza rallies increased and concern was raised that the authorities were planning to quash the major sit-ins following Ramadan. On 14 August, this concern was realised as police forces, supported by military personnel, surrounded and stormed the Islamist protest sites in Giza and the capital. The crackdown and subsequent reactionary protests and violence have thus far left over 400 people dead and thousands more wounded. The MB has alleged that approximately 2,000 people were killed. Acts of violence, which impacted on urban centres between Aswan and Alexandria, took the form of armed clashes between opposing political groupings and/or security forces, in addition to targeted attacks on security installations and Coptic Christian places of worship. Foreign nationals and areas frequented by foreign nationals were not overly affected; however, at least one British journalist was shot and killed while covering the unrest in Cairo. The journalist was apparently not directly targeted.

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Iraq's bloody 2013

Peace escapes Iraq. At least 4,000 fatalities in 2013 and 1,000 alone in July point to a state that is struggling to meet the demands placed upon it by a well-organised Sunni extremist insurgency. Following the withdrawal of the US military, the lid is now completely off and militants groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant are operating freely and with impunity across the country. The only real oasis of peace is the northern KRG region which is a largely Kurd region. The Iraqi state has attempted to co-opt Sunni tribes, attempted political reconciliation and the military option, but to no avail. The militants want Iraq and they want the Shiites, the majority in Iraq, gone. The likelihood of a settlement in the medium term remains unlikely and a continuation of the current attack cycle is likely to continue. 

Analysis - Devil in the detail

The devil is in the detail. Analysis is a tricky business in the security and political sphere. One can very often jump to conclusions based on assumptions and preconceived notions. The challenge then for all analysts is to challenge each piece of information that they receive. For example. The military in Egypt took control of the country to end a political crisis. This is a common hypothesis in the media. Other options one could consider are 1) The military has long mistrusted the true motives of the Muslim Brothers and saw an opportunity to sideline the group 2) The military want a president (the position holds much weight in Egypt) that they can control to protect their economic interests 3) The military are part of an American Zionist alliance that aims to undermine political Islam. The third one is a bit crazy but for analysts none of these can be dismissed. They should be considered and carefully analysed. For analysts in operations the task before them is typically easier. We simply need to understand what the ramifications of events are. So we draw up a list of potential causes and outcomes and group the possible ramifications. Under all three of the above the Islamists are likely to continue to agitate. This is therefore, from an operational analytical perspective, our main conclusion we deliver to our security teams and clients. For all analysts, and to reiterate, the devil is in the details, he hides where we can not or will not see it. We need to engage our colleagues, our minds and take five to sit back and consider. All options and all views (from senior and junior analysts) should be tabelled before reaching a conclusion. 

Islamists rally in defiance of military dominated interim government

Egyptian Islamist protesters are due to return to the streets on Friday despite a call by the interim government to the police to clear current Islamist protest sites. The call to protests is a clear statement of defiance by groups that held power in Egypt as recently as 3 July before a military coup. Protests last week in Cairo and Alexandria turned violent leaving upwards of 70 people dead and there are real fears now that the planned events on Friday, in light of recent government decisions, may also be affected by clashes and violent unrest. As before, the unrest is not expected to impact on resort areas, so don't bother cancelling your Sharm el Sheikh holiday just yet. Maybe best not walk through parts of Cairo (Nahda Sq., Tahrir Sq and Nasr City) at the moment though.

Leftist politician assassinated in Tunis

Leading leftist politician, Mohamed Brahmi, was gunned down in Tunis on 25 July. The killing sparked protests in a number of areas of the country and has precipitated a mini-political crisis in the country. The opposition are rallying around the killing and are accusing the ruling Ennahda party of orchestrating the killing. The developments mirror those following the murder of another leftist in February, Chokri Belaid. The current tensions coincide with heightened political turmoil regarding the new draft constitution and the delay in getting this document published. The opposition are calling for the fall of the government and are adamant that a national unity government should replace the current government to 'rescue the revolution'. Political opportunism, perhaps. However, the impact on Tunisia in the near-term is going to be far reaching. Ennahda may react as it did in February and accept the resignation of the government but still maintain power but with so much anti-Ennahda/Islamist sentiment one wonders if they will survive this round of protests. Tunisia's Revolution continues.

Quick takes - Syria

Rebel schism is the top story out of Syria today. Islamist extremists assassinated a senior FSA commander in Latakia on 11 July straining relations between the two groups who are, technically, allies in a conflict against the Syrian regime. This incident may prove one of a series of final blows to the rebel alliance which has lost significant ground since its blitzkrieg in 2012. The Syrian regime is stabilising and gaining ground in the centre and north of the country placing massive pressure on the poorly resourced rebel contingents. Splits between the rebels and the Kurd militias in the north also highlights the massive disunity within the anti-regime ranks. If a solution is not found imminently, the Bashar al-Assad regime will gain further ground and may find itself in a position to strike a lasting blow against the rebels.

Quick takes - Egypt

Egyptian political instability remains a massive medium-term concern for the MENA region. The Islamist parties have largely rejected calls by the military and interim authority to join reconciliation talks and are continuing to organise anti-military protests. Recent protests on Monday night resulted in violence in downtown Cairo leaving seven people dead. The violence mirrored clashes last Monday in Cairo outside of the Republican Guard HQ in Nasr City which left dozens dead. The polarisation of the Egyptian polity is unlikely to be overcome anytime soon and instability is likely to remain a pressing concern until 2014 at least. 

Egypt's political turmoil

On the third of July the Egyptian military forced the resignation of President Mohammed Mursi. The military measure followed days of anti-Islamist protests by secular, liberal and Coptic groups under the Tamarod or Rebellion campaign. The military intervention was welcomed by protesting groups; however, a strong protest backlash from Islamist backers of Mursi, notably his own Muslim Brotherhood and FJP parties, indicates that the political crisis in Egypt is far from over.

 

The MB and FJP has since been removed from power having been replaced by a transitional authority under the guidance of the head of the constitutional court and current interim president, Adly Mansour. The Islamists have, naturally, denounced the takeover and are threatening to boycott any future elections. Should the Islamists follow through on their threat the political instability in the country will likely worsen further in the near-term as any future government will not enjoy popular legitimacy, given the MB and FJPs massive countrywide support. That said, Egypt's stability is unlikely to be secured for the next five years, let alone in 2013, as long as there is a military that has the power to act unilaterally against civilian governments it deems unworthy. Egypt requires a complete political transformation if it is to maintain stability. As long as there is a system that provides a civilian president with major powers - which also exists with a military that dominates the state and its economy - coups and takeovers are likely to remain the norm.

 

So what is the impact on business people and tourists? Simply put…not much. The protests since the Arab Spring have affected specific areas of the country, such as main public squares in major and secondary cities and towns. Resort areas, where tens of thousands of foreigners visit annually, have been largely unaffected. This includes Sharm el Sheikh and Hurghada. What visitors to Egypt should be wary of, however, is the location of protests, which should be avoided, and the impact unrest can have on demand for transport. During past upheavals panic amongst foreigners has resulted in a large out flow of visitors and an increased demand for flights. Protests also frequently block main thoroughfares adding to the already congested Egyptian roadways. 

 

In addition to the threat of unrest, clients should also be fully aware of the ongoing elevated threat of terrorism in Egypt. Islamist extremists are present in Egypt and pose a direct risk to Westerners. Attacks in Sharm el Sheikh, Dahab and Taba between 2004 and 2006 underlined the heightened threat from this quarter and while security remains elevated, the recent military moves against Islamist political parties and personalities increases the likelihood that these militant groups (or self-radicalized individuals, may conduct or attempt a mass casualty attack… in a tourist area… in the future.

 

Red24's travel advisory for Egypt will fluctuate in response to developments in the country and clients intending to travel to or operate in the country are advised to keep a close watch on changes on the red24 Egypt country page. The country page can be accessed through the red24 website… at red24.com.

Introducing ran's new president, Hassan Rohani

Iran has a new president. Hassan Rohani, who was supported by former reformist presidents, Mohammad Khatami and Hashemi Rafsanjani, was elected with just over 50% of the vote on 14 June. Rohani, considered a moderate relative to his predecessor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is tasked with a number of major domestic and international political issues. While his power is limited in effecting real and sweeping change (Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei is still the head of the executive) he is expected to soften the rhetoric and make advances with regard to the Iranian economy, which has been hard hit by sanctions relating to the country's nuclear development ambitions. Rohani is also expected to replace hard line pro-Ahmadinejad conservatives in the Iranian state and replace them with technocrats or moderates. As a cleric and former adviser to the supreme leader, Rohani is not expected to directly challenge the existing order, which is, on paper, headed by the clerics. He will, however, face some pressure from his reformist moderate allies and liberals to introduce some reforms. Pressure from the all-powerful (economic and military) Iranian Revolutionary guard Corps to maintain their hegemony will also be a tricky path to tread. 

General backgrounder
Rohani was born in 1948. During his formative years he studied at a religious school and later earned a degree in judicial law at the University of Tehran. In the 1990s, he studied further in Scotland earning his masters and doctorate. During the 1970s he was a fervent supporter of Ayatollah Khomeini and strongly opposed the regime of the time. Following the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Rohani was actively involved in reorganizing the Iranian military and was elected to Iran's parliament, the Consultative Assembly (Majilis), in 1980. He served in the Majilis until 2000 and was actively involved in the defence and foreign policy committees. He also served in various military leadership positions during the Iran-Iraq conflict (1980-1988). From 1989 to 2005 Rohani was the representative of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei on the Supreme National Security Council. He also served as national security adviser for presidents, Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami between 1989 to 1997 and 2000 to 2005 respectively. Between 2003 and 2005 he was the country's primary nuclear negotiator. 

Upcoming protests in Egypt

Egypt is gearing up for major protests in the next fortnight. On 21 June, Islamist party supporters will gather in Nasr City, Cairo, in support of the Islamist president, Mohammed Mursi. These protests precede planned 30 June opposition protests against the embattled president. The opposition has been preparing for the 30 June for weeks under the banner of the "Rebel" movement. Opposition parties from across the political spectrum have indicated their support for the planned protest, which will demand the resignation of Mursi and new presidential elections. 

Strategic gains and over stretch

The Bashar al-Assad military forces are making major in-roads in the ongoing civil war against rebel brigades supported by Turkey, the Gulf States and the West. In early June, the regime and its Hezbollah allies recaptured Qusayr, a critical transit point between Damascus and the Med. The regime is now focused on the largest city in the country, Aleppo. The city of 3.5 million has been affected by severe fighting since mid-2012 when rebels pushed into the city and captured much of the centre and north of the city from regime forces. Crucially, the rebels did not fully rout the regime in Aleppo, which held on to key areas, notably, southern approaches, the Aleppo Central Prison and the Aleppo International Airport. In recent days the government has launched Operation Northern Storm in Aleppo governorate. The military is focusing on cutting rebel supply routes into Aleppo presently before an anticipated push into the city. In Damascus, the government has also succeeded in pushin rebels back in the east and south west of the city and security has returned to many periphery neighbourhoods. The gains in the conflict appear to indicate an imminent rebel collapse; however, this is not expected to happen. The government does not have sufficient troops to fully restore authority in the country. Large swathes of north eastern Syria, Idlib and Hama, and the southern Daraa governorate remain in rebel control and are likely to remain in their possession. The tactic that is likely being pursued by the regime is to secure key areas, held prior to 2012, to bolster any future negotiation position. This is, in essence, Assad's only option.

Explosions in Damascus

Two explosive devices detonated in Syria's capital, Damascus, earlier today. Syrian state media has stated that 14 people were killed and 31 wounded in the blasts, which struck in the historic al-Marjeh Square. The square is also the location of a number of government buildings, including the Interior Ministry. The attack coincides with major Syrian regime gains in the civil war against the rebel bands. The regime and its ally, Hezbollah, have recently made major gains in the country having repulsed a rebel offensive in the capital and capturing Quseyr, a critical town located along the government's major supply route between the Mediterranean and Damascus. Such attacks are not unusual and urban terrorism has increasingly affected Syria's major cities since 2011. There is a possibility, however, that these attacks may increase in frequency as the rebels become increasingly desperate to reverse battlefield losses. The utility of any escalation is limited given the strength of the government; however, any increase in attacks will undermine popular confidence in the government's ability to defeat the rebellion, a confidence which has spiked considerably in response to the regime's recent battlefield successes.

For an assessment of the Syrian Civil War's impact on the region, please visit red24's website. Copy and paste this link into the browser and off you go -> https://www.red24.com/nonmembers/latestanalysis.php

Hezbollah and Syria

Media buzz today is that Hezbollah, the Shiite Army of God, has deployed upwards of 4,000 militiamen to the conflict in Syria in support of Bashar al-Assad's military. The deployment is focused on al-Qusayr, a key town located between Damascus and its critical resupply points in Tartus and Latakia. The decisive battle for the town is currently ongoing with the Syrian government dedicating a large amount of resources to the battle. Rebels are putting up a good fight but are expected to lose eventually as their main resupply points have been severed. Hezbollah has also deployed forces to Aleppo and Damascus to support Syrian government efforts against rebels. So why are Hezbollah involved in Syria?

There are three broad reasons. Firstly, Syria and Iran support Hezbollah financially and politically. Indeed, Hezbollah is the biggest supporter of Syria in Lebanon. Secondly, Hezbollah is a Shiite group and is closely linked to Alawites, which dominate the current Syrian regime. The rebellion in Syria is largely Sunni and is comprised of thousands of hardline Salafist Sunnis who are opposed ideologically to Shiism and seek its absolute eradication. Hezbollah cannot tolerate a situation where a Sunni power comes to prominence in Syria. If that were to happen the group's finance and very existence would likely end. Thirdly, the war in Syria is increasingly impacting on Lebanon and with its large militia force in Lebanon and established ties to the Syrian regime not deploying these forces would be illogical. Hezbollah is here to stay and may prove the decider in the war for Syria.  

Lebanon at the cross-roads, again

Lebanon's delicate political balance between two equally strong opposing blocs, the March 8 and March 14 coalitions, continues to be affected by the ongoing fighting in neighbouring Syria. The March 8 bloc is led by the Shiite Muslim Amal and Hezbollah movements and Christian Maronites. The March 14 is led by the Future Movement, a largely Sunni grouping. The war in Syria is, effectively, one between the Alawite-dominated regime (Alawites are closely linked to Shiites) and the predominantly Sunni Muslim rebellion. Shiites and Sunnis in Lebanon are generally supportive of their brethren in Syria. Developments there, therefore, impact on the Lebanese political system. Further complicating the situation in Lebanon, extremist elements within each general bloc are increasing agitation the longer the war in Syria continues. Salafist Sunnis (ultra conservatives essentially) have increased anti-Shiite protest activity in Sidon and Tripoli. In the latter city, violence between Sunni and Alawite gunmen has also recently been reported. In the country's restive border regions with Syria clashes between Shiite clans and the local security forces and conflict spillover (kidnapping, shooting and armed incursions) have further undermined the security environment.

Within this context the Lebanese government is attempting to organise elections on 16 June. The competition between the two major blocs has made this an almost impossible task and the mandate of the current parliament is expected to be extended as both sides struggle to agree on a new electoral law and cabinet. Peaceful elections are key for Lebanon but are unlikely to resolve long-seated differences and disputes. Two possible outcomes of the elections are possible. Under both scenarios the picture painted for Lebanon is negative. If Hezbollah aligned parties win Sunni agitators will increase protest activity. If the March 14 dominate Hezbollah may activate its militia to secure a veto in any future cabinet. One gets the sense that the only real path towards stability is if Hezbollah disarms, either through military defeat or otherwise, and if the war in Syria ends. Until this happens Lebanon will be considered a high risk operating area.

A tale of misguided protest tactics, FEMEN

FEMEN protests. Sigh. These 'ladies' have gone the extra mile recently in attracting attention to their cause against sex tourism, religious institutions, international marriage agencies, perceived sexism and other social, national and international topics. Recently FEMEN activists (three) protested bare breasted outside of a court house in Tunisia against the prosecution of a fellow activist, Amina Tyler. Now, the right to protest, in my view, should be protected. But at some point one does need to draw a line. How far, after all, can one take one's 'protest'? Does protesting, as they do, serve any purpose other than to draw attention to their bodies. Does the media, which are usually drawn in droves to the small protests, even care about the cause. Certainly the cause is given some air time but the focus seems to be on their actions, therefore detracting from the primary goal or at least the goal they are attempting to advance. Is protesting in a conservative society beneficial? Semi-naked protest activity in liberal states such as Spain, the UK and Germany are, in my view, passable, because they are unusual and don't shock the conscience of the majority of the viewers. But in a Muslim state, these protests cause more of an uproar than anything else. Would their cause not have been better served by protesting with legs and arms bared, something that is still acceptable but may still draw some attention? Possibly. For my part I think FEMEN are a great example of the Rihannanisation of the feminist movement. Decency, the moral high ground and ethical protest is what will change minds, not what they are currently doing.

Sunni Jihad in Mesopotamia (Iraq)

Bloodletting in Iraq is fueling sectarian tensions in Iraq. 1,200 souls have been lost since the start of April in an apparent deliberate escalation in violence in the country. Commentators blame al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and other Sunni extremists for leading the bombing campaign. These groups, analysts argue, are attempting to incident a sectarian war which would, in theory, lead to the fall of the current government if it were severe enough. The Shiite militias aren't biting, just yet, but could if the Iraqi government of Nouri al-Maliki does not act decisively.

It is still unclear who is behind the recent violence. The most logical explanation is, is that it is a number of militant groups, some linked to former Baathists and al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQ) and, possibly, tribal groupings. These groups are likely receiving funding from some Sunni states (Saudi Arabia? Qatar?) who have long sought to confront the growing Shiite crescent in the region. Funding from Iraqi domestic actors, including political parties is also possible. These funders are unlikely to come out and claim responsibility for their involvement because it would undermine their own domestic position and international prestige. In turn, those receiving the funding are also unlikely to go shouting from the roof tops who is funding them. 

Syria playing off the front foot

Bashar al-Assad, the dictator, the enemy of the people, the soon to be overthrown, now appears to be in the ascendancy in Syria. The Syrian military, supported by Hezbollah, Iran, Russia and a new militia force, have beaten back rebel advances in Damascus, Aleppo, Daraa and Homs recently and threaten to overrun rebel areas thought to be secure, including the city of Aleppo. This new positivity on behalf of the regime is a result of a few overarching factors. Firstly, the opposition is split and their vision for the future is clouded. The rebellion is made up of nationalists, Sunni moderates and extremists, men defending their hometowns, criminals, foreign fighters and Syrian military defectors. Secondly, supplies are a worry. The rebels just don't have the equipment to challenge the Syrian government's heavy weapons and aircraft. As much as they'd like to launch a major offensive, they can't due to the massive casualties they would experience if they did. The Syrian's international backers are also unsure about whether to supply them with the necessary material for fear that it falls into the hands of the extremists. Thirdly, the Syrian regime has restructured, resupplied and re-orientated towards a guerilla style conflict. It has transformed part of its armed force into a militia-type body that is able to block rebel advances in urban areas. It also continues to receive supplies from abroad, namely from Russia and Iran. Critically, its core forces remain loyal. Be it the brutality of the rebels or their good discipline and training, many Syrian units continue to hold out against overwhelming odds. An international conference is due to be held in June and we can expect, therefore, that the Syrian regime will aim to make as much ground as possible before that meeting to improve their bargaining position with the rebels. Watch this space.