Bashar al-Assad maintains a grip on power in Syria. His elite, regular and militia forces, supported by a largely unified Alawite community and international backers (Russia, Iran and China) have successfully repulsed a determined but divide rebel 'movement'.
The rebels racked by internal dissent, an unclear common post-conflict goal and conflicting ideological positions have failed to make further in-roads into regime-dominated territory since their largely surprising early successes in 2011 and 2012. This state of affairs has largely been a result of its lack of armour and air assets and clear and unified military command. The Free Syrian Army (FSA) aligned to the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NCSROF), numerous local militias and Islamist 'extremists' all have their own command and control systems and rarely coordinate operations. Despite the rebel failures, Assad's position remains precarious, largely due to the threat of foreign intervention. The US military strike threat in September in response to the regime's chemical weapons use in Damascus shook the confidence of the regime. Indeed, they responded unusually swiftly following a Russian proposal to declare their chemical weapons stockpiles to the international community, averting an apparent imminent US air and naval strike. Despite this successful side-step, the potential for foreign military intervention in 2014 is a highly probable scenario.
In the interim there are credible indications that the regime and part of the rebellion (likely NCSROF) will meet towards the end of December or early 2014. The momentum towards talks has largely been a result of the international reaction to the August chemical attack in Damascus. It is still not clear if the two sides will meet. Indeed, should either side begin to make advances on the battlefield negotiations may be delayed. Should negotiations occur, they will not, however, affect one inevitable outcome of the civil war - Syria will remain split for many years to come. The rebels have taken control of peripheral territory in the north and north east and Sunni central regions remain as restive as ever, which will require large allocation of regime resources to subdue and contain. From strongholds in the north, Islamist extremists will also continue to place massive pressure on the regime to further their goals of creating an Islamic Caliphate in Iraq and Syria while Kurds are unlikely to step back from their push towards greater autonomy in the far north and north east.
Syria will face ongoing conflict in 2014 regardless of whether negotiations occur or not. The intensity and spread of the fighting will largely depend on a number of factors, including the extent of foreign support for local armed groups, developments on the battlefield and the relationship between competing rebel organisations. In addition to the possible internationalization of the conflict, the specter of a regionalization of the conflict is a potential new hotspot of confrontation. Israel conducted at least three attacks in Syria in 2013 and Turkey remains highly agitated by repeated cross-border conflict spillover. Either of these forces may enter the fray in 2014 in response to Syrian conflict developments or to protect their own national interests.
The rebels racked by internal dissent, an unclear common post-conflict goal and conflicting ideological positions have failed to make further in-roads into regime-dominated territory since their largely surprising early successes in 2011 and 2012. This state of affairs has largely been a result of its lack of armour and air assets and clear and unified military command. The Free Syrian Army (FSA) aligned to the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NCSROF), numerous local militias and Islamist 'extremists' all have their own command and control systems and rarely coordinate operations. Despite the rebel failures, Assad's position remains precarious, largely due to the threat of foreign intervention. The US military strike threat in September in response to the regime's chemical weapons use in Damascus shook the confidence of the regime. Indeed, they responded unusually swiftly following a Russian proposal to declare their chemical weapons stockpiles to the international community, averting an apparent imminent US air and naval strike. Despite this successful side-step, the potential for foreign military intervention in 2014 is a highly probable scenario.
In the interim there are credible indications that the regime and part of the rebellion (likely NCSROF) will meet towards the end of December or early 2014. The momentum towards talks has largely been a result of the international reaction to the August chemical attack in Damascus. It is still not clear if the two sides will meet. Indeed, should either side begin to make advances on the battlefield negotiations may be delayed. Should negotiations occur, they will not, however, affect one inevitable outcome of the civil war - Syria will remain split for many years to come. The rebels have taken control of peripheral territory in the north and north east and Sunni central regions remain as restive as ever, which will require large allocation of regime resources to subdue and contain. From strongholds in the north, Islamist extremists will also continue to place massive pressure on the regime to further their goals of creating an Islamic Caliphate in Iraq and Syria while Kurds are unlikely to step back from their push towards greater autonomy in the far north and north east.
Syria will face ongoing conflict in 2014 regardless of whether negotiations occur or not. The intensity and spread of the fighting will largely depend on a number of factors, including the extent of foreign support for local armed groups, developments on the battlefield and the relationship between competing rebel organisations. In addition to the possible internationalization of the conflict, the specter of a regionalization of the conflict is a potential new hotspot of confrontation. Israel conducted at least three attacks in Syria in 2013 and Turkey remains highly agitated by repeated cross-border conflict spillover. Either of these forces may enter the fray in 2014 in response to Syrian conflict developments or to protect their own national interests.
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