Iraq's insurgency reached new heights in 2012 and 2013 as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) reorganized and established a highly competent and organised command and control network capable of projecting its presence across much of the country and in neighbouring Syria. This trend is expected to continue through 2014.
Under the umbrella of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the group has established a presence in northern Syria and benefited greatly from a flow of fighters and expertise from the Syrian conflict theatre to Iraq through existing trafficking and smuggling routes. In December 2012, AQI benefited significantly from a spike in anti-government protests in Sunni areas while a government crackdown on Sunni communities in mid-2013 further heightened anti-government sentiment and bolstered support for ISIL/AQI operations in the country in the Sunni belt located between Baghdad, Anbar and Ninewa governorates in the north. From this strong base AQI launched a major year-long campaign, 'Breaking the Walls', which culminated in a complex, multi-phase operation against a fortified prison complex in Abu Ghraib in July 2013, which led to the escape of 500 prisoners, including dozens of hardline Islamist militants. Following the completion of this operation AQI announced the start of its next phase, 'The Harvest of the Soldiers', campaign. In the latter part of 2013 AQI mass casualty bombings resulted in hundreds of security force and civilian fatalities. In 2013, at least 5,000 people have been killed in AQI-related attacks.
AQI/ISIL are expected to continue their offensive against the state of Iraq in 2014 and into 2015. It will continue to use vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED), suicide attacks (SVEST) and suicide VBIED's in once-off attacks and wave or coordinate countrywide attacks that have resulted in a tremendous and horrific casualty count over 2012 and 2013. It's targeting of both hard and soft police, military and government targets and Shiite communities will continue and may well increase in frequency as it aims to extend its influence and control of territory in Iraq to further its ultimate goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate in central and northern Iraq and northern Syria.
It is MECASR's position that AQI/ISIL will succeed in capturing and holding territory In Iraq should the government not act immediately to reform and equip its security sector to deal with the insurgency. AQI/ISIL will also continue to pursue alliances with ideologically aligned groupings such as the al-Nusra Front in Syria; however, its increasing bravado and dominance may bring it into direct conflict with other Islamist extremist groups and result in periods of intense in-fighting, particularly in Syria where there are numerous and competing Islamist militant organisations. The AQI campaigns, which have had a significant impact on the majority Shiite population in Iraq, will also serve to escalate sectarian tensions and sectarian conflict is expected to spike in 2014. Hardline Shiite militia groups, such as the Mahdi Army, Badr organization, Asai'b ahl al-Haq (AAH), and Katai'b Hezbollah (KH) will respond with further mobilization in some areas at a minimum and retaliatory attacks against Sunni communities at the most.
Under the umbrella of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the group has established a presence in northern Syria and benefited greatly from a flow of fighters and expertise from the Syrian conflict theatre to Iraq through existing trafficking and smuggling routes. In December 2012, AQI benefited significantly from a spike in anti-government protests in Sunni areas while a government crackdown on Sunni communities in mid-2013 further heightened anti-government sentiment and bolstered support for ISIL/AQI operations in the country in the Sunni belt located between Baghdad, Anbar and Ninewa governorates in the north. From this strong base AQI launched a major year-long campaign, 'Breaking the Walls', which culminated in a complex, multi-phase operation against a fortified prison complex in Abu Ghraib in July 2013, which led to the escape of 500 prisoners, including dozens of hardline Islamist militants. Following the completion of this operation AQI announced the start of its next phase, 'The Harvest of the Soldiers', campaign. In the latter part of 2013 AQI mass casualty bombings resulted in hundreds of security force and civilian fatalities. In 2013, at least 5,000 people have been killed in AQI-related attacks.
AQI/ISIL are expected to continue their offensive against the state of Iraq in 2014 and into 2015. It will continue to use vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED), suicide attacks (SVEST) and suicide VBIED's in once-off attacks and wave or coordinate countrywide attacks that have resulted in a tremendous and horrific casualty count over 2012 and 2013. It's targeting of both hard and soft police, military and government targets and Shiite communities will continue and may well increase in frequency as it aims to extend its influence and control of territory in Iraq to further its ultimate goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate in central and northern Iraq and northern Syria.
It is MECASR's position that AQI/ISIL will succeed in capturing and holding territory In Iraq should the government not act immediately to reform and equip its security sector to deal with the insurgency. AQI/ISIL will also continue to pursue alliances with ideologically aligned groupings such as the al-Nusra Front in Syria; however, its increasing bravado and dominance may bring it into direct conflict with other Islamist extremist groups and result in periods of intense in-fighting, particularly in Syria where there are numerous and competing Islamist militant organisations. The AQI campaigns, which have had a significant impact on the majority Shiite population in Iraq, will also serve to escalate sectarian tensions and sectarian conflict is expected to spike in 2014. Hardline Shiite militia groups, such as the Mahdi Army, Badr organization, Asai'b ahl al-Haq (AAH), and Katai'b Hezbollah (KH) will respond with further mobilization in some areas at a minimum and retaliatory attacks against Sunni communities at the most.
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