Homs under siege - video

The news from Homs in the past few weeks has been bleak. Syrian opposition activists have regularly issued communiques of regime military operations in the city against opposition supporters; however, the real picture has been difficult to comprehend as independent media have been banned from covering the unrest in the country. Now CNN has issued a video of Homs, secretly smuggled out of the country, that gives the outside world a view of developments in the central Syrian city. The video is accessible here.

The video portrays a city in chaos. Rubbish is strewn across the roads, indicating that public services are non-functioning, sandbag checkpoints are dotted across some rooftops and snipers are exacting a heavy toll on day to day activity. It should be noted that only some of the city is affected. One person interviewed stated that it was difficult for people to leave the area they were in to get bread and other commodities, suggesting that some sort of economic activity still exists. The neightbourhood in question is likely Bab Amr, an anti-government hotspot.

The violence in Homs has been some of the most severe in the country. Only Deraa, Hama and Idlib have experienced similarly high levels of unrest and conflict. The government has failed to end the unrest and its policy of direct confrontation has aggravated tensions between loyalists and the opposition. Even if the regime were to cease security operations in civilian areas the damage, it appears, has been done. The opposition is becoming increasingly belligerent and its demands for an end to the Assad dynasty are unlikely to end given the heavy toll already paid in blood by residents of towns like Homs.

The Middle East in 2012

The Arab Spring was but a twinkle in Hosni's eye this time last year with the first rumblings of social discontent echoing through Tunisia and Algeria. So what signs are there now that could provide a clue to what we can expect in 2012?

In Iraq the US military withdrawal has left a power vacuum that most major political players in the region are keen to take advantage of. At the highest levels the contest between the State of Law and Iraqiya has heated up considerably with the VP and Deputy PM firmly in the sites of PM Maliki and Iraqiya threatening to withdraw from the government. This comes amid a backdrop of suspected Sunni extremist attacks and autonomy pushes by Sunni governorates that threatens another bout of sectarian blood letting. Its too early to tell how this will play out; however, the indications are that the future of Iraq is not looking great.

The Arab Spring is still continuing. It may be the longest season in history but its one that is expected to persist for a while yet. Political transitions are underway in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen (arguably); however, old political elites remain in power and the people are likely to push against these stoic forces throughout 2012. More protests should therefore be expected.

Syria's outlook remains bleak. With few options left to it, the government has taken to manufacturing crisis'. The 22 Dec bombing in Damascus was well orchestrated by the regime to coincide with the Arab League observer mission and was an attempt to solicit some sort of sympathy for the regime and add credence to its old claim that it, and not the protesters, are under greatest threat. 2012 will be a watershed for the Assad regime, either the protests will die out or armed groups opposed to the government combined with sanctions will weaken the regime considerably. When this happens the oligarchy may turn on itself or it will simply collapse. A compromise political solution does not appear to be a likely out at this stage.

These are three of the most pressing issues MENA will face in 2012. There will be other crisis' of course, such as Israeli/Palestinian tensions, Hezbollah vs Israel conflict part 2, AQIM kidnappings and the fall of one of the more stable regimes in the region (possibly). I will be an interested watcher and, as always, will endeavour to keep my blog, and you the reader, updated with interesting tit-bits from one of the most volatile and interesting regions on the planet. Happy holidays and Merry Christmas to you and your close ones, see you in 2012!

Can Maliki hold it together?

Iraq's prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, appears to be in a tight spot. The Iraqiya bloc have threatened to depart leaving him without a governing majority after Maliki moved against VP al-Hashimi and deputy pm al-Mutlak, both influential members of Iraqiya. Al-Maliki's intent appears to be clear. He wants to dominate in a post-US Iraq, he wants to retain control of the security forces and he sees the future of Iraq as under threat. Yet he faces a problem. He can not save his country without Iraqiya and Iraqiya do not want him - the simple option would be to announce new ministers for the defence and interior ministries. The question is, can he trust anyone to do it? Well, he is going to have to if he wants to remain prime minister.

Unrest returns to Cairo

Protesters and military police officers clashed in the vicinity of the Cabinet offices and Parliament in central Cairo during the early morning hours of 16 and on 17 December 2011. Demonstrators were angered when unverified reports of the beating of a detained protester circulated online. The crowd of approximately 300 people set fire to vehicles and threw stones and Molotov cocktails at police officers, prompting police officers to fire into the air and use water cannons. The fighting continued throughout the morning, and at least one government building was burned during the clashes, but other buildings in the area were not under threat. Authorities reported that at least 15 people suffered injuries in the violence, which subsided by the afternoon hours.

- Airsecurity

US Force withdraw from Iraq - 2012 Concerns

The United States Forces-Iraq lowered its colours during a ceremony in Iraq's capital, Baghdad, on 15 December. The ceremony marked the end of the US military's non-diplomatic presence in the country and comes ahead of the 31 December 2011 withdrawal of US troops from Iraq (other than those protecting the US Embassy in Baghdad) which falls in line with the status of forces agreement between the US and Iraq. At least 4,000 troops remain in the country as of 15 December; however, this force is expected to leave Iraq during the week of 19 December, ahead of the 31 December formal deadline.

The US withdrawal ends a nine year presence in Iraq. There are concerns that the withdrawal of the US military from the country could result in political instability and insecurity. Although the Iraqi police and military have taken control of security in all areas of the country the force remains prone to corruption, is split along sectarian lines and is susceptible to infiltration from non-state armed groups. Their ability to provide adequate security without physical US military support remains questionable. The stability of the Iraqi government has improved in recent years; however, there are a plethora of security and political challenges that could destabilise state in the medium-term. Among the challenges are ongoing tensions between Arabs and Kurds in the north of the country, concerns of Iranian interference in Iraq after the US withdrawal, the persistent threat of Sunni Islamist extremism and a host of internal border and political disputes. Tensions between Sunnis and Shiites also remain elevated and may be further exacerbated by ongoing disputes. Highlighting the threat, the predominantly Sunni Diyala governorate on 12 December declared its intention of pursuing semi-autonomy from the predominantly Shiite central government. The decision has been met by stiff opposition from Shiites in the governorate who held protests in the governorate capital, Baqubah, on 14 and 15 December. The Diyala autonomy decision followed a similar declaration by the authorities in the predominantly Sunni Salah ad-din governorate in October. These issues and challenges have the potential to further enflame sectarian and political tensions in Iraq and result in unrest and violence, which in turn could be taken advantage of by non-state armed groups.

www.red24.com

Arab Spring enters the Winter Wait as first anniversary commemorated

On 17 December 2010, a vegetable seller in Sidi Bizoud, central Tunisia, set himself on fire in protest against an insult by a policeperson and the confiscation of his merchandise. The act sparked protests in Tunisia and spread to the rest of the region in a wildfire of unrest. The protests have led to political changes across the region. In many areas the changes have been pronounced, such as Libya, where a new political system is in the process of being created while in other areas like Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen political transitions are ongoing and leadership change is imminent. As the MENA region enters 2012 questions will persist over state's where change has not occurred. Bahrain, Algeria, Syria and Iran are all simmering in one degree or another and political unrest appears one spark away. It will be an interesting period for MENA watchers.

Israel - Palestinian tensions

Palestinian Israeli tensions are on the radar again. On Friday, PNA leader, Abbas, submitted an application for Palestinian statehood to the UNSC. He requires 9 votes from the 15 members of the Security Council to get his state. So, whats the problem you ask? Israel, is the simple answer. It does not want a Palestinian state, particularly one that could have friendly ties to Hamas (which wants to destroy Israel) and Iran (which really wants to destroy Israel). So the Abbas move threw a bit of a spanner. The US has recognised the possibility of a conflict, should the bid succeed and are on hand to veto the move. While they've stated they do not want to use it, they certainly will, in my opinion, and Abbas knows it. So why continue? Abbas is desperate. Negotiations between Israel and the PNA are dead in the water as both sides have finally realised each side are unable to compromise - Israel want land for settlements in the West Bank and the Palestinians want land in Israeli occupied territory. While some sort of negotiation may be forthcoming in the next few months, this position is unlikely to change and conflict seems inevitable. Abbas then is playing his one remaining card. His ace in the deck is too power a UNSC vote through, hope that the US don't veto and then hope that Israel doesn't occupy the West Bank and undo all the good work the PNA has done there in recent years. And I for one, do not blame him for this approach. At this most critical of times, when conflict seems so close, Israel continues to authorise settlements. A mere two days after the UN bid Israel authorities gave the green light for 1,100 new settlement structures. Israel may say they want peace, but in reality all they want is everything, and that my dear reader, can lead to only one outcome.

Turkey's moves against Israel - Debka's view

Debka, a highly biased and unreliable media source, has provided some surprisingly good analysis of the situation or crisis developing between Turkey and Israel. It explores a number of reasons why Turkish president, Erdogan is pursuing a confrontational position vis-a-vis the Jewish state. The full article is available here http://www.debka.com/article/21282/

"Minister Tayyip Erdogan this week coolly moved his country step by provocative step towards an armed clash with Israel – not just over the Palestinian issue, but because he covets the gas and oil resources of the eastern Mediterranean opposite Israel's shores. Thursday night, Sept. 8, he announced that Turkish warships will escort any Turkish aid vessels for Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. In his remarks to Al Jazeera television, the Turkish prime minister also said he had taken steps "to stop Israel from unilaterally exploiting natural resources from the eastern Mediterranean." He did not say what steps he had taken. However, for some time now, he has moved mountains to isolate Israel by drawing a double diplomatic noose around it."

Syrian resistance close at hand

Protesters are gathering in Cairo, Sanaa, Amman and parts of Damascus today as protests for greater political freedoms continue. While reporting has become slightly jaded on the Arab Spring, youth activists continue to push regimes for their demands to be met. The situation in Syria is particularly concerning. Unlike other government's, the Assad regime is standing firm that it will not reform or meet protester demands. We fully expect armed rebellion shortly; however, whether this is successful or not is uncertain as Syria's elite military forces are a hard nut to crack. These forces, like Gaddafi's hiding out in the Libyan desert, are fiercely loyal to the regime and the ruling Alawite sect.

Turkey's strategic shift regarding Israel

The fallout of the Israeli raid on the Gaza flotilla in 2010 continues to be felt in the region. Just recently the Turk government severed major diplomatic ties with Israel and pulled out of all existing military pacts with the Jewish state. It has also announced it will be withdrawing from commercial links with Israel. Now, today, media reports are surfacing that Turk leader, Erdogan, will be pursuing closer military ties with Egypt. This is a major shift in geopolitical loyalties and places enormous strain on Israel at a time when the threat of war is escalating. To Israel's north Lebanon is currently controlled by Hezbollah and its allies, Syria is in the throes of unrest and Gaza is ready to exact revenge for countless IAF airstrikes. The Palestinian Authority is also readying for a UN vote on statehood. Should it pass the impact on Israel would be enormous as anti-Israel regimes (Iran, Syria etc) would gain a strong ally on Israel's doorstep. Even if it doesn't pass there is a major threat of civil unrest in the West Bank. Only Jordan appears to maintain its neutrality with regards to Israel. Interesting times ahead.

Tel Aviv "terror" - Ramming attacks in Israel (JPost)

Background: Ramming terror attacks in recent years

By JPOST.COM STAFF, YAAKOV LAPPIN, ETGAR LEFKOVIT

08/29/2011 05:04

http://www.jpost.com/NationalNews/Article.aspx?id=235810

South Tel Aviv attack is 5th of its kind in past three years, including "Nakba Day" attack, "Jerusalem bulldozer attacks." Seven people were injured in south Tel Aviv early Monday morning, after a terrorist from the West Bank carjacked a taxi and rammed it into a police road block protecting a Tel Aviv nightclub, before going on a stabbing spree. Monday's attack comes after a similar attack in May on Nakba Day when a young truck driver from the Arab town of Kafr Kasim caused terrifying destruction in south Tel Aviv after ramming his truck into several vehicles on Bar-Lev Street, in what police suspected to be a “lonewolf terror attack” that killed one man and injured 17 others. The 20-ton Volvo truck, driven by the 22-year-old man, departed Kafr Kasim on the morning of the attack and entered Tel Aviv via Route 4, driving through the Mesubim Junction. As the driver approached the Hatikva neighborhood, he struck and ran over several cars. The truck driver continued on, smashing into a black jeep, a white Fiat car, flattening a road sign, and striking other vehicles, before suddenly swerving into the opposite lane, running over a moped – seconds after its driver leapt off – then finally smashing sideways into an Egged bus, that just dropped off its last passenger.

The attacks are also reminiscent of the so-called "Jerusalem bulldozer attacks" three years ago that started on July 2 2008 when terrorist Husam Taysir Dwayat carried out a lethal bulldozer rampage on Jaffa Road which killed three people and wounded dozens before he was killed. Three weeks later, tractor driver Ghassan Abu Tir, a 22-year-old resident of the east Jerusalem neighborhood of Umm Tuba who was working on a construction project on a side street near the King David Hotel, pulled into King David Street and repeatedly crashed his vehicle into a No. 13 Egged bus, which managed to escape, and then rammed into five cars, one of which he overturned, before being shot dead by a motorist who happened by the scene. 15 people were wounded in the attack. Two months later, east Jerusalem resident Kasem Mugrabi drove his BMW into a a crowd in Jerusalem's Tzahal Sqare near the Old City. 17 people were wounded, most of them soldiers, before he was shot dead by an IDF officer.

Fasting ends - protests set to begin

Ramadan comes to a close on Tue/Wed. There are growing expectations that anti-government protests will re-escalate in many areas of the Middle East and North Africa as Muslims can re-energise during the day. But exactly where will the unrest kickoff? Syria, Bahrain and Yemen have experienced relatively stable and high levels of protests during Ramadan and in many other areas, such as Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Iraq the political situation has normalised following government action. Of particular interest will be Egypt. Many of its movements openly suspended Ramadan protesting. It is highly likely that these group will restart later this week, possibly as early as Friday. Start your engines.

The Night of Power

Muslims across the world will commemorate the Night of Power or Laylat al-Qadr tonight. It is widely beleived that this is the night that the Angel Gabriel revealed the Holy Quran to the Prophet Muhammad. The Quran purportedly states that the night is better than a thousand months. For fundamentalists and extremists the occassion is (incorrectly) believed to increase the browny points you receive in the after life if you martyr yourself. Keep an eye on Middle Eastern states and US Embassies tonight.

The wild west: loyalists continue to battle the rebels in Libya

Tripoli remains in the grip of fighting between loyalists and rebels. While gains have been made the continued fighting speaks to the significant support al-Gaddafi still has, particularly in Tripoli. The support has also been revealed as coming from locals and .. foreign mercenaries. The discovery of 30 bodies, clearly African, has highlighted the role these mercenaries have played in the battle for Libya. One wonders how many more of these fighters remain in the country.

On the diplomatic front the rebel NTC have stated that they plan to relocate to Tripoli shortly while the US has announced that $1.5 billion will be released to fund humanitarian operations in Libya. The rebels are certainly on the front foot and will look to capture or kill Gaddafi as soon as possible, so that the shadow of 40 years of dictatorship can finally be eradicated. However, even if they were to capture the tyrant and eradicate his loyalist and mercenary force questions still need to be answered as to whether the NTC can unify the diverse rebel factions and include the power tribes in the interim government.

Just the beginning

It may appear that Arab Spring 2011 is coming to a restless end; however, there are a number of factors that lead me to think that this is just the beginning.

1. Ramadan - the holy month is coming to an end. More people will be available to protest shortly.

2. Goals - Regime change has only occurred (sort of) in one country -> Libya. The goals of protesters are yet to be fully met in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Yemen etc.

3. Social inequality - The primary driver of the unrest in the Middle East in 2011 was social inequality - poverty, unemployment, a growing gap between rich and poor. These macro social and economic problems are grinding ahead unabated. As more people become poor, they will become angrier and begin to vent.

4. Israeli/Palestinian conflict - This issue has played in the background for a while. If the UN vote in September fails to recognise the Palestinian state, trouble could brew, particularly for states close to Israel (Jordan) and the US (Egypt, Saudi, Gulf states), which is expected to veto the Palestinian application for statehood.

So there you have it. I certainly expect trouble to continue to brew in the region through 2012 and probably beyond. Solutions are few and far between at the moment.

The rebel gamble - brazen assault in Tripoli

A major rebel gamble has begun in Libya's capital, Tripoli. Overnight fighting was reported across the city as rebel supporters skirmished with forces loyal to the regime. While information still remains sketchy it is believed that the rebels are focusing their attention on the Tajoura neighborhood and the Matiga airport. Rebels claim to have infiltrated the city on Friday via tugboats, resupplying their supporters in Tripoli. At this stage the regime are remaining defiant claiming to have, in Gaddafi's words, eliminated the 'rats'. Again this piece of information can not be verified. What is verifiable is that fighting is ongoing and their are a high number of casualties. The crucial question at this juncture is 1. Does Gaddafi maintain significant support in Tripoli to quash the latest uprising. 2. Can the rebels capture or kill Gaddafi before their supply of ammunition is depleted. A large number of Gaddafi forces remain outside of the capital. Should these forces turn back to the capital, the rebel mini-offensive could be under threat...however, even if additional forces were to be moved from the front line, Gaddafi would lose significant territory as rebels are likely to push against any weakened areas. We continue to watch with interest.

War edges closer to the Levant

(Pictured: Al-Qassam Brigades member - the group withdrew from a 2009 ceasefire with Israel, on 19 August)

The probability of a full scale conflict between Hamas and Israel is becoming an increasingly likely scenario as tensions continue to escalate between the two sides. Following Thursday's militant attacks near Eilat, the Israeli government took the knee-jerk reaction of blaming 'Gazans' (ie Hamas) for the attack, without considering the possibility that a third party, operating independently of Islamist/Palestinian extremist networks in the Gaza Strip (ie in the Sinai), may have orchestrated the worst terrorist incident in Israel since 2008. Israeli intelligence and logic aside, the IAF has since been given the green light to target militant positions, particularly those of the Palestinian Resistance Committee (PRC), in the Gaza area. Since operations began on Thursday night at least 30 people have been killed in IAF strikes, including the head of the PRC. Hamas targets have also been destroyed, which in turn has resulted in Hamas and its armed wing, the al-Qassam Brigades suspending a long standing ceasefire with Israel, which was in place since 2009.

The situation as of Saturday night has become dire. Hamas rockets are raining down on southern Israel, some as far as 40km from the Strip. At least one projectile struck the Southern District capital, Beersheba, on Saturday evening killing one man. This rocket barrage, Hamas' lifting of the ceasefire and the traditional response of the IDF/IAF to militant attacks is likely to result in a further escalation without an immediate intervention from one if not all members of the Quartet. Inside the Middle East will be watching developments closely through the weekend for signs of further escalation, such as an IDF cross border raid, Hamas terror attack in Israel or high level rocket barrage from the Gaza area. We will also be watching the reaction of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. If the war escalates may they consider entering the fray? Trying times ahead indeed.

Austerity measures and social unrest - links?

An interesting article that explores the links between austerity measures and social unrest. An excerpt:

The frequency of demonstrations, assassinations, and general strikes rises monotonically with the scale of cuts. Only in the case of riots is there a small decline for the biggest cut-backs. In the case of demonstrations, the frequency of incidents appears to rise particularly fast as expenditure cuts pass the 3% threshold.

Full article - http://www.voxeu.org/sites/default/files/file/DP8513.pdf

Reality of the state of perpetual war

On Thursday Palestinian extremists/freedom fighters carried out attacks against buses and private vehicles along Route 12 in southern Israel and fought brief gun battles with local military forces. By the end of the day 8 people were dead and 30 more wounded. The attack was the worst in recent times in Israel. The government responded strongly carrying out air attacks against Hamas installations in the Gaza Strip killing a number of people. Israeli military attacks along the shared border also mistakenly killed 5 Egyptian soldiers.

If it wasn't clear before it should be crystal clear now. Israel remains in a permanent state of readiness for war. Talk of negotiations and of improving security are secondary to the realities the country faces. Along its western border an enclave packed with militants ready to take advantage of any perceived weakness to strike at Israel, further west an Egyptian state that is losing its ability to control Islamist militants in the Sinai and on its northern border - uncertainty in Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon are weighing heavily on Israeli military planners and strategists. People who criticize Israel's disproportionate response to attacks on its soil should take these factors into account. On the other side of the coin, persons who back Israel should also consider the pain the Jewish state has inflicted on its Palestinian and Arab neighbours - settlement expansion in Palestinian areas, high level assassinations, mass arrests, sieges of communities etc etc. One only hopes that the current cycle of violence will be met at some point by statesmanship on both sides, perhaps even a willingness to negotiate a peaceful end to the madness of perpetual war. Yet, when both sides are committed to eradicating the other one can be forgiven for thinking negatively.

Flash: Kidnapping still big business in Afghanistan

The following information is an excerpt of an alert compiled by red24's Central Asian Risk Analyst, Ryan Cummings. Editorial amendments included.

Afghan security forces freed two Turk nationals on Tuesday in the Jowzan province from their Taleban captors. The pair, along with another Turkish national and two Afghan locals were seized by a group of unidentified militants on 28 June 2011. However, due to poor health, one of the Turkish engineers was released soon after his capture, while the Afghan nationals were similarly freed after their families paid a ransom estimated to be around USD 17,000 each. An alleged ransom of USD530, 000 was demanded for the release of the two Turkish nationals.

While major battles and suicide car bombings make world headlines the criminal under current in Afghanistan continues to flourish. Buoyed by massive ransom hauls criminal and insurgent gangs have made millions of dollars in recent years. Foreigners remain the most sort after captive as kidnappers can usually receive 10 to 15 times or more compared to ransoms for local nationals. Indeed as many as 30 foreigners have been reported kidnapped in the past five years while the real figure is probably five times that. With kidnapping being such big business in Afghanistan it appears that private security business will also remain a major foreign income earner in the country for some time to come.

The Bahrain hot potato - juggling expectations in the Persian Gulf

With a population of just over 1 million people Bahrain is a speck within the larger Middle East region. Despite its size it has dominated regional and, at times, international headlines due to ongoing agitation by its significant Shiite majority for greater political freedoms from the Sunni monarchy. In a short excerpt below red24 analyst, Andre Colling, summarises events in the country this year and what we have to look forward to in the coming months. The full MENA brief will appear on red24s website shortly.

In February, mainly Shiite political opposition forces initiated major pro-reform protests across Bahrain. The protests, which centred on the Pearl Roundabout in Manama, escalated on 17 February when the security forces used live rounds against protesters killing a number of people. The action served to exacerbate and escalate the unrest and calls for reform were largely replaced with calls for the overthrow of the minority Sunni-led government of King Hamad al-Khalifa. The unrest continued daily after the February events until mid-March when Bahrain requested foreign assistance to stem the protests and protect government assets. In line with the request, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) mandated a large Saudi Arabian military (1,000 soldiers and armour) and UAE police force (500 officers) to deploy to the country. The regime also initiated a state of emergency and banned all public gatherings. The measures effectively ended the protests, including those at the Pearl Roundabout.

Small and sporadic protests continued in outlying areas of the country and began to escalate once again after the state of emergency was lifted on 1 June. The regime has subsequently called for and continues to hold a National Dialogue and a parliamentary by-election on 24 September. Arguably the largest Shiite grouping, al-Wefaq, has withdrawn from the dialogue process and refuses to participate in the upcoming election (the election was called after al-Wefaq withdrew from the government in February) until reforms are initiated.

The unrest in Bahrain is set to continue until Shiites rejoin the political process, and may well escalate should the government continue to stall on granting a greater devolution of power to a democratically elected legislature. The political outlook for Bahrain is largely negative as the Khalifa family is unlikely to weaken their position by granting greater rights to what would effectively become a Shiite dominated parliament.

Special Arab Spring report

Morocco

Largely stable now following a successful constitutional referendum in early July supported by 98% of the population. Minor protests still occur; however, the overall situation has improved markedly for the regime and its business as usual.

Algeria

One of the first countries in the region to feel the impact of the Arab Spring, Algeria has worked decisively to stamp out protests. Using its oil and gas income it successfully lowered commodity prices (a key demand of protesters). The political opposition, which has traditionally been weak and divided, was unable to gain any momentum out of the initial protests. No significant protests have been held since early 2011.

Tunisia

The country is due to hold National Assembly elections in October. This will be a key test for the state. While major protests ceased in January following Ali's resignation and exile sporadic protests continue to be reported. The poll remains a key trigger point.

Libya

The country remains split between Tripoli and Benghazi. Rebels and al-Gaddafi forces still face off in a number of areas of the country; however, no decisive conflict development is expected until after Ramadan. Rebels also remain inexperienced and lack armour - key ingredients in any modern conflict.

Egypt

Elections are expected to be held in October and November; while these may placate some political groupings it will not solve the fundamental economic and social problems prevalent in the country. Sky rocketing food prices, a growing population and massive youth unemployment are key triggers for future unrest. What Egypt requires now is a Marshall Plan.

Israel

While technically not an Arab state, the country has still experienced an upswing in cost of living protests since late July. The demonstrations are gaining momentum and its anyone's guess where these will go if the government does not meet the people's demands. However, unlike the rest of the region the country is unlikely to fall into mass turmoil. Government's may fall in the short-term.

Jordan

Friday protests occur regularly. These remain small and are unlikely to grow in size at the moment. The king has taken some steps to meet the demands of political reform. While the protests are small opposition to the regime is growing and one gets the nagging sense that Jordan's problems have only just begun. The country remains heavily reliant on foreign aid and the goodwill shown towards the king by the majority of Jordanians. Should aid somehow be withdrawn or attitudes towards the king take a dramatic hit, Jordan may well have a Revolution Spring.

Syria

The al-Assad regime is close to the end now. If protesters can maintain their protest movement (which seems likely as the security forces continue to kill hundreds every week) anti-government sentiment will continue to grow and fester into armed rebellion. Once UN sanctions kick in the ability of the Syrian government to overcome the protesters will reduce. Without an Assad resignation one does not see the unrest ending any time soon.

Iran

The country's massive security force apparatus has successfully quashed all dissent. Without support of the majority of the country the Green Movement (anti-government group composed of largely middle class and urban Iranians) is unlikely to make much headway. Key trigger points for regime instability are 1. unrest in rural areas 2. protests by state workers. The regime may also shoot itself in the foot by initiating conflict with the West or Israel or splitting internally.

Bahrain

Parliamentary by-elections are due in September. Should al-Wefaq, the leading Shiite political grouping, not participate the country is likely to continue to experience unrest well into 2012. Should they join, the outlook will be positive; however, the grouping would also need to rejoin the National Dialogue. Wefaq pulled out of the talks a few weeks back citing the governments failure to meet its key demands, which are basically a greater devolution of power to an elected assembly. At present one does not see the Sunni minority giving up power to its traditional rival, the Shiite majority.

Yemen

This basket case of a state is heading towards schism. Rebellion in the north, secessionist conflict in the south, Islamist extremists declaring Islamic states in the east, water and oil shortages, restless tribes, weak central government, piracy off the coast (Socotra is now considered a pirate refuge) - factors that point to one inevitable conclusion - state failure. Perhaps a GCC intervention can save the day; however, it is likely that in 2012 or 2013 the state will split in some way or a Somalia type situation will emerge.

Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Iraq*

These states were largely unaffected by the recent Arab Spring; however, sporadic protests were still reported. The massive oil revenues have largely offset desires for political reform...for the moment. Should the oil price drop we are likely to witness massive social upheavals. Proactive political reform and economic diversification in the next five years will offset many future problems.

*Iraq - remains a special case. It has been in the grips of a conflict for a number of years and the issues there are largely unconnected to the Arab Spring movements elsewhere in the country.

A head of the hydra - al-Qaeda's ideal live on

While Osama Bin Laden has been eradicated the threat of terrorism is as strong as ever in the Middle East.

Al-Qaeda as everyone knows by now is a largely symbolic group. Once it was comprised of a number of highly capable mujahedeen but today its membership has been severely depleted as the US and UK chase down and eliminate its operatives across the world. However, the idea of al-Qaeda has not died and has spawned a number of major terrorist organizations across the region that are not only surviving but are growing. The four major bodies include al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM, formerly the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) which operates in the Sahel region (a vast desert expanse in North Africa), al-Shabaab in Somalia, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) based in Yemen.

These group are highly active in their areas of operation. AQIM have kidnapped a large number of foreigners in recent years for astonishingly large ransoms. The most current case involves a French national – AQIM are demanding 90 million euros for her release. Al-Shabaab also has not only grown into an effective terrorist force but also a major combat force. The group currently controls large parts of Somalia and Mogadishu and a final victory and push towards an Islamic state has only been halted by the presence of a small African Union force. The ISI also control some territory in Iraq; however, its speciality, mass casualty civilian attacks, has improved over the years to what Osama would agree is an art form. Its operatives also continue to assassinate scores of state officials every month and when the US do eventually withdraw fully by the end of the year, there scope of operations and brazenness may increase further. In Yemen, the basket case of the Middle East, former al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia and Yemen forces have joined hands in the mountainous and largely lawless east of Yemen and have formed AQAP. One need only Google the name and Yemen to get an idea of the threat the group pose to the state, its increasing presence and growing threat to the world. Few remember that this group is responsible for the 2009 Christmas Day bomb plot over Detroit and the 2010 cargo plane bomb plot over the US and in the UAE. This group is looking to expand and as the Yemeni state collapses around it it will find ample volunteers and room to grow into a global terrorist force.

So, in summary, is it time to rejoice as the Yanks did on 2 May when news broke of OBL's departure from this world? No. A number of threats remain and the threat is growing.

Cheering crowds as news of Osama Bin Laden's death

More at the LA Times Blog

Brief: Where art thou o Revolution?

After nearly five months of political upheaval that our children will come to know as the 2011 Middle East Revolution demonstrators across the region stand at the cross roads. From Morocco to Iran, the exhilaration of protest has given way in many places to the reality of planning and executing a revolution. While leaders in Tunisia and Egypt have fallen and others in Yemen and Syria seem close to tumbling into forced retirement, we must ask the question (as must the protesters) what has actually been achieved? To date there have been no new elections, no new constitutions (although these are being planned in Jordan and Morocco) and no real changes to political systems that continue to be top heavy i.e. strong executives with parliaments filled with members of the former, and current, ruling classes. In a sense nothing has changed, or is this view to narrow minded, too cynical? Possibly.

What I and many observers of the Middle East would like to believe is that the Middle East Revolution has achieved something more important than a coup or a simple regime change. It has changed the way people think. A new generation of young, computer literate and globally savvy youth have challenged a generation that relied on strong men and strong militaries. They have shocked an Arab demographic into getting real about democracy and allowing people the freedom to think and hope for more form their leaders, hopefully in ten years, elected....If you believe this you may also believe that George Bush only had the American people's best interests at heart when he decided to invade Iraq. Many people remain locked in a seemingly endless cycle of poverty and unemployment, Islamist extremism is growing in a number of areas across the region and ruling elites lock on power is far from diminished. Yet, a caution for the rulers. Yemen is the future for many countries in the Middle East if change is not begun. No oil, social disontent and dictatorship are a recipe for disaster...but a disaster that is perhaps a generation or more away for most.

US idealism vs US realism

A wave of freedom chants continue to ring across the Middle East with ordinary people taking to the streets to demand greater political freedom, basic rights and higher wages. The chorus has affected every state except two, the UAE and Qatar, which are essentially made up of the super rich. The chorus fits a familiar tune, freedom from oppression. The current US administration, which came to power on a wave of hope, freedom and liberty is now having to consider whether it too will have to resort to political realism in the short-term. It is easy to come to power by appealing to Utopian ideals; however, in the real world sometimes having a dictator is a good thing. In Yemen for example, the country is beset by so many problems including rebellion in the north, extremism in the east, separatist sentiment in the south and now political unrest in the centre that removing the one man that keeps it all in check is more likely to create more problems. If Saleh is overthrown tomorrow the opposing groups in the country are likely to bicker over the future character of the political system. Islamists will want an Islamist state (not good for the US), southerners may want a socialist republic (not good for the capitalists) and the rebels will want whatever they can get (not good for the Saudis). Supporting a dictator here would be logical. But if Obama were to do that openly he'd risk the credibility of his regime. Its easy to sprout democratic nonsense, its much harder to make it happen, particularly if you're eating hamburgers in Washington and shooting b-ball with the kids before Oprah starts. In tribal Yemen where revenge killings are expected for dishonouring a cow, Oprah means very little. 

Madness? This is Libya

Megalomania comes in many forms but next to the definition in the Oxford is a picture of one Muammar al-Gaddafi. His insane rants and bizare approach to governance have finally come to a head after a tumultuous forty year reign during which he kept a near iron clad fist on the country. Today, the country is torn by unrest and split in three. The historical areas of Tripolotania, Cyrrenica and Fezzan have once again emerged out of the sands of the Sahara (Fezzan in the south is likely to fall under the sway of one of the two other regions). The eastern forces of Cyrennica around the ancient citadel of Benghazi are gathering momentum as we speak and are likely to attempt an offensive to capture the capital of Tripolitana at any moment. Standing in there way are the mercenary forces of Gaddafi and his loyal praetorian guards. If they do attempt a blitzkrieg across the nearly 500 miles of desert their victory will not be a certainty. There is still much that can happen. With American fleets in the Mediteranean and the UN peacekeeping force a resolution away, foreign intervention is still a possibility. Even the northern Chadian rebels or chad government may attempt to capture parts of Fezzan in revenge for Gaddafi's 1980s ventures into the Saharan state. Mecasr watches with interest.

Unrest grips the Middle East

Unrest continues to grip multiple area in the Middle East and North Africa. Emboldened by protests in Tunisia and Egypt, opposition groups in Libya (multiple cities), Yemen (Aden, Taiz and Sanaa) and Bahrain (Manama) are taking to the streets on 17 February in an attempt to oust the regimes. The security forces are doing everything in their power to suppress the protests, however, one gets the sense that the momentum is with the people and further resignations and significant political reforms are likely.

North Africa and the domino effect. Fact of fiction?

The 14 January resignation of Tunisian President Zine Bin-Ali in what has become popularly known as the Jasmine Revolution has raised a number of questions as to the future stability of the state and of states in the wider Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. MECASR explores the debate below:

There are some merits to comparing Tunisia to neighbouring countries. States in the MENA region share a common religion, language, ethnicity and simliar political histories. MENA states are also characterized by similar political systems, which are typically dominate by a strong man and ruling party, supported by a strong (at least on the surface) military and police force and opposed by weak and divided political opposition groups. Generally, states are able to pacify their populations by providing them with strong social support using income generated by oil and gas wealth and in return the citizenry accept that certain political freedoms will be restricted or withheld. This point of view has merit and is, generally, correct; however, the question posed of whether or not Tunisia will form the first domino in a collapse of states in the MENA region can only be answered by a closer examination of each state.

MENA states may seem similar but there are nuances not immediately apparent to the casual observer. Some states are led by hereditary monarchs, these tend to be more stable such as the Gulf States, Jordan and Morocco; others are ruled by strong men who came to power via a coup or conflict (Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Yemen, Syria). The people in each state view their rulers differently. Some are loved and respected and resentment is aimed at their governments (Jordan) while other leaders are viewed as the problem (Tunisia).

Within each of these states youth bulge and unemployment and restrictions on civil liberties are clearly evident; however, the reaction of each state and each state’s ability to react is vastly different. In Tunisia, the economy is based on revenue generated by tourism and olive oil, industries that are not labour intensive and do not require a great deal of skill. The potential work force however is highly skilled. Ali did well to educate the masses but did not do well in diversifying his economy to allow other industries (that could used skilled labour) to flourish. The increasing restrictions on immigration from Tunisia to the EU also played a part in the agitation. Without an avenue to escape unemployment the youth turned on the government.

In Algeria, high oil and gas income has assisted the government to dodge the potential fallout of sustained anti-government unrest. The government’s immediate purchase of hundreds of thousands of tons of wheat and grain and immediate reduction of food prices has curbed rioting and returned the country to a semblance of calm.

In the Gulf states, oil income has been directed towards social aid packages. This isn’t a sustainable long term solution; however, in the short term anti-government sentiment will be blunted.

In Egypt, Mubarak’s reign may come to an end due to the Tunisian inspired riots, however, the end is likely to come only if the military and police forces (which number over a million men) support his ouster. There is every possibility that Mubarak will fall; however, it will not be in a popular revolution. Rather it is the unrest that will spark a power struggle within the ruling elite. Succession has been a major issue in Egypt recently. Much has been stated about the future role of Mubarak’s son, Gamal. Senior members of the military and the National Democratic Party (NDP), who have served under Mubarak for generations, may not wish to see another Mubarak in power. The role of these men will be the most important deciding factor moving forward.

MENA states are characterized by similar traits; however, nuances are key to understanding each state and whether the Tunisian “revolution” will spark similar change across the region. It remains unlikely that there will be many more collapses in the short term. Over a longer period of time there is every indication that states will find it increasingly difficult to placate their growing populations without serious economic reform (including diversification and a move away from a reliance on oil) and political reform. As the abstract social contract between the people and their rulers (the one that allows strong men to rule if social demands are met) ceases to remain relevant in the face of significant economic woes governments will have to reform to allow the people a greater voice in the running of the country. However, even these measures will not solve all ills. Current populations growth levels, diminishing resources, increasing competition for resources and growing Islamist extremism in the face of all of these challenges are unlikely to disappear in the MENA region or the world for that matter. The outlook is bleak; however, these remain medium to long term concerns. In the interim expect more protests and possibly one or more changes to the leadership of some countries. Revolutions of entire political systems are unlikely.

Some Q&A

What keeps some states strong and others weak?

Oil and gas revenue. In Yemen, the consequences of a dwindling supply of oil income has directly affected the countries patronage network. Unsuprisingly, rebellion has been sparked across the country. In the Gulf, states are buying off the citizenry. People with a full belly and families that are well looked after are unlikely to protest against the government. Cut off this aid and things will turn nasty.

Was Tunisia a revolution in the true sense?

No, the Tunisia revolution was in fact the Tunisian president change. The political system remains intact and there are no indications that a new system is going to be introduced.

In Western democracies militaries are professional and subservient to the civilian government, whats the difference in MENA?

Many leaders in the MENA region are ex-military men, having come to power via coup de tat or being closely aligned to parties with strong connections to the military. Militaries have also been used as the frontline in quelling dissent and through this have, like the Praetorian guard in Rome, gained more position and power. Military personnel in the West are unlikely to be seen in public areas in the home country. There is a clear separation. In MENA states soldiers are regularly seen on public streets.

What is the role of Islamists in the unrest?

Not much so far. Across the board they have been relatively quiet to date.

Tunisia's grass roots revolution

The Jasmine Revolution should serve as a warning to all North African states that the will of the people can still forment change, even in the absence of strong opposition political groupings. As populations become younger and poorer, authoritarian regimes will come under increasing pressure to reform politically and economically. Creative solutions to youth unemployment will need to be found to meet the demands of an increasingly frustrated class. Ali's resignation is the beginning of the end for the current political elite in North Africa. Once Gaddafi and Mubarak pass on expect further revolution if reform does not follow.

The stick with no carrot: Youth disillusionment in North Africa

From Algeria to Egypt youth rioters and protesters have taken to the streets in recent weeks in an unprecedented wave of unrest that is a serious wake up call for regimes that have stifled democracy and allowed economies, heavily reliant on single industries, to stagnate. In Algeria, government plans to raise the prices of commodities and demolish thousands of dillapidated homes has led to a major crisis, particularly in the capital, Algiers, were near nightly protests against government economic policy have been reported. The protests have not only centred on the capital with protests becoming violent in Oran located in the far west of the country. In neighbouring Tunisia, usually a beacon of stability, youth riots and protests, sparked by the suicide of a local unemployed youth, against government's economic policies and high rates of youth unemployment have shocked the nation. Unrest in Egypt has also been reported lately. A bomb attacks outside of a Christian church on 1 January acted as a release valve on long held resentment of the regime, sparking protests in Alexandria and Cairo. Egypt has a history of unrest related to economic problems as well. In the past year hundreds of protests and strikes over rising prices and poverty have been reported. For a large and young North African population which is technologically savvy, well-educated and unemployed, authoritarian practices and poor economic policies are insufficient. Ageing regimes in North Africa have done well to educate the youth in their countries; however, without diversifying the economy and creating jobs above the level of service providers or manual workers and without political reform that gives the youth a voice, tensions will continue to run deep and the allure of revolution and extremism will become increasingly strong.  

Bombing in Egypt's north

A bombing in Egypt's northern city of Alexandria has raised fresh fears of an Islamist extremist revival. On 1 January, a bomb, possibly a suicide bomber, exploded near a church in Alexandria. The blast killed 29 people and wounded 79 others. There have been no claims of responsibility; however, the target indicates that Islamist extremists were the likely culprits. Egypt has had a long and troubled history of Islamist terrorism but in recent years has successfully avoided any major incidents. Attacks that have occurred have been relatively unsophisticated and carried out by lone wolf extremists or small groups of self-radicalised elements unrelated to larger bodies. In recent months there have been increasing concerns that al-Qaeda through its affiliate the Islamic State if Iraq may conduct attacks against Christian interests in Egypt. The ISI has issued several threats against the local Coptic church for its alleged detention of two Muslim woman. Although the claims are unfounded the ISI has used the 'detention' to stir anti-Christian sentiment in Egypt, where tensions are already elevated between the majority Muslim population and large Christian minority. It is possible that an ISI cell conducted attacks; however, as stated the attack remains unclaimed and may well have been the work of a lone wolf. MECASR will continue to monitor this incident with interest. Any ISI involvement will and should cause significant concern for locals and foreigners alike.

Tunisia's unemployment conundrum

Protests against unemployment are being reported with increasing frequency across Tunisia. The protests were sparked by an attempted suicide in mid-December by a local youth who set himself ablaze in protest over his employment status. The incident sparked widespread protests across the country and revealed that frustration at government's economic policy is heightened and growing. Tunisia has one the regions most literate and educated population, however, joblessness remains a significant obstacle to long term stability. Unemployment is officially 14% however is significantly higher among the 18-30 year old demographic. The government's economic policies have also focused on tourism and most new jobs are aimed at low skill workers. With tens of thousands of unemployed graduates in the country, the government will need to act decisively to avoid a sustained protest movement which could eventually come to challenge the central government.