The 14 January resignation of Tunisian President Zine Bin-Ali in what has become popularly known as the Jasmine Revolution has raised a number of questions as to the future stability of the state and of states in the wider Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. MECASR explores the debate below:
There are some merits to comparing Tunisia to neighbouring countries. States in the MENA region share a common religion, language, ethnicity and simliar political histories. MENA states are also characterized by similar political systems, which are typically dominate by a strong man and ruling party, supported by a strong (at least on the surface) military and police force and opposed by weak and divided political opposition groups. Generally, states are able to pacify their populations by providing them with strong social support using income generated by oil and gas wealth and in return the citizenry accept that certain political freedoms will be restricted or withheld. This point of view has merit and is, generally, correct; however, the question posed of whether or not Tunisia will form the first domino in a collapse of states in the MENA region can only be answered by a closer examination of each state.
MENA states may seem similar but there are nuances not immediately apparent to the casual observer. Some states are led by hereditary monarchs, these tend to be more stable such as the Gulf States, Jordan and Morocco; others are ruled by strong men who came to power via a coup or conflict (Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Yemen, Syria). The people in each state view their rulers differently. Some are loved and respected and resentment is aimed at their governments (Jordan) while other leaders are viewed as the problem (Tunisia).
Within each of these states youth bulge and unemployment and restrictions on civil liberties are clearly evident; however, the reaction of each state and each state’s ability to react is vastly different. In Tunisia, the economy is based on revenue generated by tourism and olive oil, industries that are not labour intensive and do not require a great deal of skill. The potential work force however is highly skilled. Ali did well to educate the masses but did not do well in diversifying his economy to allow other industries (that could used skilled labour) to flourish. The increasing restrictions on immigration from Tunisia to the EU also played a part in the agitation. Without an avenue to escape unemployment the youth turned on the government.
In Algeria, high oil and gas income has assisted the government to dodge the potential fallout of sustained anti-government unrest. The government’s immediate purchase of hundreds of thousands of tons of wheat and grain and immediate reduction of food prices has curbed rioting and returned the country to a semblance of calm.
In the Gulf states, oil income has been directed towards social aid packages. This isn’t a sustainable long term solution; however, in the short term anti-government sentiment will be blunted.
In Egypt, Mubarak’s reign may come to an end due to the Tunisian inspired riots, however, the end is likely to come only if the military and police forces (which number over a million men) support his ouster. There is every possibility that Mubarak will fall; however, it will not be in a popular revolution. Rather it is the unrest that will spark a power struggle within the ruling elite. Succession has been a major issue in Egypt recently. Much has been stated about the future role of Mubarak’s son, Gamal. Senior members of the military and the National Democratic Party (NDP), who have served under Mubarak for generations, may not wish to see another Mubarak in power. The role of these men will be the most important deciding factor moving forward.
MENA states are characterized by similar traits; however, nuances are key to understanding each state and whether the Tunisian “revolution” will spark similar change across the region. It remains unlikely that there will be many more collapses in the short term. Over a longer period of time there is every indication that states will find it increasingly difficult to placate their growing populations without serious economic reform (including diversification and a move away from a reliance on oil) and political reform. As the abstract social contract between the people and their rulers (the one that allows strong men to rule if social demands are met) ceases to remain relevant in the face of significant economic woes governments will have to reform to allow the people a greater voice in the running of the country. However, even these measures will not solve all ills. Current populations growth levels, diminishing resources, increasing competition for resources and growing Islamist extremism in the face of all of these challenges are unlikely to disappear in the MENA region or the world for that matter. The outlook is bleak; however, these remain medium to long term concerns. In the interim expect more protests and possibly one or more changes to the leadership of some countries. Revolutions of entire political systems are unlikely.
Some Q&A
What keeps some states strong and others weak?
Oil and gas revenue. In Yemen, the consequences of a dwindling supply of oil income has directly affected the countries patronage network. Unsuprisingly, rebellion has been sparked across the country. In the Gulf, states are buying off the citizenry. People with a full belly and families that are well looked after are unlikely to protest against the government. Cut off this aid and things will turn nasty.
Was Tunisia a revolution in the true sense?
No, the Tunisia revolution was in fact the Tunisian president change. The political system remains intact and there are no indications that a new system is going to be introduced.
In Western democracies militaries are professional and subservient to the civilian government, whats the difference in MENA?
Many leaders in the MENA region are ex-military men, having come to power via coup de tat or being closely aligned to parties with strong connections to the military. Militaries have also been used as the frontline in quelling dissent and through this have, like the Praetorian guard in Rome, gained more position and power. Military personnel in the West are unlikely to be seen in public areas in the home country. There is a clear separation. In MENA states soldiers are regularly seen on public streets.
What is the role of Islamists in the unrest?
Not much so far. Across the board they have been relatively quiet to date.
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