Egypt's leaders through the ages an

Abdel Fattah Saeed Hussein Khalil el-Sisi became president of Egypt on 8 June. El-Sisi is the 20^th ruler of Egypt since the establishment of the modern state of Egypt in the early 19^th century. El-Sisi represents the military, which has dominated Egyptian politics since 1953. He is the quint essential 'strong man' leader. His accession has been manufactured by the military which is keen to maintain its grip on power through the suppression of Islamists and basic democratic expression.

The Muhammad Ali dynasty (1805)

Muhammad Ali Pasha al-Mas'ud ibn Agha (1805 – 1848). The founder of the modern state of Egypt. He was an Albanian Ottoman Empire commander who led a force to Egypt following the French withdrawal in 1801. From 1801 to 1805 he fought the Mamluks for control of Egypt, eventually emerging as the leader of Egypt and Sudan. His rule laid the base of the future, modern Egyptian state, separate from its Ottoman masters. His dynasty would continue into the 20^th century. Died 1949 (natural causes).

Muhammad Ali's son, Ibrahim Pasha (1848). Died 1848 (natural causes).

Muhammad Ali's grandson, Abbas I (1848-1854). Died 1854 (Murdered by two of his slaves)

Muhammad Ali's son, Muhammad Sa'id Pasha (1854-1863). Died 1863.

Muhammad Ali's grandson, Isma'il Pasha (1863-1879). Following Urabi Revolt, UK and French pressure on the Ottoman Empire led to his removal. Died 1895.

Isma'il Pasha's son, Muhammed Tewfik Pasha (1879-1892). Died 1892 (Natural causes)

Great-great-grandson of Muhammad Ali and son of Tewfik Pasha, Abbas II Hilmi Bey (1892-1914). The last Khedive. Overthrown by the UK at start of onset of WW1. Died 1944 in Switzerland.

The end of the Ottoman influence (1914)

Great-great-grandson of Muhammad Ali and son of Isma'il Pasha, Sultan Hussein Kamel (1914-1917). Died 1917 (natural causes).

Younger brother of Sultan Hussein Kamel, Fuad I (1922-1936). Died 1936 (natural causes).

Son of Fuad 1, Farouk I of Egypt (1936-1952). The Free Officers, led by Muhammad Naguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser, staged a military coup that launched the Egyptian Revolution of 1952. Farouk 1 went into exile.

Fuad II – Took the thrown after his father abdicated but was one year old at the time. Royal council ruled in his stead until Egypt was declared a republic in 1953.

The rise of the Egyptian military (1953)

President Muhammad Naguib (1953-1954) – leader of Free Officers (military). Deposed by Gamal Abdel Nasser following disagreement. House arrest for 18 years before release by Sadat.

President Gamal Abdel Nasser Hussein (1956-1970) – leader of Free Officers (military). The most successful Egyptian president. Regional player – Arab Nationalist leader. Died 1970 (Heart attack).

President Anwar Sadat (1970-1981) – senior officer in the Free Officers (military). Assassinated 1981 by military officer, Khalid Ahmed Showky Al-Islambouli. Hailed by Islamist radicals.

Muhammad Hosni El Sayed Mubarak (1981-2011). Military officer. Overthrown during Arab Spring.

Mohamed Hussein Tantawi (2011-2012). Leader of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Interim leadership ahead of democratic elections. Stepped down following elections in 2012.

The Islamists (2012)

Mohamed Morsi (2012-2013). First Islamist president. Popularly elected. Overthrown in 2013 by the military. Currently incarcerated.

The return of the military (2014)

Adly Mahmoud Mansour (2013 – 2014). Installed by the military following the mid-2013 coup. Ceded power following elections in May 2014.

Abdel Fattah Saeed Hussein Khalil el-Sisi (2014 to present). Head of the military until his resignation prior to elections in May 2014. Won a disputed election

The loaded gun - Triggers in the Iraq conflict

Over at red24 we have been tossing around a few triggers for a further escalation in the conflict in Iraq. Do you agree?

Peshmerga are convinced to enter the fight on the side of the ISF.
ISIL and allied militants take another governorate capital.
Turkey moves forces into Ninewa.
The US initiates air strikes.
Shiite militias are deployed north and west of Baghdad in great numbers.
A major refinery in the country is taken offline, for whatever reason.
ISF forces attempt to seize Kirkuk.
Iran deploys a larger number of troops to the country.

If these triggers are met, our baseline risk will likely change leading us to alter our advisory.
Do you agree?

Legislative elections and a new start in Libya?

The Libyan people will vote for a new legislature on Wednesday. They will vote for members to populate the new House of Representatives (HR). The HR will replace the massively controversial General National Congress (GNC), which was elected in 2012 and has come to be the focal point of all dissension in the country. The GNC, whose mandate expired in February, has struggled to present itself as the representative of the people and has stepped from one crisis to another. The latest was the illegal election of Ahmed Maetig, a Misratah businessman, as prime minister. The Islamist dominated GNC pushed through the appointment despite strong opposition and valid claims that the vote was unconstitutional. To many people's relief the decision was later overturned and accepted by Maetig. In the interim, however, General Haftar appeared and with hundreds of disaffected soldiers took on militia in the far east of the country in Benghazi. His rise was purportedly in response to his desire limit the influence of Islamists in the country; however, his connections to the US and the CIA have not gone unnoticed and have discredited his nationalist appeal somewhat. It is yet to be seen if Haftar will cease his attacks and return his troops to the legitimate military structures once the election is held and a new government is appointed. 

Yemen's Game of Thrones - The threat from the north

The Houthi rebel group continues to make gains in the north and the central government continues to ignore was it turning out to be a potential existential threat. Houthis have been knocking around northern Yemen since the early 2000s but it was only with the advent of the Arab Spring that the group escalated its activities and strengthened its hold on the north. Its growing strength has brought it into direct competition with Salafist communities allied to Saudi Arabia, Islah party militia and al-Ahmer tribesmen leaving hundreds dead. The Houthis have also engaged Yemeni military forces. Over the past month the group has made further gains in the north and has signed at least two ceasefires with the government; however, the sense is, is that the current ceasefire, signed on 21 June, will not hold for very long. The Houthis are demanding that an NDC federal regions proposal be scrapped. The new regions will effectively divide the Houthi staging areas in the north into three separate regions and produce "rich and poor regions". The Houthi opposition is also enflamed by the presence of conservative Salafist armed presence in the north, the encroachment of Saudi Arabia into its area of influence and, no doubt, the undue influence Shiite Iran has for the Shiite Houthi group. The government is happy to wait it out it seems. It is also unclear whether the Hadi administration can even confront the Houthis effectively given its focus on securing critical oil and gas supplies and suppressing tribal agitation in Marib, separatist sentiment in the south and AQAP in the south and south east. Hadi's test is yet to come it seems but in the mean time the Houthis will try and eke out further gains in the north.

The Iraq end game

The crisis in Iraq is deepening but not for the reasons you think. The media focus has been on the crushing defeats the ISIL has inflicted upon the Iraqi Army. This is true but the core Iraqi force, its Shiite allies and the large Kurd Peshmerga in the far north remain intact and 75 to 85% of Iraq's oil production capacity is unaffected. Indeed, oil supply has increased not decreased since the start of the militant assault on 6 June. Of particular concern is the further deepening schism of the Iraqi polity. Kurd forces have moved into disputed territories in federal Iraq, including the Kurd Jerusalem, Kirkuk, and have stated plainly that they are there to stay. Sunni tribes and a range of militant bodies have taken advantage of the security situation to take control of some areas in the Sunni heartland of Anbar. In the south, Shiite militias and Shiite volunteer armies have been mobilized to 'defend against the militants'. Demobilising this force seems a long way off. Iran, for its part, is seeking to secure the Shiite core and has dispatched troops to assist to defend Shiite religious sites and the predominantly Shiite government while the US is also mulling air strikes against the Sunnis. The militant offensive will end at some point and it is likely that the primary grouping, ISIL, will be unable to hang on to the territory it has acquired given its relatively lesser strength. The Sunni polity, divided as it is will become the side show for a wider Shiite Kurd confrontation over the Kirkuk oil fields which could increasingly draw Turkey, which supports the Kurds, and Iran, which supports the Shiite south. 

ISIL victories and Iraqi military weakness

The swift pace of the ISIL advance in northern Iraq has taken everyone by surprise. Yesterday, ISIL launched a major assault on western Mosul which later led to the capture of most of the city. The pace of the ISIL victory was matched by the almost unbelievable collapse of the Iraqi police and military. Reports of mass desertions and withdrawals circulated all day and it seemed as if the Iraqi Army was nothing but a force in name only. Very little resistance was offered and by days end ISIL had launched incursions deep into Salah ad Din and Kirkuk governorates. The collapse of the military and police is, on one hand, not too surprising to persons familiar with the conditions they work under. The security forces work long hours, are poorly paid and resourced, lack access to good intelligence and have a generally weak leadership who are better at fleeing than taking the initiative. Desertions among low level police and military personnel have become an increasing phenomenon recently in light of growing militant activity since 2012. In the face of a committed, battle hardened, well-resourced and ideologically driven insurgency the security forces have had little to respond with.

The battle is not yet won, however, and ISIL still has much to do if it is to maintain control of its new found territory. Iraq does have elite forces, such as the Tigris Command and Golden Brigades, at its disposal. There are also the Shiite militias and pro-government tribes scatterred throughout the centre and south which Prime Minister al-Maliki can call upon. The military also has heavy weapons, armour and an air force with which it will use to defend its primary cities located along the Samarra to Kirkuk line. Further north, the Kurd Peshmerga forces are present and on heightened alert. They are well trained and confident and are likely to stop any ISIL advance towards its territory (it should be noted that ISIL are unlikely to seek to engage the Kurds at present). With this in mind ISIL planners may seek to advance before withdrawing to defendable positions in the north. They have already looted millions of dollars worth of government materiel, which will boost its insurgency for years to come. Retreating back to Mosul and holding the city from the inevitable counter-attack would seem to be a logical option. Then again, given the frailty the Iraqi forces have shown to date, the ISIL may well be emboldened to further their assault southwards, even towards the capital.

A map of the current conflict area https://mapsengine.google.com/map/edit?mid=z-ifXIMu7clE.kyhswK8bqCUs

An in-depth, courtesy of red24, https://www.red24.com/members/indepth/mosul_conflict.php

Mosul under siege

ISIL militants renewed an assault on southern Mosul on 10 June and have reportedly taken control of the Mosul International Airport. These forces are also reportedly moving south of the city. This is likely an attempt to prevent Iraqi forces from reinforcing the city's defences. Kurd forces have purportedly deployed to Mosul but are in holding positions on the Left Coast (eastern Mosul). It is unlikely that these forces will attempt to engage ISIL in western Mosul. Kurd forces primary objective is to prevent ISIL infiltration into the KRG. ISIL know this and are unlikely to launch a concerted offensive east. Further incursions south and attacks on the Right Coast are anticipated. 

ISIL VBIED and city assault waves

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), a Sunni extremist grouping operational in Syria and Iraq, has escalated attacks in Iraq since 5 June. The assaults began when dozens of ISIL militants launched an assault in Samarra in an apparent attempt to gain access to the al-Askari Shrine, a prominent Shiite religious site. The incursion led to ISIL's brief capture of parts of the city before they were repulsed by a military counter-attack. Mop up operations continue to be reported but for the most the government has retaken control of the town. A day later, on 6 June, ISIL militants infiltrated the Right Coast of Mosul (western Mosul) and took control of a number of city districts and prominent local landmarks, including a hotel and university. The clashes, which are ongoing as of 9 June, have left dozens of people dead. These assaults have been interspersed with numerous high profile/mass casualty bombings in Diyala, Baghdad and Salah ad Din governorate. The worst wave of attacks occurred in Baghdad on Saturday when at least 12 bombs were detonated in mainly Shiite districts killing over 60 people. The assault waves are particularly worrying for the government, which is continuing to regain control of Fallujah, where ISIL and others remain the dominant forces, and fight off repeated ISIL attacks into Ramadi. For all attempts and purposes Iraq is in a state of civil war and the momentum, at present, appears to be on the side of the militants. This wearing down of the Iraqi government through bombings and city assaults will have an impact over the near-term if something does not change. The potential for further territory losses is high while the threat of a sectarian war is increasing and will likely reach the tipping point of ISIL conduct a successful attack on a major religious site, such as the al-Askari Shrine.