Lebanon at the cross-roads, again

Lebanon's delicate political balance between two equally strong opposing blocs, the March 8 and March 14 coalitions, continues to be affected by the ongoing fighting in neighbouring Syria. The March 8 bloc is led by the Shiite Muslim Amal and Hezbollah movements and Christian Maronites. The March 14 is led by the Future Movement, a largely Sunni grouping. The war in Syria is, effectively, one between the Alawite-dominated regime (Alawites are closely linked to Shiites) and the predominantly Sunni Muslim rebellion. Shiites and Sunnis in Lebanon are generally supportive of their brethren in Syria. Developments there, therefore, impact on the Lebanese political system. Further complicating the situation in Lebanon, extremist elements within each general bloc are increasing agitation the longer the war in Syria continues. Salafist Sunnis (ultra conservatives essentially) have increased anti-Shiite protest activity in Sidon and Tripoli. In the latter city, violence between Sunni and Alawite gunmen has also recently been reported. In the country's restive border regions with Syria clashes between Shiite clans and the local security forces and conflict spillover (kidnapping, shooting and armed incursions) have further undermined the security environment.

Within this context the Lebanese government is attempting to organise elections on 16 June. The competition between the two major blocs has made this an almost impossible task and the mandate of the current parliament is expected to be extended as both sides struggle to agree on a new electoral law and cabinet. Peaceful elections are key for Lebanon but are unlikely to resolve long-seated differences and disputes. Two possible outcomes of the elections are possible. Under both scenarios the picture painted for Lebanon is negative. If Hezbollah aligned parties win Sunni agitators will increase protest activity. If the March 14 dominate Hezbollah may activate its militia to secure a veto in any future cabinet. One gets the sense that the only real path towards stability is if Hezbollah disarms, either through military defeat or otherwise, and if the war in Syria ends. Until this happens Lebanon will be considered a high risk operating area.

A tale of misguided protest tactics, FEMEN

FEMEN protests. Sigh. These 'ladies' have gone the extra mile recently in attracting attention to their cause against sex tourism, religious institutions, international marriage agencies, perceived sexism and other social, national and international topics. Recently FEMEN activists (three) protested bare breasted outside of a court house in Tunisia against the prosecution of a fellow activist, Amina Tyler. Now, the right to protest, in my view, should be protected. But at some point one does need to draw a line. How far, after all, can one take one's 'protest'? Does protesting, as they do, serve any purpose other than to draw attention to their bodies. Does the media, which are usually drawn in droves to the small protests, even care about the cause. Certainly the cause is given some air time but the focus seems to be on their actions, therefore detracting from the primary goal or at least the goal they are attempting to advance. Is protesting in a conservative society beneficial? Semi-naked protest activity in liberal states such as Spain, the UK and Germany are, in my view, passable, because they are unusual and don't shock the conscience of the majority of the viewers. But in a Muslim state, these protests cause more of an uproar than anything else. Would their cause not have been better served by protesting with legs and arms bared, something that is still acceptable but may still draw some attention? Possibly. For my part I think FEMEN are a great example of the Rihannanisation of the feminist movement. Decency, the moral high ground and ethical protest is what will change minds, not what they are currently doing.

Sunni Jihad in Mesopotamia (Iraq)

Bloodletting in Iraq is fueling sectarian tensions in Iraq. 1,200 souls have been lost since the start of April in an apparent deliberate escalation in violence in the country. Commentators blame al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and other Sunni extremists for leading the bombing campaign. These groups, analysts argue, are attempting to incident a sectarian war which would, in theory, lead to the fall of the current government if it were severe enough. The Shiite militias aren't biting, just yet, but could if the Iraqi government of Nouri al-Maliki does not act decisively.

It is still unclear who is behind the recent violence. The most logical explanation is, is that it is a number of militant groups, some linked to former Baathists and al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQ) and, possibly, tribal groupings. These groups are likely receiving funding from some Sunni states (Saudi Arabia? Qatar?) who have long sought to confront the growing Shiite crescent in the region. Funding from Iraqi domestic actors, including political parties is also possible. These funders are unlikely to come out and claim responsibility for their involvement because it would undermine their own domestic position and international prestige. In turn, those receiving the funding are also unlikely to go shouting from the roof tops who is funding them. 

Syria playing off the front foot

Bashar al-Assad, the dictator, the enemy of the people, the soon to be overthrown, now appears to be in the ascendancy in Syria. The Syrian military, supported by Hezbollah, Iran, Russia and a new militia force, have beaten back rebel advances in Damascus, Aleppo, Daraa and Homs recently and threaten to overrun rebel areas thought to be secure, including the city of Aleppo. This new positivity on behalf of the regime is a result of a few overarching factors. Firstly, the opposition is split and their vision for the future is clouded. The rebellion is made up of nationalists, Sunni moderates and extremists, men defending their hometowns, criminals, foreign fighters and Syrian military defectors. Secondly, supplies are a worry. The rebels just don't have the equipment to challenge the Syrian government's heavy weapons and aircraft. As much as they'd like to launch a major offensive, they can't due to the massive casualties they would experience if they did. The Syrian's international backers are also unsure about whether to supply them with the necessary material for fear that it falls into the hands of the extremists. Thirdly, the Syrian regime has restructured, resupplied and re-orientated towards a guerilla style conflict. It has transformed part of its armed force into a militia-type body that is able to block rebel advances in urban areas. It also continues to receive supplies from abroad, namely from Russia and Iran. Critically, its core forces remain loyal. Be it the brutality of the rebels or their good discipline and training, many Syrian units continue to hold out against overwhelming odds. An international conference is due to be held in June and we can expect, therefore, that the Syrian regime will aim to make as much ground as possible before that meeting to improve their bargaining position with the rebels. Watch this space.

Baghdad's endless security dillemma

Baghdad was struck by eight bombings yesterday which left 70 people dead. Another bloody day in Iraq. The country has experienced a wave of terrorism since late April that has left hundreds of Iraqis dead and thousands more wounded. The bombings have been blamed on Sunni insurgents, but in Iraq, no one really knows what's going on. What is clear is that there are groups in the country that have the capacity to strike at will at any target. This points to a massive intelligence failure on behalf of the government. At present it appears that the security forces are incapable of preventing attacks or of identifying and arresting suspects. This could be a result of a number of issues including 1) poor training of the police and military 2) corruption within the governing structures, which allows groups to infiltrate secure areas, 3) actual infiltration by militant groups of police and military units and 4) excellent operational capability of the militants. It is likely that all of these elements are playing a role at the moment. The government of Nouri al-Maliki needs to act and act decisively. This humble blog suggests the following: 1) Resolve the Kurdistan border dispute. Allow the KRG autonomy and access to oil supplies if they agree to disarm their peshmerga and integrate them into the central security forces. 2) Give responsibility for security ministries to a minority leader, either a Christian, Druze or Turkmen. All major ministries should also be given to non-Shiite Arab or Sunni Arab groups for a period of two election terms. 3) Tribes need to be further co-opted into the governing structures. 4) Oil wealth and income needs to be guaranteed to Sunni groups 5) Sunni governorates that desire autonomy should be allowed to hold referendums immediately 6) Incentives need to be given to governorates that decide to allow the central government overall control of their territory. Just a few points that basically rest on shoring up national unity and providing incentives to regional agitators to end the contestation that has result in heightened political instability and created a toxic environment in which militant activity can thrive.

Economic woes in the Land of the Pharaoh

Egypt's political woes are well-document but are increasingly being overtaken by its economic concerns. Growing foreign debt, dwindling currency reserves, rising prices, devaluating currency and an IMF loan that …just….wont…get off the ground, Egypt's medium-term outlook remains massively negative. Foreign investors are running from the state leading to a major downturn in its financial account (investment in local shares and assets) while its current account (balance of export earnings minus import payments) isn't looking to flash either and is surging towards US$3 billion. In addition, the country can not pay for fuel leading to regular shortages. For further information on this increasingly dire picture check out Carnegie's article "Egypt and the IMF: Time for a Different Approach" http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2013/04/09/egypt-and-imf-time-for-different-approach/fyna

Stratfor's U.S. Naval Update Map: May 23, 2013

The latest Stratfor US Naval update (23 May) is insightful. One carrier in the Arabian Gulf and a large amphibious big deck warfare ship in the Gulf of Aden – a low number for the region. Critically, none in the Mediterranean, meaning no Syrian intervention in the near-term. With Russian ambitions growing in this area (http://www.debka.com/article/22965/Russia-staffs-Mediterranean-fleet-Turkey-weighs-payback-for-Syrian-bombings), Obama is clearly not looking to confront the Russian naval moves any time soon. Many carrier groups are also at home port, likely refitting. In the Pacific, just one carrier, the Nimitz, steaming around the South China Sea. Get more here http://www.stratfor.com/image/us-naval-update-map-may-23-2013

Lebanon and its relationship with Hezbollah, Iran and Syria

Lebanon's weak political institutions and military make the country susceptible to instability in Syria. This premise has been proven over and over again since the end of the civil war in the 1990s and is no more evident now than at any other time in its history. Political parties in Lebanon are split for their support of the Syrian regime. Indeed, one of the primary political groupings in the country, Hezbollah, is actively supporting the Assad regime with men and material. So, what can be done about this state of affairs? Can Lebanon ever escape its cycle of stability and instability and its sponge-like sensitivity to regional developments? Yes and no. 

If Hezbollah renounces violence and disbands its militia, the country has a chance. At the moment Hezbollah maintain a ten thousand strong militia force, which acts outside of the bounds of the legitimate security forces. If this militia can be integrated into the legitimate security forces and 're-orientated' towards national interests the country would have a significant defensive platform from which to stabilise its domestic security environment. This would, however, take a massive amount of 'backbone' to achieve. Hezbollah would also need to redefine its core reason for existence, which is to resist Israeli aggression. 

Hezbollah's pre-occupation with Israel appears odd. Formed to resist Israeli occupation of southern Israel the group continues to operate an armed wing, despite Israel withdrawing from southern Lebanon in 2000. At present there are one or two areas where control of territory is disputed, but this is certainly insufficient reason to continue armed struggle. To understand why its current goals remain unchanged one needs to look at Iran and Syria. These two countries supply Hezbollah and finance its activities. Iran hates Israel and wants it destroyed and Syria wants the Golan Heights back, a strategic elevated region, which dominates all approaches to northern Israel and southwestern Syria. So, for Hezbollah to back off and demilitarize it would require the Syrian and Iranian pressure to disappear. This may yet happen should the rebels overthrow the Syria regime and if a new political movement emerged in Iran. The Syrian war is still raging of course and the result is on a knife edge. Iran on the other hand is heading to the polls to select a new president. If a moderate is installed (Ahmadinejad is definitely out, having maxed out his number of terms) the relationship with Israel and, therefore, Hezbollah, could be redefined. We wait and see and in the meantime more people will die in Syria and uncertainty over Lebanon's future will persist.

Grand political games in the Middle Eastern theatre

Grand political games are being played out across the Middle East. At the higher spectrum we have Russia attempting to reassert its influence in the Mediterranean so that it can influence developments in Syria specifically. The US lack of commitment to the Syrian rebel cause has provided the Russians with a perfect opportunity. They are likely to increase their naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean imminently and will increase their military support for the Syrian regime, which is increasingly making gains against the rebels. On a more regional focus, the Iranians are on the front foot in negotiations over its nuclear weapons and in Syria. With the US constraining Israel anxiety, Iran is progressing with its development program while continuing its support of the Syrian regime. Turkey meanwhile remains upset over the mid-May car bombing in its Hatay province, an attack blamed on Syrian intelligence. Yet Turkey has not responded as yet. This is interesting and points again to its precarious position. It is emerging from a successfully negotiated ceasefire with the PKK but doesn't have the support of NATO or the US to intervene in Syria. It will continue to issue provocative statements but not intervene until it is confident that it will not lose any confrontations. While the Syrian regime is on the front foot, Turkey is unlikely to make moves against Syria. At a micro level, the disjointed rebels in Syria are suffering. They are being bombarded by Syrian government artillery and heavy weapons and are increasingly affected by in-fighting and disagreements over ideology. The Islamist influence is growing, posing massive concerns for the future of the country and region. If the Islamist militant fringe is allowed to grow further it will evolve into an insurgency that may make the Iraq insurgency look like child's play. This analysis will all change however if and when the US decide to awaken to the growing threat to their regional hegemony and the likely outcome of non-involvement.