The insurgency in Algeria continues to claim lives, impact upon local business and threaten investment in the oil- and gas-rich North African state. Since the early 1990s, Islamist militants have taken up arms to bring about regime change and to introduce an Islamist caliphate in the region. While the insurgency has waned in recent years, it continues to draw volunteers to its ranks and to threaten government and foreign interests in the country. This state of affairs remains unchanged despite a concerted campaign by the Algerian military to annihilate insurgent bases scattered over the mountainous northern and southern desert reaches of the country. The insurgency has also taken a new direction since the beginning of 2007, when the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat changed its name to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The newly rebranded group has focused its larger attacks against police and foreign interests with highly public suicide and car bomb explosions, in addition to its normal activities. The threat to foreign interests has also seemingly increased in the past two years. Kidnapping threats have reportedly been made to foreign business people and a number of kidnaps for ransom have been reported since January 2007, which suggests that kidnap and killing of foreigners remains a priority tactic for the AQIM.
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is a Sunni extremist organisation that aims to create an Islamic state in Algeria and to ultimately unite the Muslim world into a caliphate (an Islamic super state ruled by a single leader) reaching from Morocco to the Philippines. Its long running campaign against the Algerian government to achieve this end is well documented and the group's activities continue to make regional and international headlines. The April 2007 suicide car bomb attacks in Algiers against the offices of the prime minister, the kidnapping of an Egyptian in May 2007, the kidnapping of three Chinese workers in June 2007, the December 2007 suicide attacks against the Algerian judiciary and the UN headquarters in Algiers, and a range of other bomb attacks against convoys carrying foreign workers, are clear indications the group is serious about targeting high value marks such as government institutions and foreigners in Algeria.
The group has approximately 500-1,000 members, with the bulk of these operating in the northern regions. A smaller detachment is believed to be operating in the southern reaches of the Saharan desert along the border with Niger, Mali and Mauritania. The southern group's activities are minor compared to their northern compatriots who have well established networks across the north of the country, particularly in the region from Ain Defla to Skikda. This axis accounts for the majority of reported incidents involving the AQIM. The terrain is well suited to the insurgency, being mainly forested and mountainous, affording the group ample seclusion and protection from the Algerian military. It is financed through criminal activities, chiefly smuggling, and through donations, believed to be received from sympathisers and cells based in Europe. It may also have a degree of support from the primary al-Qaeda organisation, although it is commonly believed that the link between the two is largely nominal (i.e. opportunistic).
The group's ranks are replenished through recruitment amongst communities in Algeria, West Africa and other neighbouring states. High levels of unemployment, political marginalisation and disenchantment with the ruling regimes of North Africa, and the growth of Islamist thought and practice all combine to provide a rich recruitment environment for the AQIM. The AQIM is also bolstered periodically by the return of fighters from Iraq and Afghanistan who bring newly learnt tactics and experience with them. These fighters are a key ingredient to the success of the AQIM. Indeed the upswing in suicide and car bomb attacks has been explained in part as a consequence of the return of these fighters from Iraq and Afghanistan.
Algerian government response to the AQIM
The government of Abdul-Aziz Bouteflika has responded to the AQIM threat in a number of ways. Firstly, security force numbers have been increased countrywide and are due to be bolstered further by an additional 15,000 units annually until 2010, when the total Algerian security force contingent should number around 200,000 members. Secondly, it has continued a highly successful military campaign against suspected AQIM hideouts in the country. Thirdly, the intelligence services are believed to be acting to sow dissention in the ranks of the AQIM leadership; this is occasionally reported on by the Algerian press. Lastly, the government has offered a series of amnesties to the insurgents; hundreds of militants are believed to have taken up the offer, in return for a life of normalcy. These national strategies have been complimented by regional and international counter-terrorism agreements such as the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI). Together with the other North African states and the US, programs designed to coordinate regional security responses to terrorism have been operationalised. Through the TSCTI, local security forces have been equipped with the necessary skills to counter terrorist groups, particularly in the Sahel area. Local and regional strategies and policies have yet to show any significant results, however. The AQIM's presence in Algeria shows no signs of diminishing and the number of high-profile attacks is in fact increasing not falling as the government would lead us to believe.
Future outlook
AQIM remains the most potent anti-government force operating in Algeria and will continue to threaten the security of the country for the medium-term. However, its capacity to enact serious regime change remains highly improbable. The Algerian army maintains a numerical and technological superiority over the militant bands and the government remains stable and unified. AQIM's alliance with al-Qaeda remains a concern, not only for the Algerian government, but also for the neighbouring states of Morocco and Tunisia. The group's alliance with al-Qaeda has led it firmly into the internationalist jihad fold. Attacks outside of the country remain a concern for regional states and the US, both of which are keen to eradicate any future terror breeding grounds. In terms of method, there is evidence to suggest that tactics favoured by insurgents in other theatres (Iraq and Afghanistan primarily) may be gaining in popularity in Algeria. The use of improvised explosive devices, for example, is one such tactic that is becoming more frequent. However, this can simply be seen as a natural evolution of the current conflict, as insurgents experiment with new methods. Targets will continue to be foreigners and the government (military, police, industrial and otherwise). Algerian civilians will also be indirectly affected as the AQIM pursue their indiscriminate bombing campaign in public areas.
In February Algerian security forces identified four new AQIM staging points or regions. The group was believed to have nine before. However, due to the military crackdown, Dorukdel, AQIM leader, has reorganised his network. See map below.
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is a Sunni extremist organisation that aims to create an Islamic state in Algeria and to ultimately unite the Muslim world into a caliphate (an Islamic super state ruled by a single leader) reaching from Morocco to the Philippines. Its long running campaign against the Algerian government to achieve this end is well documented and the group's activities continue to make regional and international headlines. The April 2007 suicide car bomb attacks in Algiers against the offices of the prime minister, the kidnapping of an Egyptian in May 2007, the kidnapping of three Chinese workers in June 2007, the December 2007 suicide attacks against the Algerian judiciary and the UN headquarters in Algiers, and a range of other bomb attacks against convoys carrying foreign workers, are clear indications the group is serious about targeting high value marks such as government institutions and foreigners in Algeria.
The group has approximately 500-1,000 members, with the bulk of these operating in the northern regions. A smaller detachment is believed to be operating in the southern reaches of the Saharan desert along the border with Niger, Mali and Mauritania. The southern group's activities are minor compared to their northern compatriots who have well established networks across the north of the country, particularly in the region from Ain Defla to Skikda. This axis accounts for the majority of reported incidents involving the AQIM. The terrain is well suited to the insurgency, being mainly forested and mountainous, affording the group ample seclusion and protection from the Algerian military. It is financed through criminal activities, chiefly smuggling, and through donations, believed to be received from sympathisers and cells based in Europe. It may also have a degree of support from the primary al-Qaeda organisation, although it is commonly believed that the link between the two is largely nominal (i.e. opportunistic).
The group's ranks are replenished through recruitment amongst communities in Algeria, West Africa and other neighbouring states. High levels of unemployment, political marginalisation and disenchantment with the ruling regimes of North Africa, and the growth of Islamist thought and practice all combine to provide a rich recruitment environment for the AQIM. The AQIM is also bolstered periodically by the return of fighters from Iraq and Afghanistan who bring newly learnt tactics and experience with them. These fighters are a key ingredient to the success of the AQIM. Indeed the upswing in suicide and car bomb attacks has been explained in part as a consequence of the return of these fighters from Iraq and Afghanistan.
Algerian government response to the AQIM
The government of Abdul-Aziz Bouteflika has responded to the AQIM threat in a number of ways. Firstly, security force numbers have been increased countrywide and are due to be bolstered further by an additional 15,000 units annually until 2010, when the total Algerian security force contingent should number around 200,000 members. Secondly, it has continued a highly successful military campaign against suspected AQIM hideouts in the country. Thirdly, the intelligence services are believed to be acting to sow dissention in the ranks of the AQIM leadership; this is occasionally reported on by the Algerian press. Lastly, the government has offered a series of amnesties to the insurgents; hundreds of militants are believed to have taken up the offer, in return for a life of normalcy. These national strategies have been complimented by regional and international counter-terrorism agreements such as the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI). Together with the other North African states and the US, programs designed to coordinate regional security responses to terrorism have been operationalised. Through the TSCTI, local security forces have been equipped with the necessary skills to counter terrorist groups, particularly in the Sahel area. Local and regional strategies and policies have yet to show any significant results, however. The AQIM's presence in Algeria shows no signs of diminishing and the number of high-profile attacks is in fact increasing not falling as the government would lead us to believe.
Future outlook
AQIM remains the most potent anti-government force operating in Algeria and will continue to threaten the security of the country for the medium-term. However, its capacity to enact serious regime change remains highly improbable. The Algerian army maintains a numerical and technological superiority over the militant bands and the government remains stable and unified. AQIM's alliance with al-Qaeda remains a concern, not only for the Algerian government, but also for the neighbouring states of Morocco and Tunisia. The group's alliance with al-Qaeda has led it firmly into the internationalist jihad fold. Attacks outside of the country remain a concern for regional states and the US, both of which are keen to eradicate any future terror breeding grounds. In terms of method, there is evidence to suggest that tactics favoured by insurgents in other theatres (Iraq and Afghanistan primarily) may be gaining in popularity in Algeria. The use of improvised explosive devices, for example, is one such tactic that is becoming more frequent. However, this can simply be seen as a natural evolution of the current conflict, as insurgents experiment with new methods. Targets will continue to be foreigners and the government (military, police, industrial and otherwise). Algerian civilians will also be indirectly affected as the AQIM pursue their indiscriminate bombing campaign in public areas.
In February Algerian security forces identified four new AQIM staging points or regions. The group was believed to have nine before. However, due to the military crackdown, Dorukdel, AQIM leader, has reorganised his network. See map below.
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