Lebanon: The primary players and their goals

What they want or dont want

Iran - Destruction of Israel, removal of pro-West government in Lebanon. Will support Syria and Hamas to achieve these ultimate goals.
Syria - Return to Lebanon either through Hezbollah proxy or through military occupation
Lebanese Future Movement (anti-Syrian majority) - Maintain hegemony in Lebanon, try to reach consensus with Hezbollah i.e. get Hezbollah to accept anything less than a veto power in the cabinet.
Hezbollah/Amal - They want a veto in the Lebanese executive.
Israel - Wants Hezbollah to be disarmed and its northern border secured so that it can concentrate on Gaza and Hamas.
US - Wants pro-Western government to remain in power to balance Syria and Hezbollah
Russia - Doesn’t want the US to gain a foothold in Lebanon. Will look to remain neutral and a balance to any US involvement in Lebanon. Currently have naval bases in Syria (Alleppo).

Possible scenarios:

• Civil war in Lebanon, unlikely at present, unless foreign interference.
• Syrian preemptive attack on Golan Heights. Co-ordianted with Hezbollah. Unlikely, Syria would be punished severely by Israeli counter attacks.
• Popular uprising by Shiites. Unlikley, Lebanese army remains strong and has so far crushed any open dissent.
• If the Lebanese army were to fracture or weaken further, its likely that we would have to rate the country as extreme. They are the primary keepers of the peace at the moment.
• Syrian allies in Lebanon stage coup, Syrian military intervention to 'stabilize' the country.Hezbollah attack Israel in retaliation for 12 Feb assassination, Israel respond in kind at some point. Winter is a mitigating factor, slowing Israeli advance. Likely Israeli response at this time to be targeted attacks against Hezbollah positions in southern Lebanon/Beirut and or Beqaa Valley.

Notes:
Syrians main option is to further destabilise Lebanon through targeted assassinations etc. They rely on Hezbollah, however, to play along. If Hezbollah find that the pro-West government is unlikely to give up power they may be open to Syrians greater involvement in Lebanon.

Russia and US are balanced in the Mediterranean, unlikely to get directly involved over threat of larger scale war. Israel will maintain defensive positions and will be unwilling to mobilize fully unless a serious escalation in hostilities. The season also mitigates against a ground invasion at the moment. The UN are mere observers in southern Lebanon and will not stand in the way of an Israeli invasion or Hezbollah troop movements.

Upcoming events:

26 February Lebanese parliament convene for the 14th / 15 th time to elect a president. Likely to be postponed again.

29 March: Arab Summit in Damascus.

Hezbollah intelligence chief assassinated in Syria

(1962-2008)

Killed in a car bomb in Damascus on 12 February. Possible suspects - CIA, Mossad

The killing of Imad Mughniye in Damascus, what ever is the context and whom ever are the executors, is a benchmark in the war between the Iranian Terror networks and their enemies. Mughniye has led the Iranian and Hezbollah operations against US personnel since 1983 and was the top planner in the Hezbollah-Israel war. He was seen as the principal link between the Pasdaran (Iranian Revolutionary Guard) power and its supported organizations around the world including Hezbollah in Lebanon and overseas. But as important, was his role in coordinating the Iranian Terror activities with Syria's intelligence services. His elimination has mostly a symbolical effect on the secret war between Western intelligence and the axis' secret apparatus. In intelligence lingo, he was the top Terror operations general, not only central to Lebanon's activities but also to training Hezbollah's "international" action, including Iraq, Gaza and the West. The impact of such an event is seen clearly in the statements made by the leadership of Hezbollah and the potential actions the group may take.

Some other incidents he was involved in and some facts:

The 1983 bombings of the US Embassy and US Marine and French paratrooper barracks in Beirut, which killed more than 350 people

The 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires

The kidnapping of Westerners in Lebanon during the 1980s, and a series of other high-profile operations.

Mugniyah is also reported to have met with members of al-Qaeda’s senior leadership, including Osama bin Laden, and is believed to have played a role in the terrorist group’s technical development.

Interpol recently put out an international warrant for him for his alleged role in the Buenos Aires attack

The United States indicted him for his role in planning and participating in the June 14, 1985, hijacking of an American commercial airliner and the killing of US Navy diver who was aboard the flight.

Before Osama came along, Imad was responsible for the majoirty of US terror related fatalities overseas. (not including Iraq)

Response?

Hezbollah are believed to be planning a response to the killing of Imad. This may take a number of forms...a strongly worded condemnation is unlikely....a cross border incursion into Israel is also not on the cards for now. A terror attack against a Jewish target, either in Israel or elsehwere is the most plausable response. His deep connection to Osama bin Laden may also lead to retaliatory attacks. Bottom line, expect an attack, probably against a high value target, soon. See below from wiki:

"On February 16, 1992, Israeli helicopters attacked a motorcade in southern Lebanon, killing Musawi, his wife, son, and four others. Israel said the attack had been planned as an assassination attempt. In retaliation, a shadowy group called "Islamic Jihad - led by Imad- " carried out the Israeli Embassy attack in Buenos Aires. Musawi was succeeded as secretary-general of Hezbollah by Hassan Nasrallah."

More links:

FBI's most wanted
http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/terrorists/termugniyah.htm

The insurgency in Algeria

The insurgency in Algeria continues to claim lives, impact upon local business and threaten investment in the oil- and gas-rich North African state. Since the early 1990s, Islamist militants have taken up arms to bring about regime change and to introduce an Islamist caliphate in the region. While the insurgency has waned in recent years, it continues to draw volunteers to its ranks and to threaten government and foreign interests in the country. This state of affairs remains unchanged despite a concerted campaign by the Algerian military to annihilate insurgent bases scattered over the mountainous northern and southern desert reaches of the country. The insurgency has also taken a new direction since the beginning of 2007, when the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat changed its name to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The newly rebranded group has focused its larger attacks against police and foreign interests with highly public suicide and car bomb explosions, in addition to its normal activities. The threat to foreign interests has also seemingly increased in the past two years. Kidnapping threats have reportedly been made to foreign business people and a number of kidnaps for ransom have been reported since January 2007, which suggests that kidnap and killing of foreigners remains a priority tactic for the AQIM.

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is a Sunni extremist organisation that aims to create an Islamic state in Algeria and to ultimately unite the Muslim world into a caliphate (an Islamic super state ruled by a single leader) reaching from Morocco to the Philippines. Its long running campaign against the Algerian government to achieve this end is well documented and the group's activities continue to make regional and international headlines. The April 2007 suicide car bomb attacks in Algiers against the offices of the prime minister, the kidnapping of an Egyptian in May 2007, the kidnapping of three Chinese workers in June 2007, the December 2007 suicide attacks against the Algerian judiciary and the UN headquarters in Algiers, and a range of other bomb attacks against convoys carrying foreign workers, are clear indications the group is serious about targeting high value marks such as government institutions and foreigners in Algeria.

The group has approximately 500-1,000 members, with the bulk of these operating in the northern regions. A smaller detachment is believed to be operating in the southern reaches of the Saharan desert along the border with Niger, Mali and Mauritania. The southern group's activities are minor compared to their northern compatriots who have well established networks across the north of the country, particularly in the region from Ain Defla to Skikda. This axis accounts for the majority of reported incidents involving the AQIM. The terrain is well suited to the insurgency, being mainly forested and mountainous, affording the group ample seclusion and protection from the Algerian military. It is financed through criminal activities, chiefly smuggling, and through donations, believed to be received from sympathisers and cells based in Europe. It may also have a degree of support from the primary al-Qaeda organisation, although it is commonly believed that the link between the two is largely nominal (i.e. opportunistic).

The group's ranks are replenished through recruitment amongst communities in Algeria, West Africa and other neighbouring states. High levels of unemployment, political marginalisation and disenchantment with the ruling regimes of North Africa, and the growth of Islamist thought and practice all combine to provide a rich recruitment environment for the AQIM. The AQIM is also bolstered periodically by the return of fighters from Iraq and Afghanistan who bring newly learnt tactics and experience with them. These fighters are a key ingredient to the success of the AQIM. Indeed the upswing in suicide and car bomb attacks has been explained in part as a consequence of the return of these fighters from Iraq and Afghanistan.

Algerian government response to the AQIM
The government of Abdul-Aziz Bouteflika has responded to the AQIM threat in a number of ways. Firstly, security force numbers have been increased countrywide and are due to be bolstered further by an additional 15,000 units annually until 2010, when the total Algerian security force contingent should number around 200,000 members. Secondly, it has continued a highly successful military campaign against suspected AQIM hideouts in the country. Thirdly, the intelligence services are believed to be acting to sow dissention in the ranks of the AQIM leadership; this is occasionally reported on by the Algerian press. Lastly, the government has offered a series of amnesties to the insurgents; hundreds of militants are believed to have taken up the offer, in return for a life of normalcy. These national strategies have been complimented by regional and international counter-terrorism agreements such as the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI). Together with the other North African states and the US, programs designed to coordinate regional security responses to terrorism have been operationalised. Through the TSCTI, local security forces have been equipped with the necessary skills to counter terrorist groups, particularly in the Sahel area. Local and regional strategies and policies have yet to show any significant results, however. The AQIM's presence in Algeria shows no signs of diminishing and the number of high-profile attacks is in fact increasing not falling as the government would lead us to believe.

Future outlook
AQIM remains the most potent anti-government force operating in Algeria and will continue to threaten the security of the country for the medium-term. However, its capacity to enact serious regime change remains highly improbable. The Algerian army maintains a numerical and technological superiority over the militant bands and the government remains stable and unified. AQIM's alliance with al-Qaeda remains a concern, not only for the Algerian government, but also for the neighbouring states of Morocco and Tunisia. The group's alliance with al-Qaeda has led it firmly into the internationalist jihad fold. Attacks outside of the country remain a concern for regional states and the US, both of which are keen to eradicate any future terror breeding grounds. In terms of method, there is evidence to suggest that tactics favoured by insurgents in other theatres (Iraq and Afghanistan primarily) may be gaining in popularity in Algeria. The use of improvised explosive devices, for example, is one such tactic that is becoming more frequent. However, this can simply be seen as a natural evolution of the current conflict, as insurgents experiment with new methods. Targets will continue to be foreigners and the government (military, police, industrial and otherwise). Algerian civilians will also be indirectly affected as the AQIM pursue their indiscriminate bombing campaign in public areas.

In February Algerian security forces identified four new AQIM staging points or regions. The group was believed to have nine before. However, due to the military crackdown, Dorukdel, AQIM leader, has reorganised his network. See map below.

Risk analysis: Basic frameworks

Risk analysis remains a field divided. There is no single method of measuring risk. There are many indicators, but the most successful and least controversial remains the subjective approach. One based on evidence and then presenting possible scenarios. Ive put a few down below focusing on terrorism and politics.

Terrorism:

Current status

We currently rate the threat of terrorism in ___ as ___. (our position)

There is a history of terror related activity in the country__.

This threat is derived from Islamist extremist groups/anarchists/separatists/insurgents.

The following groups are believed to be active in the region/have a support structure in the region, have easy access to the region.

The most recent terror related activity occurred on_ . (action etc)

On that occasion___.

OR / AND The most recent threat received from a terror group.

Modus Operandi & Area of operation

The most high risk regions are__. The safer regions are_____

Terrorists target___ (westerners, government, military, civilians, ethnic group)

The types of weapons used in attacks__ (IED, Suicide attacks, shooting etc)

Analysis

We believe that further attacks are highly likely/possible/unlikely because of___ Threats/regional position/high number of foreign visitors/historical precedent/nationally symbolic days/govt action/islamist schools/trends/incidents

Personal response

What you can do-general security advice.

Politics:

Historical context

Main political players, current government

Government policies, policy direction

Opposition to government, name them, policies, ideology

Threat to stability?

Internal - external Consequence of opposition - Civil unrest - violence

Response to the threat.

Areas to avoid, Anniversarys to avoid, topics to avoid etc

Upcoming events that could spark events affecting safety and security.

Do we think this event will change the status quo, lead to a deterioration in security etc.

Civil unrest (Element of political)

Incidence of civil unrest are regularly/periodically reported in (country). Most incidence take the form of peaceful demonstrations/mass rallies/marches/riots/clashes with police/strikes in response to domestic issues/regional issues/international issues/random. Civil gatherings are usually peaceful/Civil gatherings turn violent on occasion with little warning. These usually occur in major cities (capital etc)/rural areas/outlying areas etc. and affect travellers in terms of delays/do not overly affect travel itenaries/have a direct impact on travellers safety (Special note). Avoid them etc + (link)

Militias and secession, how to succeed.

Regional conflicts are not modern problems for states. As long as there have been central governments, there have been groups opposed to the status quo, some of which have taken up arms to overthrow the ruling regimes. Success is usually measured by the power they are able to extract from their conflict, be it total victory or some sort of regional concession. One of the most significant successes include the Russian Revolution, American War of Independence and numerous colonial wars that resulted in the removal of the ruling regime. But what did these groups have that differentiated them from other less successful groups, thinking primarily of FARC in Colombia, the LTTE in Sri Lanka and Jundallah in Iran where conflicts continue to rage on endlessy and with, seemingly, no end in sight.

• Popular support. Usually groups opposed to a government require the support of the majority of a countries people in order to take full control, or of a regions people to take federal control. Unfortunately for many regional groupings they remain too small to openly combat central government. However, in places like Iraq, regional autonomy can be achieved, see the KRG for example.


• Backing from international powers. During the cold war US and Soviet led coups were commonplace and couldn't have succeeded without their support. Today this sort of support is less likely, in a world becoming increasingly dominated by international consensus and the idea of national sovereignty. However, covert support from the major powers is still hinted at occassionaly. Iran supports Shiite militias in Iraq and the US supports 'democracy advocates in Iran.'


• Single mindedness and unity. This may sound obvious, but if groups become splinteted in their goals like in the Philippines amongst the Moro fighters, it becomes impossible to gain any significant advantage.
  

So there you have it, not exactly a closed list but a starting point for any would-be revolutionaries.