Militias and secession, how to succeed.

Regional conflicts are not modern problems for states. As long as there have been central governments, there have been groups opposed to the status quo, some of which have taken up arms to overthrow the ruling regimes. Success is usually measured by the power they are able to extract from their conflict, be it total victory or some sort of regional concession. One of the most significant successes include the Russian Revolution, American War of Independence and numerous colonial wars that resulted in the removal of the ruling regime. But what did these groups have that differentiated them from other less successful groups, thinking primarily of FARC in Colombia, the LTTE in Sri Lanka and Jundallah in Iran where conflicts continue to rage on endlessy and with, seemingly, no end in sight.

• Popular support. Usually groups opposed to a government require the support of the majority of a countries people in order to take full control, or of a regions people to take federal control. Unfortunately for many regional groupings they remain too small to openly combat central government. However, in places like Iraq, regional autonomy can be achieved, see the KRG for example.


• Backing from international powers. During the cold war US and Soviet led coups were commonplace and couldn't have succeeded without their support. Today this sort of support is less likely, in a world becoming increasingly dominated by international consensus and the idea of national sovereignty. However, covert support from the major powers is still hinted at occassionaly. Iran supports Shiite militias in Iraq and the US supports 'democracy advocates in Iran.'


• Single mindedness and unity. This may sound obvious, but if groups become splinteted in their goals like in the Philippines amongst the Moro fighters, it becomes impossible to gain any significant advantage.
  

So there you have it, not exactly a closed list but a starting point for any would-be revolutionaries.

Indian democracy and Indian economy: Self serving or inhibiting?

James Voortman explores India's current difficulties in advancing economic reform within a democratic political system. As one of Asia's shining democratic success stories India will be keen to push through much needed economic reforms; however, recent history has shown that this is easier said than done. For more, click here.

Hezbollah to the government: Everything must go (our way)

Lebanon's political foot dragging over the election of a new president continues to cast a shadow over the futre of the country. Since the end of Lahoud's term in November the countries main opposition parties have been unable to agree on a mechanism to vote in consensus candidate, Suleiman. Hezbollah and its allies continue to demand a cabinet veto in return for a resumption in talks aimed at creating a constitutional amendment allowing Suleiman, a civil servant, the ability to stand for and be elected president. Hezbollah have also threatened to stage mass protests, threatening to disrupt the Rafik Hariri International Airport and other major entry and exit ports if a solution is not found following the 12 January session of parliament. These threats will do nothing for the confidence of the long-sufferring Lebanese people who have faced the threat of civil war since the assassination of Rafik Hariri in 2005. The short term outlook for Lebanon remains bleak. It is highly unlikely that any compromise will be found on 12 January. Expect yet another delay on the issue and mass action by the oppostion. If you're visiting Lebanon at the moment sit tight...if you're planning to go you may want to hold tight and spend your money elsewhere, perhaps on a trip to the local mall to take advantage of the post Christmas clearance sales. Everything must go.

Yemens example to us: No resources + No freedom = War

History often affords observers glimpses of the future and what we are likely to expect given the constancy of human experience. The case of Yemen is an interesting subject to observe and to analyse in order to predict the future of other Arab states in the region. Since the end of the Second World War, Arabian countries have developed considerably on the back of oil and gas wealth, which has afforded ruling regimes significant breathing room to stifle domestic opposition and maintain authoritarian status quos. However, in the case of Yemen, resources are not unlimited and the government is showing signs of stress, particularly in fringe areas such as the south, amongst ex-Southern Yemeni loyalists, and in the north, amongst Shiite minority groups.

Yemen's gas, oil and water resources are running out. The next two decades will show incredible strain on the local economy if alternative avenues of revenue are not found or if significant foreign investment is not forthcoming. The pressure on the patronage system in the country, which keeps disparate groups from openly battling the government, will grow significantly. We have already witnessed what economic discrimination in the south can result in. Widespread anti-government protests in the economically backward south have broken out frequently since May 2007. Although the risk of a coup is unlikely given the largely decentralized opposition and the well resourced northern army, the cracks are beginning to show. In the past few years the Yemeni army has also faced serious rebellion in the north amongst Zahdi Shiite groups, primarily the Believing Youth. This group is staunchly anti-government and opposed to the government of Ali Saleh. In a country defined by loyalty to the tribe rather than the state, the Zahdis and the local authorities have never got along. The presence of seemingly illegitimate government authority has deepened distrust between the groups. Saleh for his part has taken tough measures in crushing the Zahdi uprisings, using militant, loyal tribal and regular forces in these campaigns. The conflict in the north is, like the unrest in the south, likely to continue for the foreseeable future and may deteriorate further, should Saleh not take more substantive steps to appease the rebels.

As the ancestral home of Osama bin Laden, Yemen's position in jihadi thinking remains strong. Positioned between the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa, Yemen has become a central staging point for al-Qaeda and other Sunni jihadist groups. The growing instability of the south and north is likely to create conditions within which returning fighters from Iraq and Afghanistan can train and operate. The increasing pressure on the government from the USA to diminish the presence of al-Qaeda is likely to further pressure the government and strain relations between itself and the west. This may have an impact on foreign investment and aid.

Saleh needs to reform the political system immediately and return opposition groups to position of power in the country. If the demands of the opposition are not met, Saleh will find it increasingly difficult, given the economic downturn, to contain these groups. The time to act is now. If Saleh waits, the government will become weaker, diminishing its bargaining power. Hanging onto power remains 'Mugabe like' and will see the country slide deeper into the abyss. By granting power, possibly federal, to the northerners in return for an end to fighting and demobilization and by investing in the south, in terms of economic aid to the impoverished Aden, Saleh will eradicate the conditions within which al-Qaeda could operate, thus meeting the third goal. These acts remain unlikely to happen however given recent historical precedence and Yemen is likely to fragment within the next three decades. Yemen is the tip of the iceberg and an example to other Middle Eastern states, that authoritarian rule in the modern world is unsustainable given the limited resources our planet has to offer.

Algeria's ongoing campaign to root out Islamist extremism

Since the early 1990s Algeria has battled to contain an Islamist insurgency that has claimed tens of thousands of lives and that has in recent times evolved into a highly efficient and deadly insurgency structured along the lines of the al-Qaeda campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Attempts by the Algerian government to quell the insurgency have proved fruitless despite repeated amnesty offers, military campaigns and other acts of subterfuge. Algerian ministers have stated in the press that the insurgency is waning and that the war on terror was being won; yet in the past 12 months Algeria has experienced some of the worst terrorist violence since the bloody 1990s. The re-branded al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has adopted new tactics in its war against the Algerian government using suicide operations as a useful tool in its quest to overthrow the Bouteflika regime. How to combat this terror has become a central focus of local regimes and international concerns, primarily the US, which does not want to see a resurgence of Islamist extremism in the Sahel.

The emergence of the AQIM out of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat was done more for propaganda purposes than signaling a real shift in the group's policies. Indeed the group has had a long association with al-Qaeda and Algerian fighters have been prominent in Iraq and Afghanistan fighting against coalition forces there. They still have a strong Salafist leaning and are committed to national and international jihad against the enemies of Islam [sic]. The AQIM has developed new methods as mentioned above and it is believed that veteran fighters of the insurgencies elsewhere have radicalized and improved the efficiency of the movement locally. The evolution of the group has serious implications for Algerian and North African security.

Extremist Islamist thought has come to predominate in many areas of North Africa. Radical imams preaching a firebrand version of Islam have instilled in many local communities a strong anti-Western and anti-institutional sentiment that has benefited terror recruiters. Combined with high unemployment amongst easily persuaded youth the ranks of the local insurgents continue to swell. The Sahel area is seeing a decisive shift at present that could ultimately affect countries south of the Sahel. Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian security forces have done well to combat the scourge and in the case of Morocco dedicate large chunks of their spending of defence.

Battling extremism using force has clearly failed. Algeria's military is one of the strongest and well trained in Africa and yet a group of up to 1,000 insurgents continue to exact a heavy toll on civilian and military interests. Even in Morocco extremists continue to emerge and threaten local security. The problem isn’t the extremist as much as it is the doctrine, that appeals so much to the masses. The issues are therefore two fold. Poor conditions, poverty etc, give rise to discontent which is then manipulated by jihadists and extremist imams for some end, usually martyrdom. The recruits are usually poorly educated and are entranced by the possibility of becoming a martyr and escaping the current poor conditions. When these two issues exist in a country, extremism is bound to flourish. Local governments therefore need to spend their budgets, not on extra security and armies, but on education and economic reform. By taking away the conditions that extremist take advantage of and by closing down and eradicating firebrand mosques and teachings, the jihadist phenomenon will disappear. However, the conditions that give rise to these problems have existed for at least a generation and overcoming them will take time.

Economic indicators

Tunisia: Unemployment 13.9% (2006 est.); GDP per capita $8,900 (2006 est.); Literacy 74.3%

Algeria: Unemployment 15.7% (2006 est.); GDP per capita $7,600 (2006 est.); Literacy 69.9%

Morocco: Unemployment 7.7% (2006 est.); GDP per capita $4,600 (2006 est.); Literacy 52.3%

Olmert's tricky choice: Strike or..?

The question on everybody's mind is when, if at all, will Olmert make a decision to strike at the growing menace in the Gaza Strip and in southern Lebanon. The Iranian nuclear crisis and the weakness of Fatah in the West Bank aside, these two regions continue to threaten the very heart of the vulnerable Israeli state. Hamas in Gaza have done well since the takeover over the Strip in June. They have, despite economic sanctions, taken over control of the security of the region and conducted at least one highly public training drill. Rocket attacks by Hamas and Hamas aligned groups continue to reign down on Negev communities and clashes between the IDF and Palestinian gunmen are reported daily along the border. Hamas are betting on the Israeli army invading the Gaza Strip so that they can use their new defensive weapons against Israeli heavy armour. Olmerts problem is two fold. Strike and face heavy casualties, do nothing and face the Israeli public. Olmert has come under increasing pressure at home to do something about the Gaza Strip. Pressure from southern Israeli communities has become enormous of late and with just cause. The daily barrage of Qassam rockets and mortars has left a deep scar on the mental fabric of southern communities. Inaction by the Olmert government has directed the anger for these attacks away from Hamas towards the Israeli authorities. Problem one.

Problem two. The north of the country also continues to be an arena within which Israeli security can be affected. However, striking here is slightly more difficult. The presence of Lebanese Army forces and UN peacekeepers in southern Lebanon prevent Israel from striking at present. However, Hezbollah continues to rebuild and reequip with support from Iran, which has laid some 1000km of highway in the south to make the militia group more mobile. Hezbollah is strengthening but face the same problems the Israelis do in that they can not penetrate through the UN and Lebanese barrier in the south without causing significant political damage to its cause. Its goal will be to try and influence the Lebanese government and somehow manipulate the Israelis into striking first. But perhaps this will come later. Domestic ascendancy is their primary goal.

Olmert has a number of problems therefore. Hamas is strong and growing, internal anger at his inaction is rising, Hezbollah is a continuing menace in the north and the Fatah government (something we have not touched upon) remains weak in the West Bank. Israel is surrounded. The question now is, when will they lash out, because lash out they will. Watch this space.

The India-US Nuke deal

Featuring a whole new format, the South Asia Review presents a short analysis of "The India - US nuclear deal and the costs of its failure" The piece details yet another US government foriegn policy failure that could cause yet more of a schism in the already divided Indian legislature. For more, click here.