A new cycle of violence in Israel

Israel and the Palestinian territories (the West Bank and Gaza Strip) have experienced a wave of civil unrest and associated violence since early October. The primary hotspots for protests have been religious sites, borders between Jewish settlements and Palestinian communities, as well as Israeli security force posts, checkpoints and border crossing points. Coinciding with this violence, knife, vehicular and shooting attacks have spiked considerably and have spread to Israel with notable recent incidents reported in Beersheba, Tel Aviv, western Jerusalem and Dimona. The protests and violence are linked to disputes over access to the Al-Aqsa Mosque in the Old City of Jerusalem, the third-holiest site in Islam. Palestinian Muslims have accused the Israeli authorities of attempting to change the status quo in the area regarding access to the site. Visits by right-wing Jewish and Israeli political personalities have further stoked tensions and mistrust though the course of 2015. Indeed, associated low-level unrest and tensions as well as the general relationship between the Palestinians and Israelis have declined since the events of July and August 2014, when Israel and Hamas fought a major conflict in the Gaza Strip.

Full article here https://opinion.red24.com/2015/10/21/a-new-cycle-of-violence-in-israel-and-the-palestinian-territories/

red24: Egypt’s parliamentary elections

Egypt has entered an election phase with legislative elections due to be held from mid-October to early December. The election period coincides with ongoing insecurity in numerous areas of the country and attempts by the military-backed government to stabilise the political system, encourage economic growth and eliminate its domestic opponents. The forthcoming election, which is unlikely to result in any meaningful changes to the political system, is likely to be preceded by an increase in local level election-related rallies while a number of parties opposed to the military, including the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), are expected to boycott the poll and may increase anti-government protests marginally in the run up to and during the election phases. Non-state armed groups may also seek to disrupt the voting and any state-initiated election events as part of their overall strategy to undermine the military-backed regime. Protests and acts of violence will, however, not be severe and the current baseline security risks will remain largely unchanged.

Get my full article here https://www.red24.com/members/intelligence/newsletters_security_briefings/egypt_elections12102015.php

An accidental tourist - Egypt's military kills Mexican nationals

The Egyptian military mistakenly attacked a convoy of vehicles transporting tourists in the western desert near the popular Bahariya oasis on 13 September. The assault killed 12 people, including 7 Mexican nationals. A further ten people were wounded, including a dual US/Mexican national.
The Egyptian government was quick to admit that it had conducted the attack and described it as an accident. The Egyptian authorities stated that a military force in the area was pursuing militants when they came across the convoy, misidentified it as a militant band and fired upon it.
The Egyptian government has also stated that the tourists were operating in a restricted military zone. The official position has been disputed by the tour operator who has claimed that not only did they have the requisite police permit to operate in the area but they also had a police escort.
The incident serves to underscore the elevated risk of operating in Egypt's western desert area. The region has been affected by a number of mass casualty attacks since 2014. On the 19^th of July 2014, assailants attacked the El-Farafrah border security post in the New Valley governorate, killing 22 people and wounding four others. The attack was claimed by Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis. On the 31^st of May 2014, six soldiers were killed by gunmen in the 'al-Wahat' area. Since these attacks the military has been on a heightened state of alert in the western desert of the country.
Despite these incidents and the increasing risk, tourists have continued to visit the area. The local police have acted to guide local tour groups and provide some security but the risk has not been fully mitigated. Indeed, the ability of the government to safeguard tourists will continue to be undermined due to the ongoing instability in Libya and the growing insecurity in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula and Nile-centred towns.
The recent accident will also serve to further erode confidence in the ability of the authorities to safeguard tourists. The incident is a major embarrassment for the government which is seeking to eliminate militants in the country and present a façade to its domestic and international audience that it is in control and that Egypt is a safe place to visit.

Discrimination - One view, there are others.

In South Africa's constitution (Bill of Rights, Chapter 2) it reads "Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair." (http://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/chapter-2-bill-rights).

This illogical line poses one of the greatest risks to South Africa's future. When it was written there was certainly no doubt that it was included in order to ensure that the wrong's of the past could be corrected in some way. While the motive may have been pure it lacked long term wisdom. One of the key fruits of this provision has been BEE and its newest manifestation BBBEE. The fundamental principle of these policies remains sound and the majority of South Africans support attempts to redress the past and to ensure that all South Africans, young and old, enjoy freedom, education, work, basic necessities of life and the right to vote for your representatives. The policies do, however, serve a divisive purpose and there is a section of the population that remains uncertain as to the true objective of the policies.

Indeed, opposition groups have argued that both BEE and BBBEE are tools for the ruling party to secure the position of a small group of rich entrepreneurs. Certainly, the risk of a small group of rich black businessmen is undisputed. While this is great, for them, the actual goal has failed with the white minority still dominating business and owning a disproportionate amount of capital.

The youth are also at pains to understand these policies. Non-black persons born in the 1980s and 1990s and 2000s should view the legislation as wholly unfair. Access to jobs is difficult and they cannot compete with their black fellows on an equal footing. Merit serves a decreasing purpose.

The legislation also does not make provision for black persons who have benefited greatly since the end of Apartheid. The growing black middle class has grown phenomenally. Yet, legislation still favours people who are already 'on track' economically. These same people can benefit from legislation that aims to redress past imbalances.

Finally, for any major policy of redress there should surely be an end point? Some sort of time period? Perhaps a point when all is balanced or most previously disadvantaged have been given access to opportunity? Sadly, there is not. There is no hint at it. In fact, the number of people classed as disadvantaged is growing. And yet it is not the policies of Apartheid that are leading this downward trend. It is the very party which is ruling the country. Parastatals are under severe strain, corruption is at an all time high, ghost state workers number in the thousands, the economy is tanking/has tanked and yet somehow we are still managing to grip to the idea that white capital / business needs reform and if we do that all the ills will be solved. This argument falls off of an overused and obvious political template by the government against the DA run Western Cape. The DA does not care about the poor, they say. The DA's service delivery record is poor they say. Yet, the DA province is one of the best run in the country. Stats SA will back up this narrative with reference to jobs creation alone. So what are we to make of all of this? The proof, I suppose, will be in the pudding. 

How safe is Egypt?

I recently completed a piece for the red24 Blog on Egypt and I asked the question, how safe is it? Thousands of tourists enter the country each year and they are, generally, blissfully unaware of the security risks of doing so. To access the piece, follow this link https://opinion.red24.com/2015/08/23/how-safe-is-egypt

Turkey - Spiking levels of violence threaten to escalate to conflict

A spate of low-level shootings and bombings in south eastern Turkey has raised concerns of a return to a full scale conflict between the Kurdistan Workers'Party (PKK) and the Turkish state. The increasing frequency of attacks, which have included assassinations, conventional and suicide bombings and shootings targeting police and military facilities and personnel, started in the days after a major suicide bombing in Suruc. A suspected suicide bomber targeted a group of pro-Kurdish volunteers in the town leaving 32 people dead. The political opposition was quick to condemn the attack but, in an effort to gain some political capital, also blamed Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party (AKP)–led government for not doing enough to prevent the attack. The PKK went one step further and linked the government to the IS attack, claiming that the Turkish security forces were complicit in the attack.

Since 24 July, the Turkish government has gone on the offensive against both groupings. It has banned a number of protests in major cities and launched airstrikes against PKK targets in south eastern Turkey and northern Iraq killing dozens of PKK fighters. Turkey has also taken the decision to allow a US-led coalition access to the Incirlik air base to fly manned missions against IS in Syria. There are also plans to create a small buffer zone in northern Syria.

This significant about face did not, however, develop overnight. The US and its NATO partners (Turkey is also a member of NATO) have long sought a greater Turkish role in the Syrian conflict. Pressure from the US must've been significant in recent weeks as manned missions launched from other bases in the region against IS have been hampered by the great travel distances. The rapid breakdown in the relationship between the PKK and the Turkish government has also deteriorated significantly in recent months following several accusations that the Turkish military was deploying additional military forces to Kurd regions in the south east. In early July, the Kurd umbrella group, the Union of Kurdistan Communities (KCK), which includes the PKK, announced that the unilateral ceasefire was over in response to these "violations."

The Suruc bombing then was the final straw that broke the camel's back. Already under severe strain due its failure to secure a ruling majority in the recent 7 June elections or to create a viable ruling coalition, the AKP government went on the offensive. The government launched airstrikes and deployed its military in greater numbers to the Syrian border and restive Turkish south east. Turkey's western partners are likely to be severely uneasy with the assault on the PKK; however, given Turkey's critical role in the fight against IS, they are unlikely to raise too much in the way of protest.

The escalating violence in the south east is likely to continue. PKK and suspected PKK attacks between 22 July and 2 August have affected multiple southern provinces between Adana and Van raising the ire of the government, which is likely to respond in kind. The ceasefire, agreed to in 2013, has failed and a new period of negotiation will be required to end the fighting. However, no such talks are currently planned and are unlikely until the AKP secures a ruling coalition or announces a new national election (and then emerges in a position to create a new AKP-dominated government).

PKK forces in northern Iraq are also coming under severe strain. The Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is placing pressure on the PKK to leave the territory out of concern that the Turkish air strikes may cause an increasing number of casualties among the local Iraqi Kurd population. This is a change from previous periods when the KRG may have sought to remain neutral. Times have changed and the KRG's ties with the Turkish government have improved as it has, quite rightly, made the assessment that if it wishes to pursue statehood it will require Turkey's buy-in. Should PKK forces be forced out of Iraq, the potential of internecine Kurd violence in Iraq will increase as will PKK clashes with the Turkish military forces in south eastern Turkey. At a minimum, violence will escalate in the coming weeks and may then decrease if the AKP comes to power or escalate if no political solution is found between political groupings in Turkey regarding a ruling coalition or if no solution is found between the government and the PKK.

Syria at War - An update

The Syrian civil war is entering its fifth year and there remain no positive signs of an impending end to the conflict. Over 200,000 people have been killed, thousands more wounded and approximately 4 million people have been displaced by the conflict, that has touched every part of the country. The battle ground remains divided between multiple groupings.

The Islamic State dominates much of the eastern half of Syria; however, the Kurd YPG and some regime forces maintain control of territory along the Turkish border and, critically, in the cities of Al Hasakah and Deir Ez Zor.

In northern Syria, the battle for Aleppo city has become the key front in 2015. Nearly all rebel fighting groups, including the Islamic Front and Jabhat al Nusra, and regime-allied forces are present in or near this city. A decisive battle for control of Aleppo is unlikely in 2015 and even if one of the groups does rise to prominence, Islamic State forces, arrayed in the Aleppo countryside are unlikely to hold back any offensive against the city's defenders, be they rebel or regime.

The countryside between Aleppo west and Latakia east is largely dominated by rebel forces, including the aforementioned Islamist militant groupings and the Free Syrian Army. Kurd YPG forces are also based in an enclave near the Turkey border.

This area remains the beating heart of rebel resistance in the north. Depending on the support rebels receive from abroad, the rebels here may strike west into regime heartland territory in Latakia or Tartus or south into Hama. Islamic State forces located north of Aleppo city and possible regime counter-attacks will serve to stymie any major moves, should they occur.

The capital remains firmly in the grip of the regime; however, rebel and militant positions in Douma and East Ghouta mean that the regime maintains a heavy deployment of forces to this key political territory. Losing Damascus is not an option if the Assad regime wishes to survive and Hezbollah wants to exist as a viable militia, given its military resources are channelled through this area from its Iranian sponsors.

In the south, rebels under the command of the Southern Front (SF) and linked to Jordanian and US forces in Jordan, have carried out a series of offensives in 2015 and have captured most of Quneitra governorate and nearly all of Daraa governorate. A key battle for control of Daraa city is currently being fought. Should Daraa city fall the regime will open itself to raids into its core, the Damascus governorate. The Druze of As Suwayda governorate will also increasingly come into the gaze of the rebels in 2015 if Daraa falls and there are concerns of Islamic State incursions into As Suwayda from the north. Without the regime, the Druze will need to accept the rebel terms or, possibly, face a taxing war. Neutrality remains an unlikely future option.

2015 has, to date, proven to be yet another critical year in the Syrian conflict. The Islamic State rise has been phenomenal as has the emergence of a very strong Kurd force in the north. The regime is hanging on to an increasingly thin thread and losses to any of its outlying posts will serve to weaken it considerably and undermine its national prestige and any future bargaining position. Regional states appear to be prepared finally to support rebel groups but the support appears to be poorly directed at present and many questions remain regarding how rebel groupings, arrayed in numerous coalitions, will work together if or once their common enemy is removed.

In Sinai, Egypt Faces Tough Task to Counter Instability

Egypt's Sinai Peninsula is increasingly being affected by high levels of conflict and instability, which has left hundreds of people dead and thousands more wounded since 2011.

Read more here --> http://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/05/sinai-egypt-isis-al-qaeda/ 

For Saudi Arabia, Security Challenges Mount at Home and Abroad

A suicide bomber struck the Shiite Imam Ali mosque in eastern Saudi Arabia's al-Qadeeh village during Friday prayers on May 22, leaving 22 people dead and dozens more wounded. The bombing, claimed by the so-called Islamic State (ISIS), was the most significant attack in the country in years and revived memories of the mass casualty attacks—mainly targeting foreigners—of the 1990s and early 2000s. While recent international attention has focused on Saudi Arabia's more expansive foreign policy, the incident highlighted an increasing climate of instability within the kingdom's borders.

Read the rest here -> http://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/06/saudi-arabia-isis-yemen-bahrain/

War

Islam wants to kill itself. No. Humans want to kill themselves. The Middle East and North Africa are full of them...humans. No different from the west, the south, the east. What does it matter if the way that death is sped up is through obesity or conflict or cancer or drugs. The quickening pace to eternity, if you believe it, appears to be a common condition. The great tragedy is made up of two parts. One, the human that wishes death for some unknown or known reason and, two, the human that wishes death on others. The second is a common trait among one group of humans in the Middle East. The black flag. How does one seek to relate to these people. How does one convince them that liberalism is the true path. One cannot, because it is not. Perhaps a third tragedy. Spending one's life time attempting to understand number two.

The Saudis, Iran, Yemen and a bad case of worst case thinking

The current spasm of conflict in Yemen has left close to 1,000 people dead, as of writing on 22 April. The fighting involves three groups, broadly, including two primary fighting groups. On the one side is a coalition of 13 nations, which are either directly or indirectly involved in the fighting, which are led by Saudi Arabia and who are battling in support of President Hadi, the legitimate leader of the Yemeni state. On the other side are a militia group, the Houthis, who are Shiite Muslim and who are supported by a number of Yemeni military sectors, including those linked to the former president, Ali Saleh. The Houthis are also, allegedly, supported and supplied by Iran, Saudi Arabia's regional rival. The third group, which both sides are opposed to, are the Islamist extremists, notably, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the recently formed Islamic State (IS) branch in Yemen.

The fighting is currently based on four broad fronts. In the north, is a low-level tit-for-tat cross border skirmish between the Saudis and Houthis. In the south, pro-Hadi forces, including southern separatists, are participating in a ground conflict in Aden and a number of other nearby cities against the pro-Houthi force. Further east, AQAP, pro-Hadi and pro-Houthi forces are battling in multiple areas while, finally, the Saudi's and their Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) allies, are conducting an air war against the Houthi and pro-Saleh forces in cities across the country, including the capital, Sanaa.

On the Saudis side, their involvement stems from a March request from the Hadi administration to intervene in Yemen after the Houthis launched an offensive towards Aden. Aden, of course, was the city Hadi fled to when the Houthis accelerated their agitation (ongoing since September) in the capital. The Houthis, for their part, are convinced that the Hadi administration is corrupt, overly influenced by Saudi Arabia and the West and is a slight on the 2011 revolution, which ousted Saleh. The oft cited example of regional autonomy has also been regularly presented as a motivating factor. Following the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) process, which ended in January 2014, the Houthis were angered when one of the proposals was for the creation of new regions which, effectively, split their territory in the north. This NDC proposal precipitated a wave of Houthi assaults towards the capital that culminated in their capture of Sanaa in September 2014. The support of Iran, a fellow Shiite entity, has also been presented as a possible motivating factor for the Houthis somewhat aggressive stance, since 2012.

The end game scenario of the current altercation is unclear; however, all indications are that an extensive ground war may be in the pipeline. Numerous Saudi allied states have promised troops for any eventual Saudi invasion while the Saudis, in the meantime, have deployed half of their regular military force to the Yemen border and mobilised their National Guard. This, in and of itself, should be enough to give the game away and/or hint at a possible next step in this developing crisis.

The disposition of forces in Yemen is also noteworthy. The Saudi-backed coalition is predominantly Sunni while the Houthis are Shiite and appear to be supported by Iran, the primary Shiite power in the region. Saudi Arabia, supported by the West, has a set number of goals. It wants to stabilise the region, prevent Iran from gaining influence in countries bordering it and ensure that survival of the ruling Al-Saud dynasty. To do so, it has supported Sunni states and groupings across the Middle East, including in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, Egypt and Libya. It is no surprise that in three of these areas, Iran has appeared as a backer of the Saudis preferred choice. Yemen, now, stands out as yet another proxy field from which the great geopolitical competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran will play out. This has led, inexorably, to many to conclude that Yemen is yet another step towards that cataclysmic sectarian war we have been fearing for so long and, quite possibly, the actual trigger that leads the region to this ultimate battle. I, for one, can find no reason not to hold a similar position and, it must be said, seem to currently have a bad case of worst case thinking. I hope I am wrong.

Yemen's sorrow

The initiation of air strikes by Saudi Arabia and a number of its regional allies on 26 March added further distress to an already unstable country. The air strikes, which have been wide ranging and have impacted on cities across the country, have targeted members of the Shiite Muslim Houthi militia and military forces loyal to former President Ali Saleh and his son, who is also leader of the Republican Guard, Ahmed Saleh.

The air attacks followed a period of Houthi ascension in the state leading back to September when its fighters entered Sanaa and essentially assumed control of the government. The Houthi measures were largely in response to plans by the regime, led by President Hadi, to undermine Houthi controlled territory in the north through the creation of new region. Following its September victory the Houthis moved further south, east and west and took control of several governorates. Opposed to the group, Sunni tribes in Taiz, Ibb and Al-Baida, supported by militants aligned to Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, initially resisted the Houthi advance in a series of bloody battles.

In 2015, Hadi, who by now was in a position of severe weakness first resigned and then later rescinded his resignation and fled to Aden, declaring it the new capital. The declaration was rejected by the Houthis who initiated an offensive southwards towards the port city in March. Following a request by the Yemen foreign minister, the Saudis and a coalition of regional states, launched strikes against the Houthis. Battles between Sunni tribes, military units and local militias loyal to Hadi and forces aligned to the Houthis, including pro-Saleh forces, have also punctuated the conflict, most notably in Aden. Taking advantage of this, and adding further flame to the fire, Islamist extremists in Hadramawt have sought to seize control of territory, including areas near the regional capital, Mukalla.

The end game remains unclear. A Saudi-led ground intervention remains a possible short-term outcome; however, acquiring the requisite resources to manage a successful invasion will take time. The Saudis are likely to seek to continue to diminish the Houthi camps area of operation and impose a blockade on the country, thus preventing arms supplies from reaching the Shiite militia. This will likely be a first step in forcing the Houthis to withdraw to their northern Saada strongholds and to accept a negotiated settlement that is agreeable to the Sunni Arab states, Hadi and the Sunni tribes. The Houthis are likely to seek to circumvent the blockade, adapt to their air asset inferiority and stoke unrest in areas controlled by its rivals.

What is clear is that Yemen's political system is all but shattered and conflict is likely to remain a common long term feature of the country's security environment.

Egypt's struggle with militancy

Egypt has experienced a spike in acts of urban terrorism in 2015. Cairo and Alexandria have been particularly affected, with low-level attacks reported on a near-daily basis. Cities elsewhere in the country, notably in the Nile Delta, have experienced attacks on a weekly basis. The majority of these incidents have targeted state facilities and personnel, including police stations, checkpoints and soldiers, as well as infrastructure, including electricity provision sites and, more recently, businesses. These incidents have left dozens of people dead or wounded; however, average casualty figures per attack have been very low, largely due to the crude nature of most of the assaults. Reported casualties have predominantly been state employees, although civilian bystanders have occasionally been affected.

Read the rest here --> https://www.red24.com/members/intelligence/newsletters_security_briefings/egypt_struggle_militancy_11032015.php

Can UN-led Talks Bring Together a Fractured Libya?

An old article posted on the Global Observatory website. An excerpt: 

"A new round of peace talks between Libya's competing factions is taking place this week in Geneva, hosted by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). This is the second round of talks in the Swiss city this month after an initial meeting on January 14, and the Geneva process follows largely unproductive talks in Libya's northwestern border town of Ghadames in September 2014. For now, representatives of one of the two competing parliaments in the country—the Islamist-dominated General National Congress (GNC)—have declined to join any talks outside of Libya. Nonetheless, UNSMIL has stated that a future round of negotiations is expected in Libya at some point, which would include the GNC. There are also indications that pressure from the European Union, a major trading partner of Libya and end destination of Libyan oil, and the GNC's primary international supporters, Turkey and Qatar, could lead the GNC to send a delegation to talks abroad in the near future."

For the full article visit this link http://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/01/un-talks-fractured-libya-dialogue/

Hezbollah-Israel Skirmish: A Brewing Conflict or Political Stagecraft?

An article I wrote for the Global Obaservatory. An excerpt:

"Hezbollah fighters ambushed an Israel Defense Force (IDF) convoy in the disputed Shebaa Farms area near the Golan Heights on January 28. The attack left two IDF soldiers dead and seven others wounded. During the subsequent skirmish in the area, a United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) peacekeeper stationed in the Ghajar area was also hit and later died. The violence followed a period of heightened tensions in the region following an Israeli air strike against a Hezbollah and Iranian military convoy in Syria's southern Quneitra governorate on January 18 and subsequent threats by senior Hezbollah and Iranian officials to retaliate against Israel. Tensions escalated further on January 27 when the Israeli Air Force (IAF) struck a Syrian Arab Army (SAA) artillery position in response to a rocket attack from Syria into Israel-controlled territory in the Golan Heights earlier in the day."

For the full article visit http://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/02/hezbollah-israel-border-skirmish-standoff/

Sisi’s Military Maintains Power in a Fragmented Egypt

My latest article for the Global Observatory. An excerpt:

"Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has a clear political philosophy. He wants to strengthen the state and eliminate its opponents. For many Egyptians, this openly nationalistic rhetoric is welcome. Political contestation and associated civil unrest, the threat of terrorism, and a severe economic downturn have severely affected the Egyptian polity in recent years and increased the public's demand for leadership capable of meeting the country's multifaceted challenges. This basic dynamic of modern day Egypt is portrayed regularly through state-run, and some foreign, media outlets. Yet if one delves deeper, there is clearly more at play."

For the full article, visit http://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/02/sisi-military-power-egypt/

Mexico - Kidnapping statistics

Can UN-led Talks Bring Together a Fractured Libya?

I recently wrote a piece for the Global Observatory. Check it out here.

http://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/01/un-talks-fractured-libya-dialogue/

Hezbollah and Israel - Winds of War?

Hezbollah knocked out an Israeli military vehicle in the disputed Shebaa Farms area earlier today. Lebanese media have stated that four Israeli soldiers were killed in the assault while Israeli media have reported seven wounded. The incident is the latest in a number of cross border attacks sparked by the 18 January Israeli drone strike against a Hezbollah/IRGC convoy in southern Syria which killed a number of Hezbollah operatives and a senior IRGC official. The fall out of the attack has been significant with senior members of both parties calling for retaliatory attacks.

Tensions are, without doubt, elevated; however, there are certain issues which mitigate against the likelihood of a wider confrontation at present. Hezbollah are battling Sunni rebels in Syria on the side of the Syrian regime and Israel is preparing for a national election in March. Both sides are keen to avoid a full confrontation but are aware that not responding will lead them to lose prestige and, importantly, legitimacy among their respective constituencies. At present the confrontations have occurred in disputed territories and not been sustained. Should fighting persist and casualty numbers continue to rise both sides may assess that an escalation is required. If they do, we will begin to see troop movements in southern Lebanon as Hezbollah deploy or redeploy forces and a partial or full mobilisation of reserves in Israel. 

Over the longer term a conflict between Israel and Hezbollah seems almost certain given the lack of dialogue between the two and their polar opposite ideological positions. In terms of assessing when this could occur, the best guess is that it may happen after the March elections when the new prime minister would have a fresh mandate. For Hezbollah, they'd want to neutralise the Sunni Jihadist threat in the Bekaa governorate and obtain the green light from Iran and Syria to withdraw forces from Syria before it would look south towards its traditional enemy.

Anarchy and Yemen

A high ranking official was abducted by the Shiite Houthi rebel group in Sanaa on 17 January. The presidential aide's capture sparked a severe response by President Hadi who ordered loyalist troops to deploy in the city. The action sparked clashes between these troops and the Houthis on 19 January. A ceasefire was later agreed to; however, on 20 January, Hadi's residence was attacked by Houthis and the Presidential Palace, where a significant amount of arms is located, was looted and taken by the Shiite rebels.

The abduction of the aide was likely an attempt by the Houthis to undermine attempts by the regime to push through a constitution which would cement a six region Yemen. The Houthis are opposed to this federal measure and have proposed greater local control in the north. The Houthis appear disinterested in taking full control of the country and are well aware of their limitations. That said, they have a significant presence in the centre and north of the country and currently control as many as nine governorates.

The Houthi end game is unclear. It is likely that they will continue to move to block political reforms that would undermine their current dominant position. Indeed, given their strength it seems odd that Hadi would attempt to push through changes to the constitution that would frustrate the Houthis. The military, the part which is loyal to Hadi, is weak and divided. In addition, the hand of former President Ali Saleh is clear. Republican Guard units, led by Ahmed Saleh, Ali Saleh's son, were involved in the clashes on 19 January on the side of the Houthis. Ali Saleh may be positioning himself for a return, possibly in some sort of ruling council should Hadi be deposed.

Elsewhere, the uncertainty in Sanaa will benefit southern seperatists. Any weakening of the central government will raise their stock considerably and boost demands for greater local autonomy. Should a Houthi/Saleh alliance emerge, they would seek to secure the north and ally with elements of the Southern Movement. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula will also view developments favourably and will seek to make gains, much like they did during the Arab Spring when the regime's focus was on securing main urban centres. The one critical problem for the group is that all other groupings oppose them. Local states are also deeply opposed to AQAP. This state of affairs will limit the group's ability to capture and hold territory larger than a secondary governorate in the south or south east of the country.