Anarchy and Yemen

A high ranking official was abducted by the Shiite Houthi rebel group in Sanaa on 17 January. The presidential aide's capture sparked a severe response by President Hadi who ordered loyalist troops to deploy in the city. The action sparked clashes between these troops and the Houthis on 19 January. A ceasefire was later agreed to; however, on 20 January, Hadi's residence was attacked by Houthis and the Presidential Palace, where a significant amount of arms is located, was looted and taken by the Shiite rebels.

The abduction of the aide was likely an attempt by the Houthis to undermine attempts by the regime to push through a constitution which would cement a six region Yemen. The Houthis are opposed to this federal measure and have proposed greater local control in the north. The Houthis appear disinterested in taking full control of the country and are well aware of their limitations. That said, they have a significant presence in the centre and north of the country and currently control as many as nine governorates.

The Houthi end game is unclear. It is likely that they will continue to move to block political reforms that would undermine their current dominant position. Indeed, given their strength it seems odd that Hadi would attempt to push through changes to the constitution that would frustrate the Houthis. The military, the part which is loyal to Hadi, is weak and divided. In addition, the hand of former President Ali Saleh is clear. Republican Guard units, led by Ahmed Saleh, Ali Saleh's son, were involved in the clashes on 19 January on the side of the Houthis. Ali Saleh may be positioning himself for a return, possibly in some sort of ruling council should Hadi be deposed.

Elsewhere, the uncertainty in Sanaa will benefit southern seperatists. Any weakening of the central government will raise their stock considerably and boost demands for greater local autonomy. Should a Houthi/Saleh alliance emerge, they would seek to secure the north and ally with elements of the Southern Movement. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula will also view developments favourably and will seek to make gains, much like they did during the Arab Spring when the regime's focus was on securing main urban centres. The one critical problem for the group is that all other groupings oppose them. Local states are also deeply opposed to AQAP. This state of affairs will limit the group's ability to capture and hold territory larger than a secondary governorate in the south or south east of the country.