Military deployment around Syria

Syria and Iraq

The past week has seen significant discussion over the likelihood of an US strike on Syria with numerous commentators comparing the impending strike to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It should be made clear that no decision has been made or announced publicly on whether to intervene or not (Obama interviewed on PBS on 28 August stated that he had options but had not made a decision). The misunderstanding over the US and Middle East is understandable. In an attempt to inform the discussion, please find below a brief comparison of Syria and other countries where the US has recently intervened.

Bush
The Bush administration was hawkish, undermined by corruption and dual interests and committed to respond to 9/11. Afghanistan was viewed as an easy target and the regime of the time did not consider historical precedent of what precisely an intervention in Afghanistan meant – a drawn out, costly and likely indecisive war (ask the UK and Russia). Iraq presented Bush with another opportunity to complete what had been left unfinished in 1991. Its oil also offered the US with a very tempting carrot.

Obama
Since the heady days of George W, the US has come to a realization. It cannot intervene without significant cost. Indeed, since Obama has come to power, he has drawn down troops in Iraq and Afghanistan and focused on targeted drone strikes aimed at disrupting terrorist networks. This is a much more 'intelligent' use of force and is a deviation from the strong arm tactics of the Bush-era. Obama has also calculated that involvement in Syria does not suit the US interest at this time. It has had two years to intervene and has not as yet. If it wanted Syria's dwindling resources, as many people contend is their main objective, they would have intervened already. Dropping the Syrian regime does also not suit its regional ambitions. Syria may be labeled an enemy, but it's an enemy that the US and Israel can live with. Indeed, the Alawite regime contains the Sunni majority, which precedent suggests, is open to influence from al-Qaeda aligned groups. Indeed, the growing Islamist threat in Syria poses the West with a major dilemma. Support the rebels and possibly open the country up to control by Islamist extremists.

But what to do about the use of chemical weapons? Lets be clear, conventional weapons have done more harm than chemical weapons in Syria to date. HOWEVER, if the Syrians are allowed to continue to use WMD's what stops them from deploying them on a large scale basis? It is this possibility that the US wants to prevent. So a punitive strike against the Syrian regime sends a very clear message "Don't use chemical weapons or else".

Slaughter in Iraq

The conflict in Iraq gets scant attention these days. But in a story that highlights the near daily slaughter in the country the overall picture is clear and ... bleak. Courtesy of Shafaak.com

"Gunmen believed to be from al-Qaeda organization slaughtered on Wednesday an Iraqi family of Shiite Muslims south of Baghdad. This incident comes a few days after a video was published showing a more than five-Qaeda gunmen executing three truck drivers on the international road between Ramadi and Syria. It is believed by following up the images that drivers are from Alawi sect. The security source, who asked not to mention his name, told "Shafaq News", said that" gunmen attacked a house in the morning in Latifiyah area south of Baghdad and slaughtered the 7 –member family."

http://www.shafaaq.com/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7092:gunmen-dressed-afghan-uniform-slaughter-qshiiteq-family-south-of-baghdad-photos-&catid=50:security&Itemid=76

Military build-up and possible Syria strike options

A potential US-led strike on Syria

Much has been written about since Monday about a potential military strike by US-led forces against the Syrian regime in response for its alleged 21 August Sarin gas attack against a rebel held area of Damascus. Indeed, an attack scenario is getting major momentum in the media and this is likely to filter up to the main levers of power. The West has, essentially, convinced itself that the Syrian government used chemical weapons in Ghouta on that fateful night, yet conclusive evidence has yet to be produced and the West, should they intervene at this exact moment, would only be doing so with a prima facie case of misconduct. Does the Syrian regime deserve to be punished for this crime? That is uncertain.

Should the West intervene it is likely to take the form of ship-based missile attacks or air strikes. The US has naval assets in the Mediterranean (four destroyers) and  two carriers nearby (Arabian Sea). It also has an air capability at Bagram Airbase in Turkey and in Jordan not to mention its numerous other facilities across the Middle East. A land option is currently unavailable to the West give the logistics involved. Any initial missile/air attack would need to subdue Syria's existing air-defence systems before further air strikes. Following these events strikes would likely target suspect chemical weapons stores or production plants and symbolic military and state facilities. The likelihood of a successful completion of this mission is high given the US' technological superiority.

Syria has already responded to the impending strike by scattering its forces so the immediate impact of the strikes will be lessened and its conventional force is unlikely to be destroyed. Following any strike it will then retaliate. Its intelligence services will initiate a violence campaign in Lebanon in an attempt to stoke sectarian tensions. Scud attacks targeting Israel are likely while limited operations against US forces in the region, particularly those in Turkey and Jordan are a possibility. Rebels in Syria may also be encourage to launch fresh offensives coinciding with the air strikes. Likely escalation areas include those in and around Aleppo, Damascus and Idlib.

Any attack by the West will achieve little on the battlefield. At the negotiation table the attack may also serve to further harden Syria's already belligerent attitude undermining any possible peace talks. This outcome is already the most likely under the current circumstances, it should be noted. There is a possibility, however, that a sustained air campaign by the West, that essentially suppresses the Syrian air capability, one of the keys to its continued survival, will force the regime to accept a compromise. The question here is, does the US and its allies have the appetite for a sustained campaign? Time will tell.

State of the conflict in Syria

Developments in MENA

The MENA region has been affected by a number of key events in August. Many of these are connected and point to movement on US foreign policy and conflicts in the region. Interesting reading. You make up your own mind as to what they all mean.

• US Embassies places diplomatic facilities on alert in Africa, MENA and Asia in response to al-Qaeda threat. Al-Qaeda later denies that it was going to carry out an attack. Embassy issue follows US State Department Worldwide Travel Alert and Interpol global terrorism warning (Early August).
  
• Egypt moves against Muslim Brotherhood members in Cairo sparking widespread civil unrest that leaves hundreds dead (14 August).
  
• Syrian regime launches Sarin Gas attack on rebel area of Damascus killing hundreds (21 August) US appears to be set to respond with air strikes (26/27 August).
  
• Rockets are fired into northern Israel from southern Lebanon. Israel responds with air strikes on Naameh in Lebanon near Beirut (23 August).
  
• AQAP bombing targets Yemeni military personnel (25 August).
  
• Bombings in Beirut (Hezbollah area) and Tripoli (against Sunni mosques) (15 and 23 August).

The impact of the Syrian conflict on neighbouring states

A short piece I did on the impact of the Syrian Civil War on the Middle East region in June 2013. Offers some insight into whats going on in light of recent reports of possible US/NATO military action against the Assad regime in response to the chemical attack last week in Damascus' Ghouta area which left 500-1,300 people dead. 

The conflict in Syria has been ongoing since 2011 and has left approximately 100,000 people dead, tens of thousands more wounded and displaced millions, internally and externally. The war is being fought between the Syrian government (mainly Alawite) and a predominantly Sunni rebellion. The Syrian government forces comprise the military, police and civilian militia which are loyal to President Bashar al-Assad and his Ba'ath Party. The regime is also allied to Hezbollah, a Lebanon-based Shiite militia group, which has deployed hundreds of its fighters to Syria in recent months.

http://www.news24.com/MyNews24/The-impact-of-the-Syrian-conflict-on-neighbouring-states-20130827

Sarin attack in Damascus

The Syrian military attacked Ghouta in eastern Damascus earlier today with Sarin gas killing between 100 and 600 people. This is what the Syrian opposition claim and which has been supported by a flood of video on Youtube and accounts on Twitter. The attack is officially unconfirmed. The alleged Sarin incident coincides with the Sunday arrival of a UN chemical weapons inspection team raising concerns that the Ghouta incident may have been staged. What, after all, would the Syrian government have to gain from a such high profile attack near the capital when inspectors arrive unless they were close to collapse or military defeat? The answer? Nothing. There is a very good probability that the incident on 21 August was manufactured by militants within the rebellion to gain international support for UN action against the Syrian government.andrec 

Egypt: Understanding the political instability

Since 14 August, there has been a significant outbreak of violence across Egypt as the military moved to clear protest camps that were established in support of the recently deposed, democratically elected president, Mohammed Mursi. However, Egypt’s political stability has been significantly undermined over the past 32 months, dating back to January and February 2011, when countrywide anti-government rallies led to the resignation of former long-serving president, Hosni Mubarak, and the banning of the former ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). Following a transitional period of military rule under the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (February 2011 to June 2012), Islamist political parties emerged as the dominant political force in elections in late 2011 and early 2012. The Muslim Brotherhood (MB)’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and the Salafist al-Nour Party (and the Islamic Bloc) emerged as the primary political groupings, with approximately 65 percent of the seats in the People's Assembly. Liberal, leftist, moderate Islamic and former NDP-linked parties fared poorly. The presidential election in mid-2012 was won by Mohammed Mursi, an MB member; he narrowly defeated Ahmed Shafik, a former Mubarak-era cabinet minister and military leader. 

 From June 2012 to June 2013, animosity toward the Islamist-dominated government grew in response to opposition accusations that Islamists were centralising power, undermining the functioning of the judiciary and failing to meet the goals of the 2011 revolution. The constitution drafting process in late 2012 was also heavily criticised by the opposition as the drafting committee, the Constituent Assembly, was allegedly dominated by Islamist personalities. The tension between the opposition and the Islamists culminated in major countrywide anti-Islamist protests in June 2013. On 3 July, the powerful military leadership announced that it was intervening in the crisis. The military announced the suspension of the constitution. The military also removed and arrested Mursi (who remains in detention), and made the head of the Constitutional Court, Adly Mansour, the interim president. Since then, Mansour has issued a constitutional declaration (on 8 July) outlining the transition period (expected to last at least six months), appointed a new prime minister (on 9 July), and overseen the appointment of a new interim cabinet (on 16 July). 

 In the weeks following the 3 July military takeover, the MB-led National Coalition in Support of Legitimacy led a number of counter-protests against the military takeover, calling for the reinstatement of Mursi and the former constitution. These were largely held on Fridays and affected the capital, Cairo, and Alexandria. From mid- to late July, two primary gathering points emerged in Cairo and Giza, namely the Rabaa El Adawia Mosque in Nasr City and Nahda Square, respectively. These protests were affected by sporadic acts of violence, both minor and significant. On 8 July, military personnel fired on pro-Mursi demonstrators in Nasr City, killing 51 people. On 27 July, approximately 120 pro-Mursi protesters were killed in another attack in Nasr City. Following these events, calls by the interim government to the MB to disperse its Cairo and Giza rallies increased and concern was raised that the authorities were planning to quash the major sit-ins following Ramadan. On 14 August, this concern was realised as police forces, supported by military personnel, surrounded and stormed the Islamist protest sites in Giza and the capital. The crackdown and subsequent reactionary protests and violence have thus far left over 400 people dead and thousands more wounded. The MB has alleged that approximately 2,000 people were killed. Acts of violence, which impacted on urban centres between Aswan and Alexandria, took the form of armed clashes between opposing political groupings and/or security forces, in addition to targeted attacks on security installations and Coptic Christian places of worship. Foreign nationals and areas frequented by foreign nationals were not overly affected; however, at least one British journalist was shot and killed while covering the unrest in Cairo. The journalist was apparently not directly targeted.

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Iraq's bloody 2013

Peace escapes Iraq. At least 4,000 fatalities in 2013 and 1,000 alone in July point to a state that is struggling to meet the demands placed upon it by a well-organised Sunni extremist insurgency. Following the withdrawal of the US military, the lid is now completely off and militants groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant are operating freely and with impunity across the country. The only real oasis of peace is the northern KRG region which is a largely Kurd region. The Iraqi state has attempted to co-opt Sunni tribes, attempted political reconciliation and the military option, but to no avail. The militants want Iraq and they want the Shiites, the majority in Iraq, gone. The likelihood of a settlement in the medium term remains unlikely and a continuation of the current attack cycle is likely to continue. 

Analysis - Devil in the detail

The devil is in the detail. Analysis is a tricky business in the security and political sphere. One can very often jump to conclusions based on assumptions and preconceived notions. The challenge then for all analysts is to challenge each piece of information that they receive. For example. The military in Egypt took control of the country to end a political crisis. This is a common hypothesis in the media. Other options one could consider are 1) The military has long mistrusted the true motives of the Muslim Brothers and saw an opportunity to sideline the group 2) The military want a president (the position holds much weight in Egypt) that they can control to protect their economic interests 3) The military are part of an American Zionist alliance that aims to undermine political Islam. The third one is a bit crazy but for analysts none of these can be dismissed. They should be considered and carefully analysed. For analysts in operations the task before them is typically easier. We simply need to understand what the ramifications of events are. So we draw up a list of potential causes and outcomes and group the possible ramifications. Under all three of the above the Islamists are likely to continue to agitate. This is therefore, from an operational analytical perspective, our main conclusion we deliver to our security teams and clients. For all analysts, and to reiterate, the devil is in the details, he hides where we can not or will not see it. We need to engage our colleagues, our minds and take five to sit back and consider. All options and all views (from senior and junior analysts) should be tabelled before reaching a conclusion. 

Islamists rally in defiance of military dominated interim government

Egyptian Islamist protesters are due to return to the streets on Friday despite a call by the interim government to the police to clear current Islamist protest sites. The call to protests is a clear statement of defiance by groups that held power in Egypt as recently as 3 July before a military coup. Protests last week in Cairo and Alexandria turned violent leaving upwards of 70 people dead and there are real fears now that the planned events on Friday, in light of recent government decisions, may also be affected by clashes and violent unrest. As before, the unrest is not expected to impact on resort areas, so don't bother cancelling your Sharm el Sheikh holiday just yet. Maybe best not walk through parts of Cairo (Nahda Sq., Tahrir Sq and Nasr City) at the moment though.