A simple blog curated by Andre, a risk management intelligence professional. Going strong since 2005. Feedback to rushmore100@gmail.com
Thursday, March 28, 2013
US Navel deployment
Tuesday, March 26, 2013
Battle for the Levant
The conflict in Syria remains a primary regional security concern in the Levant. The fighting, which has raged since March 2011, has left over 70,000 people dead and displaced over two million. Rebels currently control approximately half of the country but critically the regime maintains control of the capital and towns and cities along the Mediterranean coast. The prospects of a decisive battle remain slim and the war is likely to persist for the next year at least. Syria maintains the support of Russia, China and Iran, countries which continue to resupply the regime's military and offer it political cover at the United Nations. The rebels meanwhile are facing an internal battle of their own. Dissent among the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NCSROF) is at an all-time high and the disparate groupings which comprise the coalition find it difficult to agree on the time of day. This weakness is reflected further on the battlefield where Islamist fighters, technically aligned to the Free Syrian Army (FSA), act largely independent of it. These battalions are viewed as highly disciplined and are well-armed. Indeed, in many recent major battles groups like the al-Nusra Front have taken the lead in confrontations with the regime. Despite these weaknesses the rebels are gaining the ascendancy, albeit slowly, and the prospects for regime survival are low. Over the next year I fully expect the rebels to push into regime strongholds and for the Assad regime to begin to crumble. As the government seeks to protect its ruling minority Alawite sect a displacement of pro-government forces is likely to the north west coast line. Don't be surprised if these forces declare a separate state in this region while the largely majority Sunni rebels fight over the remainder of the country.
Monday, March 4, 2013
Yemen - Critical upcoming National Dialogue Conference on 18 March
On 6 February, Yemen President Abdul Rabu Mansoor Hadi announced that a National Dialogue Conference will be held on 18 March. The anticipated start of the much delayed dialogue is expected to usher in a period of normalization of ties between the country's disparate opposition groups through the creation of a civil state and stronger governing institutions. A new constitution is also expected to be drafted. Following the dialogue there are hopes that conditions will be created wherein Yemen can organise fresh election in 2014. Getting all of the relevant parties to participate in the talks would be a major success. Currently, all major groups, excluding the Islamist militant al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, are expected to participate; however, given the highly contentious nature of Yemen politics currently the withdrawal of one or more of the major players prior to or during the talks remains a distinct possibility.
The two most significant players in the forthcoming dialogue, Hirak and the Houthis, hold the key to a successful dialogue. Hirak, a loose coalition of southern activist and opposition groups, is pushing for greater political power in the south. The group itself is split between those that want a federal system and those that want full secession. The group has issued several provocative statements in recent days and its members have attacked government and pro-government facilities and personnel across the south. Its members have also been implicated in attacks on the Islamist Islah party. Hirak accuses Islah, the primary player in the opposition Joint Meeting Parties opposition movement, of attacking its members during a pro-secession demonstration in Aden in February. The Houthis are a well-armed Shiite grouping in northern Yemen, which have been battling the central government and its allies since 2004. The group currently holds much of Saada governorate and holds strong influence in the neighbouring governorates of Amran, Hajja and al-Jawf. Should the Houthis or Hirak (or parts of it) decide not to participate in the dialogue, the implications for the country could be disastrous and a return to conflict (or full scale civil war) becomes a distinct possibility.