The Saudis, Iran, Yemen and a bad case of worst case thinking

The current spasm of conflict in Yemen has left close to 1,000 people dead, as of writing on 22 April. The fighting involves three groups, broadly, including two primary fighting groups. On the one side is a coalition of 13 nations, which are either directly or indirectly involved in the fighting, which are led by Saudi Arabia and who are battling in support of President Hadi, the legitimate leader of the Yemeni state. On the other side are a militia group, the Houthis, who are Shiite Muslim and who are supported by a number of Yemeni military sectors, including those linked to the former president, Ali Saleh. The Houthis are also, allegedly, supported and supplied by Iran, Saudi Arabia's regional rival. The third group, which both sides are opposed to, are the Islamist extremists, notably, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the recently formed Islamic State (IS) branch in Yemen.

The fighting is currently based on four broad fronts. In the north, is a low-level tit-for-tat cross border skirmish between the Saudis and Houthis. In the south, pro-Hadi forces, including southern separatists, are participating in a ground conflict in Aden and a number of other nearby cities against the pro-Houthi force. Further east, AQAP, pro-Hadi and pro-Houthi forces are battling in multiple areas while, finally, the Saudi's and their Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) allies, are conducting an air war against the Houthi and pro-Saleh forces in cities across the country, including the capital, Sanaa.

On the Saudis side, their involvement stems from a March request from the Hadi administration to intervene in Yemen after the Houthis launched an offensive towards Aden. Aden, of course, was the city Hadi fled to when the Houthis accelerated their agitation (ongoing since September) in the capital. The Houthis, for their part, are convinced that the Hadi administration is corrupt, overly influenced by Saudi Arabia and the West and is a slight on the 2011 revolution, which ousted Saleh. The oft cited example of regional autonomy has also been regularly presented as a motivating factor. Following the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) process, which ended in January 2014, the Houthis were angered when one of the proposals was for the creation of new regions which, effectively, split their territory in the north. This NDC proposal precipitated a wave of Houthi assaults towards the capital that culminated in their capture of Sanaa in September 2014. The support of Iran, a fellow Shiite entity, has also been presented as a possible motivating factor for the Houthis somewhat aggressive stance, since 2012.

The end game scenario of the current altercation is unclear; however, all indications are that an extensive ground war may be in the pipeline. Numerous Saudi allied states have promised troops for any eventual Saudi invasion while the Saudis, in the meantime, have deployed half of their regular military force to the Yemen border and mobilised their National Guard. This, in and of itself, should be enough to give the game away and/or hint at a possible next step in this developing crisis.

The disposition of forces in Yemen is also noteworthy. The Saudi-backed coalition is predominantly Sunni while the Houthis are Shiite and appear to be supported by Iran, the primary Shiite power in the region. Saudi Arabia, supported by the West, has a set number of goals. It wants to stabilise the region, prevent Iran from gaining influence in countries bordering it and ensure that survival of the ruling Al-Saud dynasty. To do so, it has supported Sunni states and groupings across the Middle East, including in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, Egypt and Libya. It is no surprise that in three of these areas, Iran has appeared as a backer of the Saudis preferred choice. Yemen, now, stands out as yet another proxy field from which the great geopolitical competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran will play out. This has led, inexorably, to many to conclude that Yemen is yet another step towards that cataclysmic sectarian war we have been fearing for so long and, quite possibly, the actual trigger that leads the region to this ultimate battle. I, for one, can find no reason not to hold a similar position and, it must be said, seem to currently have a bad case of worst case thinking. I hope I am wrong.

Yemen's sorrow

The initiation of air strikes by Saudi Arabia and a number of its regional allies on 26 March added further distress to an already unstable country. The air strikes, which have been wide ranging and have impacted on cities across the country, have targeted members of the Shiite Muslim Houthi militia and military forces loyal to former President Ali Saleh and his son, who is also leader of the Republican Guard, Ahmed Saleh.

The air attacks followed a period of Houthi ascension in the state leading back to September when its fighters entered Sanaa and essentially assumed control of the government. The Houthi measures were largely in response to plans by the regime, led by President Hadi, to undermine Houthi controlled territory in the north through the creation of new region. Following its September victory the Houthis moved further south, east and west and took control of several governorates. Opposed to the group, Sunni tribes in Taiz, Ibb and Al-Baida, supported by militants aligned to Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, initially resisted the Houthi advance in a series of bloody battles.

In 2015, Hadi, who by now was in a position of severe weakness first resigned and then later rescinded his resignation and fled to Aden, declaring it the new capital. The declaration was rejected by the Houthis who initiated an offensive southwards towards the port city in March. Following a request by the Yemen foreign minister, the Saudis and a coalition of regional states, launched strikes against the Houthis. Battles between Sunni tribes, military units and local militias loyal to Hadi and forces aligned to the Houthis, including pro-Saleh forces, have also punctuated the conflict, most notably in Aden. Taking advantage of this, and adding further flame to the fire, Islamist extremists in Hadramawt have sought to seize control of territory, including areas near the regional capital, Mukalla.

The end game remains unclear. A Saudi-led ground intervention remains a possible short-term outcome; however, acquiring the requisite resources to manage a successful invasion will take time. The Saudis are likely to seek to continue to diminish the Houthi camps area of operation and impose a blockade on the country, thus preventing arms supplies from reaching the Shiite militia. This will likely be a first step in forcing the Houthis to withdraw to their northern Saada strongholds and to accept a negotiated settlement that is agreeable to the Sunni Arab states, Hadi and the Sunni tribes. The Houthis are likely to seek to circumvent the blockade, adapt to their air asset inferiority and stoke unrest in areas controlled by its rivals.

What is clear is that Yemen's political system is all but shattered and conflict is likely to remain a common long term feature of the country's security environment.