Mexico - Kidnapping statistics

Can UN-led Talks Bring Together a Fractured Libya?

I recently wrote a piece for the Global Observatory. Check it out here.

http://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/01/un-talks-fractured-libya-dialogue/

Hezbollah and Israel - Winds of War?

Hezbollah knocked out an Israeli military vehicle in the disputed Shebaa Farms area earlier today. Lebanese media have stated that four Israeli soldiers were killed in the assault while Israeli media have reported seven wounded. The incident is the latest in a number of cross border attacks sparked by the 18 January Israeli drone strike against a Hezbollah/IRGC convoy in southern Syria which killed a number of Hezbollah operatives and a senior IRGC official. The fall out of the attack has been significant with senior members of both parties calling for retaliatory attacks.

Tensions are, without doubt, elevated; however, there are certain issues which mitigate against the likelihood of a wider confrontation at present. Hezbollah are battling Sunni rebels in Syria on the side of the Syrian regime and Israel is preparing for a national election in March. Both sides are keen to avoid a full confrontation but are aware that not responding will lead them to lose prestige and, importantly, legitimacy among their respective constituencies. At present the confrontations have occurred in disputed territories and not been sustained. Should fighting persist and casualty numbers continue to rise both sides may assess that an escalation is required. If they do, we will begin to see troop movements in southern Lebanon as Hezbollah deploy or redeploy forces and a partial or full mobilisation of reserves in Israel. 

Over the longer term a conflict between Israel and Hezbollah seems almost certain given the lack of dialogue between the two and their polar opposite ideological positions. In terms of assessing when this could occur, the best guess is that it may happen after the March elections when the new prime minister would have a fresh mandate. For Hezbollah, they'd want to neutralise the Sunni Jihadist threat in the Bekaa governorate and obtain the green light from Iran and Syria to withdraw forces from Syria before it would look south towards its traditional enemy.

Anarchy and Yemen

A high ranking official was abducted by the Shiite Houthi rebel group in Sanaa on 17 January. The presidential aide's capture sparked a severe response by President Hadi who ordered loyalist troops to deploy in the city. The action sparked clashes between these troops and the Houthis on 19 January. A ceasefire was later agreed to; however, on 20 January, Hadi's residence was attacked by Houthis and the Presidential Palace, where a significant amount of arms is located, was looted and taken by the Shiite rebels.

The abduction of the aide was likely an attempt by the Houthis to undermine attempts by the regime to push through a constitution which would cement a six region Yemen. The Houthis are opposed to this federal measure and have proposed greater local control in the north. The Houthis appear disinterested in taking full control of the country and are well aware of their limitations. That said, they have a significant presence in the centre and north of the country and currently control as many as nine governorates.

The Houthi end game is unclear. It is likely that they will continue to move to block political reforms that would undermine their current dominant position. Indeed, given their strength it seems odd that Hadi would attempt to push through changes to the constitution that would frustrate the Houthis. The military, the part which is loyal to Hadi, is weak and divided. In addition, the hand of former President Ali Saleh is clear. Republican Guard units, led by Ahmed Saleh, Ali Saleh's son, were involved in the clashes on 19 January on the side of the Houthis. Ali Saleh may be positioning himself for a return, possibly in some sort of ruling council should Hadi be deposed.

Elsewhere, the uncertainty in Sanaa will benefit southern seperatists. Any weakening of the central government will raise their stock considerably and boost demands for greater local autonomy. Should a Houthi/Saleh alliance emerge, they would seek to secure the north and ally with elements of the Southern Movement. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula will also view developments favourably and will seek to make gains, much like they did during the Arab Spring when the regime's focus was on securing main urban centres. The one critical problem for the group is that all other groupings oppose them. Local states are also deeply opposed to AQAP. This state of affairs will limit the group's ability to capture and hold territory larger than a secondary governorate in the south or south east of the country.