The Mumbai attacks and fallout

Much has been written about the brazen Mumbai attacks that were carried out by Islamist militants last week against a number of Western and local targets. The shock and awe that followed the initial reports of bombings and killings have been replaced by anger and a burning desire by the local Indian authorities and the normal citizenry to bring those responsible to justice. Finger pointing and accusations have been running wild with allegations that the Pakistani intelligence service somehow had some hand to play in the attacks. The evidence is damming. Pakistani ISI has long been viewed as having been infiltrated by jihadi elements and for being sympathetic to their aims. President Zadari has done his best to curb the ISI but much work still has to be done. The Pakis have also come out openly and condemned the attack and the shuttle diplomacy and back and forth statements, are clear that the Pakis do not want a confrontation with their nuclear neighbours.

The Indian 9/11, as it is now being coined, has many repurcussions for the region and the world. The most obvious is the reaction of India. Will they respond, will they take the fight across the border to Pakistan and hunt for the militants themeselves like Bush did with Iraq and Afghanistan? This is a clear possibility, but improbable at the moment. The Indians are stretched battling naxalites across the eastern states and attacking a huge neighbour would cost hundreds of thousands (and if nukes were used, millions) of lives. It is likely that the Indians will rather up the anti by accusing Pakistan of complicity thus placating the Indian public, which is currently baying for revenge. Pakistan will respond with equally fiery rhetoric and denials, more Indian ministers will resign and the matter will remain unresolved.

Pakistan for its part must continue to act against militants. The military is currently battling Taleban aligned militants across its western border with Afghanistan. However, this fight must be escalated to include the intelligence service. A cleaning of the ISI house must follow. If it doesnt, militants and those that sympathise with them will become stronger. The international community must also act and support the Indian and Pakistani governments. First step is obviously to bring the two parties to some sort of understanding. Pakistan must show it is willing to support counter-terror operations. If it doesnt, it risks war with India. Secondly, the international community must support the Indians and Pakistanis with aid, intelligence and financial and by offerring counter-terror expertise. The dangers are clear. The Jihadists want war between India and Pakistan because war suits their designs. Within chaos it operates best. Within stable states its ability to operate is seriously curtailed.