The Egyptian presidential election will be held in late May amid ongoing agitation by the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) against the military-backed interim government of Adly Mansour, appointed by the military in July 2013. The election is being contested by just two men. The two candidates are the former army chief, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Hamdeen Sabahi. The election is unlikely to produce any surprises and, with an anticipated MB boycott of the poll, El-Sisi is expected to emerge victorious. Sabahi has some support in the country. As leader of the Egyptian Popular Current and co-founder of the National Salvation Front, along with his track record of anti-Mubarak activism, he has some traction and appeal among the electorate. Indeed, he placed third with 21.5% of the vote in the first round of the 2012 presidential election, and won the governorates of Cairo and Alexandria. However, the political and economic power of the military, their hold on state institutions and recent surveys indicate the military's preferred candidate will emerge victorious.
The likely outcome of the Egyptian presidential election will result in a number of positive and negative developments. On the positive side, the political stability the re-emergence of the military has had on the highest echelons of the state will be built upon. Islamist protests will persist but for the most part Egyptians will generally welcome a new, and officially legitimate, president. There are also hopes that once the presidential election and later, the legislative election, are concluded that the political stability will translate into an increase in foreign investment and productivity and a decrease in the unemployment rate. Since 2011, the official unemployment rate has increased from approximately 9% to 13.4% in January 2014. The number of unemployed persons has increased from approximately 2.3 million people to 3.6 million. The state's critical tourism industry has also suffered. Having been at a height of 14 million visitors in 2010 the number has nearly halved since. Improving stability and security, it is argued, will attract more visitors.
These hopes are legitimate. Indeed, a successful election and solid leadership backed by the powerful military will do much to begin the work of un-tarnishing Egypt's international image and attracting investment to the Arab powerhouse. Yet, the manner in which this new 'stability' was achieved will serve to leave a lasting anti-government legacy among a large proportion of the public. In 2011/12, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the political wing of the MB, and the FJP-dominated Democratic Alliance for Egypt, obtained over ten million votes out of a total of 27 million cast. This massive turnout for the primary Islamist grouping in the country reflected the collective will of arguably 35 to 45% of the population. In 2012, voters backed the FJP and MB's presidential candidate, Mohammed Mursi. He obtained 13 million votes out of a total of 25 million cast. The support and appeal of the Islamist is, therefore, unquestioned in Egypt. Yet in June and July 2013, opponents of the Islamists launched a major anti-government protest movement. Rightly or wrongly, the military intervened to save the country from yet another political crisis. This intervention on the back of the 'will of the people' disregarded the vast proportion of Egyptians who had voted for the Islamists. It is for this reason that Egypt today is faced with a campaign of nearly daily mass protests against the military and, possibly more worrying, an escalating Islamist insurgency against the state.
Within this current poisoned political climate, the military will attempt to restabilise a country racked by polarization and competition. One option for the military will be to negotiate with the Islamists and attempt to bring them back into the political fold. This particular option appears unlikely though given that thousands of MB supporters, including Mursi, remain in detention and are facing death and life sentences charges. This will leave the military with one option, continued crackdown. In this climate, the continued radicalization of a moderate Islamist party will continue and the Islamist insurgency will likely spread. A return to the type of political violence last seen in the 1930s and 1940s is, therefore, possible.
