Lebanon's political elite gathered in Beirut on 16 September for the first time since 2006 in an attempt to reinvigorate national reconciliation talks, seen as a key political goal in the post-Syrian Occupation history of the country. Present at the talks sponsored by President Michel Suleiman, were the leaders of the most dominant parties including the Future Movement, Free Patriotic Front, Amal, Hezbollah, PSP and a host of other smaller parties. Top of the agenda was the future character of a national defence strategy - a key sticking point between the March 14 and March 8 Alliance. As predicted the talks ended up being talks about talks and another session is due to be held on 5 November.
Lebanon emerged following the Syrian withdrawal in 2005 with no clear power arbiter that could keep the opposing sides from each others throats. It was only the concerted efforts of Lebanese politicians in 2005 that paved the way for talks. However, Lebanon's political immaturity led to a breakdown in these talks with the March 8 Alliance led by Hezbollah and Amal resigning from the cabinet and withdrawing from the dialogue in 2006 following a brief war between Israel and Hezbollah in July and August. What followed was a two year political freeze during which time political and sectarian tensions flared, Fatah al-Islam fought a series of battles against the Lebanese Armed Forces, Beirut downtown was occupied by March 8 protesters and the south of the country was turned into a UN peacekeeping zone.
The freeze was broken suddenly in May 2008 when a decision by the March 14 Alliance, Future Movement, to disband the Hezbollah telephone network and remove a pro-Hezbollah manager from the Beirut International Airport sparked pitched gun battles between pro- and anti-government forces across the country. At least 65 people were killed and dozens more injured during the clashes that finally resulted in the March 8 anti-government alliance occupying March 14 positions in Beirut. The March 8 alliance had clearly emerged as the dominant physical, if not political, force in the country. It must be noted that during the unrest the Lebanese army did not engage either side and took the middle ground allowing the opposing militias space to slug it out.
The violence showed that the Hezbollah led March 8 was clearly the strongest force in the country, but without a political mandate, something the March 14 alliance held onto fiercely. Queue international diplomats and Qatar in May - both sides agreed to meet in Doha for talks to resolve the differences. The meetings were highly successful and resulted in Michel Suleiman, up to then the military leader, taking over the presidency and an agreement reached on assigning more power to the March 8 alliance. A new cabinet was formed and here we stand at the precipice of Lebanese stability. Or do we?
The country is seen as a magnet for Islamist extremists who are believed to have flocked to the country's numerous refugee camps in recent years. The most feared group of these is Jund al-Sham a group based in the Ein al Hilweh camp. Fighting between them and Fatah militia has resulted in numerous deaths in recent months; however, the clashes don’t come close the 2007 battles between Fatah al-Islam and the Lebanese Army in the Nahr al-Bared camp. Although Fatah al-Islam has been routed, some elements remained scattered in the country and have the ability to carry out attacks in the country. The political vacuum has also created space for feuding clans and militias to carry out attacks against one another. Key hotspots have been Tripoli, the Bekaa Valley and the Chouf Mountains. In addition to these threats political and military figures are routinely assassinated.
Lebanon's political elite still have much work to do. The urgency of them accomplishing there goal can not be underestimated. As long as the main political blocs, the March 8 and 14 alliances remain deeply and aggressively opposed and the Lebanese army fail to take sides, space will be created for vendettas, feuds and assassinations which means that by the time they do agree there wont be much of a country left.
Lebanon emerged following the Syrian withdrawal in 2005 with no clear power arbiter that could keep the opposing sides from each others throats. It was only the concerted efforts of Lebanese politicians in 2005 that paved the way for talks. However, Lebanon's political immaturity led to a breakdown in these talks with the March 8 Alliance led by Hezbollah and Amal resigning from the cabinet and withdrawing from the dialogue in 2006 following a brief war between Israel and Hezbollah in July and August. What followed was a two year political freeze during which time political and sectarian tensions flared, Fatah al-Islam fought a series of battles against the Lebanese Armed Forces, Beirut downtown was occupied by March 8 protesters and the south of the country was turned into a UN peacekeeping zone.
The freeze was broken suddenly in May 2008 when a decision by the March 14 Alliance, Future Movement, to disband the Hezbollah telephone network and remove a pro-Hezbollah manager from the Beirut International Airport sparked pitched gun battles between pro- and anti-government forces across the country. At least 65 people were killed and dozens more injured during the clashes that finally resulted in the March 8 anti-government alliance occupying March 14 positions in Beirut. The March 8 alliance had clearly emerged as the dominant physical, if not political, force in the country. It must be noted that during the unrest the Lebanese army did not engage either side and took the middle ground allowing the opposing militias space to slug it out.
The violence showed that the Hezbollah led March 8 was clearly the strongest force in the country, but without a political mandate, something the March 14 alliance held onto fiercely. Queue international diplomats and Qatar in May - both sides agreed to meet in Doha for talks to resolve the differences. The meetings were highly successful and resulted in Michel Suleiman, up to then the military leader, taking over the presidency and an agreement reached on assigning more power to the March 8 alliance. A new cabinet was formed and here we stand at the precipice of Lebanese stability. Or do we?
The country is seen as a magnet for Islamist extremists who are believed to have flocked to the country's numerous refugee camps in recent years. The most feared group of these is Jund al-Sham a group based in the Ein al Hilweh camp. Fighting between them and Fatah militia has resulted in numerous deaths in recent months; however, the clashes don’t come close the 2007 battles between Fatah al-Islam and the Lebanese Army in the Nahr al-Bared camp. Although Fatah al-Islam has been routed, some elements remained scattered in the country and have the ability to carry out attacks in the country. The political vacuum has also created space for feuding clans and militias to carry out attacks against one another. Key hotspots have been Tripoli, the Bekaa Valley and the Chouf Mountains. In addition to these threats political and military figures are routinely assassinated.
Lebanon's political elite still have much work to do. The urgency of them accomplishing there goal can not be underestimated. As long as the main political blocs, the March 8 and 14 alliances remain deeply and aggressively opposed and the Lebanese army fail to take sides, space will be created for vendettas, feuds and assassinations which means that by the time they do agree there wont be much of a country left.
