History often affords observers glimpses of the future and what we are likely to expect given the constancy of human experience. The case of Yemen is an interesting subject to observe and to analyse in order to predict the future of other Arab states in the region. Since the end of the Second World War, Arabian countries have developed considerably on the back of oil and gas wealth, which has afforded ruling regimes significant breathing room to stifle domestic opposition and maintain authoritarian status quos. However, in the case of Yemen, resources are not unlimited and the government is showing signs of stress, particularly in fringe areas such as the south, amongst ex-Southern Yemeni loyalists, and in the north, amongst Shiite minority groups.
Yemen's gas, oil and water resources are running out. The next two decades will show incredible strain on the local economy if alternative avenues of revenue are not found or if significant foreign investment is not forthcoming. The pressure on the patronage system in the country, which keeps disparate groups from openly battling the government, will grow significantly. We have already witnessed what economic discrimination in the south can result in. Widespread anti-government protests in the economically backward south have broken out frequently since May 2007. Although the risk of a coup is unlikely given the largely decentralized opposition and the well resourced northern army, the cracks are beginning to show. In the past few years the Yemeni army has also faced serious rebellion in the north amongst Zahdi Shiite groups, primarily the Believing Youth. This group is staunchly anti-government and opposed to the government of Ali Saleh. In a country defined by loyalty to the tribe rather than the state, the Zahdis and the local authorities have never got along. The presence of seemingly illegitimate government authority has deepened distrust between the groups. Saleh for his part has taken tough measures in crushing the Zahdi uprisings, using militant, loyal tribal and regular forces in these campaigns. The conflict in the north is, like the unrest in the south, likely to continue for the foreseeable future and may deteriorate further, should Saleh not take more substantive steps to appease the rebels.
As the ancestral home of Osama bin Laden, Yemen's position in jihadi thinking remains strong. Positioned between the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa, Yemen has become a central staging point for al-Qaeda and other Sunni jihadist groups. The growing instability of the south and north is likely to create conditions within which returning fighters from Iraq and Afghanistan can train and operate. The increasing pressure on the government from the USA to diminish the presence of al-Qaeda is likely to further pressure the government and strain relations between itself and the west. This may have an impact on foreign investment and aid.
Saleh needs to reform the political system immediately and return opposition groups to position of power in the country. If the demands of the opposition are not met, Saleh will find it increasingly difficult, given the economic downturn, to contain these groups. The time to act is now. If Saleh waits, the government will become weaker, diminishing its bargaining power. Hanging onto power remains 'Mugabe like' and will see the country slide deeper into the abyss. By granting power, possibly federal, to the northerners in return for an end to fighting and demobilization and by investing in the south, in terms of economic aid to the impoverished Aden, Saleh will eradicate the conditions within which al-Qaeda could operate, thus meeting the third goal. These acts remain unlikely to happen however given recent historical precedence and Yemen is likely to fragment within the next three decades. Yemen is the tip of the iceberg and an example to other Middle Eastern states, that authoritarian rule in the modern world is unsustainable given the limited resources our planet has to offer.
