South Africa's military mis-adventures

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC) deployed to the eastern DRC in December 2023. The deployment, which follows the announcement of the phased MONUSCO withdrawal, is aimed at supporting efforts to stabilize the troubled region where rebel groups (allegedly some supported by neighboring countries) have waged decades of war against the central government and local citizens. The latest manifestation of the militia scourge is the M23...one of approximately 120 groups of varying sizes and capabilities in the region. 

A large part of the deployed contingent are members of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). The SA contingent consists of approximately 3,000 troops at a cost of ZAR 2 billion (for 2024). They along with Malawian and Tanzanian troops are arrayed near Goma and Sake in the North Kivu Province. The deployment has gotten off to a shaky start with M23 rebels making inroads across the province recently and threatening Goma itself. On Feb. 14, indirect (mortar) fire targeting a SANDF position killed two soldiers and wounded three more.

The SANDF is chronically underfunded, under-resourced, and understaffed. Some estimates place the number of available troops at any given time at around 14,000. These forces, which are stretched due to operations in Mozambique, domestically in South Africa and now DRC, lack sufficient combat and supply support. Rooivalk helicopters (3) in the DRC have been grounded for a year. Of the 5 Oryx helicopters in the DRC, only two are functioning. This means that air support during defensive or offensive operations are basically non-existent and if troops are in need of evacuation or resupply getting these will be increasingly difficult.

It seems only a matter of time before yet another ANC-led South African disaster. Any concerted push by rebels on a SADC force base is likely to result in a massacre. Rebels are reportedly well-equipped to deal with any force they encounter in the region. Rwanda is accused of supplying M23 with advanced weaponry, including guided mortar and SAMs to the M23. 

The decision to deploy to the country seems yet another worryingly daft decision by Cyril Ramaphosa and the ANC inner circle who are keen to portray South Africa as a player on the international stage. Following its disastrous ICJ case - which resonated only with authoritarian and socialist governments and movements - the deployment could be the nail in South Africa's international prestige coffin. This will come at the expense of South African service personnel.

Sall's Senegal in the Throws of Crisis

Senegal is trumpeted as an example of a successful democracy. Well, by African standards its done rather well. The military hasn't played a major role in regime change recently like countries elsewhere in the sub-region. Yet, here we stand, again. President Macky Sall and his Benno Bokk Yakaar coalition have decided to delay the elections until the end of the year. The move comes on the back of years of democratic back sliding with various prominent opposition figures arrested and tried on varying charges. The opposition claim the cases are politically-motivated. The government claims innocence and rule of law. Well, if rule of law is to stand the test now rests with the judiciary. The presidential election can not be held at the end of the year. It must be held in quarter 2. Will the judiciary stand or will it succumb meekly like so many other institutions in Africa have over the past decade. And what of the street, civil unrest is sure to follow.

The Middle East Conflagration

The attack on Tower 22 in Jordan this last weekend by Iran-aligned militia must be seen as a 'red line' by the Biden administration. An attack that can not go unresponded to. Indeed, Biden has warned that a response is coming. As of Feb. 1, we have not seen any action. Yet, action is highly likely. What form it takes is another question. 

It is unlikely that the US will conduct any direct attack on Iranian territory. To do so, would escalate beyond what the US government would find acceptable. In turn, Iran would be required to escalate as well. My sense is they will target an Iranian or Iranian adjacent interest in one of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, or Yemen. Syria is the most likely target. The Syrian regime hasn't the capability to respond and the country hosts IRGC forces. Israel regularly attacks IRGC and Hezbollah interests in this country. Finding a target that will adequately measure the attack on Tower 22, assuage the thirst for retaliation among the US and its allies and meet the US public's expectations for an adequate response will be key. 

We wait and see.

Cape Town - Hiking Security

My home town of Cape Town has a crime problem. A beautiful city, a tourist hotspot, and great place to watch a cricket game. But crime. Its everywhere. Nowhere more so than Table Mountain National Park. Incidents in the park peaked in 2023 with over 100 incidents of muggings, assaults, and vehicle break-ins. The problem got so severe that the City of Cape Town (not responsible for policing - this is a national power), was forced to deploy 80 patrollers to monitor key hotspots between the famed Table Mountain Cable Car Station and Signal Hill, including Lions Head.

Incidents continue to be reported through 2024 and the hotspots remain areas noted above and typically within 200 meters of the park perimeter. Attacks further up the mountain are rare. With a trove of available targets at the park edge the incentive to trek higher up remains pretty low for the average criminal.

Here is a map I produce, tracking incidents. It's been used by the City of Cape Town, various news media, and hiking groups

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Check it and let me know what you think.

Taleban control zones - ISW

Libya: Prelude to civil war?

Libya's political environment remains heavily fractured despite the emergence of a UN-backed unity government. The unity government, the Government of National Accord (GNA) has taken up residence in Tripoli; however, the two other governments, the Tripoli-based GNC and Tobruk-based HoR have refused to recognise it officially.

There are no indications of an impending deal, despite massive international support for the GNA. This has created conditions for a return to a civil war given that each of the three governments has the support of armed forces.

One impending area of competition between the three, which could signal the start of a deterioration in the security environment, is the status of Sirte. The city, located on Libya's northern coastline, is controlled by Islamic State forces. Since the start of the year these forces have expanded further along the coast and besieged or captured oil export and processing towns and sites.

The IS assault has raised international concern which has viewed the IS surge in North Africa as a direct threat to Europe. Libya's international partners have been keen to create a unified government; however, local disputes have prevented this. In the interim, local forces have begun preparing to repulse IS from Sirte knowing that by so doing, their negotiation position would be greatly improved.

In recent days, forces linked to the HoR, the Libyan National Army, have begun preparing for an offensive east of Sirte. A noticeable build up has been reported in the vicinity of Ajdabiya. Forces linked to Misratah, a strong city west of Sirte, which is home to many GNC members, has also begun deploying its forces in preparation for an assault.

The UN-backed GNA has responded with alarm and has called on both sides to desist from attempting separate assaults, knowing that if either is successful that its own position would be greatly undermined. In addition there are concerns that the competition to retake Sirte may end in clashes between Misratah and LNA forces.

These concerns have already started to come to fruition. On the 3^rd of May, rival armed groups clashed in Zillah, 400km south of Sirte. The violence reportedly involved forces linked to the Libyan National Army (LNA) and those linked to the pro-Misratah Islamist Omar Mukhtar Brigade. As a side note, the Omar Mukhtar Brigade are one of a number of militias which have been involved in fighting against the LNA for control of Benghazi since 2014.

In the absence of a political agreement, local competition is likely to result in further instability and clashes which could lay the platform for a wider conflict. The Islamic State, under severe pressure, will seek to stoke tensions and it may look to conduct further probing attacks against its rivals or conduct bombings outside of its area of operation, including in Tripoli, over the near-term.

Iran-Saudi Tensions Top List of 2016 MENA Region Challenges

Tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia will top the challenges in the MENA region in 2016. More on this here http://theglobalobservatory.org/2016/01/iran-saudi-mena-yemen-nimr-al-nimr/