Middle East: Q&A

Readers of the blog have submitted a few questions over the years. I’ve attempted to answer a few here. If you have any others or would like to discuss the points further, leave a comment.

Why is peace so allusive between the Israelis and Arabs?

The crucial turning point of all new and old peace initiatives continues to be the status of Jerusalem, a city that has been fought over for centuries and left a scar across the face of the region. It is this battle for this city, a city that is home to three religions, that remains the unmoveable obstacle to all progress. If a solution can be found to the political control of Jerusalem, peace would surely follow. Other crucial issues such as the right of return for Palestinian refugees scattered by numerous Arab-Israeli wars and the status of the Palestinian state are also important stumbling blocks. If these two issues were solved without an agreement on Jerusalem a deal would fail. A deal on Jerusalem without the Palestinian issue questioned would, in my opinion, not lead to a breakdown.

What does America want in the Middle East?

The first answer that usually comes to mind is ‘oil’. Wealth attracts interest. The US saw an opportunity in the ME and took it. Of course this is not the entire truth. As global hegemon, the US seeks to balance other powers against each other. To protect its interests in the ME it sought to protect Kuwait in 1990 while only two years earlier it had been a supporter of the very same regime against Iran. In 2003, it removed Saddam Hussein. This was a strategic blunder on the part of the junior Bush, which has allowed Iran to gain the upper hand in the region. Much work will be required to restore the balance.

Will Israel last?

It needs three things to maintain its position in the region, 1. Internal unity 2. Support of a major power and 3. Technological superiority. It is these three primary elements that have helped it survive against bigger and stronger enemies for sixty years. So far it has all three. It will last, for now.

Damascus in turmoil?

Olivier Guitta interrogates the issue of Syrian complicity in the murder of former Lebanese PM Rafik Hariri and the ramifications that murder has had on the countries domestic and international image. The article appears in the Middle East Times:

If there is one country that has been all over the news lately, it is Syria. In fact between President Bashar Assad's charm offensive to the West (real or not), Syrian troops amassing near the Lebanese border, a terror attack in Damascus, it seems that today things are shaking up in Syria. But the difficulty of reading into this imbroglio is growing by the day: more players, more incidents, more drama.

While it is tough to know for sure what is going on in Assad's country, a certain pattern is emerging. And all roads lead to the International Tribunal that is meant to try the murderers of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. For the time being the various U.N. reports on the investigation are pointing to one direction where the culprits are presumed to be: Damascus.

What Assad would hate more than anything is that his regime would stand accused and be convicted of being behind the assassination of Hariri. The International Tribunal has become an obsession for the Syrian president. According to the Beirut daily Al-Anwar who cites Lebanese and international sources who obtained copies of the forthcoming report from the international commission, Syrian security services heavyweights are reportedly implicated in Hariri's assassination.

This has put the regime in Damascus in a near panic state. A number of analysts believe that Assad will go to great lengths to prevent the tribunal from proceeding. Now a more clear explanation of events which unfolded in Syria over the last year begins to emerge.

It all started with the assassination in February in Damascus of Hezbollah's Imad Mughnieh. While no formal accusation against the Syrian security services can be made, there is no way that in a country so tightly controlled there was not at least complicity from some in the regime. Interestingly, Mughnieh was suspected of having a hand in Hariri's murder and it could have been convenient for Damascus to get rid of him to avoid linkage to the regime.

Then shortly after, Syria's number 2, Assef Shawkat, head of the security services and Assad's powerful brother in law, was kicked out of the inner circle, stripped of his powers and allegedly put under house arrest. According to a Syrian opposed to the current regime, if Shawkat was not Bashar's sister's husband, he would have been eliminated. What is sure is that Shawkat was reportedly the real mastermind behind Hariri's murder. It is then quite convenient to have him taken out of the picture.

Fast forward to August 1, when General Muhammad Suleiman, Assad's right hand man was murdered by two snipers in Tartous. What makes his murder more than suspicious is that he was in his summer residence under tight security and had usually a team of 20 or so bodyguards. Weirdly enough, none of the members of his security team fired back or launched a pursuit against the snipers. Also Assad surprising everyone did not postpone a trip to Tehran, did not attend the funerals, and did not even present his condolences to the general's family. It looks like the death of his close confidante did not affect Assad in the least. And coincidence: Suleiman was summoned to appear in front of the international commission investigating the assassination of Hariri just a few days after his death. He already had been questioned twice and was one of the key witnesses, since all Syrian services reports from Lebanon were sent to him.
Last but not least, on Sept. 27, an explosion near a security service center in Damascus took place, killing 17. Again, how could this operation be pulled off in a country and a neighborhood so tightly controlled? How could a car full of 500 pounds of TNT be brought there? According to Syria's official television, the explosion killed a general and his son. It is allegedly Brigadier Abdel Karim Abbas, who was reportedly also one of the people interrogated by the international commission investigating Hariri's murder.

While it is true that one can doubt that the regime would be behind a "terror" attack that made so many victims just to kill one of its operatives, this is not so far-fetched especially in light of what occurred in the past few months.
These sudden 'accidental' deaths come at a convenient time for the regime. As they say in the intelligence business, there are no coincidences.

Olivier Guitta, an adjunct fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and a foreign affairs and counterterrorism consultant, is the founder of the newsletter The Croissant (www.thecroissant.com).

Two journalists go missing in Lebanon - updated

Two US citizens, Taylor Luck (a writer for the Amman based Jordan Times) and Holly Chmela (a New York Times intern) went missing in Lebanon on 1 October. The couple left Amman on 29 September for Beirut on holiday and were due to return to Amman on 4 October after visiting Syria. The couple were last seen leaving their Beirut hotel on 1 October and were planning to travel north to the troubled Tripoli area. Reports emerged on 9 October that the pair had been seized by the Syrian authorities in the company of a 'smuggler' and were arrested for not having the proper visa to enter Syria. The couple were handed over to the US authorities in Damascus later on 9 October.

The dissapearence remains a mystery and a number of questions remain unanswered. Why were they travelling with a smuggler? Where were they between 1 and 9 October? Why would two journalists, one familiar with the region, risk crossing illegally into Syria, during a time of increased Syrian military build up along the Lebanse border and tension with Lebanon - when they could easily obtain an entry visa? When did Syria arrest the pair? The mystery of their dissapearence and reemergence will only become clearer once the two have exited Syria and been interrogated by the US authorities. The MECAS report continue to monitor developments and will keep its readers updated.

National dialogue: Implications for Lebanon's elite

Lebanon's political elite gathered in Beirut on 16 September for the first time since 2006 in an attempt to reinvigorate national reconciliation talks, seen as a key political goal in the post-Syrian Occupation history of the country. Present at the talks sponsored by President Michel Suleiman, were the leaders of the most dominant parties including the Future Movement, Free Patriotic Front, Amal, Hezbollah, PSP and a host of other smaller parties. Top of the agenda was the future character of a national defence strategy - a key sticking point between the March 14 and March 8 Alliance. As predicted the talks ended up being talks about talks and another session is due to be held on 5 November.

Lebanon emerged following the Syrian withdrawal in 2005 with no clear power arbiter that could keep the opposing sides from each others throats. It was only the concerted efforts of Lebanese politicians in 2005 that paved the way for talks. However, Lebanon's political immaturity led to a breakdown in these talks with the March 8 Alliance led by Hezbollah and Amal resigning from the cabinet and withdrawing from the dialogue in 2006 following a brief war between Israel and Hezbollah in July and August. What followed was a two year political freeze during which time political and sectarian tensions flared, Fatah al-Islam fought a series of battles against the Lebanese Armed Forces, Beirut downtown was occupied by March 8 protesters and the south of the country was turned into a UN peacekeeping zone.

The freeze was broken suddenly in May 2008 when a decision by the March 14 Alliance, Future Movement, to disband the Hezbollah telephone network and remove a pro-Hezbollah manager from the Beirut International Airport sparked pitched gun battles between pro- and anti-government forces across the country. At least 65 people were killed and dozens more injured during the clashes that finally resulted in the March 8 anti-government alliance occupying March 14 positions in Beirut. The March 8 alliance had clearly emerged as the dominant physical, if not political, force in the country. It must be noted that during the unrest the Lebanese army did not engage either side and took the middle ground allowing the opposing militias space to slug it out.

The violence showed that the Hezbollah led March 8 was clearly the strongest force in the country, but without a political mandate, something the March 14 alliance held onto fiercely. Queue international diplomats and Qatar in May - both sides agreed to meet in Doha for talks to resolve the differences. The meetings were highly successful and resulted in Michel Suleiman, up to then the military leader, taking over the presidency and an agreement reached on assigning more power to the March 8 alliance. A new cabinet was formed and here we stand at the precipice of Lebanese stability. Or do we?

The country is seen as a magnet for Islamist extremists who are believed to have flocked to the country's numerous refugee camps in recent years. The most feared group of these is Jund al-Sham a group based in the Ein al Hilweh camp. Fighting between them and Fatah militia has resulted in numerous deaths in recent months; however, the clashes don’t come close the 2007 battles between Fatah al-Islam and the Lebanese Army in the Nahr al-Bared camp. Although Fatah al-Islam has been routed, some elements remained scattered in the country and have the ability to carry out attacks in the country. The political vacuum has also created space for feuding clans and militias to carry out attacks against one another. Key hotspots have been Tripoli, the Bekaa Valley and the Chouf Mountains. In addition to these threats political and military figures are routinely assassinated.

Lebanon's political elite still have much work to do. The urgency of them accomplishing there goal can not be underestimated. As long as the main political blocs, the March 8 and 14 alliances remain deeply and aggressively opposed and the Lebanese army fail to take sides, space will be created for vendettas, feuds and assassinations which means that by the time they do agree there wont be much of a country left.

US Embassy attacked in Sanaa

Two car bombs targeting the US Embassy in Sanaa killed 16 people on 17 September. The attack, which was later claimed by Islamic Jihad in Yemen, was the first successful attack in the city since April this year when the al-Qaeda Organisation in the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen Soldiers Brigades, fired mortars towards a customs authority office and the Italian embassy. The recent attack underscores the continuing high threat from terrorism in Yemen and has serious implications for persons wishing to conduct business or visit the country. The attack was very well planned and executed and while the attackers did not penetrate the heavily fortified perimeter, the mere presence of a large number of al-Qaeda militants in the capital without the local security forces having issued a warning is a major concern and raises questions about the Yemeni intelligence services ability to track the large number of Islamist militants in the country. The al-Qaeda inspired militants have issued a number of threats this year already and carried out a number of attacks. A few of the most major recent developments include:

• On 17 September, Islamic Jihad claims the US Embassy bombings and threatens further attacks against the UAE, Saudi and British Embassies in Sanaa.


• On 16 September, Islamic Jihad reportedly threatens to carry out attacks against targets in Yemen.


• On 19 August, the al-Qaeda group in Yemen issued a statement on a website confirming the death of al-Qa’iti and threatening reprisal attacks.


• On 11 August, Yemeni security forces raided a house in Tarim, Hadramawt governorate. At least five al-Qaeda linked militants were killed including the alleged leader of the group, Hamza al-Qa’iti. A number of Yemeni security force personnel were also among the casualties.


• On 5 August, al-Qaeda in Yemen threatened to carry out larger scale attacks in the country if militants arrested by the authorities, in connection with the 25 July suicide attack, were not released.


• On 15 June, security forces arrested two suspects accused of planting bombs in government buildings in Sanaa governorate.


• On 29 May, Yemeni authorities arrested an eleven-man terror cell in Sanaa. The suspected al-Qaeda linked cell were nationals of Chad and Saudi Arabia. The police action was followed by two security incidents on 30 May that may have been related to the capture of the al-Qaeda suspects.


• On 12 May, reports indicate that AQ in Saudi have ordered their operatives to relocate to Yemen.


• On 30 April, two bombs exploded on the premises of a customs office, near the Italian embassy in the Safia Janubiah area of Sanaa. There were no injuries or damages. Al-Qaeda Organisation in the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen Soldiers Brigades, claimed responsibility for the attack.


• On 10 April, two Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) were located in the vicinity of the west wall of the Hadda residential compound in Sanaa.


• On 9 April, a bomb exploded in the al-Hadda neighbourhood of Sanaa near the offices of Canadian oil company Nexen. There were no casualties or damage.


• On 6 April, militants belonging to al-Qaeda fired three mortars/rockets into the Kuwait housing complex in the al-Hadda neighbourhood of south western Sanaa. There were no reports of injuries or damages. The complex houses foreign workers and the offices of the Yemen-owned Safer oil company, formerly known as Hunt Oil.


• On 18 March, unknown individuals fired three mortar rounds towards the US embassy in the Sawan district of Sanaa. Two people died, including a security official guarding the embassy. The mortars landed short of the embassy in a nearby school. The Yemen government have blamed al-Qaeda for the attack.


• On 2 February, an assailant threw a grenade at a group of students in a restaurant near the University of Sanaa. The attack left two people dead and 25 injured. The perpetrator has been identified as Mohammed Hassan al-Wajih. The motive for the attack remains unclear; however, authorities believe it may have involved a family dispute.

For a video of the incident, please click on the following link: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W2G6ogHD1iM

The Afghanistan forecast

On 7 October 2001, the military forces of the United States and United Kingdom began a bombardment of Afghanistan in an attempt to oust the ruling majority Pashtun Taliban movement. The operation dubbed "Enduring Freedom" was supported by the predominantly Uzbek, Tajik and Hazara United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan or Northern Alliance (NA), which led the ground assault against the Taleban. Initial Taleban resistance crumbled under the massive onslaught and Kabul soon fell to the Western backed NA. Western ground troops arrived in 2002 under the guise of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) which was taken over by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 2003, and were tasked with securing the gains made by the initial invasion and restoring order and the rule of law in Afghanistan. Since 2003, NATO-ISAF has enjoyed only partial success in restoring order. Many parts of the country remain lawless and ungoverned. Within this hostile climate of hostility and disorder, the Taleban and other like minded groups have reemerged as dominant forces challenging and threatening the very survival of the Western backed Hamad Karzai government. There is no better example of this growing insurgent dominance than the 13 July assault on a remote US outpost in Kunar province that left nine US soldiers dead. The attack led US commanders to reevaluate the outposts position near the village of Wanar and eventually decide to withdraw its forces from the fort.

The Taleban came to prominence in Afghanistan in the early 1990s. Supported by the Pakistan intelligence services and military and filled with recruits from Pashtun communities in western Pakistan and southern Afghanistan, the Taleban came to be the greatest threat to the newly installed mujahadeen government in Kabul. In 1994, the Taleban fought a series of battles against local warlords dispelling many of them and capturing Kandahar, a major southern city. By 1996, the group had captured Kabul and had almost complete control of the country (the NA controlled 10% of the territory, predominantly in the north east). The Taleban's first order of business after coming to power was to install a new legal code which was, in essence, a strict interpretation of Sharia Law. Non-Pashtun Afghanis were also largely denied access to power and were systematically replaced in all sectors of the country's political system and economy.

During this period, the Taleban forged closer relations with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the only states which recognised the Taleban administration. Osama Bin Laden's flight to Afghanistan in the late 1990s, also led to a now infamous relationship between the Taleban and al-Qaeda. Indeed, Bin Laden's partial financing of the regime and the addition of al-Qaeda fighters into the Taleban armed forces led to the development of closer ties between the two organisations, ties that are thought to continue to this day.

The 2001 ouster of the Taleban by the combined US/UK/NA forces crippled the organisation, but did not wholly destroy it. The Taleban's strong support from local Pashtun groups along the shared Pakistan - Afghanistan border and its bases in Pakistan have helped to restore the organisation to a point were it can boast an insurgent force of 2-3,000 combatants. Its technical and numerical inferiority to NATO-ISAF and US forces (47,000 troops combined) has also largely been overcome with the Taleban resorting to an al-Qaeda type strategy similiar to typical guerilla wars elsewhere in the world. Suicide bombings, ambushes and kidnappings combined with a 'hit and run' strategy have resulted in the group making great strides towards eroding the limited authority of the Hamad Karzai government and draining the coalition NATO-ISAF and US forces to a point where Western nations have begun calling for a full withdrawal from the embattled country.

Pakistan's troubled Federally Administered Tribal Areas and North West Frontier Province are also fertile breeding grounds for the Taleban. The Haqqani faction of the Pakistan Taleban rule with impunity in northern Waziristan and offer support to the Taleban in the form of bases and training areas. Leader of the faction, Jalaluddin Haqqani is also long serving Taleban leader, having served in the Taleban administration in the 1990s and being named the one time Taleban military commander in 2001.

The consequence of the alliance with al-Qaeda, its strong community support and its bases in Pakistan have recently been revealed with the frequency of attacks in provinces (Ghazni, Wardak and Parwan) surrounding Kabul and in the capital itself increasing year on year since 2006. For NATO-ISAF and Afghan forces overcoming these considerable obstacles will require a multi-pronged approach. Engaging with and protecting local communities will have to be prioritised. Creating alliances is a key ingredient in fighting a counter-insurgency campaign. However, this may require more troops on the ground, something a war weary Western public may not be so keen on. Coalition forces will also need to target insurgent bases. Unfortunately, many of these are based in Pakistan. Obtaining permission to carry out target attacks or convincing the Pakistan military to re-establish control in its lawless western regions will require a massive effort. Expect the Taleban to continue its growth for the short-term.

Other factions:

Hizb-i-Islami (Islamic Party) is led by Gulbaddin Hekmatyar. It is also known as Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin. The group, based in Kunar, Laghman, Jalalabad and Paktia is ethnic Pashtun and supports the Taleban against the coalition forces in Afghanistan. The group gained a reputation during the Soviet occupation as the most violent of the seven mujahadeen groups operating against the Soviets. Hekmatyar received support from Pakistan and the US during this period. His party has since fallen out of favour with Pakistan and continues an insurgency against the Taleban from Maza e sharif and Jalalabad. The group must not be confused with the Khalis faction of Hizb-i-Islami, based in Nangarhar and led by Mulavi Younas Khalis, which broke away from the main faction in 1979.

Al-Qaeda in the descent, Taleban in the ascendancy

US propaganda during the month of July has indicated that Al-Qaeda attacks have decreased. In addition, a number of media reports have suggested that AQ are planning to move to Sudan and Somalia. These announcements come on the back of increased tensions following Iranian Shahab Missile tests on 9 and 10 July. Meanwhile, a US Naval carrier group has reposition from the Persian gulf to the Gulf of Oman to assist in operations against the Taleban in the Afghanistan theatre. Propaganda aside this may suggest that the US and the Iraqis are gaining significant momentum in Iraq or it may mean that AQ are holding off on attacks at present. In Iraq itself 9 of the 18 provinces have now been returned to Iraqi security control. The Stratfor article below also suggests that Iran and the US are looking to forge a long term deal over Iraq and that the first fruits of these negotiations are now being reaped as violence ebbs.

Afghanistan meanwhile remains firmly in the grip of a Taleban insurgency and no such deal seems to have been reached in this arena. The number of NATO Isaf troops based in the country remains well below levels required to bring stability. The Taleban have also evolved their tactics AQ style and are carrying out a sustained guerilla type war against foreign forces. The attacks have also begun to be focused on Kabul province. The feeling is that attacks against the economic and political heart of the country are likely to carry more weight than elsewhere in the country. The Taleban have also strenghthened its position in Pakistan's tribal areas and following peace deals with the Pakistan government and its alliances with local tribal groupings, its future seems secure. The NATO forces are left with few options other than increasing the size of its force to battle the Taleban and its allies (AQ & tribals).

One cant help but feel that the Afghan tragedy is a repeat of so many conflicts in the past. The British, Soviets and now the Americans have all come unstuck in the region. No deals will bring the Taleban to heel. The geography of Afghanistan offers the Taleban ample room to move and plan. Overcoming them will require active Nato presence in most rural and urban communities. If they can not succeed in this mission the Taleban will stay strong.