Algeria's ongoing campaign to root out Islamist extremism

Since the early 1990s Algeria has battled to contain an Islamist insurgency that has claimed tens of thousands of lives and that has in recent times evolved into a highly efficient and deadly insurgency structured along the lines of the al-Qaeda campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Attempts by the Algerian government to quell the insurgency have proved fruitless despite repeated amnesty offers, military campaigns and other acts of subterfuge. Algerian ministers have stated in the press that the insurgency is waning and that the war on terror was being won; yet in the past 12 months Algeria has experienced some of the worst terrorist violence since the bloody 1990s. The re-branded al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has adopted new tactics in its war against the Algerian government using suicide operations as a useful tool in its quest to overthrow the Bouteflika regime. How to combat this terror has become a central focus of local regimes and international concerns, primarily the US, which does not want to see a resurgence of Islamist extremism in the Sahel.

The emergence of the AQIM out of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat was done more for propaganda purposes than signaling a real shift in the group's policies. Indeed the group has had a long association with al-Qaeda and Algerian fighters have been prominent in Iraq and Afghanistan fighting against coalition forces there. They still have a strong Salafist leaning and are committed to national and international jihad against the enemies of Islam [sic]. The AQIM has developed new methods as mentioned above and it is believed that veteran fighters of the insurgencies elsewhere have radicalized and improved the efficiency of the movement locally. The evolution of the group has serious implications for Algerian and North African security.

Extremist Islamist thought has come to predominate in many areas of North Africa. Radical imams preaching a firebrand version of Islam have instilled in many local communities a strong anti-Western and anti-institutional sentiment that has benefited terror recruiters. Combined with high unemployment amongst easily persuaded youth the ranks of the local insurgents continue to swell. The Sahel area is seeing a decisive shift at present that could ultimately affect countries south of the Sahel. Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian security forces have done well to combat the scourge and in the case of Morocco dedicate large chunks of their spending of defence.

Battling extremism using force has clearly failed. Algeria's military is one of the strongest and well trained in Africa and yet a group of up to 1,000 insurgents continue to exact a heavy toll on civilian and military interests. Even in Morocco extremists continue to emerge and threaten local security. The problem isn’t the extremist as much as it is the doctrine, that appeals so much to the masses. The issues are therefore two fold. Poor conditions, poverty etc, give rise to discontent which is then manipulated by jihadists and extremist imams for some end, usually martyrdom. The recruits are usually poorly educated and are entranced by the possibility of becoming a martyr and escaping the current poor conditions. When these two issues exist in a country, extremism is bound to flourish. Local governments therefore need to spend their budgets, not on extra security and armies, but on education and economic reform. By taking away the conditions that extremist take advantage of and by closing down and eradicating firebrand mosques and teachings, the jihadist phenomenon will disappear. However, the conditions that give rise to these problems have existed for at least a generation and overcoming them will take time.

Economic indicators

Tunisia: Unemployment 13.9% (2006 est.); GDP per capita $8,900 (2006 est.); Literacy 74.3%

Algeria: Unemployment 15.7% (2006 est.); GDP per capita $7,600 (2006 est.); Literacy 69.9%

Morocco: Unemployment 7.7% (2006 est.); GDP per capita $4,600 (2006 est.); Literacy 52.3%

Olmert's tricky choice: Strike or..?

The question on everybody's mind is when, if at all, will Olmert make a decision to strike at the growing menace in the Gaza Strip and in southern Lebanon. The Iranian nuclear crisis and the weakness of Fatah in the West Bank aside, these two regions continue to threaten the very heart of the vulnerable Israeli state. Hamas in Gaza have done well since the takeover over the Strip in June. They have, despite economic sanctions, taken over control of the security of the region and conducted at least one highly public training drill. Rocket attacks by Hamas and Hamas aligned groups continue to reign down on Negev communities and clashes between the IDF and Palestinian gunmen are reported daily along the border. Hamas are betting on the Israeli army invading the Gaza Strip so that they can use their new defensive weapons against Israeli heavy armour. Olmerts problem is two fold. Strike and face heavy casualties, do nothing and face the Israeli public. Olmert has come under increasing pressure at home to do something about the Gaza Strip. Pressure from southern Israeli communities has become enormous of late and with just cause. The daily barrage of Qassam rockets and mortars has left a deep scar on the mental fabric of southern communities. Inaction by the Olmert government has directed the anger for these attacks away from Hamas towards the Israeli authorities. Problem one.

Problem two. The north of the country also continues to be an arena within which Israeli security can be affected. However, striking here is slightly more difficult. The presence of Lebanese Army forces and UN peacekeepers in southern Lebanon prevent Israel from striking at present. However, Hezbollah continues to rebuild and reequip with support from Iran, which has laid some 1000km of highway in the south to make the militia group more mobile. Hezbollah is strengthening but face the same problems the Israelis do in that they can not penetrate through the UN and Lebanese barrier in the south without causing significant political damage to its cause. Its goal will be to try and influence the Lebanese government and somehow manipulate the Israelis into striking first. But perhaps this will come later. Domestic ascendancy is their primary goal.

Olmert has a number of problems therefore. Hamas is strong and growing, internal anger at his inaction is rising, Hezbollah is a continuing menace in the north and the Fatah government (something we have not touched upon) remains weak in the West Bank. Israel is surrounded. The question now is, when will they lash out, because lash out they will. Watch this space.

The India-US Nuke deal

Featuring a whole new format, the South Asia Review presents a short analysis of "The India - US nuclear deal and the costs of its failure" The piece details yet another US government foriegn policy failure that could cause yet more of a schism in the already divided Indian legislature. For more, click here.

Voortman on Sri Lanka's fiery President Rajapakse

James Voortman, a leading Asian security analyst, outlines the main security threats in the Sri Lankan theatre at present. His most recent analysis appeared in an article published by the Asian Times. To read the article, please click here. For further South Asia analysis visit Voortman's blog by clicking here.

Defining the Qaeda monster

I recently received a mail from a reader concerning definitions and the fight against terrorism. The reader was confused that the US hadn’t been able to destroy al-Qaeda despite having overwhelming technical and military superiority. The question raised issue over the harmony of terrorists and how governments used the tag, terrorist, to identify its modern day enemies.

Terrorism is a phenomenon that is not easily defined or does it fit into any particular framework. When attempts are made to do so, arguments are made against it and counter examples generally prove to be successful in showing that a particular group or incident is not terrorism but another type of attack. So when analysing the effect of terrorism we are in fact analysing the effect of attacks on civilian or military interests by groups with set ideologies and motivations. Looking at the Middle East analysing particular countries we are confronted with numerous groups, which strangely enough are usually associated with al-Qaeda. This group has been blamed for hundreds of attacks, and groups either aligned with it or motivated by it are said to be diffuse. Yet this raises a number of problems. The most obvious being, do all these groups share a common ideology? The answer surely, must be no. With differing nationalities, immediate priorities are largely ignored by analysts and media commentators to the detriment of proper analysis. This has largely been a factor of government's pigeon holing groups into easily identifiable structures so that they can easily present the 'enemy' to their civilian populations. It is a political consequence more than a scientific one and to understand 'terrorist groups' one must understand this function, this flawed function.

The Bakiyev show: Soviet style politicking at its best

Kyrgyzstan president, Kurmanbek Bakiyev called for a referendum for 21 October. The referendum was announced in September and comes at a time of growing criticism of the Bakiyev regime. Bakiyev's presidency has faced rising crime rates, poverty, continued allegations of corruption, battles for control of lucrative businesses , political assassinations and infighting and allegations of a cover up of murders in Aksy in 2002. Popular protests to his rule have occurred frequently most notably in April and November 2006 and the hopes of the Tulip Revolution, which brought Bakiyev to power, have been dashed. Bakiyev has, therefore, chosen to ask the people to decide on constitutional amendments and reforms to the electoral law that will make political parties directly elected to a newly expanded parliament and give him greater power over the legislature. In the past, under Akiyev, snap referendums were held to give the president greater power. It is clear that the current referendum is continuing this tradition and the great hopes and ideals of the Tulip Revolution have been dashed. It is also clear that Bakiyev has not given the people enough time to realise exactly what it is that he is doing.

In October Bakiyev was elected leader of the Ak Jol Eldik Partiyasi. Although he resigned shortly after his election, it is hoped that this party will emerge as the new majority party. Kyrgyzstan has never had a majority party, unlike most if its neighbours and it is Bakiyev's hope to have a party that will legitimise his presidency and rubber stamp his decision. It is a clever political gamble. Most of the protests in the country have focused on the leaders. By moving towards parties blame is not so easily assigned. The government also gains international legitimacy and is seen to be democratic. Inspection of the proposed Kyrgyz constitution also reveals that power will continue to rest with the president and power will continue to be centered in the president's office. Under the new constitution the president elects 50% of the electoral commission, the cabinet and ministers. In fact the president can control everything and does control everything. The referendum it would seem is another smoke screen designed to deflect attention away from Bakiyev's obvious policy failures and to diminsh the power of parliament, which has been severely critical of his rule since 2005. If voters accept the new constitution, snap elections are due to be held before the end of the year for a new parliament. If they do not accept the referendum expect Bakiyev to conjur up another magic show to stay in power. With Bakiyevs manipulations and growing discontent echoes of the 2005 Tulip Revolution are already starting to be heard.

The Pakistan conundrum: Consequences of Musharraffs reelection

On 6 October President Pervez Musharraf was re-elected for a fresh five year term by the Pakistan's national and provincial assemblies. The world will now turn its attention to the Supreme Court, which is due to rule over the legality of the election, when it meets on 17 October. However, Musharraf's hold on power is set to continue, as the courts lack the stomach to stand up to the president. With Musharraf's power seemingly secure, it is appropriate to look at the issue of his re-election and how it will shape the following aspects of Pakistan's future: For more, click here.