A new cycle of violence in Israel

Israel and the Palestinian territories (the West Bank and Gaza Strip) have experienced a wave of civil unrest and associated violence since early October. The primary hotspots for protests have been religious sites, borders between Jewish settlements and Palestinian communities, as well as Israeli security force posts, checkpoints and border crossing points. Coinciding with this violence, knife, vehicular and shooting attacks have spiked considerably and have spread to Israel with notable recent incidents reported in Beersheba, Tel Aviv, western Jerusalem and Dimona. The protests and violence are linked to disputes over access to the Al-Aqsa Mosque in the Old City of Jerusalem, the third-holiest site in Islam. Palestinian Muslims have accused the Israeli authorities of attempting to change the status quo in the area regarding access to the site. Visits by right-wing Jewish and Israeli political personalities have further stoked tensions and mistrust though the course of 2015. Indeed, associated low-level unrest and tensions as well as the general relationship between the Palestinians and Israelis have declined since the events of July and August 2014, when Israel and Hamas fought a major conflict in the Gaza Strip.

Full article here https://opinion.red24.com/2015/10/21/a-new-cycle-of-violence-in-israel-and-the-palestinian-territories/

red24: Egypt’s parliamentary elections

Egypt has entered an election phase with legislative elections due to be held from mid-October to early December. The election period coincides with ongoing insecurity in numerous areas of the country and attempts by the military-backed government to stabilise the political system, encourage economic growth and eliminate its domestic opponents. The forthcoming election, which is unlikely to result in any meaningful changes to the political system, is likely to be preceded by an increase in local level election-related rallies while a number of parties opposed to the military, including the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), are expected to boycott the poll and may increase anti-government protests marginally in the run up to and during the election phases. Non-state armed groups may also seek to disrupt the voting and any state-initiated election events as part of their overall strategy to undermine the military-backed regime. Protests and acts of violence will, however, not be severe and the current baseline security risks will remain largely unchanged.

Get my full article here https://www.red24.com/members/intelligence/newsletters_security_briefings/egypt_elections12102015.php

An accidental tourist - Egypt's military kills Mexican nationals

The Egyptian military mistakenly attacked a convoy of vehicles transporting tourists in the western desert near the popular Bahariya oasis on 13 September. The assault killed 12 people, including 7 Mexican nationals. A further ten people were wounded, including a dual US/Mexican national.
The Egyptian government was quick to admit that it had conducted the attack and described it as an accident. The Egyptian authorities stated that a military force in the area was pursuing militants when they came across the convoy, misidentified it as a militant band and fired upon it.
The Egyptian government has also stated that the tourists were operating in a restricted military zone. The official position has been disputed by the tour operator who has claimed that not only did they have the requisite police permit to operate in the area but they also had a police escort.
The incident serves to underscore the elevated risk of operating in Egypt's western desert area. The region has been affected by a number of mass casualty attacks since 2014. On the 19^th of July 2014, assailants attacked the El-Farafrah border security post in the New Valley governorate, killing 22 people and wounding four others. The attack was claimed by Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis. On the 31^st of May 2014, six soldiers were killed by gunmen in the 'al-Wahat' area. Since these attacks the military has been on a heightened state of alert in the western desert of the country.
Despite these incidents and the increasing risk, tourists have continued to visit the area. The local police have acted to guide local tour groups and provide some security but the risk has not been fully mitigated. Indeed, the ability of the government to safeguard tourists will continue to be undermined due to the ongoing instability in Libya and the growing insecurity in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula and Nile-centred towns.
The recent accident will also serve to further erode confidence in the ability of the authorities to safeguard tourists. The incident is a major embarrassment for the government which is seeking to eliminate militants in the country and present a façade to its domestic and international audience that it is in control and that Egypt is a safe place to visit.

Discrimination - One view, there are others.

In South Africa's constitution (Bill of Rights, Chapter 2) it reads "Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair." (http://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/chapter-2-bill-rights).

This illogical line poses one of the greatest risks to South Africa's future. When it was written there was certainly no doubt that it was included in order to ensure that the wrong's of the past could be corrected in some way. While the motive may have been pure it lacked long term wisdom. One of the key fruits of this provision has been BEE and its newest manifestation BBBEE. The fundamental principle of these policies remains sound and the majority of South Africans support attempts to redress the past and to ensure that all South Africans, young and old, enjoy freedom, education, work, basic necessities of life and the right to vote for your representatives. The policies do, however, serve a divisive purpose and there is a section of the population that remains uncertain as to the true objective of the policies.

Indeed, opposition groups have argued that both BEE and BBBEE are tools for the ruling party to secure the position of a small group of rich entrepreneurs. Certainly, the risk of a small group of rich black businessmen is undisputed. While this is great, for them, the actual goal has failed with the white minority still dominating business and owning a disproportionate amount of capital.

The youth are also at pains to understand these policies. Non-black persons born in the 1980s and 1990s and 2000s should view the legislation as wholly unfair. Access to jobs is difficult and they cannot compete with their black fellows on an equal footing. Merit serves a decreasing purpose.

The legislation also does not make provision for black persons who have benefited greatly since the end of Apartheid. The growing black middle class has grown phenomenally. Yet, legislation still favours people who are already 'on track' economically. These same people can benefit from legislation that aims to redress past imbalances.

Finally, for any major policy of redress there should surely be an end point? Some sort of time period? Perhaps a point when all is balanced or most previously disadvantaged have been given access to opportunity? Sadly, there is not. There is no hint at it. In fact, the number of people classed as disadvantaged is growing. And yet it is not the policies of Apartheid that are leading this downward trend. It is the very party which is ruling the country. Parastatals are under severe strain, corruption is at an all time high, ghost state workers number in the thousands, the economy is tanking/has tanked and yet somehow we are still managing to grip to the idea that white capital / business needs reform and if we do that all the ills will be solved. This argument falls off of an overused and obvious political template by the government against the DA run Western Cape. The DA does not care about the poor, they say. The DA's service delivery record is poor they say. Yet, the DA province is one of the best run in the country. Stats SA will back up this narrative with reference to jobs creation alone. So what are we to make of all of this? The proof, I suppose, will be in the pudding. 

How safe is Egypt?

I recently completed a piece for the red24 Blog on Egypt and I asked the question, how safe is it? Thousands of tourists enter the country each year and they are, generally, blissfully unaware of the security risks of doing so. To access the piece, follow this link https://opinion.red24.com/2015/08/23/how-safe-is-egypt

Turkey - Spiking levels of violence threaten to escalate to conflict

A spate of low-level shootings and bombings in south eastern Turkey has raised concerns of a return to a full scale conflict between the Kurdistan Workers'Party (PKK) and the Turkish state. The increasing frequency of attacks, which have included assassinations, conventional and suicide bombings and shootings targeting police and military facilities and personnel, started in the days after a major suicide bombing in Suruc. A suspected suicide bomber targeted a group of pro-Kurdish volunteers in the town leaving 32 people dead. The political opposition was quick to condemn the attack but, in an effort to gain some political capital, also blamed Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party (AKP)–led government for not doing enough to prevent the attack. The PKK went one step further and linked the government to the IS attack, claiming that the Turkish security forces were complicit in the attack.

Since 24 July, the Turkish government has gone on the offensive against both groupings. It has banned a number of protests in major cities and launched airstrikes against PKK targets in south eastern Turkey and northern Iraq killing dozens of PKK fighters. Turkey has also taken the decision to allow a US-led coalition access to the Incirlik air base to fly manned missions against IS in Syria. There are also plans to create a small buffer zone in northern Syria.

This significant about face did not, however, develop overnight. The US and its NATO partners (Turkey is also a member of NATO) have long sought a greater Turkish role in the Syrian conflict. Pressure from the US must've been significant in recent weeks as manned missions launched from other bases in the region against IS have been hampered by the great travel distances. The rapid breakdown in the relationship between the PKK and the Turkish government has also deteriorated significantly in recent months following several accusations that the Turkish military was deploying additional military forces to Kurd regions in the south east. In early July, the Kurd umbrella group, the Union of Kurdistan Communities (KCK), which includes the PKK, announced that the unilateral ceasefire was over in response to these "violations."

The Suruc bombing then was the final straw that broke the camel's back. Already under severe strain due its failure to secure a ruling majority in the recent 7 June elections or to create a viable ruling coalition, the AKP government went on the offensive. The government launched airstrikes and deployed its military in greater numbers to the Syrian border and restive Turkish south east. Turkey's western partners are likely to be severely uneasy with the assault on the PKK; however, given Turkey's critical role in the fight against IS, they are unlikely to raise too much in the way of protest.

The escalating violence in the south east is likely to continue. PKK and suspected PKK attacks between 22 July and 2 August have affected multiple southern provinces between Adana and Van raising the ire of the government, which is likely to respond in kind. The ceasefire, agreed to in 2013, has failed and a new period of negotiation will be required to end the fighting. However, no such talks are currently planned and are unlikely until the AKP secures a ruling coalition or announces a new national election (and then emerges in a position to create a new AKP-dominated government).

PKK forces in northern Iraq are also coming under severe strain. The Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is placing pressure on the PKK to leave the territory out of concern that the Turkish air strikes may cause an increasing number of casualties among the local Iraqi Kurd population. This is a change from previous periods when the KRG may have sought to remain neutral. Times have changed and the KRG's ties with the Turkish government have improved as it has, quite rightly, made the assessment that if it wishes to pursue statehood it will require Turkey's buy-in. Should PKK forces be forced out of Iraq, the potential of internecine Kurd violence in Iraq will increase as will PKK clashes with the Turkish military forces in south eastern Turkey. At a minimum, violence will escalate in the coming weeks and may then decrease if the AKP comes to power or escalate if no political solution is found between political groupings in Turkey regarding a ruling coalition or if no solution is found between the government and the PKK.

Syria at War - An update

The Syrian civil war is entering its fifth year and there remain no positive signs of an impending end to the conflict. Over 200,000 people have been killed, thousands more wounded and approximately 4 million people have been displaced by the conflict, that has touched every part of the country. The battle ground remains divided between multiple groupings.

The Islamic State dominates much of the eastern half of Syria; however, the Kurd YPG and some regime forces maintain control of territory along the Turkish border and, critically, in the cities of Al Hasakah and Deir Ez Zor.

In northern Syria, the battle for Aleppo city has become the key front in 2015. Nearly all rebel fighting groups, including the Islamic Front and Jabhat al Nusra, and regime-allied forces are present in or near this city. A decisive battle for control of Aleppo is unlikely in 2015 and even if one of the groups does rise to prominence, Islamic State forces, arrayed in the Aleppo countryside are unlikely to hold back any offensive against the city's defenders, be they rebel or regime.

The countryside between Aleppo west and Latakia east is largely dominated by rebel forces, including the aforementioned Islamist militant groupings and the Free Syrian Army. Kurd YPG forces are also based in an enclave near the Turkey border.

This area remains the beating heart of rebel resistance in the north. Depending on the support rebels receive from abroad, the rebels here may strike west into regime heartland territory in Latakia or Tartus or south into Hama. Islamic State forces located north of Aleppo city and possible regime counter-attacks will serve to stymie any major moves, should they occur.

The capital remains firmly in the grip of the regime; however, rebel and militant positions in Douma and East Ghouta mean that the regime maintains a heavy deployment of forces to this key political territory. Losing Damascus is not an option if the Assad regime wishes to survive and Hezbollah wants to exist as a viable militia, given its military resources are channelled through this area from its Iranian sponsors.

In the south, rebels under the command of the Southern Front (SF) and linked to Jordanian and US forces in Jordan, have carried out a series of offensives in 2015 and have captured most of Quneitra governorate and nearly all of Daraa governorate. A key battle for control of Daraa city is currently being fought. Should Daraa city fall the regime will open itself to raids into its core, the Damascus governorate. The Druze of As Suwayda governorate will also increasingly come into the gaze of the rebels in 2015 if Daraa falls and there are concerns of Islamic State incursions into As Suwayda from the north. Without the regime, the Druze will need to accept the rebel terms or, possibly, face a taxing war. Neutrality remains an unlikely future option.

2015 has, to date, proven to be yet another critical year in the Syrian conflict. The Islamic State rise has been phenomenal as has the emergence of a very strong Kurd force in the north. The regime is hanging on to an increasingly thin thread and losses to any of its outlying posts will serve to weaken it considerably and undermine its national prestige and any future bargaining position. Regional states appear to be prepared finally to support rebel groups but the support appears to be poorly directed at present and many questions remain regarding how rebel groupings, arrayed in numerous coalitions, will work together if or once their common enemy is removed.