Turkey - Spiking levels of violence threaten to escalate to conflict

A spate of low-level shootings and bombings in south eastern Turkey has raised concerns of a return to a full scale conflict between the Kurdistan Workers'Party (PKK) and the Turkish state. The increasing frequency of attacks, which have included assassinations, conventional and suicide bombings and shootings targeting police and military facilities and personnel, started in the days after a major suicide bombing in Suruc. A suspected suicide bomber targeted a group of pro-Kurdish volunteers in the town leaving 32 people dead. The political opposition was quick to condemn the attack but, in an effort to gain some political capital, also blamed Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party (AKP)–led government for not doing enough to prevent the attack. The PKK went one step further and linked the government to the IS attack, claiming that the Turkish security forces were complicit in the attack.

Since 24 July, the Turkish government has gone on the offensive against both groupings. It has banned a number of protests in major cities and launched airstrikes against PKK targets in south eastern Turkey and northern Iraq killing dozens of PKK fighters. Turkey has also taken the decision to allow a US-led coalition access to the Incirlik air base to fly manned missions against IS in Syria. There are also plans to create a small buffer zone in northern Syria.

This significant about face did not, however, develop overnight. The US and its NATO partners (Turkey is also a member of NATO) have long sought a greater Turkish role in the Syrian conflict. Pressure from the US must've been significant in recent weeks as manned missions launched from other bases in the region against IS have been hampered by the great travel distances. The rapid breakdown in the relationship between the PKK and the Turkish government has also deteriorated significantly in recent months following several accusations that the Turkish military was deploying additional military forces to Kurd regions in the south east. In early July, the Kurd umbrella group, the Union of Kurdistan Communities (KCK), which includes the PKK, announced that the unilateral ceasefire was over in response to these "violations."

The Suruc bombing then was the final straw that broke the camel's back. Already under severe strain due its failure to secure a ruling majority in the recent 7 June elections or to create a viable ruling coalition, the AKP government went on the offensive. The government launched airstrikes and deployed its military in greater numbers to the Syrian border and restive Turkish south east. Turkey's western partners are likely to be severely uneasy with the assault on the PKK; however, given Turkey's critical role in the fight against IS, they are unlikely to raise too much in the way of protest.

The escalating violence in the south east is likely to continue. PKK and suspected PKK attacks between 22 July and 2 August have affected multiple southern provinces between Adana and Van raising the ire of the government, which is likely to respond in kind. The ceasefire, agreed to in 2013, has failed and a new period of negotiation will be required to end the fighting. However, no such talks are currently planned and are unlikely until the AKP secures a ruling coalition or announces a new national election (and then emerges in a position to create a new AKP-dominated government).

PKK forces in northern Iraq are also coming under severe strain. The Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is placing pressure on the PKK to leave the territory out of concern that the Turkish air strikes may cause an increasing number of casualties among the local Iraqi Kurd population. This is a change from previous periods when the KRG may have sought to remain neutral. Times have changed and the KRG's ties with the Turkish government have improved as it has, quite rightly, made the assessment that if it wishes to pursue statehood it will require Turkey's buy-in. Should PKK forces be forced out of Iraq, the potential of internecine Kurd violence in Iraq will increase as will PKK clashes with the Turkish military forces in south eastern Turkey. At a minimum, violence will escalate in the coming weeks and may then decrease if the AKP comes to power or escalate if no political solution is found between political groupings in Turkey regarding a ruling coalition or if no solution is found between the government and the PKK.

Syria at War - An update

The Syrian civil war is entering its fifth year and there remain no positive signs of an impending end to the conflict. Over 200,000 people have been killed, thousands more wounded and approximately 4 million people have been displaced by the conflict, that has touched every part of the country. The battle ground remains divided between multiple groupings.

The Islamic State dominates much of the eastern half of Syria; however, the Kurd YPG and some regime forces maintain control of territory along the Turkish border and, critically, in the cities of Al Hasakah and Deir Ez Zor.

In northern Syria, the battle for Aleppo city has become the key front in 2015. Nearly all rebel fighting groups, including the Islamic Front and Jabhat al Nusra, and regime-allied forces are present in or near this city. A decisive battle for control of Aleppo is unlikely in 2015 and even if one of the groups does rise to prominence, Islamic State forces, arrayed in the Aleppo countryside are unlikely to hold back any offensive against the city's defenders, be they rebel or regime.

The countryside between Aleppo west and Latakia east is largely dominated by rebel forces, including the aforementioned Islamist militant groupings and the Free Syrian Army. Kurd YPG forces are also based in an enclave near the Turkey border.

This area remains the beating heart of rebel resistance in the north. Depending on the support rebels receive from abroad, the rebels here may strike west into regime heartland territory in Latakia or Tartus or south into Hama. Islamic State forces located north of Aleppo city and possible regime counter-attacks will serve to stymie any major moves, should they occur.

The capital remains firmly in the grip of the regime; however, rebel and militant positions in Douma and East Ghouta mean that the regime maintains a heavy deployment of forces to this key political territory. Losing Damascus is not an option if the Assad regime wishes to survive and Hezbollah wants to exist as a viable militia, given its military resources are channelled through this area from its Iranian sponsors.

In the south, rebels under the command of the Southern Front (SF) and linked to Jordanian and US forces in Jordan, have carried out a series of offensives in 2015 and have captured most of Quneitra governorate and nearly all of Daraa governorate. A key battle for control of Daraa city is currently being fought. Should Daraa city fall the regime will open itself to raids into its core, the Damascus governorate. The Druze of As Suwayda governorate will also increasingly come into the gaze of the rebels in 2015 if Daraa falls and there are concerns of Islamic State incursions into As Suwayda from the north. Without the regime, the Druze will need to accept the rebel terms or, possibly, face a taxing war. Neutrality remains an unlikely future option.

2015 has, to date, proven to be yet another critical year in the Syrian conflict. The Islamic State rise has been phenomenal as has the emergence of a very strong Kurd force in the north. The regime is hanging on to an increasingly thin thread and losses to any of its outlying posts will serve to weaken it considerably and undermine its national prestige and any future bargaining position. Regional states appear to be prepared finally to support rebel groups but the support appears to be poorly directed at present and many questions remain regarding how rebel groupings, arrayed in numerous coalitions, will work together if or once their common enemy is removed.

In Sinai, Egypt Faces Tough Task to Counter Instability

Egypt's Sinai Peninsula is increasingly being affected by high levels of conflict and instability, which has left hundreds of people dead and thousands more wounded since 2011.

Read more here --> http://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/05/sinai-egypt-isis-al-qaeda/ 

For Saudi Arabia, Security Challenges Mount at Home and Abroad

A suicide bomber struck the Shiite Imam Ali mosque in eastern Saudi Arabia's al-Qadeeh village during Friday prayers on May 22, leaving 22 people dead and dozens more wounded. The bombing, claimed by the so-called Islamic State (ISIS), was the most significant attack in the country in years and revived memories of the mass casualty attacks—mainly targeting foreigners—of the 1990s and early 2000s. While recent international attention has focused on Saudi Arabia's more expansive foreign policy, the incident highlighted an increasing climate of instability within the kingdom's borders.

Read the rest here -> http://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/06/saudi-arabia-isis-yemen-bahrain/

War

Islam wants to kill itself. No. Humans want to kill themselves. The Middle East and North Africa are full of them...humans. No different from the west, the south, the east. What does it matter if the way that death is sped up is through obesity or conflict or cancer or drugs. The quickening pace to eternity, if you believe it, appears to be a common condition. The great tragedy is made up of two parts. One, the human that wishes death for some unknown or known reason and, two, the human that wishes death on others. The second is a common trait among one group of humans in the Middle East. The black flag. How does one seek to relate to these people. How does one convince them that liberalism is the true path. One cannot, because it is not. Perhaps a third tragedy. Spending one's life time attempting to understand number two.

The Saudis, Iran, Yemen and a bad case of worst case thinking

The current spasm of conflict in Yemen has left close to 1,000 people dead, as of writing on 22 April. The fighting involves three groups, broadly, including two primary fighting groups. On the one side is a coalition of 13 nations, which are either directly or indirectly involved in the fighting, which are led by Saudi Arabia and who are battling in support of President Hadi, the legitimate leader of the Yemeni state. On the other side are a militia group, the Houthis, who are Shiite Muslim and who are supported by a number of Yemeni military sectors, including those linked to the former president, Ali Saleh. The Houthis are also, allegedly, supported and supplied by Iran, Saudi Arabia's regional rival. The third group, which both sides are opposed to, are the Islamist extremists, notably, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the recently formed Islamic State (IS) branch in Yemen.

The fighting is currently based on four broad fronts. In the north, is a low-level tit-for-tat cross border skirmish between the Saudis and Houthis. In the south, pro-Hadi forces, including southern separatists, are participating in a ground conflict in Aden and a number of other nearby cities against the pro-Houthi force. Further east, AQAP, pro-Hadi and pro-Houthi forces are battling in multiple areas while, finally, the Saudi's and their Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) allies, are conducting an air war against the Houthi and pro-Saleh forces in cities across the country, including the capital, Sanaa.

On the Saudis side, their involvement stems from a March request from the Hadi administration to intervene in Yemen after the Houthis launched an offensive towards Aden. Aden, of course, was the city Hadi fled to when the Houthis accelerated their agitation (ongoing since September) in the capital. The Houthis, for their part, are convinced that the Hadi administration is corrupt, overly influenced by Saudi Arabia and the West and is a slight on the 2011 revolution, which ousted Saleh. The oft cited example of regional autonomy has also been regularly presented as a motivating factor. Following the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) process, which ended in January 2014, the Houthis were angered when one of the proposals was for the creation of new regions which, effectively, split their territory in the north. This NDC proposal precipitated a wave of Houthi assaults towards the capital that culminated in their capture of Sanaa in September 2014. The support of Iran, a fellow Shiite entity, has also been presented as a possible motivating factor for the Houthis somewhat aggressive stance, since 2012.

The end game scenario of the current altercation is unclear; however, all indications are that an extensive ground war may be in the pipeline. Numerous Saudi allied states have promised troops for any eventual Saudi invasion while the Saudis, in the meantime, have deployed half of their regular military force to the Yemen border and mobilised their National Guard. This, in and of itself, should be enough to give the game away and/or hint at a possible next step in this developing crisis.

The disposition of forces in Yemen is also noteworthy. The Saudi-backed coalition is predominantly Sunni while the Houthis are Shiite and appear to be supported by Iran, the primary Shiite power in the region. Saudi Arabia, supported by the West, has a set number of goals. It wants to stabilise the region, prevent Iran from gaining influence in countries bordering it and ensure that survival of the ruling Al-Saud dynasty. To do so, it has supported Sunni states and groupings across the Middle East, including in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, Egypt and Libya. It is no surprise that in three of these areas, Iran has appeared as a backer of the Saudis preferred choice. Yemen, now, stands out as yet another proxy field from which the great geopolitical competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran will play out. This has led, inexorably, to many to conclude that Yemen is yet another step towards that cataclysmic sectarian war we have been fearing for so long and, quite possibly, the actual trigger that leads the region to this ultimate battle. I, for one, can find no reason not to hold a similar position and, it must be said, seem to currently have a bad case of worst case thinking. I hope I am wrong.

Yemen's sorrow

The initiation of air strikes by Saudi Arabia and a number of its regional allies on 26 March added further distress to an already unstable country. The air strikes, which have been wide ranging and have impacted on cities across the country, have targeted members of the Shiite Muslim Houthi militia and military forces loyal to former President Ali Saleh and his son, who is also leader of the Republican Guard, Ahmed Saleh.

The air attacks followed a period of Houthi ascension in the state leading back to September when its fighters entered Sanaa and essentially assumed control of the government. The Houthi measures were largely in response to plans by the regime, led by President Hadi, to undermine Houthi controlled territory in the north through the creation of new region. Following its September victory the Houthis moved further south, east and west and took control of several governorates. Opposed to the group, Sunni tribes in Taiz, Ibb and Al-Baida, supported by militants aligned to Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, initially resisted the Houthi advance in a series of bloody battles.

In 2015, Hadi, who by now was in a position of severe weakness first resigned and then later rescinded his resignation and fled to Aden, declaring it the new capital. The declaration was rejected by the Houthis who initiated an offensive southwards towards the port city in March. Following a request by the Yemen foreign minister, the Saudis and a coalition of regional states, launched strikes against the Houthis. Battles between Sunni tribes, military units and local militias loyal to Hadi and forces aligned to the Houthis, including pro-Saleh forces, have also punctuated the conflict, most notably in Aden. Taking advantage of this, and adding further flame to the fire, Islamist extremists in Hadramawt have sought to seize control of territory, including areas near the regional capital, Mukalla.

The end game remains unclear. A Saudi-led ground intervention remains a possible short-term outcome; however, acquiring the requisite resources to manage a successful invasion will take time. The Saudis are likely to seek to continue to diminish the Houthi camps area of operation and impose a blockade on the country, thus preventing arms supplies from reaching the Shiite militia. This will likely be a first step in forcing the Houthis to withdraw to their northern Saada strongholds and to accept a negotiated settlement that is agreeable to the Sunni Arab states, Hadi and the Sunni tribes. The Houthis are likely to seek to circumvent the blockade, adapt to their air asset inferiority and stoke unrest in areas controlled by its rivals.

What is clear is that Yemen's political system is all but shattered and conflict is likely to remain a common long term feature of the country's security environment.