Can UN-led Talks Bring Together a Fractured Libya?

I recently wrote a piece for the Global Observatory. Check it out here.

http://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/01/un-talks-fractured-libya-dialogue/

Hezbollah and Israel - Winds of War?

Hezbollah knocked out an Israeli military vehicle in the disputed Shebaa Farms area earlier today. Lebanese media have stated that four Israeli soldiers were killed in the assault while Israeli media have reported seven wounded. The incident is the latest in a number of cross border attacks sparked by the 18 January Israeli drone strike against a Hezbollah/IRGC convoy in southern Syria which killed a number of Hezbollah operatives and a senior IRGC official. The fall out of the attack has been significant with senior members of both parties calling for retaliatory attacks.

Tensions are, without doubt, elevated; however, there are certain issues which mitigate against the likelihood of a wider confrontation at present. Hezbollah are battling Sunni rebels in Syria on the side of the Syrian regime and Israel is preparing for a national election in March. Both sides are keen to avoid a full confrontation but are aware that not responding will lead them to lose prestige and, importantly, legitimacy among their respective constituencies. At present the confrontations have occurred in disputed territories and not been sustained. Should fighting persist and casualty numbers continue to rise both sides may assess that an escalation is required. If they do, we will begin to see troop movements in southern Lebanon as Hezbollah deploy or redeploy forces and a partial or full mobilisation of reserves in Israel. 

Over the longer term a conflict between Israel and Hezbollah seems almost certain given the lack of dialogue between the two and their polar opposite ideological positions. In terms of assessing when this could occur, the best guess is that it may happen after the March elections when the new prime minister would have a fresh mandate. For Hezbollah, they'd want to neutralise the Sunni Jihadist threat in the Bekaa governorate and obtain the green light from Iran and Syria to withdraw forces from Syria before it would look south towards its traditional enemy.

Anarchy and Yemen

A high ranking official was abducted by the Shiite Houthi rebel group in Sanaa on 17 January. The presidential aide's capture sparked a severe response by President Hadi who ordered loyalist troops to deploy in the city. The action sparked clashes between these troops and the Houthis on 19 January. A ceasefire was later agreed to; however, on 20 January, Hadi's residence was attacked by Houthis and the Presidential Palace, where a significant amount of arms is located, was looted and taken by the Shiite rebels.

The abduction of the aide was likely an attempt by the Houthis to undermine attempts by the regime to push through a constitution which would cement a six region Yemen. The Houthis are opposed to this federal measure and have proposed greater local control in the north. The Houthis appear disinterested in taking full control of the country and are well aware of their limitations. That said, they have a significant presence in the centre and north of the country and currently control as many as nine governorates.

The Houthi end game is unclear. It is likely that they will continue to move to block political reforms that would undermine their current dominant position. Indeed, given their strength it seems odd that Hadi would attempt to push through changes to the constitution that would frustrate the Houthis. The military, the part which is loyal to Hadi, is weak and divided. In addition, the hand of former President Ali Saleh is clear. Republican Guard units, led by Ahmed Saleh, Ali Saleh's son, were involved in the clashes on 19 January on the side of the Houthis. Ali Saleh may be positioning himself for a return, possibly in some sort of ruling council should Hadi be deposed.

Elsewhere, the uncertainty in Sanaa will benefit southern seperatists. Any weakening of the central government will raise their stock considerably and boost demands for greater local autonomy. Should a Houthi/Saleh alliance emerge, they would seek to secure the north and ally with elements of the Southern Movement. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula will also view developments favourably and will seek to make gains, much like they did during the Arab Spring when the regime's focus was on securing main urban centres. The one critical problem for the group is that all other groupings oppose them. Local states are also deeply opposed to AQAP. This state of affairs will limit the group's ability to capture and hold territory larger than a secondary governorate in the south or south east of the country.

Where to now for the Islamic State?

The Islamic State leadership must be scratching their collective heads. How could the momentum achieved through a blitzkrieg-like march in June and July of 2013 have been so severely dented?

Since their June campaign and rout of the northern Iraq military divisions and its rivals in north eastern Syria, IS has made few strategic gains against its opponents. In northern Iraq, an ill-considered offensive into Kurd territory in August opened a fresh front against the group in what may well be a turning point in its longer term fortunes. Up until IS fired the first shot, the Kurds were more than content with waiting for IS to make a move. They had retaken disputed territory and where in position to defend it. To make matters worse for IS, their Kurd adventure sparked Western reaction and the US initiated air strikes against the group to halt its march on Arbil, the capital of the Kurd autonomous region in the north. Since then, the air war has expanded and now includes numerous western and, crucially, Sunni Arab regional states. The involvement of the latter has given some legitimacy to the foreign action and dulled the expected regional condemnation of another Western-led battle in Arab territory.

In Syria, the town of Kobane, largely unknown up until recently, has become a widely known symbol of resistance against IS aggression. Outbumbered and outgunned, local Kurd fighters initially stalled an IS advance in the town before Kurd volunteers from Turkey and Iraq poured in to bolster the defences and push back IS. Again, foreign air strikes proved the difference as IS armoured and artillery units were forced to withdraw from the arena, mirroring similar reaction across Iraq and Syria in recent months. In Deir ez Zor, the capital of the namesake governorate, IS has also struggled to remove the last vestiges of the Syrian regime. Stern resistance has been put up by elite Republican guard forces. Together with Kobane, hundreds of IS fighters have been killed and many more wounded in a series of assaults in these two locations.

So where to from here? IS have expanded as far as they can go, it seems. Their early success rested on a platform which had been created since 2012 following the withdrawal of the US forces. Mosul was its focus and it was in this city where it slowly eroded the capability of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). This effect, together with the mismanagement and poor training and discipline of the Iraqi army and some local support from Sunni tribes provided the base for its almost supernatural early advances. Since then the ISF have begun to reorganise and have received additional support from thousands of Shiite militiamen in the south, Iranian military forces and Western advisers. The IS advance south from Mosul in June and July also met stiff resistance from more hardy ISF forces, which remain largely intact. In Iraq, at least, a stale mate has developed where neither force has the capability to make major gains against the other. Where gains are made, such as in Baiji recently, these have proven difficult to maintain and have been swiftly overturned. The sense is, however, that with international backing and increasing number of men and material that the ISF and its new allies, the Kurds, have the upper hand and, barring any further massive blunders, are likely to slowly turn the tide against IS in Iraq. The process will be lengthy though and is unlikely to end in 2015.

In Syria, IS are in a marginally better position. For the most part, Raqqa, Deir ez Zor, northern Aleppo and southern Al-Hasakah governorates are under their control. Yet how much of this is due to their opponents distraction with other conflicts is up for debate. The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and its allies are firmly set on eliminating rebels near the capital, containing them in Daraa and Quneitra in the far south and recapturing Aleppo. Indeed, a large proportion of its resources have been dedicated to the Aleppo front. Should fighting in Aleppo cease, either due to a ceasefire or SAA victory, the regime will likely seek to consolidate in Hama and Homs before moving against IS. Should they do so, there may be some complications as US-led air strikes are largely focused on IS areas; however, with both these strikes and the SAA attention shifted, IS may become increasingly isolated. It could also fracture as local tribes seek to re-orientate allegiances towards the stronger force.

For IS planners and its senior leadership the early successes have provided them with a platform; however, this platform is now largely one aimed at consolidation and defence. As it becomes focused on statehood it will find it difficult to maintain territory in the face of overwhelming opposition and battlefield deficiencies. It has no air force and it has no way to effectively repel US-led strikes. It is also outnumbered by its opponents and has no regional allies strong enough to prove the difference in the war. Normal actors would seek negotiation at this point; however, given its ideology and recent beheadings, murders, mass kidnappings and threats, talks are unlikely, at least not on an official level. There may be some understandings but at present momentum has shifted and while it may take some time, the sense is, is that the Islamic State is doomed to conflict for the remainder of its days.

Syria: The importance of Deir ez Zor

The little known eastern Syrian city of Deir ez Zor may seem unassuming and unimportant to the casual international observer when considering the current battles raging around Damascus, Baghdad and Kobane. However, it is this battle ground which is crucial to the outcome of the war in Syria and, possibly, Iraq.

In June 2014, Islamic State (IS) militants overran large parts of northern Iraq and north eastern Syria in a blitzkrieg that netted the group large swathes of territory, loot and new recruits. Its rebel opponents and local government forces were shattered as its fast paced battalions raced from city to city. The pace of the assault and the zeal of its fighting components led the majority of its enemies to withdraw to more secure areas.

In north eastern Syria, IS sought to advance along the breadth of the Euphrates River. It achieved 90% of its mission with the capture of numerous towns between Abu Kamal and its primary Syrian stronghold of Raqqa. Syrian army and Syrian rebel groups were defeated in a string of battles including at two prominent Syrian military facilities near Raqqa. With just a small garrison left in northern Hasakah governorate, Deir Ez Zor's importance to the regime, as it attempted to hold on to some influence in north eastern Syria, increased exponentially.

The Assad regime deployed significant resources to the last remaining regime positions in Deir Ez Zor near the military airport and parts of the city located on the western bank of the Euphrates. Indeed, the importance of the city was highlighted earlier, in September 2013, when it tasked a famed commander and regime insider, Brigadier General Issam Zahreddine, and the Syrian Arab Army's  (SAA) 104th Airborne Brigade of the Republican Guard, with the defence of the city.

Zahreddine, a Druze from Al-Suwayda, comes from a long background of support for the Baathist regime. His father was a one-time Syrian Minister of Defence and it is alleged that the commanders expertise led the Syrian opposition in 2012 to place a US$200,000 bounty on his head, second  in quantity only to Assad.

For Assad, holding Deir Ez Zor is non-negotiable. Control of all or parts of the city allows the regime to project power to its eastern half. Without it, any later battles would become significantly more costly in terms of men and resources as the government would then need to launch any eventual assault from Aleppo or Palmyra. The presence of the 104^th in the city also serves to distract IS forces from engaging SAA advance forces currently in Aleppo and Idlib governorate. This thorn in the IS side is, therefore, important to maintain and to build on if the regime has any hope in retaking the state of Syria as it was prior to 2011.

If IS manage to overrun Deir Ez Zor, they will still face challenges from local tribes and other rebels but the existential threat posed to them from their near-core will be removed. On 3 December, IS launched yet another offensive in Deir Ez Zor to capture the Military Airport from the regime. As of writing they have largely failed to infiltrate the heavily fortified facility and have, again, suffered huge losses. The offensive will not be the last as IS seek to succeed in what is, arguably, the defining battle of the current phase of the Syrian and Iraqi conflict.

Iraq conflict map update - 1 December

Conflict map update - 1 December