Wednesday, July 16, 2014
Wednesday, July 9, 2014
Israel pounds Gaza in response to Gaza fire
On 7 July, the Israeli military launched Operation Protective Edge against Palestinian militants in the Gaza Strip. The operation was initiated in response to repeated rocket, mortar and missile fire into southern Israel from the Gaza Strip since mid-June. The initial stages of the operation included multiple air and naval-based strikes against militant positions across the Palestinian enclave. The Israel Defence Force (IDF) has also deployed additional forces to the Gaza Strip border and mobilized thousands of reserves. These measures combined with statements from the prime minister's office indicate that Israel is preparing for ground operations in the Gaza Strip.
The initiation of the wide ranging Israeli offensive has led militants in the Gaza Strip, including the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigade of Hamas, the Al-Quds Brigade of Islamic Jihad, the al-Nassar Salah al-Din Brigades of the Popular Resistance Committees and the National Resistance Brigades of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine to increase rocket fire into southern Israel and to deploy its longer range rocket and missile fire. These longer range projectiles have the capacity to reach Haifa in the far north and have already struck targets near Tel Aviv, Hadera and Jerusalem. The fighting has left dozens of Palestinians dead and wounded while only a handful of Israelis have been wounded, the majority of whom are based near the immediate border between Gaza and Israel.
Friday, July 4, 2014
State creation where a state already exists: The rise of the Sunnis and the Kurds
The Iraqi conflict has provided groups from across
the political spectrum with new opportunities and challenges. The biggest
losers at present appear to the be Iraqi government, which has lost a large
proportion of its military resources and territory in northern and western Iraq,
and Shiite political parties, which up until a month ago, where preparing to
negotiate for a new prime minister to head a government which, despite its
problems, controlled most of the country. Iran to has seen its proxies in Iraq
fail to stem a growing Sunni militant offensive, which threatens it’s influence
over elements of the Iraqi polity. The biggest winners have undoubtedly been
Sunni Islamist militants, the northern Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and
the KRG’s international backers, including Israel. These groups have emerged
and have carved out new territories which have essentially led to the final
death knell to the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement between the UK, France and
Russia, which set the framework for the modern day, artificial state
boundaries.
The
Sunni militant’s deadly northern assault
On 29 June, the Islamic State (IS) declared a caliphate in northern Iraq and northern Syria. The caliphate declaration coincided with the group’s rapid offensive in northern Iraq (since 6 June), which led to its capture of the city of Mosul and territory as far south as the town of Tikrit (Saddam Hussein’s home town) while in Anbar governorate the group has solidified its control of a number of towns and cities, including Fallujah. This blitzkrieg in the north and west of Iraq has accompanied a similar control of territory in Syria where opposing militant groups, including the al-Qaeda (AQ)-aligned Al-Nusra Front (ANF), have withdrawn from territory in the Deir Ez Zor governorate, essentially handing IS control of the Euphrates River from Ar Raqqah city in Syria to the Iraq government-controlled city of Haditha in Anbar.
The IS has its challenges in maintaining its control of its new ‘Islamic state’. The “Sunni Revolution”, as it is being called by some Iraqis, is not a movement led by a single party and there are numerous Sunni tribes, militant groups and former Baathists that all have a stake in the Sunni regions of Iraq and Syria. Indeed, while some groups have declared allegiance (bayat) to IS and its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, such as the ANF command in Al-Bukamal, Syria, many have wholly rejected the caliphate declaration, including the powerful Islamic Front in Syria. In Iraq, other Sunni, Sufi and Baathist groups have remained largely silent to date; however, groupings such as the Sufi militant Naqshabandi Army, led by Hussein-era commander, Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, are unlikely to accept IS leadership of the anti-government insurgency. Meanwhile, the Kurds, positioned in north western Iraq have maintained a close observance of the fighting in Sunni areas of northern Iraq but have considered, rightly so, that encroaching into IS territory would not suit their long-term goals, which are, essentially, the creation of a Kurd state in Kurdish majority areas of northern Iraq. After all, what allegiance could they owe to the central government that has blocked budget allocations and KRG attempts to sell oil extracted in its region?
On 29 June, the Islamic State (IS) declared a caliphate in northern Iraq and northern Syria. The caliphate declaration coincided with the group’s rapid offensive in northern Iraq (since 6 June), which led to its capture of the city of Mosul and territory as far south as the town of Tikrit (Saddam Hussein’s home town) while in Anbar governorate the group has solidified its control of a number of towns and cities, including Fallujah. This blitzkrieg in the north and west of Iraq has accompanied a similar control of territory in Syria where opposing militant groups, including the al-Qaeda (AQ)-aligned Al-Nusra Front (ANF), have withdrawn from territory in the Deir Ez Zor governorate, essentially handing IS control of the Euphrates River from Ar Raqqah city in Syria to the Iraq government-controlled city of Haditha in Anbar.
The IS has its challenges in maintaining its control of its new ‘Islamic state’. The “Sunni Revolution”, as it is being called by some Iraqis, is not a movement led by a single party and there are numerous Sunni tribes, militant groups and former Baathists that all have a stake in the Sunni regions of Iraq and Syria. Indeed, while some groups have declared allegiance (bayat) to IS and its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, such as the ANF command in Al-Bukamal, Syria, many have wholly rejected the caliphate declaration, including the powerful Islamic Front in Syria. In Iraq, other Sunni, Sufi and Baathist groups have remained largely silent to date; however, groupings such as the Sufi militant Naqshabandi Army, led by Hussein-era commander, Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, are unlikely to accept IS leadership of the anti-government insurgency. Meanwhile, the Kurds, positioned in north western Iraq have maintained a close observance of the fighting in Sunni areas of northern Iraq but have considered, rightly so, that encroaching into IS territory would not suit their long-term goals, which are, essentially, the creation of a Kurd state in Kurdish majority areas of northern Iraq. After all, what allegiance could they owe to the central government that has blocked budget allocations and KRG attempts to sell oil extracted in its region?
The
Kurds slick move
Following the IS advance into northern Iraqi cities and towns, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) abandoned their positions in the north and deserted en masse towards the south and into the KRG. The routed ISF forces abandoned millions of dollars’ worth of equipment, which the IS and other militant groups have gratefully accepted. Of more worth than this equipment was the ISF abandonment of territory in the eastern parts of Ninewa, Kirkuk, Salah ad Din and Diyala governorates. This security vacuum was immediately occupied by Kurdish Peshmerga (military) forces which moved beyond the Green Line, established following the 1991 Gulf War, and into disputed territories.
Following the IS advance into northern Iraqi cities and towns, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) abandoned their positions in the north and deserted en masse towards the south and into the KRG. The routed ISF forces abandoned millions of dollars’ worth of equipment, which the IS and other militant groups have gratefully accepted. Of more worth than this equipment was the ISF abandonment of territory in the eastern parts of Ninewa, Kirkuk, Salah ad Din and Diyala governorates. This security vacuum was immediately occupied by Kurdish Peshmerga (military) forces which moved beyond the Green Line, established following the 1991 Gulf War, and into disputed territories.
As of writing the
Kurd Peshmerga are arrayed in positions from Sinjar near the Syrian border to
areas immediately east of Mosul, down towards Kirkuk and further south to
Khanaqin. These forces have met very little resistance and there are strong
indications that the Sunni militants are content to allow the KRG to pursue its
territory grab, knowing quite well that drawing the Kurds into the conflict
would undermine their goal of establishing a caliphate.
It is within this context that the KRG leadership
has acted decisively. President of the KRG, Massoud Barzani, has ordered preparations
to be made for a referendum on independence including
in areas which the KRG have just annexed while statements from Barzani and a
host of other Kurdish leaders are adamant in their rejection of demands by the
central government and local minority groups, including the Turkmen, that they
withdraw from newly acquired territory. The Kurdish Jerusalem, Kirkuk, which
lies atop one of the world’s largest oil deposits has been a rallying point for
Kurd nationalism and rhetoric of late and it is highly unlikely that the Kurds
will surrender the city.
Conclusion
Iraq was created following World War One by foreign powers that new little about the dynamics of the region. At the time, the rural and under-developed Shiite south was largely subsumed into the greater current day Iraq under the leadership of the relatively well-educated Sunni elite, who represented the minority Sunni population. The promised Kurd state in the 1920s also failed to materialize and the Kurd nation was split between Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Iran. This historical injustice is now on the cusp of being righted, but at what cost?
The Kurds have a long way to go to fully safeguard their new state. While Iran and Turkey appear, on the outside at least, to have accepted increasing Kurdish encroachment into northern Iraq and its referendum plans, a strong Kurd state is not, theoretically, in their best interest given Kurd agitation in their respective border territories. The Kurd relationship with Sunni tribes and militants in northern Iraq is also another long term test. Should the insurgency be defeated there is also an elevated risk of conflict between the central Iraq government and the Kurds over their control of disputed territory. Domestically, the Kurd polity appears unified but with increasing gains, the traditional powerhouses, the KDP (closely aligned to Turkey) and PUK (aligned to Iran), may increasingly come to disagreements over the distribution of resources and power. Within this context, upcoming groups, such as Gorran, may further complicate the domestic situation. Ultimately though, the sense is that the Kurd polity will remain unified, over the medium-term at least, as they head for their long strived for state. Internal challenges will be placed aside as they all seek to carve out a new state within a state.
Iraq was created following World War One by foreign powers that new little about the dynamics of the region. At the time, the rural and under-developed Shiite south was largely subsumed into the greater current day Iraq under the leadership of the relatively well-educated Sunni elite, who represented the minority Sunni population. The promised Kurd state in the 1920s also failed to materialize and the Kurd nation was split between Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Iran. This historical injustice is now on the cusp of being righted, but at what cost?
The Kurds have a long way to go to fully safeguard their new state. While Iran and Turkey appear, on the outside at least, to have accepted increasing Kurdish encroachment into northern Iraq and its referendum plans, a strong Kurd state is not, theoretically, in their best interest given Kurd agitation in their respective border territories. The Kurd relationship with Sunni tribes and militants in northern Iraq is also another long term test. Should the insurgency be defeated there is also an elevated risk of conflict between the central Iraq government and the Kurds over their control of disputed territory. Domestically, the Kurd polity appears unified but with increasing gains, the traditional powerhouses, the KDP (closely aligned to Turkey) and PUK (aligned to Iran), may increasingly come to disagreements over the distribution of resources and power. Within this context, upcoming groups, such as Gorran, may further complicate the domestic situation. Ultimately though, the sense is that the Kurd polity will remain unified, over the medium-term at least, as they head for their long strived for state. Internal challenges will be placed aside as they all seek to carve out a new state within a state.
Wednesday, July 2, 2014
The Islamic State
On 29 June, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) issued a statement indicating the formation of a new Islamic caliphate in Syria and Iraq under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The declaration also included references to its new name, the Islamic State (IS). The announcement by the group (https://ia902501.us.archive.org/2/items/hym3_22aw/english.pdf) is controversial as it is not expected to be accepted by the multiple opposing Sunni non-state armed groups in either Syria or Iraq. Already nine groups in Syria, including the Islamic Front, have come out in rejection of the declaration while Al-Nusra Front figures have also labelled the declaration as being un-Islamic. It is not clear why al-Baghdadi decided to declare the caliphate at this time; however, the group's recent victories in northern Iraq and its capture of vast quantities of Iraqi military hardware may go some way to understanding the group's current confidence and bravado.
IS has staged a remarkable comeback since 2011 when the group appeared to be on its last legs. The withdrawal of the US military from Iraq signalled the start of its resurgence as the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were largely unable, due to intelligence failures and lack of motivation, to combat the groups rise. Under al-Baghdadi, the group, then known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and later renamed ISIL, restructured and regrouped. Two successive year long offensive in 2012 to 2014 revitalised the group as it attacked and freed hundreds of hardened militants from Iraqi jails. The group also actively recruited from among the depressed Sunni youth and has become a beacon for foreign fighters aiming to establish an Islamist caliphate in the region. The year-long offensives also seriously eroded the Iraq military and police. These operations combined with growing Sunni resentment of the Shiite-dominated government created conditions wherein it could break out and take Fallujah in January 2014 and Mosul on 10 June.
The group has been the focus of counter-terrorism debate, within and outside of Iraq. Also known as "Daash" by Iraqis, it has borne the brunt of the political rhetoric emanating from the government. Yet, the group is not the only armed group operating in the country. Indeed, there are multiple groups, including Sunni and Sufi Islamist extremists, Baathists and tribal militia, which have risen with IS over the past three years. Indeed, of late the elevated levels of violence in Iraq have been described by many locals as a Sunni Revolution and not a straightforward capture of territory by one armed group against another.
Thus, we come to the caliphate decision. No doubt the decision to declare a caliphate must have been one that had been on the table for a length of time and would, reasonably, have been made following a full consideration of what the side effects would be. Yet, the imposition of an Islamic state where none exists at present is not new. Indeed, the previous ISIL was, in essence, the creation of a set boundary wherein Islamic law was practiced and enforced. What makes the current declaration different is that they have called for near total allegiance from civilians and armed groups to al-Baghdadi without consultation from the primary fighting groups.
Perhaps IS have calculated that they are strong enough to counter the storm? Perhaps there victories in Iraq have filled the leaderships minds with misconceptions about their strength and capability? Perhaps the declaration is the start of an era of Islamic rule in the region. I think that this will be short lived. Iran, Turkey, Syria and Iraq will not allow a state like this to exist. It threatens them existentially. The US and Israel, the two powerhouses of the region, are also unlikely to allow the establishment of a radical government in Iraq and Syria. The IS's decision to form a state will also place them firmly within the targets of their rivals, particularly those groups that have declared loyalty to al-Qaeda, a group IS now seems to want to replace as the pinnacle Islamist militant group. IS will continue to grow and may succeed in holding territory but holding, administering services and ruling is another thing completely.
Thursday, June 26, 2014
Egypt's leaders through the ages an
Abdel Fattah Saeed Hussein Khalil el-Sisi became president of Egypt on 8 June. El-Sisi is the 20th ruler of Egypt since the establishment of the modern state of Egypt in the early 19th century. El-Sisi represents the military, which has dominated Egyptian politics since 1953. He is the quint essential 'strong man' leader. His accession has been manufactured by the military which is keen to maintain its grip on power through the suppression of Islamists and basic democratic expression.
The Muhammad Ali dynasty (1805)
Muhammad Ali Pasha al-Mas'ud ibn Agha (1805 – 1848). The founder of the modern state of Egypt. He was an Albanian Ottoman Empire commander who led a force to Egypt following the French withdrawal in 1801. From 1801 to 1805 he fought the Mamluks for control of Egypt, eventually emerging as the leader of Egypt and Sudan. His rule laid the base of the future, modern Egyptian state, separate from its Ottoman masters. His dynasty would continue into the 20th century. Died 1949 (natural causes).
Muhammad Ali's son, Ibrahim Pasha (1848). Died 1848 (natural causes).
Muhammad Ali's grandson, Abbas I (1848-1854). Died 1854 (Murdered by two of his slaves)
Muhammad Ali's son, Muhammad Sa'id Pasha (1854-1863). Died 1863.
Muhammad Ali's grandson, Isma'il Pasha (1863-1879). Following Urabi Revolt, UK and French pressure on the Ottoman Empire led to his removal. Died 1895.
Isma'il Pasha's son, Muhammed Tewfik Pasha (1879-1892). Died 1892 (Natural causes)
Great-great-grandson of Muhammad Ali and son of Tewfik Pasha, Abbas II Hilmi Bey (1892-1914). The last Khedive. Overthrown by the UK at start of onset of WW1. Died 1944 in Switzerland.
The end of the Ottoman influence (1914)
Great-great-grandson of Muhammad Ali and son of Isma'il Pasha, Sultan Hussein Kamel (1914-1917). Died 1917 (natural causes).
Younger brother of Sultan Hussein Kamel, Fuad I (1922-1936). Died 1936 (natural causes).
Son of Fuad 1, Farouk I of Egypt (1936-1952). The Free Officers, led by Muhammad Naguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser, staged a military coup that launched the Egyptian Revolution of 1952. Farouk 1 went into exile.
Fuad II – Took the thrown after his father abdicated but was one year old at the time. Royal council ruled in his stead until Egypt was declared a republic in 1953.
The rise of the Egyptian military (1953)
President Muhammad Naguib (1953-1954) – leader of Free Officers (military). Deposed by Gamal Abdel Nasser following disagreement. House arrest for 18 years before release by Sadat.
President Gamal Abdel Nasser Hussein (1956-1970) – leader of Free Officers (military). The most successful Egyptian president. Regional player – Arab Nationalist leader. Died 1970 (Heart attack).
President Anwar Sadat (1970-1981) – senior officer in the Free Officers (military). Assassinated 1981 by military officer, Khalid Ahmed Showky Al-Islambouli. Hailed by Islamist radicals.
Muhammad Hosni El Sayed Mubarak (1981-2011). Military officer. Overthrown during Arab Spring.
Mohamed Hussein Tantawi (2011-2012). Leader of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Interim leadership ahead of democratic elections. Stepped down following elections in 2012.
The Islamists (2012)
Mohamed Morsi (2012-2013). First Islamist president. Popularly elected. Overthrown in 2013 by the military. Currently incarcerated.
The return of the military (2014)
Adly Mahmoud Mansour (2013 – 2014). Installed by the military following the mid-2013 coup. Ceded power following elections in May 2014.
Abdel Fattah Saeed Hussein Khalil el-Sisi (2014 to present). Head of the military until his resignation prior to elections in May 2014. Won a disputed election
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