The renewed M23 assault in North Kivu, including Goma, in January is highly likely to escalate domestic and regional political tensions with tangible on-the-ground security and travel impacts over the short term. The Felix Tshisekedi-led DRC government will come under intense pressure from domestic opponents, increasing the likelihood of regime instability. Anti-Rwanda sentiment is also likely to increase over the coming months in the DRC, with resultant protest action likely to escalate nationwide. Regional tensions will almost certainly escalate; should mediation efforts fail, tensions between Kinshasa and Kigali could contribute to significant diplomatic strain and elevate the risk of regional instability.
Conflict in
eastern DRC is likely to escalate over the near term in response to the M23
assault on Goma. As of late January, FARDC and supporting international forces
(MONUSCO and SAMIDRC) have struggled to hold the well-equipped and Rwanda-backed
rebels at bay and have suffered a series of defeats and lost multiple towns,
including Minova and Sake. The likely outcome, at a minimum, is a significant
security vacuum in the eastern DRC in the coming months, which will allow
multiple armed groups operating in the region, including Mai-Mai militias, the
FDLR, and potentially the ADF, to intensify their activities while 'legitimate'
forces remain engaged in open warfare. The result will be further civilian
displacements (internal and external), disruptions of (mostly artisanal) mining
operations, and a significant economic impact on the region.
Tshisekedi's
government will come under intense scrutiny after the latest military failure.
Opponents will use this to criticize the government, its response, and its
policies. Anti-government demonstrations will likely increase in frequency
nationwide, particularly in Kinshasa and provincial capitals. Protests are also
likely to carry a strong anti-Rwandan sentiment. Tshisekedi and his supporters
could leverage anti-Rwandan sentiment to distract from the government's
failures in security in the east. The government may also be forced to deploy
additional forces and resources to eastern DRC after the M23 assault. The
likely outcome of the protests and potential security deployments will be a
weakening of the state in the west, increasing the potential for a violent
challenge against the regime. Tshisekedi was targeted in a short-lived coup
attempt in May 2024.
Regional
tensions are likely to escalate further, and while Kenyan-mediated talks are
planned between Rwandan leader Paul Kagame and Tshisekedi, it is likely that a
mediated long-term solution to the current crisis will not be forthcoming. Even
if a ceasefire and M23 withdrawal are negotiated, the long-term relationship
between the two sides will remain at the lowest point in years. Kinshasa cut
diplomatic ties with Kigali on Jan. 25. Further diplomatic tensions are likely,
potentially including travel bans, border closures, and reciprocal restrictions
on business activity, including transport. Should the violence escalate further
and the M23 fail to withdraw, leading to a likely deterioration in eastern DRC
more generally, Uganda and other nations neighboring DRC could be drawn into
the conflict. Refugee flows will likely increase into neighboring states,
straining already limited resources and forcing governments to act. Direct
military action or support for non-state armed actors in the DRC could increase.
The potential for border confrontations will increase, particularly between
Rwanda and the DRC. Minor confrontations in 2022 and 2023 at the border could
be replicated or escalated depending on the current round of fighting.
Regardless
of the outcome of the current series of battles, there are some anticipated
short-term impacts on businesses operating in the DRC. Any entity in the
eastern DRC will likely be forced to suspend operations (if they haven't
already). Heightened civil unrest is also likely to impact foreign business
operations. Suspensions of activities, disruptions of supply lines, and basic
amenities, particularly in conflict zones, are possible. Local staff employed
by foreign entities could be affected by protests and general acts of violence.
The national government will be further weakened – both politically and
militarily. In the worst-case scenario, should the government face significant
challenges (including a coup attempt or provincial dissent), changes to
policies regarding foreign interests may follow.
